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Technical notes 
 
For all books cited, I refer to the year the edition in use was published. If this does not 
coincide with the first publication of the book, the year of its first publication in its 
original language is used in the list of references. Note, though, that this does not apply to 
collections of essays, lecture manuscripts and the like which have been published 
posthumously.  
Heidegger 1988, 1992 and 2002 are manuscripts from three lecture courses Heidegger 
held in 1927, 1925 and 1919 respectively, and have no relevant first year of publication in 
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are used to elucidate and support the discussions in Being and Time, first published in 1927, 
and constitute what I sometimes refer to as Heidegger’s ‘early period’. (The essay ‘The 
Question Concerning Technology’, a lecture first given in 1953, and Heidegger 1969, 
which contains two manuscripts written in 1946 and 1955, constitute what I refer to as 
Heidegger’s ‘later period’. 
In two cases, I have made choices about references that justify a remark. For Heidegger 
1962, I refer to the relevant pages in both the edition in use and in the original German 
edition. For Kant 1929, I refer only to the page numbers in the A/B-editions, not the 
edition in use. 
On quotations: Only when an author is mentioned in the same sentence, but prior to a 
quote, is he or she left out of the reference. For all other cases there will be a reference to 
the author, even when the source of quote is unambiguous from the context. I have kept 
italics in all quotes where they were used. In a few instances, I have added italics to a 
quote; whenever I have done this, I have made a note of it in the text. 
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i n t r o d u c t i o n 
T E C H N O L O G Y ,  S E L F  A N D  A C T I O N  
 
 
 
 
 
A technological lifeworld 
It is hard to deny that technology permeates our lives, down to the smallest details. We 
wake up in the morning using an alarm clock, a clock radio or perhaps, if we are in a 
hotel, with a wake up call. We shower; using water that travels through kilometres and 
kilometres of pipes before and after it has been cleansed at a treatment plant. We eat 
breakfast; consummating food that has been cultivated and processed in all sorts of ways. 
We drive to work, or we bike, or we walk wearing more or less comfortable shoes. Does 
anyone have a job that is without technological enhancement or support? In 
communicating with friends, loved ones and colleagues, we read emails, send emails, and 
hardly ever telephone each other anymore; instead, we send an SMS. At some point 
during the day we take a painkiller (possibly because of a headache induced by too much 
coffee), and in the evenings we sit in front of the TV, the hi-fi or, more and more 
commonly, the computer. Before we go to bed at night, the last activities of our day are 
probably technologically supported: We brush our teeth, and set the alarm before we 
snuggle under our bedcovers and rest our heads on comfortable pillows. Everyday 
routines are technologically embedded. Escaping technology, on the other hand, means 
making an effort, going out of our way – if it is even at all possible. 
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The ways we relate to each other, the ways we communicate, have been technologically 
enhanced since before the alphabet evolved, when a system of tokens, in the form of 
small modified stones, assisted farmers and artisans in keeping track of their stock 
without the help of written lists. (Schmandt-Besserat 1996:7) These days, a great deal of 
communication is mediated by electronic and digital technologies, whether it is by us 
being online or always being available through our mobile phones. There seems to be a 
widespread opinion that electronic and digital technologies, more than previous forms of 
technology, and not just in communication, represent a somewhat new or different 
impact on humans. In fact, digital and electronic technologies have entered our lives to 
such an extent that Edward Tenner claims that the very concept of technology “appears to 
have become a synonym for electronic systems”. (2003:ix) The Internet, combined with 
technologies for compressing music and film files, is in this respect the prime example of 
the changes we are going through right now. Almost every day we hear of ‘pirates’ 
spreading a new album that has not yet been commercially released, or of a movie that is 
‘all over the Internet’ within hours after its release on DVD. The change in consumer 
habits is felt in other media as well; tabloid papers complain about falling circulation, and 
in February 2009, the long-established Norwegian encyclopaedia, Store Norske Leksikon, 
was compelled to go online free, which probably signifies the end to new printed editions. 
It is not all negative news, of course. For instance, the Internet provides access to all sorts 
of information that is readily available; the scholar can easily find and access research 
papers, and news of forthcoming conferences, seminars and lectures, spreads rapidly and 
broadly through e-mail lists and blogs. Distance education makes it possible for students 
(and the simply curious) to follow a syllabus from afar, perhaps even hear or see lectures 
that have been posted, or are streamed ‘live’. TV programs, both new and old, can be 
accessed online and seen a long time after they were first broadcast. Through Facebook, 
we are re-united with friends that we have not spoken to in years (although, in a few 
cases, we might have preferred it to stay that way). With the use of mobile technology we 
are ‘always’ available (not all positive, of course), and by communicating with SMS we 
carve out personal spaces where we can interact ‘silently’ in near real-time while being in 
public places, a phenomenon that has been dubbed telecocooning. (Habuchi 2005:181) The 
list goes on and on… There is an abundance of claims about the kinds of changes new 
information and communication technologies (ICT) have made, are making, and will 
continue to make in the ways we communicate; in our leisure life; in how we get to know, 
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digest and distribute information, and how these technologies challenge the monopoly of 
media owners (and give rise to new ones) in this process.1 
Such claims seem well supported. Apart from our own experiences of these recent 
technological developments, they are the subject of research in various fields, including 
sociology, anthropology, media studies and philosophy. A great many researchers are 
guided by empirical questions, such as: 
Does using the Internet change the amount of time people spend on the other activities 
they engage in? Does performing an activity online take time from comparable offline 
activities or from different ones? Does the use of mobile phones and online 
communication change people’s social resources – the number of people they 
communicate with, the type of social ties they start and maintain, and the quality of the 
relationships they have with other people? (Brynin and Kraut 2006:5) 
 
My concern in this thesis, however, is with different kinds of questions, namely 
philosophical questions that focus on what this so-called transformation means. I will not 
be asking whether it is true that society is being transformed by these new technologies – I 
take this to be undoubtedly correct in some sense or other (this across-the-board statement 
will be modified later). Neither will I map the extent of the transformation – this is 
continually being done by researchers, journalists and bloggers alike. Instead, I will be 
asking questions such as: What do we mean when we say that a kind of technology (ICT 
or another) changes society? What does such an impact, if it is to be reckoned with, tell us 
about the relationship of technologies to society? What does it tell us about the ways we, 
as humans, interact with technologies? And what does it tell us about us – can we 
understand the technologically related transformation of society to say something about 
ourselves and about the ways we relate to our social, cultural, biological and physical 
surroundings? Does it tell us anything about how we conduct and organize our lives? 
How we structure the world around us? And, finally, does it tell us something about 
technology as a phenomenon in itself? From this philosophical point of view, 
understanding the meaning of ICT’s social impact requires an investigation of what 
characterizes technology in general. 
                                              
1 “The term ‘information and communication technology’ dates from the mid-1980s and in particular from the 
British PICT initiative, a programme for looking at ICTs… One glossary from the programme leader’s summary of 
that work defined ICTs as ‘all kinds of electronic systems used for broadcasting, telecommunications and computer-
mediated communications’… [examples are] ‘personal computers, video games, interactive TV, cell phones, the 
Internet [and] electronic payments systems’… This combination of general definition and examples conveys a sense 
of what ICTs can include, without having to draw absolutely precise boundaries.” (Haddon 2004:1) As these 
examples illustrate, the expression ‘new media’ can also be, and is frequently used to denote ICTs (cf. Chapter 7). 
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The problems to be addressed 
A lot of questions, indeed; and to a certain degree I touch upon them all in the next 250 
or so pages. From this sea of questions, four research questions crystallize: 
1. The question that forms the point of departure for this thesis is the following: In what 
way does ICT contribute to communication and meaning construction? This question is, in fact, an 
adequate empirical question. Like all empirical questions, however, it presupposes a 
conceptual framework in which and from which it is asked and answered. Rather than 
pursuing this question in the direction it is pointing (that is, towards the way that 
particular technologies shape communication and meaning in particular historical 
contexts), I turn around, so to speak, to investigate the presuppositions and 
preconceptions that prompts such a question, and that goes into its empirical 
investigation. What interests me in this thesis, then, is the conceptual framework of the 
question of technology. So, in the bulk of this work, I will concern myself only indirectly 
with the first research question (although it is brought closer to the surface in Chapter 7). 
The main part of my work, therefore, will consist of a conceptual investigation the aim of 
which is to discuss the existing frameworks and to propose a new and more adequate one. 
My investigation will be guided by a general question, a specific question, and finally, a 
reflective question. 
2. The most general question to be dealt with is: Does technology have a philosophically interesting 
impact on society and us? Or, is the impact we talk about related to the needs and motives of 
those inventing, developing and using the technology? If the latter is the case, 
technologies are mere instruments. On the face of it, this seems to be a pretty good 
description and in line with much of our interactions with technology. I pick up a pen if I 
want to write something, I log onto the Internet if I think that I can find the answer to 
what that terrible rash on my right leg is, etc. Seemingly, the prime relation is between the 
world and me; technology only enters the picture if I need to manipulate the world 
somehow. In this view, which I call instrumentalism, technology is what we, personally and 
socially, define it to be.1 As early as in the next chapter in this preliminary part of the 
thesis, I provide good reasons to deem this view misleading. In doing so, the ground for 
the investigation into the concept of technology is cleared. 
                                              
1  As I discuss in Chapter 1, instrumentalism involves the view that the meaning of technology is socially 
governed/constructed. 
i n t r o d u c t i o n :  t e c h n o l o g y ,  s e l f  a n d  a c t i o n  7  
3. There is a danger in rejecting instrumentalism, namely of being accused of being the 
opposite, a technological determinist.1 Andrew Feenberg describes this position as claiming 
that “[t]echnological development transforms what it is to be human” (1999:2) because 
“technological advance has an automatic and unilinear character”. (Feenberg 1999:3) 
Determinism, also, is a less than plausible position, and the need to avoid it leads to a more 
specific question that needs to be addressed, namely: In what way does technology have an impact? 
This question forms the direction of the discussion in the three chapters that make up 
Part 1, and pursuing it entails spelling out the specifics of the technological impact, or, to 
put it differently, to formulate the concept of technology. 
4. Evidently, if technology is conceptualized to have an impact on society and on us, the 
more specific problem implies a reflective question: What does technological impact mean for our 
understanding of society and ourselves? This question (which entails an investigation of the self-
concept and of the relation of self and society) is the main focus for the investigation that 
constitutes Part 2. On the face of it, the two parts in this thesis seem unconnected, but I 
shall argue that the investigation in Part 2 is necessary for a full conceptualization of the 
concept of technology. What is gained by combining the two investigations of Parts 1 and 
2 is explained in the section below. 
The first research question problem presumes an affirmative answer to the general 
question, and is clarified by the investigation into the two more specific questions. In fact, 
the latter two investigations frame and give meaning to the first question, and with it, also 
empirical enquiries into the extent of ICT’s impact. 
Key theoretical concepts 
In the following, I present the central ideas that go into the elucidation of the problems. I 
also outline the main concepts and arguments, and, most importantly, I show the way in 
which the arguments that make up the investigations of Parts 1 and 2 interconnect. 
– The primacy of technological action – 
According to Roger Silverstone, the enthusiasm (and pessimism) following the change that 
new ICTs bring to society often seem exaggerated. The bulk of these changes are of 
quantity (pace and swiftness of exchanges, for instance) rather than quality, in the sense 
                                              
1 Or Heidegger’s specific brand of essentialism, which is close to but not identical to technological determinism (cf. 
Chapter 1). 
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that they continue rather than contrast with characteristics well known from non-
mediated and from earlier forms of mediated communication: 
The supposedly distinct characteristics of new media: digital convergence; many-to-many 
communication; interactivity; globalization; virtuality, are arguably, with the possible 
exception of the specifically technical, not new at all. Face-to-face communication is 
simultaneous and interactive and does not need a mouse. Globalization is prefigured in 
both cinematic and television culture. And any entry into electronic space has always 
presupposed and required a physical space as both its beginning and end point. Quantity, 
certainly, turns into quality in the matter of communication. This is true not just for the 
Internet but for all media networks. (Silverstone 1999:11) 
Silverstone takes this as a cue to broaden the scope, and be less focused on the 
technologies themselves. Although new ICTs undoubtedly have social consequences, it is 
through those using and communicating with the new technologies that this impact 
comes about. Accordingly, the potential consequences of new ICTs should be 
investigated by studying the technologies in use. “The new media, indeed, affect and 
involve us fully as social and political as well as economic beings… the bottom line is 
found in use, and in our capacity to mobilize their potential for social and political good.” 
(Silverstone 1999:12) In other words, the study of the technological impact on society 
coming from ICTs cannot be limited to the study of technologies, but needs to consider 
the entire use situation. Other writers underscore the same point: 
[T]here’s more to technology than technology. It’s human communication and what we do 
with our technology that really counts. What’s more, it’s all about the transformation of our 
patterns of social interaction – how we live and work through, with and around the 
technology. (Thurlow et al. 2004:2, my emphasis) 
 
Consequently, in investigating ICTs’ impact on society, we should look to technological 
actions, rather than to the technologies themselves. Undertaking communicative actions 
mediated by technologies also involves other factors than the technology: a) the users, 
with their personal competencies, motives and beliefs, and b) socio-cultural aspects, 
conventions for use, legal framework, ethics, peer pressure and so on. A technological 
action, therefore, is composed of several aspects, some of which pull the performance in 
differing directions. Focusing on the technologies in themselves (‘Internet drove Dagbladet 
into bankruptcy’, ‘WoW ruined my grades’) gives us not just a simplified picture of what 
is going on with the social changes we are living through. It potentially gives us a wrong 
impression of the causality behind the changes. Counter-measures against the perceived 
negative effects of new ICTs might therefore become misdirected. 
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However, redirecting our gaze to actions rather than to the technologies themselves, 
although a methodologically sound move, explains little in itself. And we should not take 
it as a signal to ignore the impact of technologies altogether. Is it not an interesting 
distinction in a person’s choice of e-mail rather than a letter, or a phone call? These days, 
though, the interesting distinction shows better in the opposite choice, receiving a posted 
letter from a friend who usually emails us indicates that something important is being 
conveyed. Maybe it is an invitation to a formal occasion, his wedding, or his doctoral 
defence. Or maybe he just wants to make a point, putting on a nostalgic face (I recently 
received my first postcard in about 10 years, and was baffled, to say the least – it was 
from a friend who proclaimed (in an email, afterwards) that ‘no one sends postcards 
anymore’). Surely, we choose how we communicate because the various media with which 
we can communicate express different things. These ‘different things’ might be due to the 
differing social role of the technologies, and/or it might be due to the differing 
functionality of the technologies. Both aspects are equally valid in denoting the difference 
between media, and both aspects must be reflected in the conceptualization of the 
technological action. 
If technological actions induce change, what gives technological actions their causality? If 
a component of the technological action is a technology (and it is, by default, otherwise it 
would be an action), then technologies are part of the causality of technological actions. 
Saying otherwise amounts to instrumentalism, the view that technologies are mere means, 
subject to the user’(s) rationale for an action, and the socially governed use of it. As I try to 
show in Chapter 1, instrumentalism is misleading. We should acknowledge technology, 
just as we acknowledge personal and social aspects in pointing to the causality of 
technological actions. 
Thus, taking technological actions as a topic does not mean turning away from 
technology; on the contrary, it means approaching the question of the meaning of technology. 
Not in the sense of its encyclopaedic entry, but to the process in which a type of 
technology attains its meaning, how it becomes the specific kind of technology we perceive it to be. As 
argued in Part 1, there are two kinds of forces shaping the meaning of a (type of) 
technology, one from the ‘outside’ (personal/social) and one emanating from the 
technological items themselves. We do not just imbue a technology with functions 
because of personal and social requirements; in a technological action a technology realizes 
some of its inherent capabilities. This is what I call a technology’s affordance. Technologies 
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afford certain ways of being handled, and through that, afford certain actions with them. 
We use email instead of a letter, or a phone call, because of its technology-specific 
characteristics. The actions that are being afforded by the technology must be reflected in 
our understanding of technological actions, because the arsenal of such actions often 
exceeds those that the technology was designed to afford (cf. Chapter 4). 
What is needed if we are to use technological actions as our focus point, is to investigate 
what it is that constitutes a technological action. Stated differently, we must acknowledge that 
technological actions are not merely composed of technology, the user(s), and the socio-
cultural, but that what any component offers in an action is shaped by what the other 
components offer in the very same action. For instance, a carpenter can seem proficient 
when using a hammer, but turns into an apprentice if presented with a nail gun. 
Technology, user and socio-cultural factors accentuate specific characteristics in the other 
factors. I will express this by saying that a person in a technological action is not the 
person per se, the person objectively regarded, but is the person appearing in a certain way. 
The skills, the knowledge, the competencies, the beliefs a person uses actively in his close 
encounter with a technology would not have mattered in a different technological action. 
Neither is the socio-cultural context everything that surrounds a technological action. 
Martin Heidegger argues that a hammer points out its social and physical context; those 
things that cannot be hammered on are simply not part of the context of the hammer (cf. 
Chapter 2). However, only by being in a ‘hammerable’ context is a hammer a hammer. 
Technology and context are mutually defining, as well as technology and user. Or, as I 
will describe their relation, they are interdependent. 
A technological action is therefore not just an assembly of pre-defined entities. It is a 
constituted totality, comprised of constituents that are themselves constituted through the 
very same action in question. As a consequence, the appearance of any of the constituents 
in a technological action is primarily related to the action itself because every co-constituent of 
the action appears in accordance with the specific (kind of) action. The technological 
action is therefore not an effect of the contribution of the technology, the user(s) and 
socio-cultural aspects; the action itself has primacy. This is to say that the action defines its co-
constituents.  
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– Providing a conceptual framework – 
As mentioned, I have chosen to shift the focus from ICTs to technology as a phenomenon 
in its own right. In investigating the changes occurring in the wake of new ICTs, we need to 
relate ICTs both to other forms of communication technologies, and to technology in 
general. The most fundamental level here, of course, is the latter, and is what I concern 
myself with the most (Chapter 7 is an exception). With that, the main purpose of this 
thesis is to provide a conceptual framework for empirical investigations of the alleged social changes 
due to new ICTs: a framework for the design, the execution and the interpretation of 
empirical research into ICT and other specific forms of technology. 
Throughout this thesis, I point out the manners in which technology has always 
transformed the human way of life.1 Although not wanting to play down the impact of 
ICTs, a theoretical consequence of the conceptual framework is that the influential power 
of the dominating technologies in the digital era is a continuation of how our lives always have 
been technologically enmeshed. This is implied in the aforementioned refutation of technological 
instrumentalism; in order to understand the way ICTs transform society and ourselves, it is 
necessary to understand that technologies are not just there, readily available for us to employ 
in accordance with, or contrary to, a set of instructions in a manual. Technologies 
introduce something fundamentally more through being available for us to use. The 
modified stone used as a hammer in Olduwai Gorge did this two-and-a-half million years 
ago, the printing press of Johannes Gutenberg did this approximately 560 years ago, and 
the NeXTcube did this when it served as Tim Berner-Lee’s server 20 years ago, thereby 
kick-starting what became the World Wide Web. A technology is not a transparent 
mediating presence between the user and the world, with it we make the world we interact 
with, and in so doing, technologies contribute to the making of us. What we think of as the world, 
what we think of as a person, ourselves or others, is affected by the entire technological 
repertoire in a society, and these days, especially ICTs. To understand the latter impact, 
however, we need to understand the former. 
A counter-argument to this is that such a view amounts to technological determinism. If 
technology as such has this kind of impact on humans and society, would that not mean 
that we are determined by the technological presence? Is society dominated by the 
technology that inhabits it? Does technological development dictate social development? 
                                              
1 There is some precedence for using a capital T in writing about technology in general. (Heidegger 1977, 1993) I will 
not follow this because it implies that technology is more autonomous than I think it is. 
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Are we in some sense controlled by the technology in using it? Besides refuting 
instrumentalism, the understanding of technology that is developed in Part 1 counters 
determinism. It is equally important to understand the technology that mediates between 
the world and us in a manner that is not opaque as it is to understand it as not mediating 
in a transparent manner. Actually, possible accusations of technological determinism 
double the reason why we need to understand the relationship between humans, the 
world and technology properly before embarking on empirical investigations. Neither 
instrumentalism nor determinism offers an adequate framework for describing the 
relation between technology, society and us. 
– Technology, society, self – 
Clearly, this work concerns the relationship between humans and technology. 
Technologies have been an integral part of human activities for millions of years, so how 
are we to understand our relation to them? What do we gain, as human beings and as a 
society, by developing and using technologies? Of course, we expand our abilities, 
technologies enable us to perform certain actions that we could not perform as rapidly, 
efficiently, or at all, without them. This, I think, is unquestionable. But there is more 
involved, both as to how society is structured, and as to how we see ourselves and our 
possibilities in the world. In fact, technological presence has wide-ranging consequences 
for (but does not determine) how both the self and a society can be conceptualized. 
Hans Achterhuis points out that technological change does not merely change the nature 
of the technological mediation, but it necessarily also changes the human experiences that 
accompany our employment of the technologies.1 (2001:2) We only need to think of the 
example above, email vs. letter, to see what he means. The same message transmitted 
through different media attains a different meaning for us; we experience the interchange 
with our friend differently, and with it, our friend. Technological actions not only help 
shape the outcome of the actions, they rebound on the user’s identity. 
 
                                              
1 In this thesis, I use technological mediation and technological action interchangeably, despite the fact that not all 
technological actions are mediations in the sense of standing between us and other people or the world. In Chapter 
4, I review different kinds of human-technology relations, and while some technological actions are true mediations 
(‘standing between’), others are interactions with a technology. Nevertheless, all technological mediations are 
technological actions, so what is true of the latter is also true of the former. To me, ‘mediation’ does not manage to 
encompass the importance of the context of use in the constitutional process, nor does it emphasize the dynamics 
between the constituents. For most part, I use mediation in two circumstances: in the scientific use of technology 
and in communication (cf. Chapter 2). 
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When we use simple devices to move, position, extend or protect our bodies, our 
techniques change both objects and bodies. And by adopting devices we do more. We 
change our social selves. In other species, natural selection and social selection shape the 
appearance of the animal. In humanity, technology helps shape identity. (Tenner 2003:29) 
This not only relates to how a person is perceived by others, but also to how the person 
sees himself. The most important argument that connects Parts 1 and 2 is that we not 
only change the range of our abilities by employing technologies, we change our self-
image: how we perceive ourselves to be and what we are able to do and become. If 
technology is to be conceptualized in the manner described in the previous section, it is 
required that we also a) develop a notion of the constitution of the self that is open in the 
sense of ‘allowing’ this kind of influence, and b) explicate the nature of this influence. 
For this reason, the investigation into technology needs a complementary investigation into the 
shaping of the self. There are two matters that especially need to be looked into in this 
regard: Firstly, the relation between the self and intersubjectivity, and secondly, the role of 
technology in the conceptualization of the self beyond that of co-constituting the appearance of a 
person in a specific technological action. Both factors are important if we are to conceptualize 
the relation of technology, society and self in an adequate way. Technology plays a dual 
role here. Besides influencing the self in the manner already indicated, technology 
influences intersubjectivity through its societal impact. The bottom line in the 
constitution of the self is that, as I shall argue extensively in Chapters 6 and 7, any 
understanding of the self must be of the self as embedded. We cannot understand the self, 
society and technology without understanding them in relation to each other, neither the 
‘simple’ technological actions (explored in Chapters 2, 3 and 4), nor the terms in which 
our lifeworld, the world as imbued with meaning, is constituted technologically as well as 
socially (Chapters 4 and 6).1 
This line in the investigation therefore looks beyond specific technological actions, but 
does not for that reason leave the primacy of action behind. In Part 2, I argue that the self 
is associated with its potential for acting and with what it might become. What the self can 
become is related to both the social/the intersubjective sphere and to its practical space, that 
                                              
1 ‘Lifeworld’ is a concept that has quite specific meaning and function in the theories of Edmund Husserl (1970), and 
Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann (1973), as the world as it appears in the natural attitude, both in a pre-
scientific and pre-phenomenological manner (cf. Chapter 3). I use it in a more casual manner, as an expression of how 
the world around us is ‘always already’ structured when we enter it (see below). That is, in being born we enter a world that 
is already meaningful, comprised of structures of meaning to which we cannot but relate. I therefore use it without 
regard to whether it is prior to any scientific or phenomenological investigation or not. 
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is, the horizon of its action potential. 1  In a line of thought well known from 
phenomenology, both a self and a lifeworld come into existence through embeddedness. 
Our awareness of ourselves is intimately connected to our engagement in our surroundings, 
and our awareness of our surroundings is intimately connected to our engagement in 
them. Therefore, it is necessary for the self to undertake some kind of action in his 
surroundings to become a self, in the (self-) reflected sense (cf. Chapters 3 and 6). This 
way, the self and the lifeworld are interdependent. Technology’s role in the relation 
between self and lifeworld is in terms of being a lifeworld phenomenon, a part of what 
gives the lifeworld its meaning. In other words, technology is a lifeworld structure. 
If we are to develop an understanding of technology as a phenomenon of its own, we 
need to see how it can be said to be a lifeworld structure, and with what it provides us in 
being that (it is only for us that there can be anything like a lifeworld, that is, the world as 
meaningful). I have already mentioned that this is connected to how we comprehend our 
horizon of potential actions, our practical space. Consequently, the question above reads 
as a question of how technology influences this practical space. In Chapter 4, I reject the 
view that technology is an extension of how we act in our lifeworld, favouring instead the 
view that it is an upgrade of our practical space. The main difference between these two views 
is that in the former understanding technologies extend our abilities within an already 
defined practical space, while the latter understanding means that technologies have a role 
in designating the practical space. Or, using the term already presented, technologies co-
constitute the practical space; they do not just extend our abilities within an already 
constituted practical space. The main task in responding to the problem in Part 2, then, is 
to connect the self to the practical space. 
– Thrownness and the structure of the lifeworld – 
The relation of the self to its lifeworld can be described most effectively as thrownness. This 
concept, coming from Heidegger, indicates that we have never been in a position located 
outside of the social world, the lifeworld. (Heidegger 1962:321/276) We are ‘thrown’ into 
existence, and cannot but relate to our surroundings the way they are already structured. 
                                              
1 For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘practical space’ conveys that how we are in the world does not come down to a 
mental representation of the world (mental space), but is more importantly related to our body and its motility. 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962:137ff) For Merleau-Ponty, the body has its own intentionality that cannot be represented 
mentally, so that practical space denotes the world in which the body can move. (Merleau-Ponty 1962:139) I borrow 
the concept, but as I do not discuss embodiment, it gains a slightly more specific meaning: the world in which we 
can act. 
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In our thrownness, we are always already beside others, and always already beside items in 
the lifeworld (but, as we shall see in Part 1, not as defined things). And, most importantly, 
we are always already within the same relations that others have to the lifeworld-items, that 
is, we share the socially governed meanings of items with others. This is the sense in 
which the world as we meet it in our thrownness is – to employ this distinctly 
phenomenological phrasing yet again – always already meaningful.1 
This might sound stifling and oppressive, and although it can be, thrownness in fact 
harbours the possibility for us to become anything at all. Thrownness positions us among 
actualities, among potentialities, among challenges, among the possibilities to realize 
ourselves. As we shall see in Chapter 6, a crucial part of thrownness is that we are thrown 
in an attitude of projecting ourselves towards the future. Such a projection means that we 
project ourselves towards a horizon. In front of us, so to speak, is the intersubjective 
world and the thing world (and our own mortality) with their respective horizons. 
Between us and the horizons, we not only find the lifeworld as it is, but also the potential 
for how it, and we, might become (cf. Chapters 4 and 6). A main aspect of Heidegger’s 
philosophy is that to be is to become. I will retain this aspect, but investigate more 
specifically technology’s role in this becoming. 
The investigation into the concept of technology is mainly driven by the need to work out 
a philosophy of the lifeworld that recognizes the constitutive role of technology. As 
mentioned, my contention is that the lifeworld is meaningful, and that technology is a 
principal factor in the meaningfulness of the lifeworld. As such, technology functions in a 
two-fold manner, as an always already structure, and as a (re-) organizing principle. In our 
thrownness, we meet the world as it is always already structured, that is, as meaningful. 
Aspects such as language, social institutions, statutory framework, and ethical and 
religious considerations co-constitute the structures of meaning that make up the 
lifeworld. My task is to demonstrate that technology is an influence on par with those 
mentioned. Of special interest is the role of technology in the re-structuring of the 
lifeworld. Because technology does have an inherent possibility to structure the lifeworld, 
                                              
1 ‘Always already’ first and foremost indicates the structure of time: “Every ‘now’, moreover, is already either a ‘just-
now’ or a ‘forthwith’… Every last ‘now’, as ‘now’, is always already a ‘forthwith’ that is no longer; thus it is time in the 
sense of the ‘no-longer-now’ – in the sense of the past. Every first ‘now’ is a ‘just-now’ that is not yet; thus it is time 
in the sense of the ‘not-yetnow’ – in the sense of the ‘future’.” (Heidegger 1962:476/424) Considering the dynamical 
constitution of the meaningful structures that we cannot but relate to in our thrownness, I am also comfortable in 
calling meaningfulness ‘always already’ (cf. Chapter 3). 
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it also harbours the possibility of re-structuring it. We can use technologies to make new 
structures of meaning. In fact, this is what we do all the time. In developing new 
technologies or in evolving new praxes for existing technologies, we change the world, 
our possibilities, our goals and beliefs. In short, we re-structure the lifeworld. Only 
because technologies have the structural impact, can we make new structures by virtue of 
technologies. 
In Chapters 2 and 4, I argue that the structures of meaning making up our lifeworld 
should be conceptualized as articulations. In a sense, the structures of meaning are 
constructed by various social (political, religious, ethical, economic) and technological 
forces exercising their influence in the co-constitutional manner described earlier. 
Accordingly, technological actions lead to the articulation of the meanings that structure 
the lifeworld.1 Rather than thinking about this as relativism and as raising a veil between 
ourselves and a presumed objective world behind it, this is in fact a necessary way of 
creating reality. We cannot live in a world that is not articulated, and as mentioned above, 
we do not. We are always already within structures of meaning and have to cope with 
them. However, the particular articulations are in some sense contingent, offering us one 
possible articulation of reality (cf. Chapter 3). Another technology, another social praxis, 
another historical time, or another place would have created other articulations. As there 
is no non-perspectival access to ‘the world’, the way we apprehend it will always be 
through an articulated perspective, that is, through structures of meaning. Technological 
actions (which, to remind the reader once more, do not imply actions determined by the 
technology in use) create reality. 
The two-foldedness of the always already structure and the re-organizing activity means 
that the structures of meaning that make up our lifeworld are continuously becoming: 
They are perspectival and contextual, and continuously constructed and negotiated in the 
intersubjective realm (cf. Chapter 6). To get a grip on how meaning is articulated we have 
to look at the always already meaningful and the potential meaningful as mutual 
necessary. Meaning is this complementarity. And, by implication, so is the lifeworld. My 
thesis, then, amounts to an investigation into technology’s role in the complementarity.2  
                                              
1 Actually, as we shall see in Chapter 4, a material technological item is itself a structure of meaning as it is connected to 
various praxes and contexts, and can as such be regarded as an articulation in itself. 
2 The complementarity is particularly displayed through the concepts of actuality and virtuality in Chapter 4. 
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Undoubtedly, one of the most significant structural factors in our world is the presence of 
ICTs. ICTs are gaining an increasing influence on how we communicate, how we 
organize our daily lives, and on how our society functions; in other words, the influence 
of ICTs on the meanings that structure our lifeworld is discernible. As such, however, 
ICTs are only doing what other technologies have always been doing. We, and probably 
more so those coming after us, are thrown into a lifeworld permeated by online and 
wireless ICTs. To proliferate, to feel safe and comfortable, and to thrive in the lifeworld, 
we need to relate competently to these media, and as researchers, we need to understand 
what this relating involves. We need to see that it is only in interacting with what is an 
actuality (the world as it is) that one glimpses what might become. Things in their 
actuality point forward to their potentiality, For instance, what problems are there with that 
which already is; what can be done better with it, and what should be done to its negative 
sides? The actuality and the potentiality of our lifeworld constitute our practical space. Only by taking 
an actuality as a starting point, only by interacting with that which already is, for instance 
through a technological action, can we glimpse the potentiality of our lifeworld. Without 
action, we glimpse nothing. Action has primacy. 
Methodological remarks 
This thesis primarily (but not exclusively) concerns itself with the phenomenology of being a 
technology user. With a piece of technology in hand, a person is a different individual; when 
acts are technologically augmented, a person is faced with specific constraints and 
possibilities. Not only that, the world he acts in is also different. However, it is important 
that I also look beyond single technological artefacts and direct personal interactions with 
such. My investigation often revolves around the fact that technologies have their impact 
as a part of larger technological systems, and/or as a part of larger socio-economic 
systems. Few technologies involve user(s) in the sense that ICTs do, but are instead a 
component of larger systems whose impact we only encounter indirectly. We experience 
the car, but not the factory in which it is assembled. We experience the effect of the 
financial crisis, but not the Dow Jones. As such, the focal point of the investigation is on 
our experience with technology by existing in a technologically permeated lifeworld. Accordingly, the 
phenomenology of being a technology-user involves more generally the relation between 
the self and the lifeworld (which also makes good sense because our personal encounters 
with technologies more often than not are governed by social conventions).  
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The parts of the thesis that are concerned with the self and lifeworld draw on classical 
phenomenology, most notably on the work of Heidegger. However, this thesis does not 
provide an exegesis of Heidegger’s work, nor does it aim to be a contribution to 
phenomenology proper. Instead, by focusing my investigation strongly on technology and 
technological actions (rather than other aspects that phenomenologists also argue is 
important for the constitution of the self, such as transcendental, temporal, historical, 
bodily and cultural aspects), I put ideas, insights and concepts from phenomenology to 
use in a discourse on technology.1 This way, my approach has many affinities with the 
post-phenomenology of Don Ihde. Like this project, post-phenomenology is occupied 
with the importance of technology in the lifeworld, and takes, as the name itself implies, a 
phenomenological inspired perspective. 
My approach, though, differs from post-phenomenology in one crucial aspect. Inspired 
by the sociological approach to the study of technology called Science and Technology 
Studies (STS), post-phenomenology takes case studies, usually from a scientific context, as 
its focal point, and describes and elucidates these from a phenomenological point of view. 
Although I often employ examples of technology-use to convey theoretical points, my 
main focus is to a larger degree on the conceptual framework rather than on the specific 
cases. 2  As such, my approach is also akin to, but yet different from, the study of 
technology found in Actor-Network Theory. Although obviously sharing many 
theoretical viewpoints with Bruno Latour, especially seen through my concept of 
interdependence (cf. Chapter 6), I rarely discuss technology in a scientific setting (note, 
Latour occasionally transcends this setting also). 
Furthermore, I do not share Latour’s scepticism of Heidegger (1999:176) and agree with 
Søren Riis (2008) that the two thinkers have more in common than Latour himself 
acknowledges (cf. Chapter 3). In the thinking in recent philosophy of technology (which 
includes post-phenomenology) Heidegger is not regarded as offering anything in 
particular to contemporary thinking about technology. For that, he is seen as being too 
preoccupied with the transcendental conditions for modern technology, and his concepts 
                                              
1 Heidegger, as we shall see over the following chapters, has written extensively on tools and technology, and both 
Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty have written on subjects that implicate an effect on the self and the 
lifeworld through the use of tools and technology. 
2 Case studies, although always present, have become more conspicuous in Ihde’s thinking over the years. It would 
not be incorrect to say that earlier stages of his thinking revolved more around the conceptual framework. (Ihde 
1979, 1983, 1990) 
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as inadequately suited to display the specific characteristics of technologies. The 
consequence of this focus is that Heidegger presents modern technology 
(characteristically denoted with a capital T) as constituting one indistinct and 
comprehensive impact on society. This has led Heidegger to a negative, almost dystopian, 
view of modern technology (cf. Chapter 1). This, in turn, prompts contemporary 
philosophers of technology, including Ihde and Latour, to be less than forthcoming 
towards perspectives that take technology in general under consideration.  
Although I agree with the criticism of the all-encompassing line of Heidegger’s thinking, I 
nevertheless consider an investigation into technology in the general sense to contribute 
importantly to our understanding of various technologies and their specific impact on our 
daily lives. Consequently, the task I set for myself in answering my research questions is 
to develop the conceptual framework in a manner that encompasses technology as a 
phenomenon in its own right and yet leaves room for the specifics of various technologies. 
Answering my research questions in this way, my investigation necessarily has a broad 
scope. Rather than entering into lengthy discussion of minutiae, for instance in 
phenomenology or about any one thinker, empirical and theoretical support for the 
developing conceptual framework has been found by combining insights and perspectives 
from a wide range of sources. Rather than focusing on knock-down arguments of a 
thinker or a position, I focus on the constructive contributions a thinker can make to my 
project. For this reason, I see my project as a contribution to both phenomenological 
research and to the field of contemporary philosophy of technology: To a larger extent 
than classical phenomenology, technology is brought into the constitution of the self and 
the lifeworld in a positive manner, and to a larger extent than in the philosophy of 
technology, the co-constitutional role of technology in our understanding of the self and 
the lifeworld is explored and conceptualized.  
On the remaining chapters 
The thesis is composed of two main parts, comprising three chapters each, and a 
preliminary part, comprising this introduction and the first chapter, which is prior to the 
actual discussion on the concept of technology and therefore also of a preliminary 
character. In that chapter, called The Impact of Technology, I present the definition of 
instrumentalism and discuss the two related notions of determinism and essentialism. I do 
not argue explicitly against instrumentalism, but find in both determinism and 
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essentialism good arguments against holding the view that technologies are transparent in 
terms of their impact. In this connection, transparent means that the impact of a 
technological action is ‘dictated’ by whomever is developing, using or assessing a 
technology. However, theories that imply an all-encompassing impact from technology 
have their own weaknesses, some of which are taken up in this chapter. In the end, I 
conclude that there are good reasons to think of technology as having some sort of 
impact. What this impact is, however, is explored in Part 1, which is called Technology. 
The discussion on the concept of technology has a hermeneutical character. I find it hard 
to discuss the relevant concepts fully without having described why I discuss them. 
Consequently, I start Part 1 with outlining the main ideas of the concept of technology in 
Chapter 2, called Technological Realism. More precisely, I outline the main ideas by 
introducing the constitutional-articulative perspective on technology, reserving the full 
exploration of the two concepts to Chapter 3 and 4 respectively. 
The third chapter, Intentionality in Action, is mainly a discussion of Husserl and Heidegger. I 
have chosen to ‘lay low’ myself, and just to present what amounts to a ‘general ontology’. 
Through Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl’s theory of intentionality, a theory of our 
practical behaviour as opening the very world we act in emerges. Rather than being about 
perceiving the world, intentionality for Heidegger is primarily about acting in it. From this 
discussion the co-constitutional role of technology in the lifeworld is identified. 
The fourth chapter, The Revealing-Concealing Structure, is one of the two main chapters. In it, the 
discussion on the concept of technology comes to a conclusion. I take a position where I 
can substantiate and specify how technology contributes to the constitution of the world 
and how technology contributes to the articulation of a lifeworld. In short, this consists of 
showing that the actual and potential actions that technologies embody constitutes our 
practical space. This illustrates that technologies really do have an impact on society without 
implying determinism or that this impact amounts to an indistinct and comprehensive 
one.  
Part 2, called Self and Society, concerns the positive role of technology in the constitution of 
self and intersubjectivity. Formulating the positive role demands a critical assessment of 
objectifying approaches to the self, showing that such approaches presuppose mineness. 
In Chapter 5, The Elusive Self, I argue that mineness leaves us with only a minimal notion 
of the self that in its nature is open to constitutional influences from its surroundings.  
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Chapter 6, Embeddedness, explores this openness. From the minimal notion, we are able to 
see how the self is constituted embeddedly rather than independently of the world and 
other selves. This is the other main chapter in the thesis, as it is where the notion of 
technology is merged with the notion of the self to express the definitive definition of 
practical space. The actuality and potentiality contained in the notion of practical space is 
integral to the understanding of the self because the self is constituted primarily as future-
directed. This means that the self is constituted in accordance with its possibilities, rather 
than its experiences and accomplishments.  
Chapter 7, Society, Communication and Technology, leaves the self discourse, and directs our 
gaze to the connection between technology and the development of society. More 
specifically, it is an attempt to critically apply the understanding of technology developed 
in Part 1 on some of the claims put forward by communication theorists concerning the 
strong relation between types of communication technology and various stages of social 
development. Although interesting in many facets, such claims often implicate an 
untenable technological determinism. The question of how to conceptualize the impact of 
ICTs on our present and future society is affected by this discussion. 
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The instrumental definition of technology 
Dutch philosopher Hans Achterhuis distinguishes between two generations in the 
philosophy of technology: The classical approach, found in the writings of Martin 
Heidegger, Karl Jaspers and the dystopian par excellence Jacques Ellul, as examples, and the 
empirical approach of recent American thinkers like Don Ihde, Andrew Feenberg, Langdon 
Winner and Donna Haraway. While the former approach is characterized by being 
preoccupied with “the historical and transcendental conditions that made modern 
technology”, the latter is occupied with “the manifold ways in which technology 
manifests itself”. (Achterhuis 2001:3)1 In this sense the two generations, when looking at 
modern technology, fix their eyes in opposite directions: “Classical philosophy of 
technology tried to understand technology from its conditions of possibility, from what 
must be presupposed in order for it to be possible.” (Verbeek 2005:7) This backward 
looking, genealogical and ontological approach contrasts noticeably with the forward-
looking project of the empirical philosophers, who in their technology-close approach are 
concerned with the possibilities of managing and influencing technological development. 
                                              
1 To regard the history of the philosophy of technology as consisting of only two homogeneous generations is a 
simplification well suited to map the theoretical origins of the empirical philosophers addressed by Achterhuis, but is 
not a fair representation of the actual development in the thinking about technology generally. Ihde 1993 and 
Mitcham 1994, for instance, provide a far richer background for the contemporary philosophy of technology. 
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Through this, they recognize the immediate need for attending to some unfortunate spin-
off effects of modern technology, such as nuclear waste, global warming, prescription 
drug addiction, electronic surveillance and orbital debris. In so doing, the younger 
generation offers a far more politically based philosophy than that of the classical 
philosophers. To take control of technological development demands a proper 
understanding of the role and the impact of technology on society, which in turn 
demands a proper philosophical analysis of technology’s meaning. However, precisely 
because of this, is it also apparent that the two generations have something very 
fundamental in common: Technology and technological development profoundly change 
the society in which technologies exist and operate. 
In opposition to this shared key assumption is the opinion that technology is a mere 
device, a contrivance, a means to an end, an instrumentum. What matters in a 
technologically augmented action is the rationale, the end-goal and the motive, behind the 
action. This view, based on what Martin Heidegger calls the instrumental definition of 
technology (1993:312), results in technology and technological development being 
regarded as not in themselves worthy of thematization, but only as subordinate to the 
philosophy of science, environmental ethics, or some other philosophical, scientific or 
social discourse.1 
A related definition of technology sees its role and function as insignificant compared to 
the social and political development in a society: “What matters is not technology itself, 
but the social or economical system in which it is embedded.” (Winner 1986:20) Langdon 
Winner, who is critical of this view, calls this a theory of the social determination of 
technology. This is in effect a variation of the instrumentalist definition in the sense that 
technology becomes ontologically transparent. Instead, what is seen as significant is the social and 
political motivation behind the introduction of a technology in a society, and/or how the 
meaning of a technology is a ‘construct’ of specific social groups interpreting the 
technology within a context of use, with little or no regard to possible constraints in the 
technology itself. Seen this way, technological development can be fully controlled both 
socially and politically without much further ado. However, both generations of thinkers 
                                              
1 In the same paragraph, Heidegger offers an alternative, anthropological definition: Technology is a human activity. 
(Heidegger 1993:312) Heidegger claims that these two definitions belong together, but in a logical sense, this is only 
partly true; the instrumental definition presupposes the anthropological, but the latter is also true for theories that 
regard technology as being more than mere means for actions. 
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share a scepticism of the instrumental understanding of technology, which, if taken at face 
value, is seen not just as wrong, but also as potentially dangerous. 
For the following, I define instrumentalism as the view that technologies are mere means 
and that they are transparent when mediating between motives for use and effects of use. 
Instrumentalism, then, implies that technologies do not bring in any philosophically 
interesting aspects to the shaping of society and in the constitution of those who use 
them. I will not delve any further into the definition of instrumentalism; this chapter is 
primarily an attempt to illustrate that there are good reason to accept that technologies in 
fact do have a philosophically interesting impact on society and users. However, such a 
notion includes both technological determinism and the more moderate view that 
technologies, in some sense, influence society and users, and I shall argue that 
determinism is as unacceptable as instrumentalism, while waiting until the next three 
chapters to formulate how the influence is to be conceptualized. 
Technological thinking 
Heidegger describes the instrumental definition as a correct, but not true, concept of 
technology. (1993:312-13) What he means by this somewhat cryptic statement is that on 
one level it is clearly the case that humans employ technologies based on purposes and 
knowledge, and as such technology is a tool, employed to achieve a pre-defined goal. This 
even applies to modern technology, Heidegger notes, but the definition is just not true 
because it fails to reveal the essence of technology. The question of truth is ontological 
rather than epistemological for Heidegger, and what is true of a thing such as technology 
reveals an ontological relation between the thing and the way we are in the world, that is, 
our particular and historically situated existence. An ontological relation means that it has 
a constitutive function, in the sense that the thing marks a disclosure, an unconcealment in 
Heidegger’s words. The world is not just there in itself, it is brought forward in specific 
ways. In this sense, what is revealed is primarily a world, a condition of possibility for 
seeing the world, and the particular revealing by such a thing as modern technology 
entails that the thing’s specific essence, its meaning, is a key part of how the world is 
unconcealed.1 For this reason, it is crucial that technology is conceived in a way that 
exposes said relation. By regarding technology as transparent, by not making technology a 
                                              
1 A terminological clarification: ‘Revealing’ is used to denote an activity, while the thing or the world as revealed is 
referred to as the unconcealed. 
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topic for reflection, instrumentalism instead obscures the ontological relation. If we settle 
for the instrumental definition, we will not be opened up to the ontological ramifications 
of modern technology, and consequently neither to its real meaning. 
An analysis of what is true of modern technology must therefore be approached in two 
steps. The first is an investigation into the nature of unconcealment, and a subsequent 
establishing of modern technology as indeed a kind of revealing; and the second, an 
investigation into the nature of this particular revealing, how modern technology opens up 
the world for us, how it constitutes things. In this chapter, I will ignore the first step, and 
proceed directly to the second, to the question of the essence of modern technology.1 It is 
possible to accept the result of the first analysis, and reject the last one, which is precisely 
what I will do. For Heidegger, however, the two analyses taken together convince him 
that the problem of modern technology is that it conceals alternative ways of revealing, so 
that it is taken as the only kind of unconcealment. If that is the case, we are not free with 
respect to modern technology, or more precisely, to the world as unconcealed by modern 
technology. Literally, we cannot discover that there are other possible ways of being in the 
world because they remain concealed by the essence of modern technology. This, for 
Heidegger, is the true danger of settling for the instrumental definition of technology. 
Through his analysis of modern technology, Heidegger shows its essence to be something 
he calls Gestell, which, as he says, “is by no means anything technological”. (1993:311) 
Consequently, we will never disclose the essence of technology by scrutinizing 
technological items. In line with what I stated above, Gestell is best understood as our 
attitude to the world that we assume when we act in the world through modern 
technology. As such, Gestell shows itself in humans through the operation of modern 
technology. In putting modern technology to use, whatever it is that the technology 
operates on is ‘ordered’ into being resources, the Bestand as Heidegger calls it, for the 
technological activity.2 This ordering does not come in the form of a decree, but should 
rather be regarded as how nature is treated due to the effect of modern technology. The 
Bestand can be understood in two ways, one literally, where natural things are lined up as 
resources, and then more figuratively, where it alludes to a state of mind, a way of 
                                              
1 I will return to the first step, the structure of unconcealment (revealing) and concealment in Chapter 4. 
2 Gestell is often translated as “Enframing”, but this usually brings about a number of reservations as to how it should 
be understood in English. Albert Borgmann proposes ‘framework’ as an alternative translation. (2005:428) Bestand is 
usually translated as ‘standing-reserve’, but according to Borgmann, ‘resources’ would be less awkward. To avoid 
lengthy terminological discussions I will keep the German words, and instead try to convey their meaning.  
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regarding the world. For Heidegger, modern society is declining due to the influence of 
Gestell. First natural resources, instead of having a meaning and a value of their own, are 
reduced to Bestand for humans, but eventually also us, the humans who perform this 
reduction through our development and employment of technology, start to treat each 
other the same way, rendering the human race itself Bestand.  
Perhaps a way to make this quite abstract analysis a bit more tangible is to relate Gestell to 
a particular kind of thinking that Heidegger refers to as calculative thinking. This concept 
alludes to our tendency to be unscrupulously goal-oriented in our activities rather than 
contemplative on what it means to be underway to something. Calculative thinking 
“computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical 
possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking 
never stops, never collects itself.” (Heidegger 1969:46) This is perfectly in line with how 
Gestell challenges nature: “This setting-upon that challenges the energies of nature is an 
expediting, and in two ways. It expedites in that it unlocks and exposes. Yet that 
expediting is always itself directed from the beginning toward furthering something else, 
i.e., toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense.” (Heidegger 
1993:321)1  Both calculative thinking and Gestell, then, push towards a maximizing of 
efficiency, ultimately not because it is for the best for humans and society, although we – 
under the influence of the instrumental definition of technology – might think this is the 
reason, but because efficiency becomes a goal in itself. 
To convey the affinities between Gestell and calculative thinking, the concept of 
technological thinking has surfaced. (Dreyfus 1993, Feenberg 1999) Technological thinking, 
although not a concept used by Heidegger himself, not only denotes calculative thinking 
under the influence of Gestell, but also displays splendidly Heidegger’s idea that the 
challenging of nature necessarily is carried out through and by human beings. (Heidegger 
1993:323) The concept of technological thinking therefore harbours the already 
mentioned challenging of nature.2  
                                              
1 Lovitt’s original translation reads ‘challenging-forth’ instead of ‘challenging’. (Heidegger 1977) Admittedly, this is 
more accurate when one considers the complete analysis of Gestell as a “sending from Being”. For some reason, Krell 
(Heidegger 1993) has undertaken a slight alteration to Lovitt’s translation, and for now, I follow Krell, but read on. 
2 Tabachnick 2004 equates technological thinking with Gestell, which to me seems a bit inaccurate because Gestell, for 
Heidegger, primarily is an ontological concept, while technological thinking rather should be understood as how 
Gestell directs human thinking in one specific direction. 
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The inflexibility of technology  
The crux of Heidegger’s reflection is that if we confine ourselves to believing that 
technology-as-instrument is the true definition of technology we will be enchained to 
Gestell and subject to the negative social, political, and philosophical development that 
follows. A related, and equally dangerous issue is that the propagation of technological 
thinking means that instead of us refining and enhancing our thinking abilities (as we 
might fool ourselves to think), we are heading toward a forgetting of thinking, a forgetting 
of asking questions, a machine-like existence much like modern technology itself. We are 
then in a position where we cannot catch sight of other possible ways of unconcealment, 
other possible ways of being in the world. However, if we in something that resembles an 
act of meditation open ourselves to what is true of technology we will gain a freedom 
towards it and the technological way of thinking. This freedom does not mean that 
technology ends up as a mere instrument – the Gestell is still the essence of modern 
technology – it just does not have ascendancy over us anymore.  
Heidegger warns against taking active measures to overcome the Gestell, as this only will 
demonstrate how entangled we are in the technological way of life. “Because the essence 
of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon technology and decisive 
confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to it and, on 
the other, fundamentally different to it.” (Heidegger 1993:340) One problem is that since 
the essence of technology is seen as not being technological, it would not suffice to gain 
control over the technology itself, we need to take control over what controls technology. 
A more serious problem is that the will to dominate that shows itself in the attempt to 
control technology or its development is itself a typical characteristic of technological thinking. 
(Heidegger 1969:59, cf. Dreyfus 1993) This is why Heidegger resorts to a rather vague 
prescription to overcome the demands of the Gestell: “Here and now and in little things… 
we may foster the saving power in its increase. This includes holding always before our 
eyes the extreme danger.” (1993:338) By careful and mindful association with technology 
we can “let technical devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside, 
that is, let them alone, as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon 
something higher”. (Heidegger 1969:54) If we are able to relate to devices in this relaxed, 
meditative way, “we no longer view things only in a technical way”. (Heidegger 1969:54) 1 
                                              
1 For Heidegger, it is primarily art that has the potential of revealing real ontological truths. Hence, works of art can 
play a crucial role in salvaging us from the opening by Gestell. (Heidegger 1993:339ff) One of the reasons for this is 
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The younger generation of technology thinkers, however, is not convinced by this train of 
thought, and feels that the threat of modern technology should be worked out in an 
engagement with technology rather than withdrawing from it: “Heidegger’s argument is 
developed at such a high level of abstraction he literally cannot discriminate between 
electricity and atom bombs, agricultural techniques and the Holocaust.” (Feenberg 
1999:187) The specific functional and material properties of technologies have no 
significance for Heidegger. The level of abstraction leaves his concepts not only useless 
for an analysis of how modern technologies have changed society, but more worryingly, 
also useless in the struggle to eliminate or pacify the unfortunate development that 
Heidegger and Feenberg agree really does follow modern technology. Combined with the 
proscribed passivity, the level of abstraction entails that we either lose our influence over 
the technology and the technological development or, at a minimum, that we lose how to 
conceptualize such an influence. Heidegger’s non-interventionist approach seems to 
forbid political measures against, say, global warming, nuclear rearmament, and so on, lest 
one entangles oneself even further into the hands of Gestell. This is wrong-headed, 
Feenberg claims: “Real change will come…when we recognize the nature of our 
subordinate position in the technical systems that enroll us, and begin to intervene in the 
design process in the defense of the conditions of a meaningful life and a livable 
environment.” (1999:xiv) 
Furthermore, Heidegger’s neglect of specific technological properties leads to a notable 
consequence. On the face of it, his essentialism1 seems to be the exact opposite of the 
instrumental definition; as we have seen, technology, in Heidegger’s view, is far from 
ontologically transparent. However, a closer look into the presuppositions of 
instrumentalism and Heideggerian essentialism reveals a common attitude, namely that a 
technological action’s meaning is determined, fixed, outside the action itself; either the meaning of a 
                                                                                                                                             
that art is in some sense already related to technological artefacts in that they are made, reflected in the Greek 
expression technē (see below). (Heidegger 1993:318f), I will not go into this aspect in Heidegger’s theory, as it 
demands a specific non-technological response. I am more interested in our handling of technologies and what it 
entails. 
1 A word of caution about calling Heidegger’s take on modern technology ‘essentialism’. This is not “what these days 
is called and criticized as essentialism. Critics take exception to essentialism because they think of it as the oppressive 
imposition of a timeless mold on what is in fact historically changing and multiple in its appearances. Heidegger 
obviously does not disagree with the claim that reality changes fundamentally over time.” (Borgmann 2005:421) 
Instead, ‘essence’ used in phenomenology denotes something that is essential in our experience of the thing; that is, a 
thing without this aspect would not be experienced as this thing, but another. As such, the essence is a part of the 
meaning of the thing for us, and therefore as historically situated as we are. This way, ‘essentialism’ used here does 
not imply an autonomous Platonic idea, or an Aristotelian nature that resides in, or throughout, a thing. 
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technological action is in the Gestell, or it is in the purposes and aims of the subject or 
subjects (or society) engaging in technological actions. In neither case will the actual 
technology, not its function or its materiality, have a profound effect on the meaning of 
the technological action. For this reason, we cannot say that Heidegger’s view of modern 
technology is technological determinism, even though it implies that society is shaped by 
technological thinking. Before ending the discussion of strong views on technological 
impact, I will now turn to a more explicit argument for technological determinism. 
The machine  
Both generations of philosophers of technology acknowledge that modern technology in 
some fundamental way is different from earlier forms of technology. More precisely, 
modern forms of technology are regarded as being dissociated itself from the local 
cultural belonging that characterized pre-modern technology. In an often-cited example, 
Heidegger points to the way a hydroelectric power plant interferes in the Rhine’s natural 
course by damming up the water and regulating the river’s flow at a rate that optimizes 
the plant’s production of energy. In doing this, Heidegger notes, it is not just the energy 
extracted from the stream that is at our disposal, “even the river itself appears to be 
something at our command”. (1993:321) What is typical of the power plant is that it 
extracts the energy from the river even if there is an energy surplus in its vicinity. In such 
situations, the energy will be stored and distributed to far away places. This is typical of 
the Gestell. It pulls natural resources from its natural habitat for the sake of being at our 
disposal whenever we find it convenient to put it to use. 
In contrast, pre-modern technology emanated a certain respect towards that with which it 
interacted, the user and the objective of the technological action. The change from the 
earlier to the modern form of technology is seen in the differing contexts surrounding the 
production of the technological artefact. Heidegger famously contrasts the modern 
perception of technology with the ancient Greek concept of technē, which signifies both 
technological artefacts and works of fine art. According to Heidegger, tools and devices 
back then revered the beautiful in addition to having proper functional properties. 
(1993:318f)1 
                                              
1 It might be more accurate to say that technē means the craft of making artefacts in a technologically but also at the 
same time aesthetically informed way. In contrast to Heidegger’s claim about the parity of the two meanings, though, 
Richard Parry claims that the Greeks regarded the practical use of technē as a higher form of use than the aesthetical 
use. (Parry 2003) 
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Jacques Ellul describes much the same phenomenon with regard to pre-modern 
technology, but in the work of a Swiss armourer in the sixteenth century: 
The modifications of a given type [of sword] were not the outcome of calculation or of an 
exclusively technical will. They resulted from aesthetic considerations… As for the idea, 
frequently accepted since the triumph of efficiency, that the beautiful is that which is well 
adapted to use – assuredly no such notion guided the aesthetic searchings of the past. (Ellul 
1964:72) 
Like Heidegger, Ellul sees technology as having taken on a novel and dangerous form in 
its modern variant. What has happened is a change in the emphasis placed on the 
technology itself. While earlier times were concerned with perfecting the utilization of a 
tool, the modern view emphasizes the tool itself. Technological perfection used to be an 
achievement in the mastery of a tool, but in modern technology, in particularly 
demonstrated by the machine, perfection belongs to the mathematical rigor in the machine’s 
construction; it is the machine that needs to be perfect, not the technological action of the 
human. The aesthetical dimension, therefore, has become separated from the technology, 
or, as it appears in Ellul’s statement above, the aesthetical criteria are inverted, technologized. 
Furthermore, this has brought about a different norm for what constitutes a good (or 
even beautiful) tool, most prominently, efficiency. This is reflected in Ellul’s definition of 
modern technology: “the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for 
a given stage of development) in every field of human activity”. (1964:xxv)1 In his gloomy 
book, The Technological Society, Ellul argues that not just aesthetical considerations but all of 
society’s moral, political and economic etc values and decisions, or all human actions, are 
technologized. That is, human activity in general becomes, although not acknowledged as 
such, a result of considerations that eventually support or enhance the technological 
aspect.2 
As in Heidegger’s case, the concept of modern technology includes much more than the 
specific technological artefacts; it denotes a whole way of thinking. Although Ellul’s 
definition of modern technology clearly echoes Heidegger’s concept of calculative 
thinking, which also has ‘absolute efficiency’ – efficiency for efficiency’s own sake – as its 
main objective, he does not share Heidegger’s thoughts about a non-technological Gestell 
                                              
1 Ellul preferred the concept ‘la technique’ (trans.: technique) to denote the driving force in what amounts to the 
technological society that we live in today. It is therefore more accurate to think of la technique as the combination of 
technologies and the thoroughly technologized structure of society. Admittedly awkward at times, I will nevertheless, 
except for quotes, continue to use ‘modern technology’ when I refer to his descriptions of la technique. 
2 Ellul is without doubt highly influenced by thinkers like Max Weber and Karl Marx (Scharff & Dusek 2003b). It is 
beyond the scope of this work to trace the genealogy of Ellul’s thoughts. 
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reigning over technology (and humanity). The felonious party is technology itself. More 
precisely, the introduction of the machine is the main reason for the modern 
technologized society. However, the machine in itself is not enough. Although alienating 
and harmful in its own way – Ellul talks especially of the grittiness and slums of the large 
cities as directly caused by the introduction of the machine and the subsequent possibility 
of mass production – the mere presence of the machine does not constitute the more 
long-term danger, the technologization of society. Something else is also needed: 
The metal monster could not go on forever torturing mankind. It found in technique a rule 
as hard and inflexible as itself. Technique integrates the machine into society. It constructs 
the kind of world the machine needs and introduces order where the incoherent banging of 
machinery heaped up ruins. It clarifies, arranges, and rationalizes; it does in the domain of 
the abstract what the machine did in the domain of labor. (Ellul 1964:5) 
 
The mathematical precision, efficiency and rationality of the machine must be 
transformed into ideas – rules as Ellul calls them – of rationalization and effectiveness. 
The machine itself is too unlike the human, but ideas are human-like. But this, of course, 
does not deprive the machine of its pivotal role; when we start to think that these ideas 
are ideals, and when we start to think that the most effective is the most beautiful, it is the 
machine that has generalized its own machinistic logic into ideas. Again, it is impossible 
not to see the parallels between Heidegger and Ellul. However, in the latter’s insistence 
that the guilty party is technological rather than non-technological, it is hard to regard 
modern technology, or even the machine, as anything but inherently evil.  
In Heidegger’s view, it is the non-technological Gestell that is autonomous, not the 
technology, but for Ellul, the condition for the technologization of society by technology 
is that technology itself is autonomous. This autonomy is new with modern technology and 
means that the technological system “has become a reality in itself, self-sufficient, with its 
special laws and its own determinations… technique tolerates no judgment from without 
and accepts no limitation”. (Ellul 1964:134) Pre-modern technology was bound to local 
habits, local values, and local praxis, something that is visible in the diverse appearances of 
pre-modern technologies that perform basically the same function. As we saw above, the 
machine in itself is not autonomous either. Autonomy then, is what results when the 
machine’s evilness has transformed itself into social ideas: 
As long as technique was represented exclusively by the machine, it was possible to speak 
of “of man and the machine.”… But when technique enters into every area of life, 
including the human, it ceases to be external to man and becomes his very substance. It is 
no longer face to face with man but is integrated with him, and it progressively absorbs 
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him. In this respect, technique is radically different from the machine. This transformation, 
so obvious in modern society, is the result of the fact that technique has become 
autonomous. (Ellul 1964:6) 
Autonomy is possible because modern technology is self-augmented. In an analogous 
fashion to how technology has inverted our ideals of beauty and efficiency, technology 
has turned its own autonomy into a moral, political and economic goal. This is manifest 
by our willingly building machines that require less and less human intervention. Our 
involvement in production looks increasingly like that of a technician – the normal state is 
to observe the production, intervention is only necessary when something breaks down. 
In fact, after a while this becomes the principle for production and therefore also the 
norm for the design of new machines; the less human involvement the better: “Freeing 
man from toil is in itself an ideal. Beyond this, every intervention of man, however 
educated or used to machinery he may be, is a source of error and unpredictability. The 
combination of man and technique is a happy one only if man has no responsibility.” 
(Ellul 1964:136) 
Instead of reacting against the gradual invasion of machines into the production, which 
we should, we happily let this happen. Why? Because we are already dominated by 
technology: “[t]he power and autonomy of technique are so well secured that it, in turn, 
has become the judge of what is moral, the creator of a new morality”. (Ellul 1964:134) 
The autonomy of technology is thus fulfilled: It has made us believe that this is for the 
better for humanity, when in fact it is only good for technology itself. Modern technology 
has, Ellul adds, reduced humans to a ‘technical animal’, and society as whole has become 
a thoroughly technological society.1 To briefly sum up Ellul’s position, the introduction of 
the machine unleashes a technological ‘spirit’ that in a linear and deterministic fashion 
reduces everything in society to a technological entity; every social action is founded on 
the support and enhancement of the technological ideals inherent in the machine. 
Ellul’s vision of the technological future is even bleaker than Heidegger’s. While 
Heidegger prescribes an alleviation of the effect of modern technology through a 
meditative, relaxed attitude towards it, all that Ellul leaves us with is to resort to a form of 
Luddism.2 If we want to combat modern technology, we must throw the machine out the 
                                              
1 Ellul also treats other important characteristics in technology’s autonomy; they include rationality, artificiality, 
universality and self-directedness. See Ellul 1964, Chapter 2.  
2 Luddite was originally the name for workers who opposed the mechanization of cotton and woollen mills in 
England in the period 1811-1816. Now, Luddism is a term for those who oppose modern technology in general. 
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window, so to speak. No alternative use or alternative attitude towards it will change the 
threat of modern technology. Ellul’s analysis of the machine’s inherent dangers aside, his 
claims of the shifting mindsets and ideals in the wake of modern technology do not really 
seem correct. Even though the political climate has cooled off a little since the seventies, I 
think one would be hard pressed to find an example of automation, reorganization and 
streamlining in a corporation that results in the lay-off of employees that is not met with 
massive protests. When the production at the Union factory in Skien, Norway in 2005 
was shut down – even though the factory had a healthy cost/profit balance, the owner, 
Norske Skog, had decided to leave that line of business (a prime example of ‘efficiency 
for efficiency’s own sake’?) – various forms of support for the factory followed. The 
workers themselves and their union, the local community, some investors in Oslo, and 
politicians at the national level came up with various solutions that would secure a 
continued production at the factory. Some even argued that the corporation had a 
responsibility towards the local community, seeing that many smaller companies’ business 
was partly dependent on the continuation of the production at the factory. In spite of all 
this, however, the factory closed on March 1, 2006, and 340 workers lost their jobs. Ellul 
might have predicted the outcome of this conflict, but the massive protests and 
involvements do not align well with his contention that the technological society has 
already succumbed to technological ideals.  
As already mentioned, the younger philosophers of technology have criticized Heidegger 
and Ellul for overemphasizing the ‘uprooting’ of the cultural embeddedness that 
characterized pre-modern technology. Now we can see why: Modern technology takes on 
a form that renders impossible any room for a defining cultural influence over the technology. Given 
that the impact the other way around, from technology to the human realm, is highly 
operational on Heidegger’s and Ellul’s views, “[t]echnological development transforms 
what it is to be human” (Feenberg 1999:2), and badly so. This is the unhappy cul-de-sac 
that the younger generation seeks to overcome.1 Ontologically the monolithic view of 
technology is discarded, and methodologically the a priori and transcendental analysis is 
rejected. Instead, we have a view of technology that rejects the determinism/essentialism, 
                                              
1 It is possible to be a technological determinist and think that it is positive for humanity. This is more unusual than 
the pessimistic/dystopian kind, but Marshall McLuhan is an example. He ridicules instrumentalism, calling it 
‘somnambulism’ (McLuhan 2001:11), and does not let his essentialist leanings take him into the dystopia of Ellul and 
Heidegger, but sees the “current translation of our entire lives into the spiritual form of information” as an 
opportunity to make “the entire globe and…the human family, a single consciousness”. (McLuhan 2001:67) In 
Chapter 7, I discuss an approach to communication technologies that is inspired by McLuhan. 
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but retain the idea that technologies have the power to influence society in various ways; 
just not in the monolithic (and non-negotiable) form that both Heidegger and Ellul 
describe. 
Technology as a system  
Heidegger’s and Ellul’s analyses mean that while pre-modern technologies are seen as 
scattered and primarily linked to local technological actions and praxis, modern 
technology forms a homogenous entity where each particular technology primarily is 
universally linked to other technologies. This constitutes modern technology, in contrast 
to pre-modern technology, as a system. While Heidegger does not elaborate on this specific 
concept – admittedly, it can only be said to be implicit in the unifying Wesen of modern 
technology, it is explicit in Ellul’s treatment of the autonomy of technology. 
As the title of his first book, Autonomous Technology indicates, the American philosopher of 
technology Langdon Winner follows up on this specific concept. ‘Modern technology’ 
designates for Winner a system of technology rather than a class of technologies; 
Heidegger’s examples of modern technology are mostly singular, such as the already 
mentioned power plant, an airplane, a highway intersection etc.1 Winner’s technological 
system is made up of interconnected technologies with complex rules and complex 
interactivity concealed within the structure. While single or small clusters of technologies 
are designed, constructed, run and adopted willingly by individuals or societies, technology 
as a whole is a complex assembly that develops in a manner that cannot be manoeuvred 
fully by human intervention. Although not in the absolute sense of Ellul, Winner regards 
technology as being autonomous. Furthermore, we must acknowledge that because they 
are (semi-) autonomous, technologies have consequences with non-technological 
ramifications, that is, consequences for the structure of society as a whole. Technology is 
in this sense a part of the shaping of society, on par with other socio-political factors. This 
is expressed in the title to Winner’s most famous article: ‘Do Artefacts Have Politics?’ 
Technology comes with politically charged consequences, and it is therefore of utmost 
importance that we ourselves engage politically with technology.2 If we do not, technology 
                                              
1 Ellul has a touch of both; although some of his arguments revolve around the inherent evil of ‘the machine’, the 
system is evident in the technologization that transforms everything in society into a form of technology (in the 
sense that all values and norms eventually support the technological element). 
2 The understanding of (modern) technology as something that should be studied as a part of a larger system is also 
found in the sociological approach of technology as expressed in the edited volumes of Bijker et al. 1987 and 
MacKenzie & Wajcman 1999, as two examples. More on this approach below, and again in Chapter 2. 
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has the potential of being the prime shaper of society, which must be avoided, according 
to Winner. 
Winner, like Heidegger and Ellul, regards modern technology as something that can only 
be understood as being somewhat outside across-the-board human control, and finds, like 
Ellul and unlike Heidegger, this to be due to technology itself. Not only has technology in 
its modern appearance grown into such a huge structure that no human or society can 
oversee or control it, but because of this, it requires a surrounding socio-economical 
network so that it can function and prosper. However, as I mentioned, Winner does not 
understand the autonomy of technology to entail the determinism that Ellul holds. We 
cannot control technology as such – its total consequences will always escape our control, 
but that does not mean that we in return are controlled by technology. Winner does not 
view modern technology as inherently evil; the autonomy of technology is therefore not 
envisioned as a certified road to catastrophe.  
The autonomy of technology is related to the distribution of technological knowledge. 
Now, this could mean a number of things. For instance, few people even understand the 
most common household technologies well enough to undertake a simple repair should 
something break: “Knowledge of how things are put together and how they work exceed 
the grasp of everyone other than the expert directly concerned with the particulars.” But 
the expert only knows so much, of course, and “is largely oblivious to the nature of 
processes and configurations outside his field”. (Winner 1977:28) This is not just a trivial 
fact; it is a consequence of the demands the increasing technological complexity puts on 
society. One of the characteristics of modern technology is its specialized system of 
production: “People work within and are served by technical organizations that by their 
very nature forbid a perspicuous overview.” (Winner 1977:28) The individual not 
knowing the technological make-up of his own house is a symptom of the growing 
complexity of modern technology.  
The body and the depth of the world’s knowledge increase continually, but individuals 
cannot keep up. We are, relatively speaking, becoming more ignorant; individual 
knowledge might have increased generation by generation, but the shared pool of possible 
things to know has increased even more. So also for the body and the depth of 
technology. There is a complexity in modern technology that renders our relation to it 
almost religious: “[A]ll people do, and indeed, must accept a great number of things on 
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faith. They are aware that the major components of complex systems usually work, that 
other specialists know what they are doing, and that somehow the whole fits together in 
relatively good adjustment.” (Winner 1977:284) 
In this sense, the technological system amounts to what in cybernetics is called a black 
box. Taking his cue from electrical engineering, psychiatrist and cybernetics pioneer 
William Ross Ashby extended the application of the concept to the operation of just 
about any complex system, even something seemingly as uncomplicated as the opening of 
a door: 
The child who tries to open a door has to manipulate the handle (the input) so as to 
produce the desired movement at the latch (the output); and he has to learn how to control 
the one by the other without being able to see the internal mechanism that links them. In 
our daily lives we are confronted at every turn with systems whose internal mechanisms are 
not fully open to inspection, and which must be treated by the methods appropriate to the 
Black Box. (1956:86) 
A black box is something whose internal workings we do not oversee, but that we can 
learn to operate and manipulate; we learn to couple the input with the desired output. 
However, that does not mean that we control it. If the mechanism between the handle 
and the latch should stop working, the child would be helpless, much like what happens 
to us when the washing machine breaks down.1  
The concept of the black box is not all helpful, though, as the concept primarily applies to 
those instances when the relation between input and output is predictable in spite of the 
hidden procedures within the box. As we shall see, at the heart of Winner’s theory of 
autonomous technology this does not hold. The output is not necessarily predictable 
from what we put into a technology in terms of ideas, function and predicted 
consequences. Winner’s black box is still a black box, though, because we do not control 
all the relations and connections within the system. The technological system is more like 
a door that is connected to and opens many other doors as well; doors that we never 
meant to go through in the first place. 
                                              
1 Arguably, the most famous recent application of the black box concept is in Science and Technology Studies (STS), 
for instance in Latour 1987:2f, 1999:183ff. Latour’s definition is in accordance with Ashby’s, but Latour primarily 
narrow down its utilization to a technoscience setting. Winner employs the concept sarcastically in a criticism of one 
of the branches of STS, social constructivism of technology (see below). 
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The technological imperative 
According to Winner the increasing complexity of modern technology is due neither to a 
Heideggerian Gestell nor Ellulian evilness harboured in the midst of the technological 
system. Winner nevertheless sees the development from an easily supervised kind of 
technology into the modern concealed variant as based on what follows naturally in the 
wake of technological developments. Naturally, but not deterministically. A technological 
innovation, usually brought forward as a solution to a problem that itself can be or not be 
technological, brings with it the possibilities of new preferences, which in turn brings with 
it new problems that seek new solutions, etc. Inspired by examples from Karl Marx, 
Winner points out that: 
At a certain stage in the development of technics, the need for physical mobility actually 
becomes the need to have access to automobiles, airlines, or effective equivalents. Such 
needs are as basic for that stage of technical capacity as the need for good oxen or a good 
pair of sandals might have been for an earlier one…the feeling that soap is one of life’s 
necessities appeared only with the coming of industrial techniques of soap manufacture. 
With the spread of this innovation came an unprecedented desire for well-scrubbed 
cleanliness that is now second nature to most of us. There have been times and cultures, 
however, in which our need to do away with dirt, “germs”, and odors would have seemed 
totally puzzling. (1977:84) 
 
Now, what is puzzling, but also the most interesting, is the role and function of choice in 
technological innovation. For the most part, we will have a feeling of freedom of choice 
in our technological decisions. But that does not mean that we can foresee all the 
consequences of our choices. In a longish example, 1  Winner shows how an entire 
community in Sevettijärvi, Finland was changed culturally and economically due to the 
introduction of snowmobiles to the reindeer roundup. Initially based on a choice, the 
presence of the snowmobiles led to consequences definitely not chosen. First came a 
positive change in herding praxis, then a less positive change in the reindeer population: 
New forms of stampeding led to physiological strain on the animals, especially on 
pregnant female reindeers, and eventually a decrease in the number of families that were 
able to continue making a living based on the small reindeer population. The most 
conspicuous change was in the relations within the community; the initial economic 
prosperity led to a ‘need’ for modern household products like washing machines and 
telephones, eventually leading to a hitherto never seen social hierarchy within the 
community between those who adopted the snowmobiles and those who did not. In a 
                                              
1 Borrowed from a 1973 study by Pertti J. Pelto. 
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sense, Winner observes, the population knew what they were doing when they chose to 
modernize their business, since the snowmobiles made herding far more efficient than the 
old methods, mostly done by foot. “From another point of view, however, they never 
knew what hit them.” (Winner 1977:87) 
Although clearly inspired by Ellul’s thoughts on the self-augmentation of technology, 
Winner does not follow his pessimistic thoughts on the deterministic linearity in the 
technologization of society. The examples above illustrate that Winner acknowledges that 
profound unexpected changes follow in the wake of technologies. Furthermore, he 
emphasizes that those kinds of changes are right at the centre of the meaning of 
technology – they are due to the agency of technology, what he calls the politics of technology. 
To demonstrate the importance of this fact, he rhetorically asks us to imagine a world 
where technologies do nothing but that which we construct them to do. It is hardly 
conceivable how such a world would be, other than a radically different world than the 
one we now inhabit. Ellul focuses on the negative aspects of this, Winner on the positive. 
“Technology, in its various manifestations, affects the world by enlarging the scope and 
power of human activity in general as well as in the specifics.” (1977:98) More precisely, 
technology affects the world instrumentally and economically; that is, technology often 
requires the creation and sustaining of a socio-technological structure around itself. 
Instrumental requirements, not to be confused with the instrumental definition of 
technology, allude to the well-known aspect of advanced technologies requiring the 
development of other advanced technologies to reach or even stretch their maximized 
function. Think of the evolution of the telescope, from Galileo Galilee’s handmade one 
(which also demanded the presence of additional technology to keep it steady)1 and the 
ultra high-tech Hubble space telescope.2 
Economic requirements are non-technological requirements for a technology to work 
properly or reach further. This is not just infrastructure, laws and other socio-economic 
aspects that need to be in place for a technological object or small-scale system to be able 
to function, which, granted, are quite trivial. More importantly, this concerns the 
complete socio-economic direction a society takes after the introduction of a technology. 
We have already seen how a technology can lead to a new social norm, such as cleanliness 
as a result of the introduction of soap. Technology can also create the need for energy, 
                                              
1 http://cmi.yale.edu/bh/week3/pages/page2.html (possibly a replica) [02.01.2009] 
2 http://hubblesite.org/ [02.01.2009]  
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materials, labour and information where none such need existed previously. “Before the 
invention of heart transplanting, there was no scarcity of hearts; one per person was 
universally supplied. With the advent of transplants, however, the organ became suddenly 
a scarce commodity.” (Winner 1977:101) We can also see this in the introduction of 
various medical and microbiological technologies. This has resulted in an enormous 
demand of resource use in varying arenas: Further scientific and technological research is 
a given, but it also requires bioethical debates, new journals, extensive legislation, protest 
groups and so on. Winner labels the instrumental and economic requirements a 
technological imperative. This imperative shows how the introduction of a technology leads to 
a socio-technological dialectic to meet the novel ‘problems’ and ‘needs’ posed by 
technology.  
In addition, the phenomenon of reverse adaptation will elucidate the coalescence of 
technology and society. Defined as “the adjustment of human ends to match the 
character to available means” (Winner 1977:229), it is in effect a ‘naturalization’ of the 
semi-mystical aspect in Ellul of how the ideals of the machine are generalized as human 
ideas. At the core of this concept is the by now familiar description of how technological 
thinking invades all our other considerations. The ideals of efficiency, speed, rationality 
and goal-orientation replace playfulness, fantasy, relaxation and creativity. This can be on 
a personal level, but also on a social level where we can see to how political and economic 
objectives and aspirations change in the aftermath of a technological innovation or 
breakthrough to accommodate the use of said technology. One of Winner’s examples 
concerns the vacuum left after Neil Armstrong fulfilled President Kennedy’s space-related 
goal for the sixties and set foot on the moon. Here NASA was left with a huge high-tech 
system of experts and fine-tuned equipment, now what? A plethora of suggestions was 
put on the table – expeditions to Mars, space shuttles, etc. All had the same argument at 
their fundament: The high-tech system should continue to exist; the fulfilment of one 
goal is not enough, give the system more money to pursue new goals. The self-
argumentation is telling in how technology ‘argues’ for its own proliferation: “if the 
system is deemed important to society as a whole, and if the new purpose is crucial to the 
survival of the system, then that purpose will be supported regardless of its objective 
value to the society”.1 (Winner 1977:245) 
                                              
1 Winner probably exaggerates the lack of plans immediately after the moon landing; further plans were surely well 
underway in 1969. However, that does nothing to change the bottom line of the argument. 
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Comedian Jerry Seinfeld points out an absurdity that reflects the coalescence of 
technology and society. Apparently, he says, we were involved in activities that resulted in 
cracking our skulls open. Instead of avoiding these activities, we invented the helmet so 
that our head-cracking lifestyle could continue. Now, as it turned out, this was not 
enough; people were still cracking their heads. Therefore, we had to come up with a 
helmet law to make people wear those helmets. The main absurdity, Seinfeld continues, is 
that the idea behind the helmet law is to protect a brain that is functioning so poorly it is 
not even trying to stop cracking open the head that protects it! Technology is introduced 
as a solution to a problem (rather than disposing of the cause to the problem), and 
entangles itself even more into society by ending up as a part of a legislation that makes 
sure that people use the technology. This is an innocent example, but Seinfeld describes 
an escalating self-preservation system that also is seen in the simple fact that most of our 
remedies for things that have gone awry because of technology (I presume that in 
Seinfeld’s example the head-cracking activities are bike riding, motorcycling, parachuting, 
downhill skiing and other technologically enhanced activities) are themselves 
technologies: solar-power to respond to the demand for electricity, medicine to soften the 
side effects of other medicines, farmed fish because the oceans have been overfished, and 
so on. 
The technical imperative and reverse adaptations are central concepts for Winner, as they 
are the processes by which we understand how technology and society go together and 
form the entire system that surrounds technology. The concepts also display the agency 
of technology, that is, how technology influences this system. Therefore, the concepts 
should not be read as being all negative, because they draw “attention to the momentum 
of large-scale sociotechnical systems, to the response of modern societies to certain 
technological imperatives, and to the ways human ends are powerfully transformed as 
they are adapted to technical means”. (Winner 1986:21) To powerfully transform could 
mean a descent into the technological society in the Ellulian way, but it can also, as we 
saw above, “enlarge the power and scope of human activity”. That we acknowledge this 
aspect of technology is presupposed in all our R&D on technology in the first place, of 
course, but the agency of technology means that the enlargement goes even further, 
thereby granting an innocent pill against high blood pressure the power of sustaining 
elderly men’s active sex life. As for the ‘invention’ of the wheel – surely cars, office chairs 
and yo-yo’s were not ‘a part of the plan.’ In a sense, we cannot do as Ellul does; accept 
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the negative and reject the positive. If technology has agency it should work both ways. 
The question is, of course, how should we go about to ensuring that it goes mostly in the 
good way? 
Negotiating with technology 
Technological imperatives and reverse adaptation can be seen as a rather more tangible 
description of the self-augmentation of technology. As we saw above, Ellul explained this 
phenomenon by pointing to the machine’s inherent deterministic character, which set off 
a linear development towards the full technologization of society. Winner’s account, on 
the other hand, does not entail (or presuppose) technological determinism. Without 
determinism, Winner evades two central, but problematic aspects of Ellul’s theory: 
reductionism and technocracy. The first occurs through the process of technologization – 
when we ‘act on behalf’ of technology in social activities and decision making, eventually 
all personal and social entities will, willingly or not, support the integration of the 
technological ideals. 
Technocracy is a crucial element in the theory of the technological society, as the power 
will befall those who know how to deal with modern technology. A technocracy is a state 
that does not arrive at its decisions through political negotiations, but through technical-
scientific considerations. (Smits 2001:157) Typical for a technocracy is that there exists a 
gap between the intellectual incapacity of the mob of specialized workers on the one hand 
and the monopoly of technical means by a technical elite on the other. The new elite is an 
elite even when it is popular with the people… Technique shapes an aristocratic society, 
which in turn implies aristocratic government. Democracy in such a society can only be a 
mere appearance. (Ellul 1964:275) 
Because the means for the unification of society – planning, propaganda and legislation – 
are already in the possession of the state, it follows that a technocracy will be vital in 
determining how modern technology, unlike pre-modern technology, becomes such a 
universal force. In fact, modern technology will enhance the possibilities the state has to 
unify and control society, so the self-augmentation of technology is seen at work once 
more. States, whether they are dictatorships or democracies, have no other option than to 
yield to technological expertise: if politicians resist the expertise they will be pushed aside 
by the experts, if they give in, well, they have given in. (Ellul 1964:259)  
The different views of Winner and Ellul on these questions can be seen in their differing 
ways of understanding autonomy. For Ellul, autonomy means that technology itself 
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initiates and directs technological actions. For Winner, however, autonomy is made up of 
two irreducible principles: a) we choose the technology and, b) technology has agency, i.e. 
social consequences. Technological actions are always initiated by us, by actual choice 
(Ellul would say that the choice was only ostensible).1 That, however, does not entail total 
control over all consequences of a technological action or the introduction of a 
technology to society. If we lean towards technological determinism (or instrumentalism 
for that matter), we will lose sight of the actual actions that are necessary in order to have 
a decisive influence over the socio-technical development. It is therefore crucial to get the 
analysis of technology right, and this includes the meaning of the concept of autonomy. 
Winner seems to be saying that, yes, technology is an overwhelming system, and therefore 
the expert is necessary, but the expert only controls part of the system and for that 
reason, we need to treat technology politically. A political level can co-ordinate 
subsystems of experts, and thereby gain a higher level of control. That is how we can 
come to grips with technological development. This does not mean that we gain total 
control over the technology though, as it still is autonomous in the minimal sense that 
Winner proposes. Instead, technology could be treated as another political player, and 
then we could expect the same kind of flexibility/inflexibility and egalitarianism/non-
egalitarianism from technology as we expect from a political opponent. When it comes to 
the shaping of society, we negotiate with technology. 
When it comes to the specifics of this negotiating process, Winner becomes much more 
vague. This theme is not really explored in Autonomous Technology, except for a very general 
last (half-) chapter on what he calls epistemological Luddism. After reviewing a few 
options that all resemble a plea for a return to a romantic pre-modern technological 
society – options that he writes off on the grounds that “[t]here is no living body of 
knowledge, no method of inquiry applicable to our present situation that tells us how to 
move any differently from the way we already do” (1977:328), he again stresses the 
importance of acknowledging “the fact that there are already technologies occupying the 
available physical and social space and employing the available resources”. (1977:239) 
Instead of looking away from this fact, we must make the most of it; to open up the black 
                                              
1 This is simplified and exaggerated, as it is a practical impossibility to impose a choice on all and every instance of 
technologically tinted incident that falls upon us: “Each individual lives with procedures, rules, processes, 
institutions, and material devices that are not of his making but powerfully shape what he does. It is scarcely even 
imaginable what it would mean for each of us to make decisions about the vast array of sociotechnical circumstances 
that enter our experience.” (Winner 1977:86) The important thing is that even if there are instances where we could 
question the range of choices we have, this does not mean that we never choose. 
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box, to lay bare the interconnections, to gain entrance, so to speak, to the labyrinths of 
the technological system. That does not necessarily mean to dismantle the actual 
technological artefacts, but to deconstruct the system; proper access to socio-
technological development goes through a proper analysis of it. Epistemological Luddism 
is primarily a methodology intended to disclose patterns and types of human dependency 
on small and large-scale technological networks.  
How does Winner think that this should be accomplished? Can we get at the core of 
these problems through some good old-fashioned armchair philosophy? Here Winner 
becomes somewhat of a more traditional Luddite after all as he proposes a number of 
experiments to see how deeply dependent we really are on the technology around us. One 
experiment is to “disconnect crucial links in the organized system for a time and [study] 
the result”. (1977:332) Admittedly, this will create social commotion, but it still offers a 
chance to learn about the innermost nature of the systems and institutions. However, is 
not this as romantic and utopian as the alternatives Winner himself dismissed? How are 
we to disconnect the systems? Does Winner believe that it is possible to come to a socio-
political agreement on this? Private/corporate investors control many, perhaps most, 
large-scale technologies connected to production and infrastructure. Could we sidestep a 
society’s economic (super-) powers by a democratic decision to shut down, or disconnect 
the business of these economic players? Would Microsoft accept that, ‘just as an 
experiment’? I doubt that even the governmentally owned Norwegian oil-company 
StatoilHydro would accept this kind of intervention. If not, does Winner then encourage 
civil disobedience, or sabotage? That does not integrate well with his emphasis on 
democracy elsewhere in his screed.1 However, like it or not, the power in a society is 
distributed unequally; some considerations, usually economic, will always outweigh others, 
even from the perspective of a democratic state.2  
                                              
1 Winner does recognize the danger (or the advantage!) of sabotage in modern technological society. (Winner 1975) 
2  Although this is not the place for a politically inclined discussion, Winner displays what I think is a naïveté 
concerning democratic processes (cf. Smits 2001:167). He occasionally talks about a more extensive layman 
participation in the development of new technologies, recently proposing to a US Congressional committee that 
nanotechnology research should be performed in a way that allowed for non-professionals to scrutinize the research. 
(Winner 1995, 2003, 2006) Admiringly, in discussing these matters he shows an unlimited belief in the inherent good 
in people. Although fully aware of existing political and social power relations, he seems to believe that given the 
chance in a truly egalitarian society people would generally act and decide in an informed and selfless way, sometimes 
referring to Scandinavia as a place where non-professionals roles are taking on a more active part in “the shaping of 
technological order”. (Winner 1995:78) To me, as someone who lives in a Scandinavian country where one of the 
largest political parties is a right-winged populist one, this sounds a little flawed. However, undoubtedly there are 
ways of explaining the current political tendencies in Norway that would shed light on why richness, freedom and 
possibilities for participation tend to draw people towards egoism and indifference. 
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A more hands-on experiment would be to refuse to restore technological artefacts as they 
break down, or even to let the systems they are a part of die. Too many resources are 
spent without any questioning on keeping fragile, oversized, or perhaps obsolete systems 
running. “We build more and more freeways, larger and larger suburban developments, 
greater and greater systems of centralized water supply, power, sewers, and police, all in a 
frantic effort to sustain order and minimal comfort in the sprawling urban complex.” 
(Winner 1977:333) Again, concerning the major players in both national and international 
economies, I must ask how realistic this is. Is it not likely that anyone with a large 
investment in the infrastructure of a society would fight against the mere disintegration of 
the investments? In addition, more theoretically, would this not create even more chaos 
out of the technological system? Unless all examples of a type of technology break down 
simultaneously, this would either lead to a kind of social hierarchy that resembles the 
Finnish reindeer herding community after the introduction of snowmobiles, in the sense 
that some have the technology (that still works) and some do not. Alternatively, it would 
lead people to find alternative solutions. Presumably, it is this last alternative Winner 
hopes for, but unless this is a pre-modern sort of alternative, we would have the presence 
of a competing technology with its own agency, setting off a dialectics of its own. The 
complexity of the socio-technical system would increase, not diminish. The black box 
would become even more unhandy. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 could be viewed as a kind of disturbance to 
the socio-technical system that would give us the chance to re-think our relations to the 
socio-technological society. But as Winner himself has noted (he has written extensively 
on this event), this interruption has not led to a more open, participatory, and democratic 
society, the kind of society Winner hoped for in his 1977 musings about epistemological 
Luddism. The technologies for and appurtenant legislation concerning surveillance, 
security and control have increased extensively in the last few years. The measure that is 
apparent to most of us (not just Americans), the tightening of airplane security, is only 
one, and perhaps innocuous, effect on our daily life. “We cannot know the specific 
intentions of the September 11 terrorists. But if one of their aims was to render our way 
of life much less open and free, they have succeeded beyond their wildest dreams.” 
(Winner 2004:163) The socio-technical system that surrounds the attacked, that is, the 
‘interrupted’ component reacted by protecting the overall system: “The country is 
building new barriers around crucial systems, strengthening their internal components, 
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surrounding them with elaborate methods of policing and surveillance.” (Winner 
2004:167) The black box has turned blacker, sturdier. To me, this looks like a reaction 
one should only expect from the system. As long as the system is not experiencing a total 
breakdown, but only disturbances, it will protect itself. The kind of socio-technological 
system that Winner describes is more akin to a network of (semi-) independent 
components rather than a building where the top 90 floors are dependent on the first 
floor. We can, of course, question the legitimacy and the democracy challenging aspects 
of these control intensifying processes, but as long as the power in a society is politically, 
economically, or technologically far from equally distributed, the methodology of 
epistemological Luddism seems as romantic and utopian as the alternatives Winner 
dismissed. The way I see it, it is a long way until we can reach a point where a democratic 
dismantling of socio-technological systems that Winner yearns for is possible. 
As we have seen over the last few pages, Winner shares the worry of Ellul and Heidegger 
about the escalating haste of modern life – an escalation spurred by modern technology. 
And it seems to me that this is partly what he wants to come to grips with. But is the pace 
of modern life inextricably linked to modern technology? Non-Western cultures have 
integrated modern technology without necessarily adapting the lifestyle. I am not aware of 
any comparative studies between the Western and the non-Western ‘way of life’ as 
influenced by modern technology, 1  but there very well can be other reasons besides 
technological ones that have led the Western civilization to adopt its specific pace. To 
blame our hasty existence on technology might be too close to the reductionism of Ellul. 
Exploiting the agency 
Winner is a little less Luddite in spirit when he writes about how we can exploit the 
agency of technology. In the aforementioned article ‘Do Artefacts Have Politics?’ Winner 
explores how we can use technology to promote certain political ideas. More precisely, 
how a certain technological structure can deliberately lead to a social structure that fits 
certain political ideas. The most illustrative example is his well-known interpretation of 
                                              
1 An attempted example of such is found in Hubert L. Dreyfus’ study of the Styrofoam cup in Japan. (1993) Dreyfus 
sees this as a prime example of how modern technologies can be received through a very different understanding of 
things and existence, giving way to a different role all-together for the modern, where the modern and pre-modern 
can co-exist. The Western mistake is to let the modern become the only way of life. We simply have forgotten the 
other ways of being, as Heidegger would say; we have forgotten how to ask questions. Then again, in Japan there is 
even an established expression, Karo-jisatsu, that means ‘death by overwork’, so perhaps we should be careful to 
conclude that Japan has escaped the Western pace from this example alone.  
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New York City planner Robert Moses’ design of the bridges that pass over the Long 
Island Parkways from his time as civic planner. These bridges are relatively low, allowing 
only cars to pass below them. No trucks or buses fit underneath. One of the 
consequences of this was that at the time the overpasses were built, only people who were 
relatively well off could gain access to the recreational areas and beaches that were out on 
Long Island. In effect, Moses blocked all racial minorities and low-income groups from 
visiting these areas. Now, Moses was also the planner for some of these areas, such as 
Jones Beach, and Winner asserts that the socially biased consequences were not 
accidental, but were meticulously thought out in advance, and then built into the designs. 
Through a specific design and construction of the technology, Moses achieved a political 
and social goal without compromising the prime function of the overpasses; other 
vehicles could pass over the parkways without disturbing the traffic underneath (and 
therefore it can be hard to notice socio-political implications of technological structures 
like this). More generally, Moses’ planning tended to favour highways instead of the 
infrastructure of public transportation. 
This example illustrates an additional effect of the agency of technology; we can utilize 
this agency, we are not just under its influence. We do not merely need to find measures 
against them, or to diminish their effect, we can actively shape the world around us 
through them. Winner himself points to several examples of the same phenomenon, 
Baron Haussmann’s wide boulevards in 19th century Paris (to discourage situations that 
fuel revolutionary tendencies), the construction by American universities of huge plazas in 
the late sixties (to defuse student demonstrations). In fact, it is conceivable that many 
kinds of city planning will include some choices that will be of a social and political 
character. The monumental structures along Berlin’s Karl Marx Allé, especially the 
Frankfurter Tor and its adjoining buildings, were surely not constructed by the DDR for 
merely functional purposes; standing outside the buildings will make anyone realize his 
diminutiveness compared to that of the State. 
Winner has been criticized for his unambiguous interpretation of Moses’ work, because it 
leaves no room for context-sensitive receptions of technologies. (Woolgar 1991) In line 
with this thinking, a technology’s effect cannot be determined in advance, either from a 
designer or from inherent characteristics of the technology itself. It would therefore be 
wrong to fix its meaning unequivocally from one of the perspectives, for instance the 
design perspective, the meaning rather being regarded as constructed socially within its 
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context of use. Others have expressed the worry that Winner (in general) is too 
ideological in his writings, presenting his politically inclined interpretations as facts. (Pitt 
2000:73) Steve Woolgar’s criticism spurred Winner to write a widely discussed criticism of 
the social constructivist perception of technology.1 Taking Woolgar’s criticism of himself 
as a prime example of this kind of thinking, Winner condemns what he perceives as a 
naïve value-neutral methodology. Although obviously finding the constructivist 
methodology of ‘opening up the black box’ of technological systems valuable (no wonder, 
it does bear a striking resemblance to his own epistemological Luddism), Winner is not 
content with a mere opening as it will fail to expose the significance of certain 
technological choices. This renders the constructivist analysis descriptive and lacking in 
normative potency. 
Winner attributes this to a commitment in social constructivism to study the origins of 
the conventional use of technology rather than its consequence. “What the introduction 
of new artefacts means for people’s sense of self, for the texture of human communities, 
for qualities of everyday living, and for the broader distribution of power in society – 
these are not matters of explicit concern.” (Winner 1993:368) Woolgar, who in criticizing 
Winner depends on the general social constructivist aversion against postulating 
inevitabilities, sides with Pitt in attacking Winner’s categorical interpretation: “In order to 
present technology as either requiring or being compatible with a particular form of social 
organization, Winner advances a definitive version of the capacity or effects of that 
technology.” (Woolgar 1991:34) For Woolgar, this means that Winner, instead of opening 
up the black box of the technological system, once more ‘black boxes’ it, in as much as he 
treats “as definitive what might elsewhere be treated…as essentially contingent and 
contestable versions of the capacity of various technologies”. (Woolgar 1991:95) This, in 
Woolgar’s eyes, brings Winner too close to technological determinism. I cannot agree. If 
anything, this criticism implies that Winner himself suddenly advocates instrumentalism 
and that the technology is reduced to a mere instrument of Moses’ intentions. If politics 
and social issues from the design perspective are the driving force behind, and constitutes 
                                              
1 Winner 1993. Although social constructivism primarily is associated with the criticism of objectivist conceptions of 
the nature of scientific facts (Bloor 1976, Latour & Woolgar 1986, Collins & Pinch 1993), it can more generally be 
regarded as a methodological approach to any man-made concept that has been thought to refer to an inherent 
nature independent of how humans see or think about them, from ‘countries’ to ‘subjectivity’ and ‘gender’, and as 
such a critique of theories of determinism and inevitability. For a sympathetic but critical overview of constructivism 
in general, see Hacking 1999 (he prefers the term constructionism). Whenever I discuss ‘social constructivism’ (here 
and in the next chapter), it is the social construction of technology that I am addressing. 
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the meaning of a technology, does it then make sense to speak of an inherent politics of the 
technologies themselves? (See also Smits 2001:167) This is, in fact, an ambiguity in 
Winner’s conceptualization of technology that leaves us in doubt about the organizing 
qualities of the technologies themselves. As the next three chapters display, technologies, 
because they have agency, have far more ontologically interesting properties than being 
instruments for our goals and intentions. 
The main problem with any value-neutral approach is that one misses the fact that there is 
a sliding scale in how much we can influence technologies’ consequences. Some 
technologies are open in this regard, that is, their effects are flexible, open to negotiation 
(and control, such in the example of the overpasses), and their socio-political function is 
to a large degree dependent on the context they are employed in, that is, both intentions 
and social conventions. This is true for most technologies. Even if not all their 
consequences can be anticipated, unwanted social and political effects can be eliminated 
and remedied after the fact. 
However, other technologies are authoritarian, meaning that their social and political 
effects are less flexible and more deterministic.1 In such cases, “the initial choice about 
whether or not to adopt something is decisive in regard to its consequences. There are no 
alternative physical designs or arrangements that would make a significant difference.” 
(Winner 1986:38) An authoritarian technology opens up a social and political 
developmental trajectory that is hard, perhaps impossible, to alter. The main example, 
perhaps the only real clear-cut example of a thoroughly authoritarian technology, that 
Winner mentions, is the atom bomb. Once it was created, it had, and still has, a range of 
socio-political consequences, some of which could not possibly have been foreseen by 
Oppenheimer and the Manhattan Project, such as the Cold War itself, through ‘Glasnost’ 
and beyond, and up to the recent fear of terrorist groups possessing ‘dirty bombs’. 
Unpredicted consequences are to be expected from any technology, something that is also 
emphasized by social constructivism (Oudshoorn & Pinch 2003), but this particular 
trajectory seems to have been impossible to halt through socio-political means. Even 
though the Cold War has ended, the atom bomb has shaped our society forever. 
Because some technologies are more authoritarian than others, it is of utmost importance 
for politicians, entrepreneurs and all those involved in large-scale technological planning 
                                              
1 Winner owes this distinction to Lewis Mumford (Winner 1986:19).  
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and decisions that one does not regard all technology as normatively neutral concerning 
values and social effects. To do so, “to believe that they are working on a rather flexible 
technology whose adverse social effects can be fixed by changing the design parameters” 
(Winner 1986:39), would be an outright self-delusion, and a dangerous one at that. 
Instead of being an expression of a determinist (or instrumentalist) approach, Winner’s 
criticism of the social construction of technology is a highly normative socio-political 
statement.  
Social structure and agency 
It should be noted, though, that this normative element in Winner’s analysis of the agency 
of technology, democratic or authoritarian, usually brings him to fairly negatively tinted 
investigations. Authoritarian technologies are negative in themselves, but also when 
discussing democratic technologies, the question often becomes how we should delimit 
the possible dangerous aspects of use and misuse. Only occasionally does he explicitly 
mention the constructive possibilities inherent in his own view about the agency of 
technology. Because of this, Winner (especially in Autonomous Technology) appears to still 
have a lot in common with the sweeping and depressing analysis of Ellul. This is 
especially apparent in their opinion that modern technology amounts to the structuring of 
society, and it is evident that they do not regard this finding in a positive light. “However 
important and impressive mechanical technique remains, it is only accessory to other 
factors which are much more decisive, if less spectacular. I have in mind the vast amount 
of organization in every field.” (Ellul 1964:11) For Ellul the organization is what results 
when the machine’s ideals are converted into social standardization and rationalization. 
(Ellul 1964:11f) Winner, in defining ‘organization’ in much the same vein (“the term 
organization will signify all varieties of technical (rational-productive) social arrangements” 
(Winner 1977:12)), implies strongly that modern technology shapes modern society in a 
primarily negative way; the social structure has ‘the negative’ built-in. 
For both thinkers, the concept of organization is linked to modern technology. While pre-
modern technology was structured through local cultural praxes, modern technologies 
inherently have organizational powers. The consequence of this is that Winner follows 
Ellul (and Heidegger) in reinforcing the contrast between pre-modern and modern 
technology. Of course, as I have mentioned earlier, this contrast should not be taken too 
lightly, but one crucial implication of this is that pre-modern technologies end up as being 
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explained instrumentally; the relation between pre-modern man and pre-modern 
technology is explained as an instrumental relation. We then face a situation where 
technologies in the pre-modern era are seen as mere instruments, while technologies in 
our days are ontologically and politically oppressive. 
One of the reasons why this ‘dualism’ occurs is because the relation between modern 
technology and social structure is treated entirely as a political one. Because the structures 
in our surroundings are analysed as belonging to the political domain the relationship 
becomes an expression of a power relationship. However, if we instead treat the social 
structure as a more general expression of how our lifeworld ‘always already’ is meaningful, 
a different picture emerges: a) pre-modern technologies can be seen as having 
‘organizational powers’ as well, and b) the organizational activity due to technologies can 
be both negative and positive, both harmful and constructive in both pre-modern and modern 
eras. In this sense we can have a continuation between pre-modern and modern use of 
technology, while at the same time keeping the explanatory means to carry out a political 
analysis of the role modern technology-as-a-system has taken in the industrialized parts of 
our world.  
In closing 
The political analysis aside, Winner’s conception of the duality in the agency of 
technology points us in the direction of the general aim of this project: How the meaning 
of technology is two-sided. The world that we are thrown into at birth is (always already) 
meaningful; we meet the world-as-structured through sets of meaning-structures. This is the 
lifeworld whose arrangement and appearance we just have to acknowledge upon entering. 
A large part of how today’s lifeworld presents itself is due to technology. At the same 
time, all activity in the world is an organizing endeavour; we use technology to create new 
structures of meaning, or to alter existing ones. In neither case is instrumentalism, the 
thought that technology is ontologically transparent, an option. 
When we discuss instrumentalism, the question is not whether technology shapes our 
society or not; I think most people will agree that it does. It is absurd to deny that there is 
a relation between the car and the many highways cutting through almost every 
Norwegian valley or mountain pass, as one example. Instrumentalism is instead a denial, 
implicit if nothing else, of the marked impact on our world, our society, from technology 
itself. It is a denial of technology’s inherent politics, as Winner would phrase it. 
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Instrumentalism is to put the entire responsibility of the miserable, or otherwise, 
conditions of our world on the people and the society that use the technology. Even the 
unanticipated consequences of technological innovation and use are located at the user 
end of the technological action, as a result of the unforeseen consequences of our 
decisions or of our inferences. To say this, however, is to lose a valuable analytical tool, 
whether one is studying history, sociology, or philosophy. The changes that the 
introduction of a technology brings become somewhat mystical and elusive. By 
acknowledging that technology has an influential role, we can grasp the changes at their 
root, although we will be just as ill-equipped to foresee precisely what consequences will 
follow in the wake of a technological innovation. Technology is ontological – it shapes 
our world, our lifeworld.1 
However, there is a certain ambiguity in Winner’s conception. On the one hand, he tells 
us that technology has agency, that is, it has organizing qualities. On the other hand, the 
examples he provides point in the direction of the instrumental definition of technology; 
because of this agency, we can use technologies to organize society in a manner of our 
own choice. 2  The way I see it, this stops short of a full analysis of the impact of 
technology on our world and on our society. Therefore, we need to explore the full extent 
of this impact, which amounts to exploring the meaning of technology. 
The main task for this chapter, then, has primarily been to argue that technologies 
(modern and pre-modern) have an impact on society that needs to be recognized. I have 
shown the inadequacy of holding that technologies are mere means for our intentions, 
and by implication, also as neutral in relation to socially governed (i.e. conventional) uses. 
I have also argued that there is a sense of negotiating when we interact with technologies, 
thereby implying the erroneousness of determinist and essentialist conceptions of 
technology. The question facing us now, then, is what exactly is the meaning of 
technology? 
 
                                              
1 There is obviously a sliding scale between near-instrumentalism (or near-social determinism) and near-technological 
determinism. Some examples will point in one direction, others in the opposite. Even if an example points in one 
direction, this does not mean that it should be taken as an expression of the extreme end of this direction. 
2 Instrumentalism, remember, is the instrumental definition coupled with a notion of technologies as transparent. 
Winner does not hold the latter notion, of course. 
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Defining ‘technology’ 
Stephen J. Kline claims that the only thing writers on technology agree on is that 
technology is important. (2003:210) Apart from this, there is little agreement to be found 
in the literature. Disagreements can be about the relation between the social and the 
technological development. This includes questions such as those we encountered in the 
previous chapter about technology’s possible autonomous drive; whether technology has 
a specific essence, whether the autonomous drive or the essence implies de-humanization, 
and so forth. Another often-discussed question is the ethics connected to use and 
development of technology, both within and outside a scientific setting. This is especially 
evident in the flourishing field of bioethics, where the proposed needs and possible 
consequences of both the development and application of biotechnologies are scrutinized 
and discussed by scientists, philosophers, ethicists, non-professionals with economic 
interests, and politicians alike. Further, one can discuss the relation between technology 
and science, with a philosophy of technology only recently coming out as a discipline of 
its own. (Ihde 1993:3f, Dusek 2006:1) The questions concerning technology are 
themselves plentiful; accordingly the answers even more so. 
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Like questions of religion, disagreements on technology and its relation to science, ethics 
or some other social and cultural matter can sometimes be traced to differing opinions 
about the definitions of the concepts involved in the discussion. (Dusek 2006:26) What, 
exactly, in our surroundings should be labelled a technology? What is the difference 
between a thing, or an artefact, a tool, and a technology? Looking at how the concept of 
technology is employed across disciplines; from philosophy to sociology and 
anthropology to architecture and engineering, and across academic cultures (continental 
vs. Anglo-American), one can safely conclude that the concept itself comes without any 
rigid rules for its application.1 Because the concept encompasses phenomena so diverse in 
their characteristics and so varied in their use, it seems impossible to define it sufficiently 
general. Thomas Hughes points to another problem in tracing the concept of technology: 
[H]istorians of technology today are applying the word to activities and things in the past 
not then known as technology, but that are similar to activities and things in the present 
that are called technology. For example, machines in the nineteenth century and mills in 
the medieval period are called technologies today, but they were not so designated by 
contemporaries, who called them simply machines and mills. (2004:3f) 
Instead of finding one definition that suits all, maybe ‘technology’ should be seen as a 
family resemblance type of concept – Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion for general concepts 
whose instances share characteristics with some of the other instances, but none shares 
characteristics with all. (Wittgenstein 1953:§66-67, Dusek 2006:29) Rather than grasping 
for a universally valid definition, it will then be necessary to form a set of criteria that 
delimits the extension, namely, the set of things, artefacts, systems that ‘technology’ refers 
to in specific points in time. However, this approach presupposes that we already have a 
preconception of what ‘technology’ means (in this specific point in time) – how else could 
we point out the extension? 
As we shall see, Martin Heidegger argues that to regard an item, for instance a hammer, as 
a thing with specific properties that renders it a piece of technology is an abstraction of 
how the item already functions, or is meant to function, within a certain context. 
Ontologically, the use is prior to the definition. This means that before we can say what 
technology means, we should explore how it performs; technology-in-action is prior to the 
conceptual meaning of technology. In shifting the centre of attention from the concept of 
technology per se to technologically mediated actions, a very interesting perspective 
                                              
1 Mitcham (1994) exposes theories and thoughts about technology in a variety of approaches, from the humanities 
via science to engineering. 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r e a l i s m  5 7  
emerges: Technological actions make the world appear in a way that is related to the 
properties and aspects of the technology in use. Consequently, technological actions, and 
by that technologies, take part in the constitution of the world. It is my opinion that this 
is the most profound approach to the question of the meaning of technology (in the 
general sense), and for this reason, I will explore the meaning of technology through the 
technologically related appearance of the world. In this chapter, I introduce the main 
ideas related to this perspective, which I call the constitutional-articulative perspective, while the 
next two chapters expand on the ideas that are presented here. 
If technology was defined by its Wesen, as Heidegger wants it, the extension of 
‘technology’, would be given: Anything that instantiates this Wesen, anything that enhances 
and supports technological thinking, would qualify as a technology. However, once 
Heidegger’s brand of essentialism is rejected a different approach to capture what the 
concept of technology refers to has to be utilized. Val Dusek claims that technology 
understood as tools and machines is “the most obvious definition”. (2006:31) Most 
philosophers of technology, however, Dusek himself included, regards the extension of 
‘technology’ to include more than tools. Larry Hickman for instance, defines technology 
as “the invention, development, and cognitive deployment of tools and other artefacts”. 
(2001:12) In fact, artefacts seem to be more important to the definition than tools are. 
Don Ihde defines technology as “those artifacts of material culture that we use in various 
ways within our environment” (1990:1), while Carl Mitcham starts his Thinking through 
Technology with the following: “Technology, or the making and using of artefacts…”. 
(1994:1) Tools might be an obvious association to form upon hearing the word 
technology, but it is not an exhaustive category. Chairs, cupboards, refrigerators, trains, 
medicine, jeans and blankets, presumptively, could be labelled technological items straight 
off, but rather more awkwardly tools. Furthermore, tool-use does not necessitate using a 
technology, as the emphasis on artefact means that a tool must be manufactured to be 
identified as a technology. Using a hammer to hit a nail, then, entails a technological 
action, while using a randomly picked stone does not, even though the two items could be 
used interchangeably and the stone is used as a tool.  
Using artefacts as the basis for the definition – that is, to require that a technology is 
something manufactured – delimits technology to the human realm. (Ihde 1993b:47f) 
Tool-use, however, is more widespread. Opportunistic tool-use, to utilize a naturally 
occurring item, is well documented among other primates, for instance chimpanzees use 
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blades of grass to fetch termites from their nest and sticks to beat objects down from 
trees. Similar kinds of tool-use are found among non-primates as well, vultures can drop 
rocks onto ostrich eggs to crack these open, and the sea otter is known to use rocks to 
open up the shells that protects the abalone.1 (Stanford 2001:111) Adaptations and small 
modifications of found tools can also occur among primates; chimpanzees choose 
particular stones for their functionality, twigs are lopped off sticks, straws are shaped to 
improve the termite ‘fishing’, and so on. (Ihde 1993b:48, Stanford 2001:111ff, Ambrose 
2001:1748f) 
To a certain degree, such examples threaten the human exclusivity of manufacture, but 
approximately 2.5 million years ago, with the first hominids, the Homo Habilis, a different 
method of manufacturing tools emerged, which marks an entirely different kind of tool 
use all together. Homo Habilis created a certain type of tools that is called Olduwan, named 
after the site of their initial discovery, the Olduwai Gorge in today’s Tanzania. These tools 
are remarkable because they were manufactured using other tools. Oldowan tools are 
stones with sharp edges that made them suitable to skin animals, to cut flesh, or to cut 
open bones. (Mithen 1996:106ff, Ambrose 2001:1749). The edges were made by chipping 
flakes off the stone in a single stroke using another stone. This demands a fine-grained 
technique, but more interestingly, the chipper-stone had itself been modified to suit the 
task. Furthermore, this chipping was performed on top of a base used as an anvil. 
(Ambrose 2001:1749) Hence, we see the beginning of a system of tool making 
(accordingly, the Olduwan tools are sometimes referred to as the Oldowan Industrial 
Complex). 
Although we should be careful to proclaim that the Oldowan tools marks a qualitative 
different kind of tool making, it is doubtless a more advanced kind, and seems to be quite 
specific for humans. Kanzi, a bonobo (pygmy chimpanzee) has been trained to make 
stone tools in a similar fashion, but has not been able to perform an adequately fine-
grained operation; to make Oldowan tools the strike must be both forceful and accurate. 
(Ambrose 2001:1749) Of course, this primarily shows that the physiological evolution of 
the bonobo has not equipped Kanzi with the required bodily and cognitive skills that 
Homo Habilis had evolved by the time the Olduwan tools were created, rather than saying 
                                              
1 Abalone is a clam, who, like the common mussel, the scallop and the oyster, resides within two shells. 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r e a l i s m  5 9  
that industrial human tool use is qualitatively different from that of opportunistic and 
proto-manufactured tool use by animals.1 
Technological action 
Moreover, using ‘artefact’ as the definition of technology would presuppose the very 
thing that is to be defined. There is nothing in the thing that we call a ‘hammer’ that tells 
us that it is a piece of technology (or even a tool). We can easily establish that it is a 
manufactured object (as opposed to a stone), but so is a painting, a sculpture, or any 
objects of art or religious belonging, which, although usually made by technological 
devices, should be kept out of the definition of technology. Therefore, unless we already 
have determined that any manufactured item defines as technology, we gain little by 
inspecting the hammer-in-itself. Instead, we need to consider the overall context for the 
hammer, what it is made to do, how it performs this task, etc. In this sense, a hammer is a 
technology because it enters a praxis of, say, hitting nails, or constructing houses (these 
days it has been replaced with a nail gun in this particular praxis). Or, at least, that it has 
the potential for entering such praxes.2 We can tell that a hammer is a piece of technology 
because we recognize its action potential in light of a given context. That the hammer is 
dependent on the context in this sense can seem to be a fairly trivial argument, but when 
the subject matter is the meaning of technology, this relation attains a more substantial 
importance. The hammer and its context are what I will call interdependent. The hammer is 
a hammer because it can be used as such within a context, but what stands out from the 
world as a relevant context is in turn dependent on the hammer itself. What the hammer 
affords – rock hard hits or pulling things, points it toward things like nails and spikes, 
things that afford hitting or pulling. 
Heidegger’s discussion in Being and Time of the primacy of our practical understanding of 
objects in the world over our theoretical knowledge of them emphasizes this line of 
                                              
1 Although I too will consider human belonging as a requirement for technology, it is with certain unease, as it is 
difficult to see a clear-cut argument for why technology should be confined to the human realm. Cultural 
embeddedness is widely regarded as important (Ihde 1993b:50), so it might be taken for granted that cultural praxes 
are exclusively human. However, Stanford points out that the novel and successful ways of handling and modifying 
tools often propagate and remains over generations within a group of chimpanzees, leading to great variation in use 
between groups. In this sense, tool use among chimpanzees forms a cultural expression, or praxis. Stanford also 
points out that several primates’ shows behavioural traditions – socially transmitted patterns of behaviour specific to 
groups, although not always connected to tool use. (2001:115) Besides reinforcing an untenable dualism between 
nature and culture, technology defined as exclusively human might reflect a lingering anthropocentrism in our 
thinking about the difference between human and animal tool use. 
2 This is the crux of Heidegger’s tool-analysis, which I will explain more fully shortly. 
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reasoning. Heidegger claims that when we are in-the-world, we do not find ourselves in a 
geometrically defined room, or space, surrounded by ‘neutral’ or pure entities that we 
then are free to interpret in any way we choose. Instead, the space we are in is defined 
through the entities that fill it. However, this should not be understood to mean that the 
room is merely ‘the sum total’ of these entities, because we get to know, firstly, the 
entities through a certain in-use-approach that defines them as the kind of entities that 
they are, and secondly, the space as connected to the entities in the way they are. The way 
we are able to approach an entity is attributable to its readiness-to-hand, its zuhandenheit, 
which defines how the entity can be put to use. We should be careful how we understand 
this, because Heidegger does not see readiness-to-hand as something belonging to an 
entity, or as a way of describing it, instead “[r]eadiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they 
are in themselves are defined ontologico-categorially”. (Heidegger 1962:101/71) This means that 
readiness-to-hand is primary even to calling it an ‘entity’, or a ‘thing’, not to mention 
calling it a ‘hammer’. Readiness-to-hand is how the thing exists, how it can be approached 
by us, that is, the mode in which we get to know something that we can call a thing, or a 
tool. It follows from this that all entities are primarily approached as tools, or equipment 
as Heidegger calls them not to limit the analysis to hammers and axes. Equipment 
“includes everything we make use of domestically or in public life. In this broad 
ontological sense bridges, streets, street lamps are also items of equipment”. (Heidegger 
1988:292)1 
The theoretical knowledge we have of an entity as a specific thing and as a thing with a 
particular functionality is therefore something that only can emerge from a practical 
engagement with it. For instance, it is through the act of hammering that an entity is 
constituted as a hammer, because it is in the act of hammering that the entity displays the 
particular kind of manipulability towards the environment that distinguishes hammers.  
No matter how sharply we just look at the ‘outward appearance’ of Things… we cannot 
discover anything ready-to-hand. If we look at Things just ‘theoretically’, we can get along 
without understanding readiness-to-hand. But when we deal with them by using them and 
                                              
1 Just as readiness-to-hand is the kind, or mode of being that equipment are, we are in a mode of being as well, which 
Heidegger calls concern. Concern is the attitude with which we are in-the-world; we are not just there, we are there in a 
certain way, and this is therefore part of the reason why we approach all entities as equipment. It would take me too 
far away to go into concern here, but it shows again, as with Gestell’s essence (cf. Chapter 1), that the kinds of being 
other things are, reflect back to ourselves because we are the only being for which there can be other Beings. 
(Heidegger 1962:32ff/11ff) Things in the world have another mode of being that Heidegger calls Vorhandenheit, 
presence-at-hand. This is not things considered theoretically, but things as they can figure theoretically, detached from 
their equipmental context, and as they are, in themselves, in their what. More on the relation between readiness-to-
hand and presence-at-hand in Chapter 3. 
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manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our 
manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific Thingly character. (Heidegger 
1962:98/69) 
 
Through its readiness-to-hand, the equipment displays a structure of in-order-to that 
constitutes the relation between the particular entity and its environment. The structure of 
in-order-to involves a referring that we cannot grasp in analyzing the thing outside of its 
context of use. This kind of referring is not a mere index; instead, it has an ontological 
character. That is to say, the referring serves a dual purpose: It constitutes what in the 
world can serve as context for it, and through doing so, the entity in turn is constituted as a 
tool within the context because of its ‘specific thingly character:’  
Equipment – in accordance with its equipmentality – always is in terms of its belonging to 
other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, 
doors, room. These ‘Things’ never show themselves proximally as they are for 
themselves… Out of this the ‘arrangement’ emerges, and it is in this that any ‘individual’ 
item of equipment shows itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already been 
discovered. (Heidegger 1962:97f/68f) 
Even the room itself, where we ourselves are and where we encounter the totality of 
equipment shows itself to us as equipment for residing (thereby belonging to the totality 
of equipments). Heidegger’s ontological argumentation sustains the claim above, that we 
cannot deduct the technologically relevant properties of the hammer from considering it 
in isolation from neither its action potential (in-order-to) nor its context of use 
(environment, totality of equipment). The hammer as something we would call a 
technology can only emerge from its ‘hammering’ readiness-to-hand.1 Relating this back 
to what we discussed above, grasping the extension of technology should therefore be 
regarded as a hermeneutical endeavour, with a fluctuating movement between parts 
(technologies) and wholes (contexts).2 
The importance of taking into account the context when we consider the extension of 
technology is also implied in the conceptions of technology’s socio-political impact 
                                              
1 Heidegger’s tool-analysis harbours (at least) two further aspects; how the world unfolds because of our involvement 
with it (revealing, cf. Chapter 1), and the relation we have to tools in technological actions. These aspects will be 
discussed in the two following chapters. Another aspect is in what mode does an entity that we do not know 
presents itself, as when someone who has never seen a hammer sees one for the first time. Heidegger argues here 
that the entity nevertheless presents itself and are approached as something in-order-to, only that the referring is not 
yet known. It makes no structural difference of the relation to the thing that the equipmental context is not known 
from before; we never encounter an entity as a mere thing. (Heidegger 1988:304, 2002:60f) As with my concept of 
affordance, if we avoid seeing the toolness of tools as a case of (representative) interpretation, unknown tasks and 
functions present no problems to the theory. 
2 This movement mirrors the hermeneutical circle. See Heidegger 1962, §32-33, Gadamer 1989:266ff. 
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encountered in the previous chapter. We saw that modern technology emerged as a 
system that constructs itself around artefacts, hand-tools, machines or otherwise, to 
ensure that they run as expected. Langdon Winner accentuated the set of instrumental, 
economic and political connections built in and around artefacts, such as the Long Island 
Parkway overpasses and the atom bomb, while Jacques Ellul included the propagation of 
a certain state of mind, la technique, a set of psychological ideas or rules concerning the 
technological influence on society. In both cases, the concept of technology points to that 
of a social structure rather than that of a single artefact or tool. Seen this way, the car is a 
technology because it is embedded within a technological system of roads, gas stations, 
traffic rules, and laws for ownership and so on. (Kline 2003:211) The car could still 
perform all the actions it is made to do: Drive, honk the horn, keep the motor fetishist 
happy, but if we take away the surrounding organization, it would not have the same, if 
any, technological function.  
Interestingly, this points us to a notion of technology that no longer merely refers to 
material artefacts, or at least not to the artefacts in isolation. In some, perhaps most, cases, 
the system around an artefact comprises non-material components. For cars, for instance, 
to ‘function technologically’ legislations in various forms have been created, social 
institutions like the Department of Motor Vehicles1 have been established to support 
some of this legislation, a system of auto clubs like the Norwegian NAF, mandatory car 
insurance and so on, are also consequences of the car having its technological function 
within a society. These features are essential parts of the organizational changes to a 
society that artefacts bring about, but they exceed the artefact’s proximate consequences, 
which for a car are phenomena like faster and private travel, pollution, traffic accidents, 
and so on. For some technologies at least, to grasp their meaning in the sense it was 
defined in the introduction to this part, how they make a difference to society and us, we 
need to look beyond the actions performed by them, and assess the broader 
organizational change they produce in a society. The ‘meaning’ of using Instant Messaging 
is not confined to the actions of sitting in front of the online computer, to type and to 
read and so on, it is also connected to the changing forms of communication, both in 
methods and content, which again has an effect on how we relate to each other. How can 
we justify the claim that these larger changes in part are due to the technology itself? What 
does that statement even mean?  
                                              
1 In Norwegian: Biltilsynet. 
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Introducing the constitutional-articulative perspective 
I will not delve further into what items that could possibly be included in the extension of 
‘technology’.1 My purpose has been to extricate a methodology of defining the content of the 
extension of ‘technology’. The considerations above suggest that we should focus 
somewhat indirectly on actions and the changes following these. What kinds of actions 
would we label technological actions, and what constitutes the actions? Furthermore, 
what kinds of changes in our surroundings (material, social or organizational, individual 
or type of) would we think of as technological, and what define these changes as the 
specific changes that they are? Can we, for instance, discern any qualities in the 
technologies themselves that improve our understanding of the changes? The discussion 
above displays that the meaning of the technology employed in a technological action 
should be considered as influenced by all participants in the action (including the artefact 
itself). 
More precisely, this means that technologies, user(s) and various contextual phenomena, 
including social and technological praxes, all bring significant qualities that have an effect 
on each other’s appearances and therefore also the overall functional properties of the 
action. The relation between the participants will for this reason be expressed as 
interdependent, which differs from an interactive relation in that the latter indicates that 
the interaction between the participants is based on inherent or autonomously defined 
functional properties – properties that remains principally unaffected in the interaction. 
Interdependence, on the other hand, means that the person with a hammer is not ‘a 
person plus a hammer’, but is a constituted entity, interdependent on the person, the 
material affordances of the hammer,2 the task at hand, the praxis the person is immersed in, 
and other contextual phenomena that augment or constrain the hammering action. In this 
case, it is suitable to talk of a constituted totality, while at other times, for instance in the 
case of a machine, it is more appropriate to talk of a constituted technological artefact 
(even if a machine never operates without doing so within an organizational totality). 
Contrary to Heidegger and Ellul, it is the goal of this investigation to formulate a meaning 
                                              
1 See Mitcham 1994, chaps. 7 through 10 for an extended discussion on what the concept of technology have been 
understood to refer to. See also Kline 2003 
2 ‘Affordance’ here alludes to how a thing’s physical properties in themselves grants us (and deny us) specific ways of 
handling/using them. (Gibson 1986:127-143) Although Gibson’s use of the concept is from visual psychology, the 
concept has been used outside this context, to denote material and social properties of items. (Hutcby 2001) I will 
discuss and define ‘affordance’ more closely and precisely in Chapter 4. 
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of technology without a fundamental difference between a self-contained artefact (a 
machine) or a totality (a hand-tool in use). 
The constitution by interdependent contributors imply that whatever change a 
technological action brings about in the world, be it the alteration of an existing object, 
the manufacture of a new product, a change to the social organization, or a scientific 
image or model, it is ‘produced’ by all the constituents. In an ontological analysis, one can 
and should not emphasize merely one of the contributing factors.1 More precisely, the 
outcome owes its function and meaning not only to which contributing factors were 
involved in the action, but also to the manner in which each contributing factor appears. 
The ‘manner’, of course, alludes to how each participant appears as constituted in the action. 
The outcome of a technological action is for this reason strongly related to the 
constituted artefact/totality of the action, but it does not follow from this that it is a mere 
projection, fiction-like, in view of the fact that the constituents are constrained by the 
existing material and social actuality. The ‘product’ has a dual structure of self-sufficiency 
and dependency. I have, to highlight this meaning, chosen to call the outcome of a 
technological action, whether it is a tin can or a mathematical model of the solar system, 
an articulation. Since the constituents are joined in an act of articulating, I will use the semi-
neologism ‘articulative’ to denote the act of articulating (and consequently, also for the 
principal characteristic of the technological artefact as constituted in the act). 
We are faced, then, with two perspectives on the technological action, one that 
investigates the relation between the constituents of the technological artefact, and one 
that investigates the relation between the constituted whole and the outcome that the 
action results in, the material and/or social changes. Given that I do not want to convey 
an impression that these two perspectives are independent, I title my investigation into 
the meaning of technology a constitutional-articulative perspective. Because the outcome of the 
action, the point and purpose of picking up a technology to do something, is highly 
relevant for the constitution of the technological action, and because the constitution is 
highly decisive for how the material or socio-political outcome appears, the two 
perspectives should be held, simultaneously, together and apart. Before arguing more 
carefully for the perspective in Chapters 3 and 4, I shall discuss similar concepts to 
articulation, such as ‘construction’, ‘presentation’, and ‘representation’. 
                                              
1 Although, for empirical studies it is a necessity that some parameters, categories like ‘the social’ (see below), or ‘the 
psychological’, will be more relevant than others will. 
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Construction | articulation 
Describing the relation between the constituted technology and the outcome of the 
technological action as ‘articulative’ is an alternative to ‘transparent’ (technological 
instrumentalism) or ‘subservient’ (technological determinism), in the sense that 
articulative means that technological change – the outcome of a technological action, is 
not determined by any inherent qualities of the technology, and not pre-determined by 
the user’s intention. Nor should the outcome be thought of as a social construction. 
Social constructivism, taken as one (of several) interpretational methodologies within 
Social and Technology Studies (STS), is primarily a narrative about the socially shaped 
meaning a type of technology attain through a social dialectic of variation and selection, 
somewhat comparable to the process of natural selection in evolution theory. (Bijker et 
al.1984) However, there is one notable difference. Variation in evolution theory is 
primarily explained in terms of differences in the genetic makeup of a species within an 
environment – through sexual reproduction and odd mutations. In social constructivism, 
on the other hand, variation is initially explained in terms of the different impact one and 
the same technology has on various social groups: A piece of technology is received, 
interpreted, employed and developed according to a specific group’s set of already 
existing social meanings. It is therefore not the technology, ‘species’, that shows variation; 
it is the interpretation of the technology that varies. Examples of social groups are 
engineers, sales representatives, consumers, advertisers, filmmakers, critics, and women 
and so on. The kind of adaptation within a social group is often referred to as interpretive 
flexibility. (Pinch & Bijker 1987, Woolgar 1991) Since different social groups have 
differing needs with a technology, their adaptation will pose dissimilar problems that in 
turn will direct the development of the technology in different trajectories. 
There have been several empirical studies in STS (not just in the social constructivist 
tradition) that substantiate the concept of interpretive flexibility by looking at the 
development and adaptation of technologies. (For instance, Bijker, Hughes & Pinch 1987, 
Bijker & Law 1992a, McKenzie & Wajcmann 1999a, Oudshoorn & Pinch 2003a) One of 
the most famous studies concerns the evolvement of the safety bicycle, the type of bike 
that has two identically sized wheels and a chain drive to the rear wheel. Before the safety 
bike, the most common bike was the rather unsafe Ordinary Bicycle, popularly called ‘the 
Penny-Farthing’,1 who had a large, directly pedal-driven front wheel. Between these two 
                                              
1 In Norwegian slang: Velte-Petter. 
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types of bikes there was a short-lived type called the Bicyclette, which had a smaller front 
wheel than the Penny-Farthing, albeit still larger than the rear wheel, and a chain 
connecting the pedals and the rear wheel. With this type there occurred two problems, 
relating to two separate social groups, the ones that liked to ride in high speed – smaller 
front wheel meant slower top-speed, and those who liked to go for a tour with the bike – 
smaller wheel meant increased vibration. Eventually both problems were solved by adding 
an air tyre, and lowering the front wheel even more to add to the safety. (Bijker et al.1984, 
Pinch & Bijker 1987)  
The process of development, selection and adaptation usually comes to an end, a state 
referred to as stabilization and closure, when the technology receives a predominant 
meaning and form of use. In the case with the bicycle, this happened a few years after the 
air tyre equipped safety bike prevailed over rival adjustments of the Ordinary Bicycle and 
the Bicyclette. The process leading up to the closure is then ‘black boxed’, which gives the 
wrongful impression of inevitability between the technology and its current meaning and 
form of use, thereby indicating that the understanding of a technology is determined by 
the technology itself. In principle, though, the black box can be re-opened at any time and 
the dialectics can resume. (Kline & Pinch 1996:767) In the case above, the solution to the 
two separate problems merged with the air tyre, but it need not be so; the solution to one 
problem could be ample enough for one of the social groups, but the artefact could still 
pose additional problems for the other. For instance, race bikers needed further 
modifications to enhance the speed of the bike, leading for instance to the buckhorn 
shaped handlebar (which, these days, has been replaced with yet another speed-enhancing 
variant). Here we see how the inconsistent adaptation of one and the same technology by 
different social groups can set off a development of the technology in a variety of 
trajectories, thereby reinforcing the interpretive differences, and eventually leading to 
variations in the material appearance of the technology. 
This narrative implies that the actions for which a technology is employed, and the 
resulting ‘constructions’, are socially shaped. Although the technology is not regarded as 
an instrument for a user(s) intention, it is principally viewed as neutral, which renders the 
meaning less or not at all caused by any specific characteristics of the technology: “The 
developmental process is not determined by purely technological problems, but by 
technological problems resulting from applications of technology by specific social 
groups.” (Bijker et al.1984:41) This, of course, presupposes that technology itself is 
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regarded as transparent in terms of the impact is has on society and in terms of its own 
meaning. 
The construal of a technology as a causal factor seems to imply that there are definite, 
identifiable features and characteristics of that technology, whereas the central thrust of 
social shaping is to suggest that such features and characteristics are contingent, that any 
such features we would wish to attribute to a technology are the temporary upshot of a series of complex 
social (definitional) processes, largely due to the efforts of particular social agencies (groups). Or, to put the 
point another way, [the] invocation of a technology as a cause implies the possibility of 
providing a definitive description of that technology. (Woolgar 1991:31, my emphasis) 
Although the constitutional-articulative perspective emphasizes technology’s own role in 
the meaning it takes on in a society, this implies neither a causal relation nor a definite 
description of a technology in the sense that Woolgar criticizes. Instead, and as will be 
clearer throughout the next two chapters, constitutional interdependence entails that each 
constituent possesses certain properties that constrain how the technology appears in a 
given, embedded action. Neither the technology nor the social (or even the user(s)) is a causal 
factor in themselves, only the constituted totality can be said to be the causal factor. 
Therefore, as I will maintain, there is something to be said about technology related to its 
meaning, but this must be said through a constitutional analysis, not a causal-functional 
one. 
The strong ‘neutralism’ advocated by Woolgar is not shared by all, for instance it has been 
claimed that to consider that “the attributes and effects of all technologies are both socially 
negotiated and real (physical, material, biological)” (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1999:26n), is 
not contrary to holding a social constructivist theory of technology. However, as the same 
writers admit, this clarification showed up in social constructivist literature somewhat later 
than the initial writings on it in the 1980’s (cf. Oudshoorn & Pinch 2003b:3, Rappert 
2003:567ff). Within STS-writings that deal with the role of technology’s impact on 
society, the main interpretation of the relation between the technology and the social is 
what I would call an interactive view. Although this interactive approach avoids the 
reductionism of social determinism, it still maintains “a fairly stable and matter-of-fact 
division between the social and the technical”. (Bijker & Law 1992:201)1 I suspect that 
this division is upheld for methodological reasons. The social construction of technology, 
                                              
1 Bijker & Law distinguishes this from Bruno Latour and actor-network theory. (Bijker & Law 1992:201f) In certain 
aspects, this view resembles what I called the constitutional relation. It seems to me that Woolgar, while criticizing 
those who hold a causal theory of technology, retains the view that technology and the social are two separate 
categories. Only if this is done does his quote above make any sense. Latour’s twist is to regard technology and social 
as being of the same category. If they are (which I also hold), there is of course no danger in giving technology itself 
its due place in the ‘articulation’ of its own effects. I will return to Latour in the next chapter. 
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after all, is a sociological and historical endeavour, and as such, it requires fairly clear-cut 
parameters to be empirically operative. 
In emphasising the social embeddedness of technology, social constructivism has been 
important in exposing the complex developmental trajectories behind many technologies 
and in rejecting technological deterministically inclined accounts. However, as an 
ontological investigation (into the meaning of technology), it does not have a satisfactory 
concept of technology (and perhaps it should not either). The main reason for this is the 
uneasy role played by technology in the constructivist narratives, even for those 
constructivists that assume some sense of material ‘agency’. In my mind, this is primarily 
because the methodological parameters do not encompass how the technology itself 
affords the technological action. For instance, in an essay about the introduction of the 
Model T Ford to rural America, Kline & Pinch is early on explicit about the shortcomings 
of earlier theories of the social construction of technology; it is “the neglect of the 
reciprocal relationship between artefacts and social groups. We agree that it is important 
to show not only how social groups shape technology, but also how the identities of 
social groups are reconstituted in the process.” (1996:767) However, time and again the 
concept of interpretative flexibility is employed without any noticeable constraining 
(except from social factors). The operating parameters remain social throughout the essay, 
focusing on the social factors that changed the meaning of the automobile from ‘a 
nuisance’ to ‘beneficial’. (Kline & Pinch 1996:767, 772, 777, 783) The precise role of 
technology remains inconclusive; one claims that the impact ‘goes both ways’, but fail to 
carry this through conceptually.  
Social constructivism emphasizes the origin of the normal use of a technology, even if the 
path to the ‘black boxed’ stage is taken as non-linear.1 This holds even though ‘normal 
use’ for a certain kind of technology can differ significantly from social group to social 
group: Confronted with a particular technology such as a bike we saw how different 
groups show different preferences; racers wanted a bike that enhanced speed, while 
touring cyclists wanted a comfortable bike. Hence, the normal use among racers will 
differ from the normal use among touring cyclists. In this sense, by focusing on the intra-
                                              
1 A worry in social constructivism of technology is that there often will be sub-groups within a social group that for 
various reasons drops off the narrative, although it is quite likely that they do contribute indirectly or directly to the 
shaping of the technology. Typically, this will be groups like women, ethnic minorities and manual workers. 
(MacKenzie & Wajcman 1999:22. See also Oudshoorn & Kline 2003:4. Winner expresses a related concern for social 
“groups that have no voice but that, nevertheless, will be affected by the results of technical change”. (1993:269f) 
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group dynamics leading to the emergence of differing normality, social constructivists 
take the technological variation crucial for the principle of interpretative flexibility for 
granted. This is also evident in the Model T Ford example. For rural America, the 
automobile had almost reached a state of closure: It was a nuisance. However,  
New meanings are being given to the car by the new emerging social group of users – in 
this case, technically competent farm men. To the urban user the car meant transport. For 
the rural users… the car, as well as being a form of transport, could be a farm tool, a 
stationary source of power, part of a domestic technology, or perhaps all of these. (Kline & 
Pinch 1996:777) 
That the car itself afforded such ‘new’ uses is not reflected in the constructivist analysis. 
The analogy to variation within natural selection is not fully employed. Natural selection 
presupposes a genetic variation, that is, that there is a variation in a species in how the 
individuals are suited to survival and reproduction in an environment. We could say, 
albeit quite figuratively, that a species affords several different behavioural traits, some of 
whom are better suited within the environment than others. Taking this into the realm of 
technology means that we conceptualize the technology to afford several different ways to 
be used. This is not a trivial way of putting it, because it grants the technology itself an 
explanatory role in the concept of variation. The by-product is, however, that the analysis 
of technological actions must grant a place for the technological artefact. 
Therefore, by focusing on technologies’ constitutional role, we can investigate how 
technologies themselves afford the variety that makes interpretative flexibility possible. 
Because social constructivism puts so much emphasis on the receiver-end of technology 
(and accordingly, technology’s neutrality), the basic concept of variation remains an 
ambiguous, even un-explained term. Analyzing the technology as constituted, however, 
enables us to regard it as multistable, affording differing interpretations relative to social 
and user-dependent perspectives, while at the same time keeping in mind technology’s 
own contribution. (Ihde 2002:106) This way, we can grasp how a technology can gain 
several parallel closures and stabilizations without having to assume a stage of ‘normal 
use’ within a social group. The concept of multistability allows different synchronous 
stable meanings from, say, the design and the user standpoints.1  
The concept of construction, because of social constructivism, has come to be associated 
with knowledge relativism and a strong emphasis on the social shaping and the 
                                              
1 I will return to the concept of multistability in Chapter 4. 
7 0  T E C H N O L O G Y  
appurtenant underplaying of technology itself, and as such, it has taken on a meaning, 
correct or not, that points to something resembling non-realism. (Latour 1999:114f, 2003) 
For this reason, I find it necessary, not only to distance myself from social constructivism 
of technology, but also from the concept of construction itself.  
(Re-) presentation | articulation  
It is not just technologies used for some kind of production, to make new artefacts, which 
has the character of being articulative. ‘Articulative’ is appropriate to denote 
technologically mediated actions in general. 1  The concept of articulation is meant to 
convey two ideas. First, the meaning of the outcome of a technological action is not 
(usually) an arbitrary construction, and secondly, the technological action triggers the 
object of the action to present itself in a certain way. Although a technological action presents 
an object, articulation is a more fitting concept because presentations of any object will 
always correspond to a perspective on this object. An object is presented according to 
both a situated requirement; what is the task at hand, and to the constituted totality that 
performs the technological mediation. Through technologies with other qualities, or 
alternative contexts, or through users with other preferences and aims, the technological 
action would have ‘presented’ the object differently but not for that reason necessarily 
less accurate; it would have been a different way of presenting the object, suited to the 
particularities of that constituted mediation. Therefore, to avoid the allusions of 
presenting something in its purely objective way, articulative is chosen to denote the 
process of technological mediation. 
The operation of an X-ray apparatus can serve as a simple example of an articulative 
process (and the X-ray image as an articulation). Sometimes technology is defined as 
being the processing of nature or at least an intervention into something organic by 
inorganic or artificial means. (Gehlen 1980:5ff, Krogh 1998:2ff) This claim presupposes 
an essential contrast between nature and technology. Technology will often be regarded as 
either violating nature by turning it into something it is presumed not to be, or as an 
appendix, an addition to nature, as in the conception of technology as an exosomatic 
organ, where technology leaves nature unharmed but still appears as foreign to the 
                                              
1 ‘Technological action’ and ‘technological mediation’ is interchangeable. Although using a hammer to hit a nail is a 
clear-cut example of an action, to look through a microscope feels less so, and a computer generated image from a 
light wave even less than that. But these are all mediations, and they should also be regarded as actions for reasons 
that will be clear in the next chapter, when I discuss the relation between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand. 
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natural. However, looking at the relation between an X-ray machine and a body through 
the constitutional-articulative perspective indicates that technological interventions into 
nature need not be seen as a violation, but as a way to instigate nature to present itself 
(although, to repeat this once again, this means to present itself in a certain way, as an 
articulation). This perspective will enable us to question the entire concept of a ‘pure 
nature’, a contrast I will return to below. The X-ray image results from the interaction of 
an X-ray technician, the X-ray technology and praxis, and the body itself. This is the 
constituted whole that performs the action. Decisive aspects here are, for instance, why an X-
ray is taken at all, the function of the X-ray equipment, whether the technician can 
operate the equipment properly, and so on. 
The X-ray image produced is a certain way of representing the body. It is not the ‘truest’ 
or ‘most objective’ representation of the body, but is a functional mode of the body that 
reveals certain aspects deemed relevant for the task. The representation can hardly be 
called a pure objective depiction of the body, dependent as it is on the specific technical 
constraints of the apparatus, but it would likewise be absurd to regard it as an arbitrary 
construction, as it is clearly constrained by bodily properties. The technology focuses on 
and enhances, augments and translates certain aspects of the body, while at the same time 
play down or ignore others. It reveals aspects of the body and at the same time, it 
conceals other possible representations of it. Technician, technology and body are in this 
case mutual constraints. To look at a body through X-ray’s does not produce an arbitrary 
image, and it does not invent something that is not there, but it projects a certain functional 
perspective on the body.1 It is in this sense that the image is an articulation, articulated by X-
ray technology, the competent use by an X-ray technician, and the body itself. It is, in this 
sense, an interpretation even prior to what we normally would label the interpretation of 
an X-ray image. 
Articulation, then, is the way we can become acquainted with something; we can 
approach something only in as much as it is articulated, that is, as it stands out from that 
which it is not. From this it follows that articulation should not be seen negatively, as the 
‘only extent’ that we can know something, but in the positive way as the condition for us to 
know anything at all. While ‘representation’ and ‘presentation’ are both concepts, the way I 
see it, that imply that the technological action, for instance of taking an X-ray, results in 
                                              
1 As I shall return to below, this is the crux in Don Ihde’s concept ‘technoscience’. 
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an objective portrayal of the body. This has the unfortunate consequence that the 
technology is rendered transparent (and that the other factors in the technological action 
are also in their most objective, truest, forms). As I have argued here, this does not allow 
for the specific constraints belonging to any technology, and for that reason I prefer 
‘articulation’ to denote the products of technological actions.1 
Technological realism 
Emphasizing that the articulation is neither objective (as opposed to ‘representation’) nor 
arbitrary (as opposed to a specific interpretation of ‘construction’) locates the 
constitutional-articulative perspective somewhere between objectivism and reductionism. 
Objectivism is to consider the outcome of a technological action as an objectively true 
presentation or representation of the object in the technological action. Objectivism 
defined this way would be nonsensical for certain, perhaps most, uses of technology. 
When technology is employed for some kind of production, for instance to make fish 
fingers from fish, the fish fingers can hardly be called a representation of the fish. For this 
kind of technological action it does not make sense to think of the relation between the 
object before and after the processing as representation; the whole purpose of the 
technological action is to produce something new (and typically from several resources). 
Likewise, for kitchen utensils like knives, forks, pans, and strainers and so on, it is equally 
nonsensical to ask if they are representations of the objects with which they are involved. 
Sometimes, however, technologies are conceptualized as neutral aids or augmentations of 
our natural abilities, especially when put to use in a scientific setting. For instance, when 
Galileo Galilee employed a telescope to study the moon it assisted and augmented his 
vision. In such cases, it seems appropriate to perceive the telescopic image as a mere 
projected image of the moon. Although today’s scientific use of technology, also the use 
of telescopes, is far more complex than this, objectivism is to regard the technological 
mediation in science as transparent, and by implication, to regard the result of the 
mediation, the generated image, as an objectively true presentation or representation. 
However, the example with the X-ray equipment above suggests that to look at 
something through an apparatus inevitably focus on and enhance certain aspects of the 
                                              
1 Bruno Latour also employs the concept of ‘articulation’ (which, in relation with ‘proposition’, for him is an 
alternative to ‘construction’). His use has strong affinity to my use, as something that “occupies the position left 
empty between the object and the subject or the external world and the mind”. (Latour 1999:303) Also Heidegger 
uses ‘articulation’ in a related but not identical manner, namely to denote the connection between readiness-to-hand 
and presence-at-hand in the act of understanding. (Heidegger 1962:190/149, cf. Welton 2000:354) 
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object due to the inherent constraints of the technology. According to Don Ihde this was 
the case with Galileo’s telescope; aspects relevant for the scientific examination of the 
moon (or of space in general) was enhanced and became presented correspondingly. 
We could say the Moon became larger, magnified. But it was also displaced – telescopically 
it was taken out of the night sky and relocated within the field of telescopic vision. It lost 
its place in the expanse of heavens and became a more focal, particularized object, now 
apparently, close up. (Ihde 2002:58) 
 
Simple magnifying devices like optical telescopes, glasses and hearing aids might seem so 
innocently intrusive that the articulative element in their contribution easily can be 
missed. Accordingly, these kinds of devices often figure as paradigm examples of the 
transparency of technology. Nonetheless, even simple technologies articulate an object in 
accordance with how they are designed to present their objects, what they can discover 
and what aspects of the world they are tuned into.1 Actually, it is because of this focusing, 
the removal of aspects not deemed relevant for the task, which makes technological 
mediation essential for modern science. It is because they are able to articulate the 
scientific object in this way rather than that way that they are useful in the first place. 
Neither does the constitutional-articulative perspective denote a form of reductionism; 
that the meaning of the outcome represents a meaning imposed on the phenomenon 
from the outside. This is a form of reductionism in so far as the outcome is portrayed as 
supervening on merely one or a few of the contributing participants in the technological 
action. Typically, the attention is directed towards only one, technology or ‘the machine’ 
in the case of Ellulian determinism, Gestell in Heideggerian essentialism or the social 
constructed convention of use in social constructivism. As mentioned in Chapter 1, to 
over-emphasize technology and ignore it completely are seemingly contradictory, but 
instrumentalism and determinism concur in the sense that their methodologies are 
reductionistic towards the contributing factors in the technological action. While 
objectivism implies a naïveté in its realism, in the sense that it portrays reality as being 
unimpaired and shining through the technological mediation unscathed, reductionism 
implies a form of non-realism in the sense that reality becomes what we as individuals or 
as a society, or technology, ‘want’ it to be, thus rendering our conception of reality 
                                              
1 As Ihde points out, taking the optical telescope as a paradigm example of the relation between nature and science 
involves a double reduction, a reduction of science to a visual bias, and a reduction of vision to be biased towards 
motion and shape. (Ihde 2002:54) 
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arbitrary.1 As often is the case when two opposites meet, the middle ground will turn out 
to be the more credible account, and through developing a theory of technological 
meaning that make allowances for all contributing factors, the constitutional-articulative 
perspective attempts to avoid the naïveté of objectivism and the non-realism of 
reductionism. It is equally absurd to regard the telescopic image as objectively true of the 
moon, as it is to regard it as not true at all. 
The claim that a scientific image, fact, or model represents reality or conversely, that it 
only presents a constructed reality are arguments that are performed over a set of shared, 
but ill-conceived presuppositions. If something is said to be a mere constructed reality, 
this presupposes that there is something called reality somewhat behind or beyond it. 
Instead, regarding technologically mediated ‘products’ as articulations means that we use 
technology as a way of making reality. Use of technology should not be seen as either 
granting us ‘direct access’ to a pure nature-in-itself, nor should it be seen as putting a veil 
over this nature-in-itself. There is no such thing as a reality that we, by constructing the 
proper means, can describe in ‘pure’ objective terms. The technological articulation is for 
this reason not a reduction or a diminished form of reality, but is itself reality, however, 
without the illusion of being an ‘objective truth’ about reality.  
So far, in this chapter I have introduced the two foundations of the meaning of 
technology. First, the relation between the factors in a technological action was briefly 
considered. This concerns the relation between technology and context (including user(s), 
task and goal) for the technological action. I suggested that this is an interdependent 
relation, with each of the constituents having non-trivial bearing on how the other 
constituents appeared in the specific technological situation. Then, based on this 
interdependence, I considered the relation between the technological action and the 
outcome of the action. I claimed that the interaction of the constituents resulted in an 
articulation, which is the way an object appears through the technological action. The 
object mentioned here could for instance be a new product, a scientific representation, a 
repaired artefact, a clothed person, or the Julian calendar. The articulation is merely one 
possible way the object reveals itself, and an object can reveal itself in a number of ways 
based on the specifics of the technological action. None of the ways needs to be seen as 
more or less accurate, they corresponds to different perspectives and functions. What this 
                                              
1  My account has, and not entirely by accident, somewhat messed up the distinction between ontology and 
epistemology. I will not deal with that here, but in the following chapter, this very distinction is re-thought. 
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also implies, and this claim will be reinforced through the discussions in the two following 
chapters, is that without a perspectival revealing, nothing would be revealed at all; making 
an articulation is to make reality. The concept of making reality is right there at the heart of 
the meaning of technology, not just in scientific mediation, but also in technological 
actions in general. 
Science and nature 
The reductionism of instrumentalism and technological determinism maintains a contrast, 
a gap between technology and user (and between technology and society), which implies 
that the relation between technology and us is a form for power struggle. Instrumentalism 
assimilates technology under the user’s intentions, while the opposite holds for 
determinism (including Heideggerian essentialism) – especially in its pessimistic variety, in 
the sense that technology subverts and transforms both humans and society into 
something they are presumed not to be authentically.1 The contrast between humans and 
society on one hand and technology on the other is also found expressed as a contrast 
between nature and culture (technology as an expression of culture), or as I touched upon 
above, the contrast between the natural and the artificial. 
Walter Rammert finds that seeing technology in contrast to another substance has been a 
frequent tendency in the thinking about technology. Through time, technology has been 
seen in opposition to nature, to life, to culture, and more recently to society. (Rammert 
1999:25) Rather than being perceived as working in tandem with, integrated into and even 
co-constitute how nature, life, etc. appear and are thought about, technology has typically 
been seen as alien and alienating. As we saw in Chapter 1, this is quite evident in the 
thinking of Heidegger and Ellul, and even Winner’s notion has this aspect lurking in the 
background as a potential danger. In the literature, then, we can find accounts of the 
artificial, lifeless, unnaturally organized technology in contrast to the living, self-organizing 
nature, or the logico-mechanistic technology in contrast to an creative meaningful culture, 
or the fierce algorithmic-linearity of technological efficiency in contrast to the heuristically 
unhurriedness of social processes, and so on.2 (Rammert 1999:26ff) 
                                              
1 This implies not just technological essentialism, but also an essentialist theory of humans and of society. 
2 I will not pursue this claim further, but it strikes me as likely that the strategy of contrasting technology to another 
substance arises from the ‘withdrawn’ approach of the older generation of philosophers of technology. This strategy 
tries to work out a lexical definition of technology, rather than approach it from its situatedness. As mentioned, I 
prefer a different approach to delineate the extension of the concept. 
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However, these demarcations are now being challenged, in not only a theoretical sense, 
but also more materially, through new technologies. For instance, transgenic animals are 
animals that are genetically engineered and bred in the lab for the sake of illuminating our 
knowledge about diseases and the consequent search for treatments. Genetic engineering 
for this purpose has been around for many years in various animal life forms, such as the 
OncoMouse® in cancer-research. (Marshall 1997) Recently also primates have been 
employed for this purpose, marking a significant step towards examining human-like 
genetic processes (and adding further controversy to an already inflamed debate). (Chan 
et al.2001) Transgenic animals are alive, yet artificial, and perhaps they should even be 
regarded as technological. 
Much of our knowledge about nature is mediated by technologies. This has been called the 
characteristic of modern science, giving rise to the classification ‘technoscience’: “The 
claim of technoscience… is that it reveals a world which, perceptually identified, is both a 
microworld and a macroworld which could not be experienced except through the 
mediations of instruments.” (Ihde 1993a:3, see also Latour 1987, Selinger & Ihde 2003) In 
many cases, exemplified by optical telescopes and microscopes, the technological 
mediation retains the same basic perspective we ourselves have on the world, and poses 
as such no more fundamental problems to the contrast between technology and nature 
than basic observation does (although, as mentioned above, the mediation involves a 
reduction and focusing of the scientific object to aspects pre-determined as more relevant 
than others). 
Technoscience does more than augment the human perspective, though, as high-tech 
manipulations can generate conditions that yield empirical data that otherwise would be 
impossible to obtain. For example, modern particle physics explains the fundamentals of 
the natural world in terms of the workings of subatomic particles like quarks, muons, 
gluons, and the W and Z bosons. The problem is, none of these particles exists 
disconnected in nature and is therefore impossible to observe naturally. However, their 
existence can be verified experimentally, making comprehensive use of fine-grained 
technology to create some fairly extreme artificial conditions. In huge particle 
accelerators, like the one at CERN in Switzerland, protons are technologically stripped of 
its accompanying electrons, and accelerated singularly. The single protons, when they 
reach a velocity close to the speed of light, are smashed into each other, creating a 
collision that releases sufficient energy for single particles to be formed and exist 
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disconnected for a short fragment of time. The generated particles are not observed 
directly, though, only indirectly through mapping their movements after the collision, 
using particle detectors to pick up electrical signals emitted by the particles. The signals 
are then processed by a computer, and charted as movements on a computer-generated 
model. From the kind of movement a particle performs (among other parameters), 
physicists are able to tell what kind of particle it is and how it interacts with other particles 
and how they mediate the fundamental forces of nature.1 
Is there a difference between ‘nature’ and what we know about nature? Moreover, is there 
a difference between nature as it exists ‘naturally’, and how it is artificially triggered to 
present itself? The subatomic particles can only exist disconnected technologically – for a 
short fraction of time in a particle accelerator (or in the Big Bang), does that make them – 
as described individually – more technological than natural? What is observed in the 
establishing of the subatomic particles is not an isomorphism between the particles and 
nature, but an isomorphism between the mathematical theory that predicts the existence 
of these particles and the technologically generated particles. Still, these experiments do 
yield knowledge about nature; it does tell us something about how nature is (more 
precisely, in this case, it tells us about the Big Bang). Technoscience means that the 
boundaries between technology and nature, while not blurred altogether, at least have to 
be thought through carefully; as mentioned, there is no contradiction is regarding a 
phenomenon as both technological and real.2 
The emergence of computers and increasing processing power has opened up 
technological possibilities for science in a number of other ways as well. Through 
gathering information from various fields such as zoology, physiology and palaeontology, 
one has been able to construct a computer model of the Tyrannosaurus rex. This has 
been done by plotting known data about the T-Rex and known data about physiology of 
animals in general into the computer model. The known variables have then made it 
possible to generate estimates about the unknown variables in the T-Rex’s body, including 
walking and running performance. It has been estimated that its running speed was not 
                                              
1 http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/Research/MinChall-en.html [26.11.2008] These days, particle physics is 
working hard to confirm the existence of the Higgs boson, a proposed but not yet observed particle whose existence 
would inform issues about other particles’ ability to possess mass. (Cho 2007) 
2 For additional arguments for such a claim, albeit from a somewhat different perspective, see Latour 1999, Chapter 
5. Latour, although being a key figure in STS, is not a social constructivist, but holds a theory not unlike the 
constitutional-articulative perspective (see next chapter). 
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very fast, and, because of body weight and bone structure, it took at least 1-2 seconds to 
turn 45 degrees. (Hutchinson et al. 2007) These statistics supports the hypothesis that the 
T-Rex was relatively easy to escape from for smaller, quicker animals, which some have 
taken to imply that the T-Rex was mainly necrophagous.1 
With the use of computers, it is also possible to simulate certain evolutionary processes 
such as group selection to gain usable and applicable knowledge about it. Within 
Ethology and Evolutionary Psychology, group selection is thought to be at the heart of 
the development of altruistic (moral) behaviour in animals and humans. Earlier models of 
altruism, based on game theory, indicated that the development of altruistic behaviour 
was incompatible with the central tenets of evolution theory because altruistic individuals 
would always loose out to selfish individuals. (Sober 1994:10ff) However, recent 
computer simulations of group selection have suggested that this conclusion was 
premature, as computer models indicate that altruistically dominated groups can resist the 
invasion of selfish individuals, and altruism even can arise within a non-altruistically 
dominated group. (Ono et al.2003, Fletcher & Zwick 2004) Altruism, it seems, is indeed 
compatible and explainable in an evolutionary perspective. 
What is the nature of the computer T-Rex and the simulated evolutionary processes? 
They are not entirely nature, technologically generated models as they are, but surely, they 
should not be regarded as entirely ‘technological’ either. 
Human nature? 
More broadly, one might ask what a culture amounts to without the presence of any form 
of technology. Or, broader still, what is a human being without being a tool-using animal. 
Tool-use has long been regarded as one of the defining features of being human, as 
reflected in the frequent use of the playful expression Homo Faber, the tool-making 
human. The scientific moniker for our species, Homo sapiens – Latin for ‘the rational 
human’, borrows its meaning from Aristotle, who defined the essence of the human as 
rationality. (2000:12/1098a) However, considering our species’ evolutionary history, it is 
appropriate to ask if humans did “first get smart and then stand up, free their hands, and 
make tools? Or did they first stand up and make tools and then get smart?” (Dusek 
                                              
1 This study has employed several disputed parameters, so the findings are controversial (leading one scientist to 
dubbing such models as ‘desktop palaeontology’). http://www.forskning.no/Artikler/2007/juni/1181050747.44 
[02.01.2009] 
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2006:117) 1  While being relatively primitive, the earliest manufactured stone tools, as 
mentioned above, are about 2.5 million years old. Non-manufactured stone tools were 
used presumably a million years before this by the Australopithecus-genus, pre-dating the 
Homo-lineage.2 Tool-use among other primates and animals (and pre-Homo) discounts it as 
the mark of the human, but it is nevertheless clear that tool-use has been a part of the 
human evolution for a very long time, possibly co-evolving with proto-language (and a 
great deal of other bodily, cognitive and social skills). (Mithen 1996, Johansson 2005). 
Furthermore, it is still safe to say that tool-use was an integral feature of the development 
of culture. The so-called cultural explosion, which saw the occurrence of burial rites and 
artistic expressions like cave paintings, decoration of stone axes and so forth, happened 
about 30-60.000 years ago. (Mithen 1996) Considering that the relics of this explosion 
(cave paintings, decorations) were created with the aid of tools, it is reasonable to claim 
that humankind’s social life developed from living in groups founded on the mutual 
requirements of gathering/hunting food and protection from enemies to being founded 
on the establishment of a group identity mediated by technology. In light of this, we can 
establish that “[t]here are no known peoples, now or in historic or even prehistoric times, 
who have not possessed technologies in some minimal sense”. (Ihde 1990:11) 
Consequently, to say anything about humans (or culture) without technology amount to 
no more than an idealization from and a consequent ignoring of an especially important 
aspect of our situated lives. Moreover, could we not then ask, slightly rhetorical, would 
not this be a theoretically useless human being? 
How feasible are thought experiments like these anyway? Don Ihde points to a notorious 
difficulty, well known in hermeneutical literature: “Since we envision it from the familiar 
and engaged position which we actually occupy within our more saturated technological 
form of life, we may not even be aware of just how deeply we are enmeshed, even at the 
perceptual level, in this form.” (Ihde 1990:11) Langdon Winner provides an example of 
this oblivious enmeshment. Winner has from time to time asked his students to disengage 
themselves from at least one particular piece of technology for a week. The students 
would choose things like mechanical transport, electrical devices or industrially prepared 
                                              
1 Dusek argues that the Homo Ludens conception is only rivalled by language as the defining characteristics in the 20th 
century literature, and claims further that those who were pessimistic concerning technology’s influence on human 
usually were the same people who held language as the defining mark. (Dusek 2006:112) 
2 Archaeological record of this usage is scarce because these tools were not modified; consequently, they are hard to 
distinguish from regular rocks. (Mithen 1996:24, see also Dusek 2006:117) 
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food. This low-key experiment was unambiguous; most of them could not even go a full 
day without the piece of technology.1 
Thought experiments like ‘culture-without-technology’ and ‘human-without-technology’ 
are designed to establish and emphasize a contrast between technology and its 
surroundings. This distinction is a prerequisite for both the transparency of technology 
found in instrumentalism and constructivism, and also to support the admonitions of the 
alienating characteristic of technology found in determinism. However, as these short 
remarks have indicated, humans, society, nature and technology need to be thought of as 
intertwined in a manner that renders a sharp distinction between a (hypothesized) human-
in-itself and a (hypothesized) technology-in-itself nonsensical. 
In closing 
An ongoing issue in this chapter has been to discuss the intermingling of technology and 
its context, whether the context is ‘nature’, ‘the social’, ‘science’ or ‘the user’. This has 
enabled me to introduce the constitutional-articulative perspective on technological 
action/mediation, and to discuss it briefly in relation to the question of realism. I have 
indicated that the use of technology should be seen as a way of making reality. In this 
sense, the concept of ‘making reality’ is a continuation of what was started in the previous 
chapter. It was there suggested that technologies are involved in the world in a two-fold 
manner, as an organization of the world, and as a way we (re-)organize the world. In this 
chapter, I have argued that ‘reality’, as seen through the constitutional-articulative 
perspective, indicates that a requirement for us to have a reality at all is that the reality is 
organized. This is because what counts as reality, for any species, will be perspectival, that 
is, we do not live in a world objectively; we see and act in the world in a certain way. What 
this means, is that we relate to the world according to how it is organized through various 
sets of meaning-structures, and according to the constraints in how we (re-)organize it. 
This is the sense in which we live in a lifeworld. These meanings are made by us, these 
meanings are our world.  
Technologies are part of how we structure our world. There are many ways of carving up 
the world so that it makes sense to us. For instance, we can regard our language as a 
                                              
1 Langdon Winner, in conversation. Don Ihde performed a similar but less dramatic experiment, when he asked his 
students to catalogue and categorize their interactions with technological items during an hour or two. The result was 
to the same effect, an overwhelming number of encounters of varying dependence. (Ihde 1983:10f) 
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means of structuring how we perceive the world (Taylor 1985:260), and, as Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty has pointed out, we influence the appearance of the world by behaving in 
it. (1962:203) Consequently, the constitutional-articulative perspective does not imply that 
technology is necessary for there to be a lifeworld – for instance, it can be argued that 
even animals that use very little or no tools still lives in a lifeworld, that is, have a relation 
to their surroundings that can be described as being imbued with meaning and not mere 
causality (Uexküll 1982). But technologies do make up a fundamental place in the web of 
meanings that make up our lifeworld. It would therefore be erroneous to regard the 
technological impact on our lifeworld as negative, in fact, this aspect is in itself positive in 
the sense that it co-constitutes our lifeworld; it helps us making our lifeworld. However, 
the technological influence can be negative, of course, and sometimes for reasons relating 
directly to how the technology organizes the lifeworld. This, again, remind us that how 
important it is not to regard technology as neutral, but as a lifeworld-organizing tool. 
Using technology does not take us away from a mythical authentic, natural state, a state 
more real than our socio-technological present, technology makes our reality. 
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c h a p t e r   t h r e e 
I N T E N T I O N A L I T Y  I N  A C T I O N  
 
 
 
 
Introducing constitution 
What constitutes a technological action? What constitutes the technology employed in a 
technological action? Are these two questions really different questions? In an interactive 
approach to technological action (cf. Chapter 2), they would, as long as the technological 
action is seen as being performed by a set of separately defined actors and artefacts. This 
holds even if the interaction is seen as producing a result that cannot be reduced to either. 
The outcome of the technological action is in the interactive approach emergent on the 
specific situation, the technology and the actors. Through the constitutional-articulative 
perspective, on the other hand, these two questions would be considered as two different 
ways of asking the same question, the answers represent two perspectives on the same 
phenomenon. The technology employed in a technological action reflects the co-
constitutional relationship between the actors and artefacts, and as such, it can even be 
said to be a materialization, an embodiment, of this interdependence.  
What is a technological action? In the previous chapter, this concept was employed as an 
action carried out through technological means, to be precise, an action mediated by some 
piece of technology. However, what is the technological? ‘The technological’, as we saw in 
both Jacques Ellul and Martin Heidegger, is the meaning of technology. Although that 
8 4  T E C H N O L O G Y  
definition gives us few or no clues as to which items, or kinds of items, should count as 
technology, or how various technological artefacts differ in function, scope and impact on 
society, I will adopt the attitude that there is a meaning to technology. That is to say, there 
is a meaning to technology (in the general sense); technology can be investigated and 
discussed as a lifeworld phenomenon. Furthermore, it is my opinion that we learn 
something about specific technologies by working our way towards this general meaning. 
This was the lesson from the two previous chapters; technology (or technologies – here it 
does not matter if one chooses the plural or the singular form) is an integral part of how 
we live in and understand our world (and, as we shall see in later chapters, also an integral 
part of how we understand ourselves). If the two previous chapters established that 
technology forms a part of our world that exceeds its mere presence, now we need to turn 
to the actual question of Part 1, what is this meaning, what is the meaning of technology? 
While the next chapter is a discussion of how the world opens up, is revealed, articulated, 
in specific ways though technologically mediated actions, the present chapter is mainly 
about the relation we gain to the world through technologies. More precisely, this chapter 
discusses the extent the constitution of subjects (us) and objects (world) is (co-) 
dependent on technologies. We shall see that a) the constitution of subject and object is 
mutual, and b) knowledge of objects is grounded in our activity in the world (hence the 
title of this dissertation). This chapter, then, is an analysis of the first half of the 
constitutional-articulative perspective, that is, the constitution of the totality that acts in 
technological actions. 
Subjectivity | objectivity 
There is a specific challenge to raising the question of the meaning of technology. For 
reasons that are discussed in the two previous chapters, we need to articulate the meaning 
so that it embraces all the things we would call a technology, but still leaves room for the 
specifics of each and every technology. Further, even if it is quite broad, the definition 
should not be empty or tautological; it should teach us something about technology as a 
phenomenon and about specific technologies. We need to strike a balance between 
technological instrumentalism and determinism. As we have seen, instrumentalism and 
related approaches to technology that do not recognize material agency is unable to grasp 
the intermingling of technology, users and society, whereas the so-called opposite view, 
technological determinism (and Heideggerian essentialism) over-emphasizes the agency of 
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technology. Both approaches fail, and for the same reasons. “The myth of the Neutral 
Tool under complete human control and the myth of the Autonomous Destiny that no 
human can master are symmetrical.” (Latour 1999:178) Latour blames modernity’s prejudice 
about a subject-object dualism for the myth and the subsequent theoretical cul-de-sacs that 
instrumentalism and determinism represents.1 Assuming at the outset that objects (nature, 
society) and subjects (humans) are differentiated in an essential manner means that 
technological mediation takes on the role of putting subjects and objects together again, 
in which case the technological item or the action itself is seen as either neutral or all 
encompassing. Both alternatives are untenable. 
What instrumentalism and determinism (and interactive approaches as well) fail to 
recognize is that there is no such thing as a subject without an object and vice versa; a 
subject is created as a subject in dealings with objects, and an object is only objective in 
contrast to subjectivity. This implies that what an object or a subject is, is not something 
autonomous, but necessarily depends on ‘the other’ to be meaningful as an object or a 
subject. This intermingling can for instance be seen in the relation between a gun and a 
man. ‘Guns don’t kill people, people kill people’, the right-winged National Rifle 
Association (NRA) says to defy those who advocate stricter gun control in the USA. The 
NRA regards the gun as a strictly neutral instrument that does nothing to change latent 
compulsions of a user. If the user of a gun is a peaceful person, the use of the gun will be 
for peaceful purposes, but if the user is a criminal, the gun will be used for criminal 
purposes. The relation of the gun to the gunman and the gun-enhanced action is, in this 
respect, transparent; the NRA advocates technological instrumentalism. Determinism, on 
the other hand, seems to be implied in the gun control slogan that instigated NRA’s 
response: ‘Guns Kill People’. Who is right? If one regards the object, the gun, and the 
subject to persist as distinct entities, the description of the relation between subject and 
object becomes a description of a power struggle. Does man control gun, or does gun 
control man? Neither.  
You are different with a gun in your hand; the gun is different with you holding it. You are 
another subject because you hold the gun; the gun is another object because it has entered 
into a relationship with you. The gun is no longer the gun-in-the-armory or the gun-in-the-
drawer or the gun-in-the-pocket, but the gun-in-your-hand, aimed at someone who is 
screaming. What is true of the subject, of the gunman, is as true of the object, of the gun 
that is held. (Latour 1999:179f) 
                                              
1 The subjectivity-objectivity dualism is palpable in not just the philosophy of technology, but in many fields with the 
mind-body dualism as perhaps the most notorious version of it. However, this is not the place to go into those. 
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What Latour proposes is not to eliminate the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity 
altogether, but to understand them differently, namely as products of a constitutional 
process, rather than as the condition for such a process. The ‘problem’ of this way of 
describing the relation, is that subjects, or objects, no longer can be described as having 
stable, autonomous essences. Instead, both become temporary entities, dependent on the 
specifics of their situatedness; a subject is only this particular subject in relation to that 
particular object, etc. At first glance, this might be a problem only if one intends to keep the 
prejudice of the modern alive, that is, to continue to regard subjectivity and objectivity as 
ontologically separate. However, the situated constitution of subjectivity (and objectivity) 
raises important issues about traditional notions of the self. What is the self, how is it 
constituted, how should we explain the feeling of being a lasting entity throughout an 
entire life, a largely static subject in dealing with a number of objects (and other subjects) 
from one situation to another, from one point in life to another, maybe years apart? 
The problem of the lasting self will be addressed more fully in Chapters 5 and 6, where I 
will argue for the intimate relation between self and society in the constitution of the 
former. I will also argue that the concept of the self is as much about projecting oneself 
into the future as it is about recollecting oneself from the past. This, finally, will reveal the 
place for a technologically permeated social world into the concept of the self as the self’s 
possibilities are related to its potential practical space. However, that analysis requires that 
we have already explored the sense in which a subject and object comes together as just 
that, as subject and object, and for that, we need a constitutional analysis of the concept 
of intentionality, and this is what I set out to do in the present chapter. More precisely, this 
is done through the action-oriented analysis of intentionality inherent in Heidegger’s part 
elaboration, part criticism of Edmund Husserl’s transcendental analysis of intentionality. 
Like Latour, and among a long line of phenomenologists, Heidegger tried to develop an 
understanding of our existence in a way that sees the subject-object relation because of our 
activities rather than as a presupposition for it. The hammer-example we encountered 
briefly in Chapter 2 described the relation between equipment and us as far more 
intermingled than that of the relation between two autonomously defined objects and 
subjects. Primarily, the equipment-analysis showed an object as appearing as the kind of 
object it is, and as an object through our concerned contextual engagement. However, the 
analysis, as it was introduced in the previous chapter, does not rule out the possibility that 
the subject in the action is taken for granted, Descartes-style, as a presupposition for such an 
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action to be undertaken at all. Modernist philosopher René Descartes’ claim was that it is 
necessary to establish an absolutely secure ground for knowledge about the objective 
world, and famously found this ground in the subject, in the cogito. (Descartes 1992) 
Subjectivity, represented by the ‘I think’, was for Descartes primary, epistemologically 
preceding all objectivity, ontologically separate from the objective world. 
Later on in this chapter, I shall look more closely at Heidegger’s equipment-analysis. It 
becomes apparent that his analysis does not imply primacy of subjectivity. Even the 
concept with which he denotes the subject, Dasein, reflects subjectivity’s embeddedness, 
as we can see in its literal translation: Being-there. I shall not enter into a review of the 
problems with Descartes’ position, 1  but limit myself to one formal dilemma with 
assuming the primacy of subjectivity: It would be to presume that the subject is somehow 
able to grasp itself in-itself, as in Descartes ‘I think’, prior to or beyond its actual existence 
among objects (and other subjects). If this were the case, subjectivity would depend on a 
reflection. However, a reflective act would imply, first, that to reflect upon oneself is to take 
oneself as an object for reflection, and second, as an object for theoretical consideration 
prior to any practical engagements in-the-world. Leaving aside for the time being how 
Heidegger explicitly argues against the possibility of the last implication,2 an important 
dilemma emerges from the first implication: A subject cannot know itself as a subject 
without taking oneself as an object. This not only makes our acquaintance with ourselves 
into an objective kind of knowledge,3 it also turns objectivity into a presupposition for 
subjectivity. Taking the subject as primary therefore seems to dissolve into taking an 
object as primary, which would amount to a contradiction in terms, because it is still 
unavoidably the case that “objects exist only for a subject that does the objectifying.” 
(Heidegger 1988:157) However, how does Heidegger evade the mentioned dilemma? 
Above all, he does what Latour does; he denies the primacy of either. 4  Then he 
substantiates the non-primacy by investigating into the ontological conditions for 
Dasein’s existence. 
                                              
1 Such can be found in any textbook on the history of modern philosophy. 
2 As we saw in the previous chapter, Heidegger regards practical engagements as revealing the objectivity of objects, 
which in turn makes possible theoretical considerations about them. Much more on this later in the present chapter. 
3 More on the problem of this kind of self-theory sometimes referred to as a higher-order theory in Chapters 6 and 7. 
4 Despite Latour’s own remarks to the opposite effect (1999:176), Latour and Heidegger have a lot in common when 
it comes to describing the relation between subject and object, and more general, the constitution of reality. If we 
look at the ‘early’ Heidegger of Being and Time, this is fairly obvious, but Latour himself dismisses the ‘later’ 
Heidegger, of the Technology-article (cf. Chapter 1). However, Søren Riis presents a strong argument for the 
similarities that also exists between the ‘later’ Heidegger’s thinking about technology and Latour. (Riis 2008) 
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First, it is important to note that for Heidegger “subject and Object do not coincide with 
Dasein and the world”. (Heidegger 1962:87/60) Rather than saying, as I did above, that 
Dasein is Heidegger’s expression for the subject, a more precise way of explaining the 
concept of Dasein would be to say that it denotes a ‘single human existence’, the specific 
human kind of being. This existence, this being, can attain a subjective perspective, but it 
would only be one dimension of Dasein. Ontologically, Dasein exists first and foremost 
as Being-in-the-world, as something that is immersed within a totality of things and other 
Daseins. Existence, to be, is the most foundational fact about all beings, and no being 
exists without existing within the world (or, at least, a world). No being, not even Dasein, 
finds itself somehow outside the world in a position to enter it. Dasein finds itself in the 
world, or put more precisely, Dasein finds itself thrown into the world: 
[Dasein] is not a free-floating self-projection; but its character is determined by thrownness 
as a fact of the entity which it is; and, so determined, it has in each case already been 
delivered over to existence, and it constantly so remains… It exists as an entity which has 
to be as it is and as it can be. (Heidegger 1962:321/276) 
 
Because modern humans are so focused upon the why of our existence, it is often 
forgotten that this thrownness, the that-we-are, is the basic mode, and the basic truth of 
our lives. The thrownness implicates that we do not exist in-the-world as a being in a 
relation to the world, the thrownness is more fundamental than that. Had we been in-the-
world in the sense of a relationship, it would have been possible to leave and enter this 
relationship (and therefore also the world) at will. This is not the case. Instead, being-in-
the-world is the (ontological) prerequisite for entering into any relationships at all. 
(Heidegger 1962:84/57) Now, once thrown into the world we do not most primordially 
find ourselves there as a subject. Neither do we find the world unfolding before our eyes 
as a predetermined, geometrically defined space; the world as we get to know it is revealed 
through Dasein’s concernful engagement in its thrownness (see below, cf. Chapter 2). 
However, there is an assumption to this: Dasein is able to relate to other things than itself 
in the world. How is the relation between a subject and an object, or more generally 
between subjectivity and objectivity, constituted, given that neither is primary?1 
                                              
1 In the short presentation that this chapter is, there is a danger of obscuring a crucial aspect of Heidegger’s Dasein-
analysis. ‘Being-in-the-world’ is not merely an alternative formulation of Latour’s situational constitutive relation. 
Heidegger would have thought of that as being too close in kind to the spatial relation of water in a glass. Being-in-the-
world is not a spatial relationship, but is the possibility condition for Dasein to enter into spatial relations. (Heidegger 
1962 §12, cf. 1992:157f) Heidegger’s conception of ontological constitution concerns Being itself and delves into 
matters he labels ‘existential’, which are foundational for both common sense comprehensions and scientific 
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Intentionality 
The concepts of subject and object are often discussed in terms of intentionality. Borrowing 
the concept from his teacher Franz Brentano, who himself revived it from mediaeval 
Scholasticism, Husserl described intentionality as a fundamental aspect of consciousness. 
“Intentional experiences have the peculiarity of directing themselves in varying fashion to 
presented objects… An object is ‘referred to’ or ‘aimed at’ in them, and in presentative or 
judging or other fashion.” (Husserl 2001:98) No matter the precise content of our 
conscious experiences; what objects they are about, how we experience them, or what we 
think of them; conscious experiences are intentional in the sense of directing themselves 
to objects. Whenever we just perceive a thing, when we admire or desire it, or when we 
are judgemental about it, we intend the thing. It does not even matter if the thing we 
intend does not exist; we are still directed towards it. It is through being intentional that 
consciousness is about objects and the world. In other words, it is through intentionality 
that consciousness transcends itself. A full understanding of the action-oriented analysis of 
intentionality by Heidegger (which renders possible the full understanding of the co-
dependent constitution of subject and object) requires an understanding of his reaction to 
Husserl’s consciousness-oriented analysis of intentionality. Consequently, I will now 
spend a few pages on Husserl’s notion of intentionality in order to be able to connect the 
concepts of intentionality, action and technology. 
It is important to note that, for Husserl, intentionality is not something other than 
consciousness, something attached to it which consciousness must make use of in order 
to experience an object or to reach the objective world. As we shall see later, Husserl 
argues against the view that consciousness has a box-within-a-box structure, where 
consciousness is filled with ‘objects’ that we subsequently have certain attitudes towards. 
As Husserl says, “we do not experience the object and beside it the intentional experience 
directed upon it”. (2001:98) The intentional experience is our conscious experience of the 
object. This way, it would be wrong to say that we first intend an object and then project 
particular attitudes, such as admiring, judging, hating and desiring – Husserl calls these the 
                                                                                                                                             
investigations into the lifeworld. Lifeworld relations, such as water-glass, and Latour’s gun-man conception, are 
‘existentiell’ matters and concerns Dasein ontically. The complex relation between ontic and ontological, and 
existentiell and existentiality, is not something I can explore in this chapter. Suffice it to say that methodologically 
Heidegger stresses the importance of the ontic as a way into the analysis of the ontological, but ontologically he 
shows ontic relations themselves to be constituted. See Heidegger 1962 §3 and §4, especially p. 33/12f. I, however, 
will disregard the ontic/ontological distinction in the following, and continue to use ‘ontological’ in the sense that is 
has been employed so far. Some of my uses of ‘ontological’ will probably seem ‘ontic’ to the Heideggerian. 
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quality of the intentional acts, towards the intended object. Intentionality is a fundamental 
structure of consciousness and is not something we possess besides being conscious 
creatures; to study intentionality is to study consciousness itself.1 
This emerges from Husserl’s argumentation against two possible conceptions of how 
subjects and objects are connected – namely, that the connection should be described as a 
relation, and that conscious experiences are intentional because objects outside the subject 
cause them. If the intentional experience of an object, what Husserl calls an intentional act, 
is happening because we stand in a relation to this object, with the subject as one pole and 
the object as another pole in the relation, it would be difficult to explain that we are able 
to think of non-existing entities such as the Greek god Zeus, nymphs or unicorns. 
Likewise, although it initially might seem plausible to say that the presence of a beautiful 
car causes our admiration of it, non-existing or absent entities can hardly be said to cause 
anything like an intentional experience. The relational and the causal views also 
presuppose that the subject and the object enter (and leave) this relation, causal or 
otherwise, as pre- and independently defined entities. We have already seen some reasons 
to reject views that have this as consequence. 
Another reason why Husserl dismisses the relational and the causal view is the 
fundamental difference in how the object is thought of intentionally and how it is given in 
perception. While the object is perceived through a perspective, that is, it shows itself 
partially, with hidden sides, in a dim light that tones down some of its particular features, 
or as broken (for instance, a chair with the seat missing), and so on. Intentionally, the 
object is not like that; it is intended as a complete and full object. In fact, it is because we 
know that the perceived object is not as we perceive it; that it does have a backside and an 
underside; that it is a broken object of this sort and not a new kind of object of that sort, 
that we are able to say that the partially perceived object is an object of a particular sort. 
When I walk around a car, the car presents itself perceptually different from moment to 
moment. First, I might have the bonnet, the headlights and the windscreen right in front 
of me, then I will walk past the side doors, and after that, I will face the back of the car. 
Now the bonnet, the headlights, the windscreen, and the side doors are completely or 
partly hidden. Had the relational or the causal view been accepted, the intentional object 
                                              
1 There are several differences in how Brentano and Husserl use the term. For instance, Brentano regards all 
conscious experience as intentional, whereas Husserl excludes such experiences as pain, anxiety and pleasure from 
intentional experiences. (Husserl 2001:109ff) In addition, on Husserl’s view, Brentano made the mistake of regarding 
conscious contents as phenomena in their own right, that is, as objects in consciousness. (Husserl 2001:97ff). 
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  i n  a c t i o n  9 1  
would have had to be identical to the object as it is perceived. The front view, the side 
view and the back view would then have appeared as three different objects (if objects at 
all). Intentionally, however, it is not like that; I walk around the same car; I perceive the 
same object but from different angles. There is a very simple reason for this, namely, we 
do not see our perceptions; we see things. (Husserl 2001:99,104) 
Husserl substantiates this with two distinctions, one concerning the content of our 
intentional acts and the other concerning the independence of the intentional object. 
First, in our intentional acts, there are two kinds of content; on the one hand, we have the 
reellen (real) content, which he also refers to as the phenomenological content, on the 
other hand, there is the intentional content proper. The second distinction emerges when 
we analyse the intentional content, and is between “the object as it is intended and the object 
[…] which is intended”. (Husserl 2001:113) Concerning the first distinction, it can be 
expressed as the difference between the subjective, temporal experience of the intentional 
act and the objective reference of the act. The difference between a non-intentional and 
an intentional experience, can exemplify the reellen content. A feeling of pain, or of 
anxiety, will not be directed towards an object, but is a conscious experience, that is, an 
experience with a sensuous content. This content is reellen, but is not intentional. It is 
stretched out in time, that is, it is a temporal occurrence, which is subjectively 
experienced. In an intentional act, seeing an SUV at a car dealer’s lot for instance, we will 
have both a reellen and intentional content. If I look at the car, close my eyes, and open 
them to look at it again, the reellen content of my intentional act has changed; it is a new 
occurrence, in the sense that seeing the car anew involves a new complex of sensations, 
temporarily and subjectively different from the previous one.1 However, the intentional 
content (unless I change my attitude to the car) will not have changed. 
There is a very good reason to distinguish between the reellen and the intentional content, 
namely that the reellen is immanent to the act. 
[I]mmanent contents, which belong to the real make-up (reellen Bestande) of the intentional 
experiences, are not intentional: they constitute the act, provide necessary points d’appui which 
renders possible an intention, but are not themselves intended. (Husserl 2001:99)  
The intentional content, on the other hand, transcends the act itself; it involves aspects 
and features that cannot be immanent to the act.2 This becomes clear from Husserl’s 
                                              
1 I owe this example to Dan Zahavi.  
2 In the case of non-existing objects one could be induced to think that they are a part of the immanent content since 
they do not exist in the world, but a unicorn is as much a transcendental object as an SUV. Non-existence makes no 
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treatment of the distinction between the object as it is intended and the object that is 
intended. 
This distinction emerges when we look into the difference between an intentional act’s 
matter and quality. That is to say, the intentional object is independent both of how it 
appears in the intentional act, the matter of the intentional act, and of the attitude, the 
quality, we have towards it. For instance, the matter can vary without a corresponding 
change in intentional object or quality of the act. I can see an SUV and dislike it for its 
pollutive properties regardless of how the car itself appears. I can see it approaching 
through my rear-view mirror, I can see it shining new in a car lot or dirty and wrecked in a 
breaker's yard, I can see it vaguely through a mist, or I can walk around it, without 
changing how I think about it. The same applies if I perceive a car through changing light 
conditions. I might first recognize an object as an SUV through a very dim light and come 
to think of what I feel about this kind of cars. The light might then brighten up so that it 
reveals more and more details of the particular car up until the point where I see it lucidly. 
Throughout this sequence, the car appears differently in my intentional act, but not 
because of the object – the car itself – has changed, and not because I change my attitude 
towards it, but because the intentional content has a certain matter that is an outcome of 
the particularities of the situation in which I perceive the intentional object.1  
In addition, the independence of the intentional object surfaces if we vary the quality of 
the intentional act. For instance, my politico-ethical dislike of SUV’s might change into a 
guilty pleasure once I get to drive one and experience the overview of the traffic it 
affords; a shift in the intentional quality does of course not imply a change in intentional 
object. The quality of the intentional act can change even if I keep the act’s matter the 
same; upon looking at an SUV through a retailer’s window, I can first just perceive it, 
then I can admire it, then I might wish I had a car like that, and finally, I can decide that I 
do not want one after all. Throughout this sequence, the matter of the intentional act is 
constant, but the meaning of the intentional act changes because I change my attitude 
                                                                                                                                             
difference to the intentional structure, but concerns truth-conditions, which are not part of the analysis of intentionality. 
(Husserl 2001:99, 126f) 
1 An exception here is when changing conditions of how an object is perceived reveals the object as something else 
than one first had interpreted it to be. Husserl has an elaborate analysis of how intentions are fulfilled, and how 
fulfilment of intentions sometimes leads us over into new objects. (See Husserl 2001, the entire first section of Sixth 
Investigation) This does not concern directly the structure of the intentional act, between the intentional 
consciousness and the intentional object, so I will not enter that discussion. 
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towards the intentional object, the quality of the act.1 In general, intentional objects can 
figure in a number of qualitatively different intentional acts; I can merely think of 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations, I can read it, I can be frustrated about its impenetrable 
content, or I can admire the many phenomenological analysis contained in it. The object 
that is intended can figure in intentional acts that differ in respect of both matter and 
quality and will as such be different objects-as-intended. The intentional object itself, 
however, is not to be equated or identified with this content.2 (Husserl 2001:113) 
It is important, though, to realize that what has just been said does not imply that we first 
intend an object, in the sense of representing it mentally, and then intend our attitudes 
towards it. The intentional object, the object that transcends the immanent content, is not 
a mental representation. We are directed towards an object, but this object is not 
something we will find inside our consciousness. There are several reasons for the denial 
of a representational theory of intentionality. For instance, upon discussing the image-theory 
of perception, Husserl points out that for something to be a representation it must be 
constituted as such by a consciousness. Mere similarity between two phenomena does not 
make one a representation of the other; there is nothing intrinsic in a phenomenon that 
makes it a representation. Being a representation is not a characteristic like being red or 
spherical. (Husserl 2001:125) A representational relation is not a causal relation, it is a 
meant relation; it cannot be established by mere perception. As such, it requires a 
consciousness that interprets (or designs) the connection as representational. This means 
that two objects must be intentionally given in order for one of them to be taken as a 
representation of the other. Explaining the intentional object as being a representation 
therefore involves a vicious circle. 
Further, a representational theory of intentionality implies that we, in order to be intentional, 
are not directed towards the object outside us but towards an occurrence in perceptual 
consciousness; an object representing it inside. In this case, intentionality, to avoid the 
vicious circle, is postulated as an additional level in consciousness (the box-within-box 
structure mentioned earlier). On this level, we shall be able to ‘compare’ the object in 
perceptual consciousness with the object outside consciousness, and determine whether it 
                                              
1 The combination of the act’s matter and quality makes up what Husserl calls the intentional essence. The meaning of the 
act, however, is due to the act’s semantic essence, which in some cases can be different from the intentional essence. 
(Husserl 2001:122f) Since I am trying to identify the intentional object, I will not go further into that distinction. 
2 If it had, the intentional object would have been a subjective intentional construct. 
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is sufficiently similar (as an image or as a code) to be intentionally established as a 
representation. However, how is the object established as an intentional object on that 
level? To avoid yet another vicious circle, we are compelled to postulate yet another level, 
taking the previous level as its object, and so on, in which case we have an infinite regress. 
(Husserl 2001:126) 
Apart from the formal problem this involves, it also points us toward another reason why 
we should dismiss the thought of the intentional object as a representation, namely that it 
is totally at odds with the phenomenology of our intentional experiences. This is again a 
repudiation of the thought of intentionality as a (causal) relation between two poles in 
experience, a subject and an object. Besides the reasons we saw earlier for not accepting 
this thought, it is phenomenologically evident that we do not experience our activities in 
the way described above: 
[W]e simply ‘live in’ the act in question, become absorbed, e.g., in the perceptual ‘taking in’ 
of some event happening before us, in some play of fancy, in reading a story, in carrying 
out a mathematical proof etc. (Husserl 2001:100) 
There is then, no phenomenological evidence that we experience the world mediated by 
immanent representations. Experientially, we are immersed in our activities, directed 
towards the world. The objects of our intentional acts are the objects themselves, as they 
are in-the-world.1 Thinking the intentional object as a representation is not based on 
experience. Instead, Husserl claims, it is grounded in reflection.  
The consequence of claiming that the intentional object is a representation comes down 
to giving primacy to the subject, and then wondering, as Descartes did, if and how 
subjective experience can transcend the immanent subjective sphere and reach out and 
contain truth about the world as it is. Instead, intentionality is the capacity of the 
conscious subject to relate to the world. In this sense, intentionality is a more 
fundamental aspect of human consciousness than the kind of self-reflection that enabled 
Descartes to question the validity of his perceptions. According to Husserl, Descartes 
failed to analyse the intentional foundation of his own reflections:  
In our description relation to an experiencing ego is inescapable, but the experience described 
is not itself an experiential complex having the ego-presentation as its part. We perform the 
description after an objectifying act of reflection, in which reflection on the ego is 
combined with reflection on the experienced act to yield a relational act, in which the ego 
appears as itself related to its act’s object through its act. Plainly an essential descriptive 
                                              
1 Needless to add, this is not to say that we can only be conscious of existing objects or of objects in our vicinity. 
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change has occurred. The original act is no longer simply there, we no longer live in it, but 
we attend to it and pass judgement on it. (Husserl 2001:101)1 
Husserl’s analysis of intentionality shows that the world is ‘brought before’ the intentional 
consciousness prior to our reflections upon (and question the validity of) the contents of 
our thoughts. Intentionality, therefore, is the key concept to understand how we are in-
the-world, and is for Husserl a way of avoiding the sceptical problems arising from 
Descartes’ analysis, and through it, the deadlock of modern dualistic philosophy.2 
The question of the being of the intentional object 
Husserl’s theory of intentionality, however, according to Heidegger, remains within the 
limits of the subjectivist tradition of Cartesian philosophy, and consequently retains the 
primacy of the subject.3 The main reason for this is that Husserl’s analysis primarily is an 
investigation into how objects ‘show themselves’ for a consciousness, and addresses the 
relation of cognitive acts, such as knowing, believing, admiring and judging, to the 
intentional object in the sense of a perceived object. Consciousness then appears as the 
‘place’ where the intentional object is constituted. 
Heidegger follows Husserl in holding that it is only for a consciousness anything like an 
object shows itself in its objectivity, and therefore broadly embraces the concepts and 
distinctions in Husserl’s analysis. (Heidegger 1988:55-67, 1992:27-47) However, there is, 
in Heidegger’s opinion, an obvious shortcoming in performing the analysis of 
intentionality in perceptual terms, namely that “to be perceived is only a characteristic of a 
being that has to do with its being apprehended; it is not the determination of the being’s 
being-in-itself”. (Heidegger 1988:112) Even if the intentionality of our conscious 
experiences demonstrates the transcendence of the intentional object, and as such enables 
Husserl to shrug off accusations of scepticism, the being of the intentional object, its 
existence and its how of this existence, is not established through the theory of 
                                              
1 Husserl changed his view on the ego soon after Logical Investigations [1900-01], saying for instance in a note to the 
second edition [1913] that an analysis of intentionality “can be systematically explored without taking up any stance 
on the ego-issue.” (Husserl 2001:93) However, he did not change the argument contained in the quote above, that 
reflection on our own experiences is a fundamentally different act from living our experiences (and that the former 
act presupposes the latter). 
2 In the later work, Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy [1913], Husserl elaborates his 
theory of intentionality. He introduces some new terms, but overall the concept of intentionality is as described here. 
However, an ambiguous use of the term Noema has given rise to considerably different interpretations concerning 
the status and nature of the intentional object. For an overview of this discussion, see Drummond 1997. 
3  Heidegger can sometimes be a tad biased when criticising Husserl, but as his criticism is important for the 
understanding of Heidegger himself, I will for most part take Heidegger’s interpretations at face value. See Crowell 
2001 and Overgaard 2004 for a more critical view of Heidegger’s interpretations of Husserl. 
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intentionality; merely its constitution as a perceived object. Furthermore, investigating into 
the being of the intentional will reveal another, still more basic question about being itself, 
being-as-such. Failing the former will lead to a distorted account of the latter. For 
Heidegger, this dual neglect gives Husserl’s account of being-as-such an element of 
idealism, which he finds highly unsatisfactory.1 
The way Heidegger sees it, this problem is more palpable in Husserl’s later treatments of 
intentionality, for instance in Ideas. Here Husserl builds his investigation upon the 
phenomenological reduction, which consists of three distinct ‘movements’. First, there is the 
epoché, the methodological ‘bracketing’ of assumptions and theories of existence in the 
purpose of relating only to what is presented in consciousness as it is presented. Then 
there are the two reductions, the transcendental reduction, which we perform when we lead 
the investigation back (Re-ducere is Latin for ‘leading back’) from the intentional object to 
the structures of intentionality that are effective in regular world-immersed conscious 
experiences, but which we are not thematically aware of. Finally, there is the eidetic 
reduction, which is done by turning from an intentional object’s particularities to focus on 
its eidos, its essence, “the What of an individuum”.2 (Husserl 1982:8/10) Heidegger’s claim 
is that the methodology of the phenomenological reduction prevents an opening up to 
what he perceives as the more fundamental issue, namely the being of the intentional 
object and the consciousness where it purportedly manifests itself. 
Heidegger points to two basic problems in this regard. First, the reduction involves a 
deliberate turning away from the more fundamental question: 
In its methodological sense as a disregarding…the reduction is in principle inappropriate 
for determining the being of consciousness positively. The sense of the reduction involves 
precisely giving up the ground upon which alone the question of the intentional could be 
based. (Heidegger 1992:109) 
Even if Husserl’s phenomenological analysis starts with an acknowledgement of the mode 
of being in the world among other beings in the world; existence in the so-called natural 
attitude, it deliberately and methodologically “seeks to arrive at…pure consciousness”. 
(Heidegger 1992:109) The explicit purpose of the phenomenological reduction is to 
analyse consciousness itself, as it is in itself regardless of the state or the being of the 
                                              
1 In the lecture course from 1927, Heidegger says, “to this very day I am unaware of any infallible decision according 
to which idealism is false.” (1988:167) Nevertheless, in light of his own investigations, he finds it ‘untenable.’  
2 Husserl employed the basic idea behind the phenomenological reduction in the earlier treatment as well, but not 
consistently and never in an explicitly methodological way (Husserl 1982:140/117). The epoché, should not really be 
viewed as a part of the phenomenological reduction, but as a preliminary step towards the reductions proper.  
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world, without positing anything about the world that is other to consciousness. Also, 
through the eidetic reduction, to disregard concrete and individual consciousness and 
instead focus on consciousness as pure, that is, as universal and ‘empty’ of content; “the 
essence, the ideal being of lived experiences”. (Heidegger 1992:103) However, being 
rather perceptive, Husserl makes several remarks to counter criticism to the effect that the 
reduction should involve an elimination of the existence and being of the world, and 
‘changing all the world into a subjective illusion’. A more careful reading, Husserl says, 
will reveal that the reduction “take[s] nothing away from the fully valid being of the world 
as the all of realities, just as nothing is taken away from the fully valid geometrical being 
of the square by denying that the square is round”. (Husserl 1982:129/106-7) In fact, the 
opposite is the case; the main objective of the phenomenological reduction is precisely to 
arrive at a firm understanding of the being of the world. 
For Husserl, the necessity of this methodology is a consequence of the analysis of 
intentionality (although not something he discovered until after the publication of Logical 
Investigations). We saw above that there is a ‘discrepancy’ between how an object is given to 
experience and how we perceive, think of and experience it. We perceive an object, but 
given to us is only the side of the object facing us; we always see the object from a 
specific perspective but experience it as a complete, full object. Further, we cannot equate 
the intentional object with how it appears as-perceived; the intentional object has a value, a 
meaning; a belonging to something that transcends the object as it is given in experience. 
Consequently, it becomes necessary to make a distinction between the object (or, the 
world) as we obtain it experientially and the ‘contribution’ of consciousness intentionally, 
given that it is consciousness that ‘connects’ the particular object with its eidos, and 
accordingly, that it is through consciousness that the world is for us. What happened after 
his initial treatment of intentionality in Logical Investigations was that Husserl came to 
realize that it was only by investigating into pure consciousness that we would be able to 
understand the constitution of the intentional object. And this, he found, could only be 
undertaken through the phenomenological reduction. 
However, this does not suggest that the phenomenological reduction primarily is an 
attempt to describe the structures of consciousness, in a quasi-Kantian manner. As 
mentioned, the main purpose is to clarify the constitution of the objective world. In 
intentional experience, we get to know the world as it is constituted for us, but the 
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moments in the constitutional process transcend what we have access to in the natural 
attitude.  
Reality is not in itself something absolute which becomes tied secondarily to something 
else; rather, in the absolute sense, it is nothing at all; it has no ‘absolute essence’ whatever; it 
has the essentiality of something which, of necessity, is only intentional, only an object of 
consciousness, something presented in the manner peculiar to consciousness, something 
apparent <as apparent>. (Husserl 1982:113/94) 
Things just are; they do not have, or live in or through essences as such. Things in the 
world come to be and vanish without the question of essence occurring. The question of 
a thing’s essence can only make sense for a consciousness, and consequently, the essence 
is only obtainable for a consciousness. (Husserl 1982:129/106f) The mere bracketing of 
the world is not sufficient in this regard, and to clarify the constitution of the world, that 
is, to access reality’s ‘absolute essence’, we must turn away from the particularities of the 
transcendental attitude and lead our way back to the essences of the intentional objects. 
Eventually, it will be shown, for short, that all intentional objects belong to the same 
ontological region; they have the same basic being; the being of the transcendent. 
Consciousness, on the other hand, where this transcendence becomes manifested, 
therefore has a different kind of being. However, one cannot reach the primordial level of 
transcendent being without undergoing the reduction, the analysis of pure consciousness. 
[T]his most radical of all ontological distinctions – being as consciousness and being as 
something which becomes ‘manifested’ in consciousness, ‘transcendent’ being… can be 
attained in its purity and appreciated only by the method of the phenomenological 
reduction. (Husserl 1982:171/141-2) 
 
Heidegger does acknowledge that the exposition of being might be the rationale behind 
Husserl’s methodology (Heidegger 1982:109), but remains doubtful about Husserl’s 
conclusion. Is the phenomenological reduction really the proper methodological way to 
proceed to arrive at ‘the most radical of all ontological distinctions’ of being? Moreover, is 
this distinction valid? It is clear from the second basic problem he raises that Heidegger 
answers both these questions negatively. Husserl’s exclusive focus on the what of the 
intentional object, that is, through his investigations into essence, he disregards the 
question of the existence of the intentional object, and it is because of this he ends up 
with what Heidegger regards as a misguided ontological distinction. 
When I determine the essentia, the essence of [for instance] color and sound, I disregard 
their existentia, their particular individuation, whether the color is the color of a thing, in this 
or that illumination. I look only at what pertains to every color as color, regardless of 
whether it exists or not. I disregard its existence, and so all the more the essence of its 
existence. (Heidegger 1992:110) 
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Through the phenomenological reduction one attains the essence of a thing’s what, but 
fails to grasp the essence of a thing’s being as an existing thing, in its how or why in the 
actual world. Aron Gurwitsch, who attended lectures by and was greatly influenced by 
Husserl, also mentions that the ontological question of existence is not taken up and 
discussed in the constitutive phenomenology that Husserl presents in Ideas. Gurwitsch 
points out that this is due to the inherent limitation in the focus of the methodology, 
namely on consciousness as constitutive of objects (or, more generally, objectivity).  
On its [constitutive phenomenology] grounds, no ontological inquiry is to be pursued 
directly, but only, so to speak, in an oblique manner. Whatever ontological results are 
attained, they are obtained as by-products, though much desired and searched for, of 
investigations bearing upon and concerned with conscious life. In fact, if consciousness is 
recognized as the universal and only medium of access to whatever exists, there is no 
longer the possibility of approaching being and existence directly and immediately. 
(Gurwitsch 1961:627)1 
In this sense, we are faced with a paradox in Husserl’s constitutive investigations: Despite 
the deliberate turning away from the question of existence throughout the entire 
phenomenological reduction, one somehow ends up with a radical distinction that posits 
two essential forms of existence, that is, two kinds of being. Disregarding existence 
implies that one assumes that a thing’s ‘what’ is not affected by the thing in its concrete 
existence, which in turn presupposes that “the entity which is intentional must be 
originally given, that is, it must be originally experienced in its manner of being”. 
(Heidegger 1992:110) Only if this is the case, can there be no problem in taking the 
thing’s ‘what’ as the source of the phenomenological reduction. In other words, there 
should be no discrepancies concerning the intentional object’s essence as it presents itself 
in the natural attitude and in consciousness after the epoché; only then is the bracketing 
legitimate. 
It is evident that Husserl presupposes this; we miss nothing essential in bracketing 
assumptions of existence, quite on the contrary, only then can we approach the essential. 
The natural attitude, as Husserl describes it, is there when we are “conscious of a world 
endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having become in time”. (Husserl 
1982:51/48) It is there when we are among things and other subjects and ‘know’ these 
things and subjects – “a ‘knowing of them’ which involves no conceptual thinking”. 
(Husserl 1982:52/49) The natural attitude is the basis for all sorts of conceptual thinking, 
                                              
1 It was only later, with the development of the genetic phenomenology from the late 1920’s, that Husserl discussed 
existence more directly. (Gurwitsch 1961:629) 
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including scientific and philosophical thinking, and the phenomenological reduction. It is 
a pre-theoretical state; it is characterized by our relating to things in a non-theoretical way. 
At least, that is how Husserl argues. Heidegger, on the other hand, finds the description 
of the natural attitude misleading. Although Husserl is right in calling our stance towards 
other things an attitude, in the sense that it clearly involves a stance towards other things, it 
is not natural, nor can it be said to be primary or authentic. Quite the opposite, the way 
Husserl describes the natural attitude is that of a theoretical stance, in the sense that 
it must first be derived from natural comportment, from the natural way of experience; one 
must so to speak ‘place oneself into’ this way of considering things (and so assume an 
attitude toward them) in order to experience in this manner. (Heidegger 1992:113) 
The manner in which we experience things from the natural attitude as it is described by 
Husserl is that of putting ourselves opposite another thing, another entity as “a lawfully 
regulated flow of occurrences in the spatio-temporal exteriority of the world”. (Heidegger 
1992:113) Experiencing things in this manner implies a) an a priori assumption of a subject 
and an object standing opposite each other entering a relation, and b) that the object is a 
priori assumed to be, and is approached as, a well-defined object, an object in its what. In 
so doing, Husserl takes as his starting point a way of relating to entities that presupposes a 
more basic way of being. Consequently, he fails to notice that the so-called non-
conceptual knowledge of the natural attitude involves a pre-understanding. Moreover, this 
pre-understanding, Heidegger argues, is of a kind where the question of an object’s actual 
existence is anything but trivial. 
Heidegger concludes that by performing the analysis of intentionality on the backdrop of 
the reductions, which itself is preceded by the perceptually founded account of the natural 
attitude, Husserl cuts himself off from grasping the being of the intentional. Looking 
away from existence at the outset results in a misconception of the true sense of being-as-
such that is riddled with some quasi-Cartesian problems: 
How is it at all possible that this sphere of…pure consciousness, which is supposed to be 
separated from every transcendence by an absolute gulf, is at the same time united with 
reality in the unity as a real human being, who himself occurs as a real object in the world? 
How is it at all possible that lived experiences constitute an absolute and pure region of 
being and at the same time occur in the transcendence of the world? (Heidegger 1992:101) 
Heidegger himself attempts to avoid this ‘absolute gulf’ in how he conceives Dasein’s 
self-understanding. According to Heidegger, “we understand ourselves and our existence 
by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of. We understand 
ourselves by starting from them because the Dasein finds itself primarily in things.” 
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(1988:159) We discover ourselves, not by turning back on ourselves and reflecting on our 
conscious experiences, but because our selves are reflected back to us from our daily 
dealings with the things that are surrounding us. Subjectivity (and, as I will discuss shortly, 
objectivity) emerges from this engagement with things. Because of this, intentionality as it 
is conceived by Husserl – the subjective holding of an object (in its what) – pre-supposes 
this way of being-alongside objects. A fuller criticism of the basis of Husserl’s 
understanding of intentionality, therefore, involves the analysis of our being-in-the-world 
and of the being of the entities that we encounter in our surroundings.1 
Readiness-to-hand  
According to Heidegger, then, Husserl’s phenomenological reduction presupposes that 
we in the natural attitude encounter things in their what. To encounter a thing in its what 
means that we grasp what it is that distinguishes it as the thing it is. Which, in turn, 
demands a kind of reflection where the thing is considered isolated in form from other 
things, things that it itself is not. However, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, this is 
not the primordial manner in which we encounter entities. Instead, we encounter them as 
they are linked up to other entities in an equipmental totality. More precisely, we meet 
them, in a non-reflective manner, as indistinguishable from this totality. This means that, 
as an integral part of this totality, entities appear in their readiness-to-hand, as items for 
certain kinds of use within the totality, for instance, the item we would call a nail is 
connected to (the item we would call) the hammer through its to-be-hammered-on. In 
general, readiness-to-hand alludes to certain characteristics of the entity, characteristics 
that belong to the entity in virtue of its in-order-to: “serviceability, conduciveness, 
usability, manipulability”. (Heidegger 1962:97/68) Readiness-to-hand, Heidegger claims, 
precedes all our contemplations on what kind of entity it is. In fact, the kind of 
understanding of an entity we gain through encountering it in its readiness-to-hand is 
crucial for our understanding of the entity’s what.2 
                                              
1 Founding intentionality in existence and especially in the dealings with things meant for Husserl that Heidegger 
never stepped out of the natural attitude and because of this his account was limited by the prejudices inherent in 
that attitude. However, whether Husserl is right in this rebuttal, falls outside the scope and motive behind the 
discussion on intentionality in the present context. 
2 Readiness-to-hand is not necessarily prior in the sense of a time sequence where we first encounter readiness-to-
hand, and then, after having become acquainted with an entity’s presence-at-hand, only relate to it as presence-at-
hand. Nor does it signify that we are only able to relate to a thing in its presence-at-hand when we master it in its 
readiness-to-hand. While doing his job, a carpenter, although being perfectly well acquainted with the hammer in its 
presence-at-hand is nevertheless caught up in the job at hand, and then, as long as the job is coming along fine 
without interruptions, relates to the hammer as readiness-to-hand. The question of primordiality concerns the manner 
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Considering the what of an entity means encountering the entity in its presence-at-hand. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand are not properties 
belonging to entities, they are two different kinds of being in which entities exist. That is, 
they are two different ways we can approach an entity (because we, Dasein, are the only 
being for whom being is an issue). The question for Heidegger, then, is what kind of 
approach is the primordial, approaching an entity in its presence-at-hand or in its 
readiness-to-hand. 1  While readiness-to-hand is elaborately described in Being and Time, 
presence-at-hand is not, and the concept has been met with claims of being somewhat ill 
defined and ambiguously used. (Soffer 1999:382, Overgaard 2004:174) Heidegger 
principally presents presence-at-hand as the kind of being which shows itself when the 
totality in which the readiness-to-hand is in breaks down. (Heidegger 1962:103f/73f) An 
entity in its readiness-to-hand is fundamentally connected to other entities (in their 
readiness-to-hand), but also to Dasein’s engagement and interest in what the entity can do 
in light of the contextual, or equipmental, totality. When I pick up a hammer in order to 
drive a nail into the living room wall with the purpose of hanging a painting on the wall, 
the use of the hammer is connected not only to the rest of the equipment but is also 
fundamentally connected to the overall project of mine. In our existence, we are 
constantly engaged in various projects; therefore our interest in various types of 
equipment is a concerned interest; we approach them for what they can do in whatever 
project we are involved in right now. 
An entity in its presence-of-hand, on the other hand, is just there, as it occurs detached 
from other things and from the concerned interest of Dasein, for instance, the hammer as 
it appears in the toolbox or on the shelf of the hardware store. Presence-at-hand is the 
entity regarded in a purely objective way, as a thing in its own right. As such, it steps out 
of the equipmental totality, and acts as raw material for values, meaning, and theoretical 
relations and definitions. It is the entity understood as a purely material thing, a thing of 
nature, contemplated in its thinghood rather than in its connectedness in a practical totality; 
the result of an analysis of what makes it a thing capable of an autonomous existence, 
                                                                                                                                             
of being of presence-at-hand, which presupposes the manner of being of readiness-to-hand; readiness-to-hand is in 
this sense ontological prior to presence-at-hand, but as we will see below, the first encounter of an entity is of its 
readiness-to-hand. 
1 Saying that readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand are two different approaches is a grave simplification on the 
verge of misrepresentation. It is doubtless that the concepts alludes to two kinds the being of the things themselves, but 
for the question of how we intentionally encounter objects, I believe it accentuates the difference between readiness-
to-hand and presence-at-hand quite well. (Heidegger 1962:101/71) 
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detached from other equipmental things in their presence-at-hand. In other words, we 
encounter a thing in its presence-at-hand when we relate to the entity as a mere occurring 
phenomenon in front of us. It is also the thing seen in the present, in its present state, as 
it occurs temporarily right now. (Heidegger 1992:194f) Or perhaps just as correct, as it 
never exists. The temporal aspect is important, because things in their present is not how 
we principally encounter things – our projects are not only stretched out horizontally and 
spatially (the equipmental totality) but are in their nature also extended vertically and 
temporally. Given then, that the thing was approached principally as an indistinguishable 
part of an equipmental totality and as a part of an ongoing concerned project, the thing in 
its present-at-hand, as it is perceived in its thinghood, is an abstraction, in a double manner, 
from our original or primordial encounter with it.1 To access the thing in its presence-at-
hand, we must ‘freeze’ time and ‘tear’ the thing out of the context that made us aware of 
the thing in the first place. 
Indeed, the perceiving of a thing in the natural attitude as Husserl describes it seems to be 
as presence-at-hand. He even speaks of perception as being of that which is “simply there 
for me, ‘on-hand’”. (Husserl 1982:51/48) This does not mean, of course, that Husserl does 
not recognize that things are connected to other things in practical relations or to us as 
things of value. In fact, he is quite explicit that when we perceive things in the natural 
attitude, we perceive them as having both value and practical characteristics. 
[The] world is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also with the same 
immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world. I simply find the 
physical things in front of me furnished not only with merely material determinations but 
also with value-characteristics, as beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and 
disagreeable, and the like. Immediately, physical things stand there as Objects of use, the 
‘table’ with its ‘books’, the ‘drinking glass’, ‘the vase’ the ‘piano’, etc. These value-
characteristics and practical characteristics also belong constitutively to the Objects ‘on hand’ as 
Objects, regardless of whether or not I turn to such characteristics. (Husserl 1982:53/50)2 
                                              
1 Ultimately, both the intentional being and the intentional object require timeliness for both Husserl and Heidegger. 
However, these are different although kindred conceptions of temporality. (Dahlstrom 2001:149-160) 
2 Related, Husserl points out that we never perceive objects in total isolation from other objects, a book is perceived 
as lying on the table, which is perceived as being in a room, etc. His concept of horizon involves both the sides of an 
object that are out of view, and other entities. (Husserl 2001:104, 1982:51f/48ff) What these have in common, for 
Husserl, is that we understand the object on the background of the horizontal structure. However, Husserl’s concept 
of horizon seems to indicate that an object is singled out as something other than the rest objects in its horizon, and 
for Heidegger this would mean that objects in a horizon are posited in their presence-at-hand. Consequently, the 
relation of object and its horizon in Husserl appears as that of a spatial relation rather than in Heidegger’s sense of a 
totality of practical meanings. (Boedeker Jr. 2001:72) See Welton 2000 (Part III) and Overgaard 2004 (109-117) for a 
different and more nuanced interpretation of Husserl’s concept of horizon. 
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The question is, how do we go from the object, as it is perceived ‘on-hand’ to the 
practical (and value-) characteristics? The explanation Husserl offers here is that these 
characteristics appear ‘immediately’ in the perception, that is, that they are co-perceived 
with the thing itself. However, for Heidegger, precisely this presents the problems with 
Husserl’s approach. Recall the quote from the previous chapter: “No matter how sharply 
we just look at the ‘outward appearance’ of Things… we cannot discover anything ready-
to-hand.” (Heidegger 1962:98/69) We will not be able to grasp the specific ‘hammering’ 
characteristics of an entity such as a hammer if we only approach it as an occurring thing. 
Seeing an object, and recognizing it as something-to-be-hammered-with, presupposes 
familiarity of contexts in which it can be put to use, and in these the object is ‘visible’ in 
its readiness-to-hand. Let us, for the sake of the argument, imagine a person seeing a 
hammer for the first time, and having no previous knowledge of any ‘hammering 
contexts’. This person would approach the entity as a mere object, and therefore have no 
understanding of what it is that makes this the thing it is, namely a hammer.1 He will not 
be able to tell what it is that characterizes it as a hammering thing unless he becomes 
acquainted with a hammering context, in which it can show itself in its ready-to-hand. 
Explaining to the person what this thing we call a hammer is consists in showing or telling 
how the hammer is put to use in a hammering context (which also requires pointing out 
other entities’ readiness-to-hand to explain their usefulness in the same context). 
We can now pose a slightly rhetorical question: Is the hammer in its what dependent upon 
the hammer in practical use, in its readiness-to-hand? If one is compelled to answer yes to 
this question, one cannot accept that acquaintance with things is founded merely on how 
they are perceived as occurring objects. It then also becomes difficult, or quite simply 
impossible, to hold that the question of existence can be bracketed in the investigation of 
a thing’s being. This argument is supported by recognizing that the context in which a 
piece of equipment belongs is not constituted by the sum total of the specific pieces of 
instruments (in their what) that are contained in it; what pieces of equipment that belongs 
to a context is constituted by the context itself. This is evident from examples regarding 
tools such as hammers and nails, of course, but we get the same idea from considering 
things that are not commonly seen as tools, for instance a wall: 
                                              
1 This way of saying it is not entirely precise from a Heideggerian point of view. The hammer-ignorant would 
probably recognize it as an item that could be used for something, i.e. as a piece of equipment, rather than a mere 
object (Heidegger 1988:304, cf. 2002:60f) Readiness-to-hand should not be understood to imply that we cannot 
perceive any entity without first being familiar with the entity’s specific function. 
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The functionality contexture is not a relational whole in the sense of a product that emerges 
only from the conjoint occurrence of a number of things. The functionality whole, 
narrower or broader – room, house, neighbourhood, town, city – is the prius, within which 
specific beings, as beings of this or that character are as they are and exhibit themselves 
correspondingly. If we are actually thinking the wall, what is given beforehand, even if not 
apprehended thematically, is living room, drawing room, house. A specific functionality 
whole is pre-understood. (Heidegger 1988:164, cf. 1962:97f/68f) 
 
We cannot think of the equipmental whole as something that is the sum of its part, the 
totality of things in their presence-at-hand. (Heidegger 1988:166) Instead, to investigate the 
being of things, we need to take their equipmental character, the referring to, and from, 
other pieces of equipment as the starting point. ‘Referring’ should be read carefully here, 
though. The referring necessarily involved in things’ usefulness cannot involve a relation 
between entities in their presence-at-hand, but appears from the entities’ usefulness, their 
readiness-to-hand: “the references are precisely the involvements [Wobei] in which the 
concernful occupation dwells”. (Heidegger 1992:187) Given that the totality is precisely 
what is toned down, or removed from the entity in its presence-at-hand, investigation into 
the being of a thing requires taking its actual existence as the basis for the investigation. 
Consequently, we can conclude that the ‘whatness of the beings confronting us every day is 
defined by their equipmental character”. (Heidegger 1988:304) But how, exactly, does 
presence-at-hand emerge from the prior mode of readiness-to-hand? This is the question 
we now must turn to. 
Intentionality in action 
What we primarily intend when we are caught up in the handling of equipment is not the 
instruments themselves, but the overall task we are engulfed in. The task is primary in the 
sense that it is the reason why we pick up the specific tools, but it is also primary for the 
reason that the tools that are put to use are concealed in the task. This relates to the 
understanding of readiness-to-hand in an important way, because it makes the primacy of 
the totality to the particularities of each instrument (in their presence-at-hand) to emerge 
more intelligibly. As mentioned, it is through readiness-to-hand that instruments form 
part of a totality. In the process of hanging a painting on the wall, my principal focus is 
not on the hammer, or the nail. For one thing, it is not because I have a hammer and a 
nail that I suddenly find myself in the project of hanging a painting on the wall. In the 
sense that I do intend the hammer, it is because it is perfect for driving the nail into the 
wall, and as such, an entity that enables me to reach my goal. However, there is another 
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sense in which the employed equipment is not in focus. In the actual hammering of the 
nail, the hammer steps into the background. In Heidegger’s expression, it “withdraws”. 
(1962:99/69). Instead of focusing on the tool itself (the hammer), my attention is directed 
at the activity of hammering the nail. My focal point is the nail, while the hammer takes 
on a signification on par with my arm; it becomes as transparent as the arm itself. When 
this is the case, I am as comfortable swinging the hammer as I am with swinging my arm. 
Actually, this seems to be a prerequisite of performing well. If I instead had been 
thematically aware of the hammer, more occupied with the act of swinging it than of the 
nail, I would probably not have performed the task itself, the hammering of the nail, very 
well. In these cases, the tool does not disappear functionally, of course; the hammer still 
involves the referring, its in-order-to, to the context that makes it stand out as an object 
suitable for hammering (cf. Chapter 2).  
In its normal use, then, the hammer itself is not thematized, the attention goes ‘through’ 
it. In this sense, there is no phenomenological difference in how our arm is attached to 
my body and the way the hammer is attached to the arm. If it had not been for the pain it 
could just as well have been my arm I used to hit the nail. Thematically, it is just as ‘lost’ 
as the arm itself. However, when the hammer is unable to function the way it is supposed 
to, for instance, if the handle comes loose or breaks, our attention turns to the hammer, 
and it is thematized as a thing of its own. The hammer no longer shows itself in its 
usability, but in its conspicuousness; it stands out and becomes visible as a thing in itself. Of 
course, the un-usability of the hammer is only comprehensible from the point of view of 
the equipmental totality; its un-usability is not a judgement made from its presence-at-
hand, as an occurring thing. (Heidegger 1962:102/73) It is only by holding it up against a 
totality that we can say it is broken. Having lost its function presupposes that it had a 
function, a usability in the first place. 
Furthermore, when the hammer is misplaced or missing, it also appears to us as visible 
and singular, something that should have been here, in this project, right now. At this 
moment, the whole project grinds to a halt, and turns into presence-at-hand, as just 
occurring: “When we notice what is un-ready-to-hand, that which is ready-to-hand enters 
the mode of obtrusiveness.” (Heidegger 1962:103/73) It is therefore not just the equipment 
that breaks down; it is the totality of equipment (and the project, which also, in the act of 
being carried out, is in a mode of readiness-to-hand). Sometimes we may encounter a 
piece of equipment that is unsuited for the task, for instance, if I was about to hammer 
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the nail into the wall and suddenly realized that what I held between my fingers was a 
screw, not a nail. The screw, although being ready-to-hand in a different project, appears 
to us as obstinate. It is disturbing, it is a thing that stands in the way for our original project, 
and requires us to attend to something else before we can proceed with the project (to go 
and look for a nail, to put the screw back to where it belongs, etc). It therefore calls 
attention to itself, in its thinghood. 
What happens in the cases of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy is that we go from 
an involved practical handling of a tool to a ‘disinterested’ attitude towards the broken, 
misplaced or redundant thing; we need to find out what it is that prevents us from 
performing the task. While the practical handling presents us with the entity in its 
readiness-to-hand, the disinterested attitude takes as its source the entity in its presence-
at-hand. The primordial context-of-use disappears, and the hammer itself as a thing in-
itself comes into sight. We take on a theoretical attitude towards the equipment, the context 
and our project, and ask ourselves, what has broken down, what has to be done to get the 
project back up and running, and so on. 
However, we soon realise that what announces itself when we turn from readiness-to-
hand to presence-to-hand is not something new; it has been there all along. It is, of 
course, not the case that the entity changes from one thing to another when it goes from 
its presence-to-hand to its readiness-to-hand. Instead, we become aware of the thing in an 
explicit manner. “The context is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a 
totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection.” (Heidegger 1962:105/75) This 
makes sense, of course, because to say that something does not work or is unsuited, 
requires a certain kind of pre-understanding. 
When something within the world is encountered in the character of being ‘obstructive,’ ‘in 
the way,’ that is, lying in the way of concern, this ‘it doesn’t belong here’ is possible only on the 
basis of the specific presence of the world as a fixed, familiar totality of references. There 
can be something like a not-belonging-here only against the background of a primary 
familiarity, which itself is not conscious and intended but is rather present in this 
unprominent way. (Heidegger 1992:188-9) 
In other words, the kind of knowledge of a thing in its presence-at-hand is a ‘reworking’ 
of the kind of understanding we have when we are caught up in some project or another. 
We should therefore not think of encounters of readiness-to-hand implying some sort of 
blind or mechanical behaviour. “Action”, Heidegger says, “has its own kind of sight”. 
(1962:99/69)  
1 0 8  T E C H N O L O G Y  
By way of a summary, we have now seen how the intentional holding of a thing in its what 
presupposes the primordial readiness-to-hand manner of being. Furthermore, the 
characteristics of the thing’s what are, in the terminology introduced in the previous 
chapter, an articulation of the kind of understanding that manifests itself in the encounters 
of the thing in its readiness-to-hand. The criticism of Husserl’s theory of intentionality (or 
more precisely, of the conviction of the later Husserl that intentionality must be 
investigated by bracketing assumptions of actual existence) amounts to an exposing of the 
pre-understanding of being that is manifested in our intentional states. Not only when we 
admire, or judge, or condemn a thing do we manifest this pre-understanding, but also in 
the mere perception of something as-something do we in a vital manner lean on a pre-
existing relation to this thing, namely as part of the equipmental totality we primordially 
direct ourselves toward. What is ‘lit up’ by the turn to presence-at-hand, the entity in its 
objectivity, as a singular, autonomous object in-the-world, already presupposes the 
unconcealment of a world that is due to our encounter with readiness-to-hand.  
Ultimately, all this, intentionality, presence-at-hand, and our orientation towards 
readiness-to-hand, leads back the specific kind of being-in-the-world that we live in, i.e. 
which belongs to Dasein. As mentioned in Chapter 2, according to Heidegger, we are in-
the-world in a mode of concern. We do not discover ourselves before or outside our actual 
existence in-the-world in which case we could have entered the world ‘at free will’. We are 
always already in-the-world, and as such find ourselves alongside other subjects and 
things; existence implies co-existence. However, we never are per ce in-the-world, in our 
existence we are always caught up in specific manners of being, characterized by certain 
ways of acting in our surroundings. 
Dasein’s facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself or even split 
up into definitive ways of Being-in… having to do with something, producing something, 
attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up 
and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, 
discussing, determining… All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of being. 
(Heidegger 1962:83/56-7)  
Because of the mode of concern, we are in-the-world with a basic assumption that entities 
in the world have to do with our ongoing occupations. In this sense, we display a pre-
understanding of their being – pre-understanding because is it is indifferent to the specific 
usefulness of the entities. “Our understanding of being is indifferent but is at any time 
differentiable.” (Heidegger 1988:176) Through this undifferentiated pre-understanding, a 
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world is revealed. This unconcealment, this having a world, in turn is the framework 
condition for differentiated structures of meanings within the world.1  
The concernful constitution of Dasein, then, implies that we are fundamentally directed 
toward the world before the world is thematized (and differentiated) as objective in the 
intentional sense. It is in this sense that Heidegger holds that intentionality does not 
constitute the subject-object relation, but that intentionality is itself constituted by the co-
existence of the concernful Dasein. However, as this is not an intentional relation, it is not 
yet a subject-object relation. To grasp this properly, it is necessary to rethink the concept of 
transcendence. As we saw, Husserl’s ontological distinction posits the being of the 
transcendent as opposed to the being of the immanent, with consciousness and 
subjectivity as belonging to the latter. Heidegger’s claim that we discover ourselves in 
dealings with things, on the other hand, implies that the radical ontological distinction is 
false because Dasein, subjectivity, is itself primordially transcendent, ‘out there’, in-the-
world before it is an immanent conscious ‘fact’, before it is the characteristic of self-
consciousness.  
When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get 
out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of 
Being is such that it is always ‘outside’ alongside entities which it encounters and which 
belongs to a world already discovered… even in this ‘Being-outside’ alongside the object, 
Dasein is still ‘inside’, if we understand this in the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself 
‘inside’ as a Being-in-the-world which knows. (1962:89/62, cf. 1988:162) 
Contrary to Husserl, then, who held that the transcendent intentional object is constituted 
by a subject’s intentional directedness towards it, the result of the existential investigation 
of Heidegger is that “[t]ranscendence is a fundamental determination of the ontological structure of the 
Dasein”. (Heidegger 1988:162) 
What does this mean for the concept of subjectivity? In its concernful constitution, 
Dasein is not in-the-world in an explicit self-conscious sense, as a what, disconnected 
from ‘other’ entities, but is tangled up, and with, them. Are we then ‘blindly’ in the world, 
groping our way through our surroundings? Is our primordial existence on a par with that 
of a rock (or a hammer)? No, there is a difference between a human existence and the 
being of other kinds of beings. As Heidegger often mentions, Dasein is the only being for 
whom being is a question; therefore, we do not attain the being of entities in our 
                                              
1 The concerned being-in, which belongs to the temporal-ontological structure of care, is the cornerstone of Being and 
Time, and should have been discussed and argued for much more thoroughly. However, for the task of this chapter, 
this brief presentation will have to do. 
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surroundings. In our concern we are attentive to readiness-to-hand, but are not ourselves 
ready-to-hand.1 Dasein has a world, we have a pre-understanding of the being of other 
beings; other beings are not capable of such a pre-understanding, and do for that reason 
not have a world. 
However, this does not imply that Dasein pre-exists as a subjectivity outside or beyond 
the world, and then directs itself towards readiness-to-hand. “Dasein… knows about 
itself without explicit reflection in the sense of an inner perception bent back on itself but 
in the manner of finding itself in things.” (Heidegger 1988:171) We do not discover 
ourselves prior to our concernful being-in-the-world, we discover ourselves because of, 
and through, our concernful being-in-the-world. Dasein, as a self, only emerges within the 
world, from engaging with the things of the world. Dasein understands itself in terms of 
its possibilities related to the things that surround it, in terms of what it can do with them. 
Explicating the Dasein-self, therefore, involves taking it out of its ordinary entanglement, 
explicating it out of its realm of action, yet the nature of the explicit Dasein-self is 
dependent upon this entanglement.2 
To emphasize it once again, existence cannot be bracketed when subjectivity and self-
consciousness are investigated. As Heidegger sums up his own investigations: 
We cannot define the Dasein’s ontological constitution with the aid of self-consciousness, 
but, to the contrary, we have to clarify the diverse possibilities of self-understanding by way 
of an adequately clarified structure of existence. (Heidegger 1988:174) 
 
Notions of the ‘external’ dependence and constitution of the self are common not just in 
phenomenological literature (which, contrary to what one might think from the previous 
paragraphs, includes Husserl, see Zahavi 1999, Overgaard 2004), but from other 
approaches to the self as well. I shall not pursue the question of the constitution of self 
and subjectivity any further here, but shall return to it in Part 2. The discussion on 
intentionality has explicated how objects and objectivity emerge from our (technological) 
actions as beings-in-the-world. As Dasein, we reveal the world in a certain way, through 
                                              
1 Another very important analysis in this connection, but which can only be mentioned briefly here, is that of Dasein 
in its everyday existence among other Dasein's (not among other Dasein’s seen as subjects, of course). Ontological 
prior to Dasein’s explication of itself as a subject, is its existence as indistinguishable from das Man (the they). “The 
Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self… As they-self the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the ‘they’, and must 
find itself. This dispersal characterizes the ‘subject’ of that kind of Being which we know as concernful absorption in 
the world we encounter as closest to us.” (Heidegger 1962:167/129) More on the They below, in Chapter 6. 
2 A question that naturally follows is, What is the nature of this explicated self? Is it object-like, discovered in a form 
of reflection? Alternatively, is it a form of selfhood that accompanies intentional acts? (Zahavi 2006:83f) This thematic 
will be pursued in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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our dealings with the things in our (and their) surroundings. The unconcealed world is 
then lit up and made explicit by the turn to presence-at-hand. The intentional relation 
between a subject and an object is for this reason constituted by Dasein’s transcendence, 
Dasein’s being-in-the-world, and Dasein’s technological actions in-the-world.1 
In closing 
In what way has the co-constitution of subject and object been enlightened throughout 
this chapter? And how does this relate to the question of technological actions, the main 
topic in this chapter? First, the primacy of both subject and object has been rejected. We 
would not be able to pose the question ‘Is there a world of objects outside ourselves (our 
mind)’ had we not already in some sense presupposed that there is. Asking about objects 
is asking about something possessing the property of objectivity, that is, about something 
that we ourselves are not. However, had we not had such a conception ‘always already’ 
everything would only be ‘me’ – we would not be able to differentiate between others and 
myself. Moreover, I would then not be able to conceptualize a me either, because a me 
presupposes something that me is not. 
Without the foundation of a theory of intentionality, conceptualizing subject and object as 
co-dependent rapidly dissolves into a subject-relativism that is at odds with the 
phenomenology of being a self: I experience myself as being the same person when I am 
holding a shotgun having just fired three shots at a passing car and when I am holding my 
fork eating my dinner. The analysis of intentionality has therefore been necessary to 
explicate what it means for a subject to be constituted differently from one technological 
action to another; why are we able to take on a different meaning when meeting different 
objects? Without a subject at ‘the bottom’, so to speak, there can be no co-dependence. 
What we think of as the subject of a technological action exceeds that of a mere result of 
the preceding object-encounter of the actor. Although we are coloured by, learn from, 
our object-encounters, and as such assimilate aspects of our object-experiences into our 
                                              
1 Heidegger does not discuss the concept of technology in the period around the publication of Being and Time, but, 
as we have seen, equipment, items as they afford usability and manipulability. Although the concepts of equipment 
and technology are more different than one should think from the words alone, I regard the congruent points 
between the ‘early’ and the ‘late’ Heidegger, most notably the revealing that belongs to both equipment and 
technology, as more important. However, there is one significant difference worth mentioning: While the 
technological action analysed in Being and Time makes the object appear as the object it is, the introduction of Gestell 
as the ‘governor’ of technological action has the consequence that the object disappears as the object it is; the object 
is reduced to Bestand. As I asserted in Chapter 1, it is possible to accept Heidegger’s analysis of revealing, and still 
reject the analysis of the nature of technology’s concealment. In the following chapter, an investigation into revealing, 
it will be clear what that statement really means. 
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selves, we are not wholly absorbed by the situational constituted subject-object 
constellation. The dynamics in the relation between actor(s), materiality and context 
presupposed in the concept of articulation requires a kernel of selfhood to substantiate the 
actor’s contribution to the articulation. However, this does not imply the primacy of 
subjectivity, as the investigation into the action-oriented concept of intentionality has 
exposed. The non-primacy of the self is explored further in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Through the co-constitution of subject and object, the basic sense of technological 
actions is displayed. Without much talk about technology as such (this will be done in the 
following chapter), we have seen that our basic being in the world is that of concernful 
action; action that is more often than not augmented by equipment, and always oriented 
towards one’s surroundings as equipment. I have explored the fundamentals in the how’s 
and the why’s of our outlook at the world. How we intend the world is fundamentally not 
in terms of being a subject standing opposed to scattered objects; subjectivity against 
objectivity. Because of our concernful being-in-the-world, we become visible to ourselves 
as subjects, and things in the world become visible as objects. In this sense, 
technologically mediated actions become essential in the understanding we have not only 
of the world – how we perceive and understand the world, so to speak, but also for the 
understanding of ourselves; what we are is inextricably tangled up in what we do. Moreover, and 
this will be explored in depth in Chapter 6, since our self-understanding is connected to 
what we do, what we are capable of doing, our self-understanding consequently expand 
when our practical space expand. 
In the following chapter, the materiality of technologies will be in focus: How does the world 
open up for us, how does our practical space, our possible space of action, expand because of our 
involvement of technologies? As we have seen in this chapter, concernful action is always 
an opening of the world, but it is also an opening of the world in specific ways, a thought 
that was introduced in Chapter 2. Investigating the specific technological world-revealing 
more fully follows up on, but require a step beyond, the ‘mere’ opening of the world 
elaborated in the present chapter. The overall aim of this study is to expose technology’s 
role in the expansion of our practical space, and now we are prepared to tackle that 
question more explicitly. 
  
 
 
 
c h a p t e r   f o u r 
T H E  R E V E A L I N G - C O N C E A L I N G  S T R U C T U R E  
 
 
 
 
Technology and action 
Through Heidegger’s treatment of readiness-to-hand (cf. Chapter 3), we saw how 
technological actions reveal a world – a world that is originally (in the ontological sense) 
met as a totality, but that subsequently can be differentiated into occurring things (entities 
in their presence-at-hand), and thematized as things in-themselves. As clearly demarcated 
things, these entities figure in various theoretical settings (for instance, hypotheses about 
causal connections between things), in explicit knowledge and understanding. But, as we 
saw, this knowledge is of the world as it already is unconcealed by readiness-to-hand. It is 
the entities in their readiness-to-hand that ‘carve out’ the world in such a way that entities 
are connected through their functions. Readiness-to-hand, then, is the presupposition for 
a thing to gain its meaning as a singular thing. The argument was that we would not be 
able to say what a thing is unless we know something about a) what it is useful for, and b) 
how it is related to (and therefore differs in function within a totality from) other things. 
Revealing a world in this manner is the basic sense of ‘technological action,’ since the way 
we see the world is to a large degree reliant on the equipment we use in this world (and 
increasingly so, on our growing dependence on various forms of technologies). However, 
the investigations of the previous chapter are better regarded as explicating the meaning 
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of action rather than the meaning of technology. For one thing, readiness-to-hand as the 
being of beings that are not Dasein is ontologically linked to our own conduct; the 
concernfulness we display in our being-in-the-world. The tool-analysis of Heidegger is 
primarily about being, and not about things. Second, to define the meaning of technology, 
we need to approach technological items in their what. Having discovered the foundation 
of things’ ‘what’ is not yet an explication of their ‘what,’ their meaning. Thirdly, we need to 
move beyond the preferred examples of Heidegger, hand-tools like hammers and such, 
and see if we can approach modern technologies like machines, assembly lines and 
modern digital communication technologies in the same manner. 
Heidegger’s own attempt at going from equipment to more complex technologies ended 
in the dystopian essentialism we encountered in Chapter 1, where he described our 
relation to (modern) technological items as subordinate because they expose us to the 
Gestell and technological thinking. Technology and technological actions, in ‘the later’ 
Heidegger’s view, meant not just a revealing of the world, but also an all-encompassing 
unconcealment in the sense that we become blind to other possible unconcealments, 
other possible ways of being-in-the-world, because of it. This, in turn, meant that 
technology represents a negative take-over of truth and meaning. Dismissing this view 
only means dismissing a particular assumption about the human-technology relationship 
in the unconcealed world (‘we are subordinate to technology”); it does not require us to 
dismiss the basic sense of technological actions as revealing. In other words, accepting 
that technological actions involve a specific revealing of the world does not commit us to 
the Heideggerian brand of technological essentialism. In arguing how technology reveals 
the world, the present chapter will deal with technology in a more direct manner than the 
previous. Against this backdrop, exploring technology’s meaning means asking questions 
like, what does it mean that technologies enable us to expand our practical space, and 
what is it about the technologies themselves that enable us to do this, or more specifically, 
in what sense do technologies co-constitute articulations.  
The body extension thesis 
As we saw in the previous chapter, in its primordial state, in its readiness-to-hand, the 
hammer becomes transparent. When we use a hammer skilfully we focus on the task, we 
‘see through’ the hammer in much the same way we ‘see through’ our arm when we pick 
something up to scrutinize it. In such situations, we do not need to think explicitly how to 
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operate our arm and neither does the skilful hammerer when operating the hammer; the 
hammer is thematically and reflectively as transparent as the arm itself. Furthermore, the 
energy gained by swinging our arm is transmitted from the arm and gets its release in the 
blow of the hammer. This suggests that the hammer, when in use as a technological artefact, can 
be conceptualized as an extension of our arm.1 Is this the sense – as an extension – that 
the tool, the hammer, makes it possible for us to extend our bodily range of actions, and 
through it, our entire practical space? Totally different objects like an axe, a pen, a cup, a 
microscope and a bicycle seem to fit this description straightforwardly – these are all 
artefacts that makes it possible for us to do chores that would be harder or even 
impossible with normal bodily abilities as sight, hearing, strength etc. Moreover, although 
the use of such artefacts as the sewing machine, the stone crusher, the mill, and the car is 
not as close to our bodily characteristics as the hammer or the axe, they still embody the 
aspect of extending our bodily range, and thereby our space of possible actions.  
We can regard technological objects as extending practical space in several ways. 
(Mitcham 1994:176f) The hammer, for instance, enlarges the ‘natural’ power of our body. 
The use of it depends on us initiating a certain force that is channelled and augmented 
through the use of the hammer. Binoculars and the optical telescope provide an enlarged 
image of a distant phenomenon. The use of these items is dependent on our vision, but 
enhances our ‘seeing power’, and effectively brings the phenomenon itself closer to us so 
it can be seen as plainly as if we had been in the close vicinities of it ourselves. Both the 
hammer and the telescope, and also the car and the sewing machine can be seen as 
enlarging already existing abilities of a single person. Technologies and humans can in 
these instances, be said to compose what James K. Feibleman calls ‘an organ-artifact 
circuit’. This circuit is not restricted to hand-tools.  
The stove is an external stomach, and cooking is a form of pre-digestion, reducing 
intractable foods to assimilable form and making possible the consumption of hard fibers 
which could not otherwise be eaten. Libraries are external memory banks; they contain 
more information than any single human brain could manage. Computers are external 
minds; they calculate faster than mathematicians and manipulate abstract thought with 
great skill and accuracy. Motor cars and airplanes are external muscles; they provide 
external movement more efficiently than legs. (Feibleman 1979:39) 
                                              
1 Another famous example of the transparency of tools is found in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s writings on how a blind 
man is not so much conscious of his cane as of the world encountered through the tip of the cane. For Merleau-
Ponty, our body image is not a representation, but presents itself to us through our moving around in-the-world – it 
is, so to speak, thrown back at us from the world as it is revealed in our movements. Consequently, since the cane is 
critical in revealing the world, it is comprehended as a part of our body. It is ‘a bodily auxiliary’. (Merleau-Ponty 
1962:152, cf. 143) 
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Feibleman’s expression is in accordance with other conceptualizations of tools and 
technology as extensions of the body, or of something that normally is seen as being 
inside or part of the body itself. Ernst Kapp (1877), for instance, regarded tools as Organ-
Projektions both in a direct manner (as the hammer to the hand) and in an analogous way 
(as the camera lens to the eye, the railroad to the body’s circulatory system, or a machine 
to the interworkings of the body). (Mitcham 1994:24,176, Krogh 1998:20f) Kapp also 
found morphological similarities between technological artefacts and bodily aspects, 
although such similarities will usually be discovered after the fact, and is not necessarily 
designed. 
The bent finger becomes a hook, the hollow of the hand a bowl; in the sword, spear, oar, 
shovel, rake, plow and spade one observes sundry positions of arm, hand, and fingers, the 
adaptation of which to hunting, fishing, gardening and field tools is readily available. (Kapp 
1877, quoted in and translated by Mitcham 1994:24) 
From Kapp and Feibleman we can formulate a body extension thesis as regards the 
human-technology relation: Body extension is the primordial relation to technology. That is, body 
extension is the original meaning of technological items, which means that this relation is 
retained in other forms of technology that do not function as conspicuously extensions as 
hammers or binoculars do. If that is the case, body extension, in some way or another, 
must be an essential element of the meaning of technology. However, in what follows, I 
shall argue that this thesis has some serious shortcomings that necessitate a different 
conceptualization of the primordial relation we have to technology. The crux of this 
argumentation is that extension is not a proper description of how technologies expand our 
practical space. 
It seems to me that the body extension thesis fits well with a common sense conception 
of tool use (which is why I want to explore its usefulness in investigating the meaning of 
technology). It also lies behind the design of many new technologies, especially of new 
electronic gadgets (Clark 2003), although factors like ‘better’, ‘faster’, ‘cheaper’, and ‘more 
powerful’ are also important in this regard. (Norman 1998) Similar views of the basic 
relation between humans and technology are often encountered in discussions of 
technology. Arnold Gehlen (1980), for instance, thought the human body to be so frail 
and vulnerable, and so limited in natural instincts and abilities that we (as opposed to 
animals) need tools not only to strengthen us, but also as organ substitutions to survive in 
nature. Alfred J. Lotka (1956) coined the term exosomatic organs to describe tools that are 
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external to the body but connect to and augment our endosomatic organs, his term for arms, 
eyes, ears, and so on.1 
The digital revolution and research in Artificial Intelligence have raised hopes for the 
perfect merging of man and technology (man-machine), both in terms of a physical 
merging (cyborgs), and as extensions of the body, primarily of the brain. Bertram C. 
Brookes expresses this when he adopts Lotka’s term for the claim that computers can 
function as exosomatic brains “whose ‘memory’ and processing capacities can be 
increased indefinitely”. (Brookes 1975:47) Gregory Newby claims that ideally, an 
exosomatic memory system should function as a transparent extension of our inherent 
mnemonic capacities, “so that finding information would seem the same as remembering 
it to the human user”. (Newby 2001:1029) The only difference, of course, is that as 
extended with this kind of technology our memory would be immensely larger, just like 
our arm becomes immensely stronger with a hammer in hand. Brookes (and Newby) has 
a certain affinity to a tradition in Artificial Intelligence that thinks computers and artificial 
processing of information should be designed and developed as extensions and 
augmentations of natural human intelligence, rather than as a foreign (to brain and mind) 
kind of intelligence. (Ashby 1952, Engelbart 1962) This tradition, working within what 
has been called the augmentationist framework (Skagestad 1993), led to, among other things, 
the development of the personal computer, the PC.2 
Brookes and Newby might also have been inspired by Marshall McLuhan, who claimed 
that while our bodies became extended in the mechanical age, and our central nervous 
system in the electric technologies from the late 19th century and onwards, we are now 
about to “approach the final phase of the extensions of man – the technological 
simulation of consciousness, when the creative process of knowing will be collectively 
and corporately extended to the whole of human society”. (McLuhan 2001:3) Through 
our technologies, man has become, “an organism that now wears its brain outside his 
                                              
1 Karl R. Popper has also employed this term. He considered myths, ideas and theories as being “[l]ike tools… 
organs evolving outside our skins. They are exosomatic artifacts.” (Popper 1972:286) However, Popper’s application 
of ‘exosomatic’ is not as an extension of the human body; the concept of organ is primarily employed as an analogy. 
The exosomatic artefacts are the content of a World 3, with the physical world, i.e. the world of causal interactions, 
as World 1 and subjective experiences belong to a World 2. (Popper 1972:74) In claiming there is separate 
exosomatic evolution in World 3, Popper’s theory is comparable to Richard Dawkins’ idea about the evolution of 
memes, the social counterpart to genes, which is similar to but disconnected from the evolution in the natural world. 
(Dawkins 1989) 
2 The digital revolution and AI have, perhaps more than any technological innovation preceding them, led to a 
tremendous blooming of research into various kinds of man-machine couplings, many of which could be 
conceptualized as body-extending technologies. (Clark 2003) 
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skull and its nerves outside its hide”. (McLuhan 2001:63, cf. 384f, cf. McLuhan 1962:32) 
Both our body and our mind are ‘out there’, in the world, through the technologies with 
which we have colonized it. Through media technologies, which are what occupies 
McLuhan, the human kind can connect and perform collectively to reach new levels of 
competence and enlightenment that would be impossible if we had stayed isolated 
subjects, i.e. without technology.  
McLuhan’s notion of the ‘final phase’, combined with his celebrated concept of ‘the 
Global Village’, which alludes to the new social organization that comes about as a result 
of the distribution of various media technologies,1 (McLuhan 1962) have also inspired 
some Web-enthusiasts who hope that the Internet will permit us to ‘leave our bodies’ 
behind and conduct our lives entirely in cyberspace. The idea is that the cyber-technology 
enables us to transcend the limits of our embodied existence, so that we can live, as pure 
consciousnesses, in a hitherto not seen freedom. Often we also can find musings about 
the possibility of equality and equal distribution of rights and opportunities that seem 
impossible to gain in the physical world. As one enthusiast says, “virtual bullets cannot 
kill”. (Barlow 1998)2 This semi-Platonic perspective; existence as conscious existence, might 
seem to invert the original thesis about body-extension, but, in fact, the fulfilment of this 
utopian dream is dependent on body-extending technologies to take care of all the 
unpleasant tasks that are required for us to survive, in the bodily sense. We need to be 
hooked up to the physical world in a way that our body can take care of itself, while we 
(whatever we can be said to be without bodies) live our lives in cyberspace. According to 
Barlow, attending to the needs of our body is the reason why our mind has not realized 
the freedom it has an inherent possibility to attain. 
Extending the body of single persons, however, is not the only way to conceptualize 
technologies as extending human bodily abilities. A contraption such as the pile driver, for 
instance, collects and focuses the power and abilities of several humans, enabling them to 
perform actions that they would not be able to perform collectively without the pile 
driver. The pile driver places “at human disposal energies that human beings do not 
otherwise possess”. (Mitcham 1994:177) This is the case with many technologies that are 
                                              
1 Perhaps it would be better to label it an ‘old’ social organization, as McLuhan thinks that media technologies make 
people relate to each other globally in a manner that resembles how people related to each other in the village 
structure of the world before the rise of national states and economies. More on this in Chapter 7. 
2 For a critical review of this kind of web enthusiasm, see Dreyfus 2001.  
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based on classical mechanics. Other technologies translate data. For instance, the electron 
telescope translates sub-light wave data into visible information as if it was an optical 
telescope picking up this information. Technologies for visualizing and translation, also 
found in medicine, for instance, are quite different in form from the hammer and the axe, 
but can still be regarded as extending our bodily abilities as they enable our eyes to see 
things that otherwise would remain unseen from the ‘normal’ human perspective. 
Technologies like these, in their conceptualization, depend on human abilities, on the 
human way of life, the human way of operating in our surroundings, and can for that 
reason be seen as extensions of our body; they are their function by being adapted to how 
humans apprehend and comprehend their surroundings. This is basic enough; all kinds of 
technology must be adapted to a sphere of human usefulness to enter a realm of praxis, a 
car must be designed so that people are able to fit into it, and a printer must print 
readable types, etc. However, as mentioned, there are some problems connected to our 
understanding of technology if we are to take the body extension thesis as foundational in 
our relation to technology. 
The closeness of body and technology 
The common thought about the extension of the body (or, at least, of human abilities) is 
that this manner of relating to tools, artefacts, or natural objects such as rocks and sticks, 
is the original relation we have to tools. Complex systems of tools and modern 
technology are in turn regarded as a prolongation of the original relation; different in 
form, but not in kind, as in Edward T. Hall’s telling statement, “[t]he evolution of 
weapons begins with the teeth and the fist and ends with the atom bomb”. (1959:79) 
Although it historically is likely to be the case that our first relations to tools were of this 
close kind, the extension-approach does not have the power to illuminate and 
conceptualize the role technology plays in our experience of technology and, more 
generally, in our existence. We shall have to look beyond historical precedence to find a 
more fundamental aspect of technology and technology-use. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, most writers on technology acknowledge that something more 
than mere development was involved in the transition from earlier kinds of technology to 
modern technology, exemplified by Ellul’s ‘Machine’. However, the body extension thesis 
cuts across this division, as many modern and hypermodern technologies can be 
categorized as body extensions, as we have just seen. But what about the ‘Machine’ itself, 
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the sheer symbol of the possible alienation by technology, can it be conceptualized as an 
extension of the body? And if so, in what sense? To explore this, we need to take a look 
at the evolution in the relation we have towards technologies, from pre-modern to 
modern technologies. Is there a common thread to be found? 
Arnold Gehlen claims that there are two aspects to the development in the human-
technology relation, a) the replacement of organic materials with artificial ones, and b) the 
replacement of organic energy with non-organic energy. (1980:5f) While the former is a 
basic feature of tool-use as is reflected in the classifications of human cultural 
development (Stone Age, Iron Age, Bronze Age), the latter is, for Gehlen, the 
characteristic of modern technological artefacts.1 
As long as wood remained the most significant fuel material, and the work of domestic 
animals the most important source of energy, the advance of material culture, and thus 
ultimately population growth, met a limit of a nontechnical kind that rested upon the slow 
tempo of organic growth and reproduction. By building hydroelectric power stations and 
by gaining control over nuclear energy, man has freed his energy supplies from the 
limitations of the renewal of organic substances. (Gehlen 1980:6) 
Carl Mitcham also points to two lines that can be traced in the evolution of human-
technology relations, a) like Gehlen, the immediate source of energy, and b) the 
immediate source of guidance. While hand tools are controlled by, and have as their 
prime source of energy, individuals, there is a gradual shift via groups of people to a 
situation where modern devices are guided by mechanical or electrical controls – in 
Gehlen’s terms this is the stage of automation – and where the sources of energy are 
artificially generated in an abstracted form. 
Tools are first of all hand tools, then machines that require energy input from groups of 
laborers (as with galley slaves rowing a ship) or animals (a team of oxen pulling a 
mouldboard plow) or the readily accessible motions of nature (wind caught by the sail). 
External input undergoes further transmutation with the development of, first, the heat 
engine (steam engine, internal combustion engine), then electricity, to drive a mechanical 
prime mover. The power of the steam engine exponentially exceeds any previous energy 
source; electricity takes such powers into realms of scientific and conceptual abstraction. 
(Mitcham 1994:185) 
There seems, then, to have been a gradual development away from a functional closeness 
of man and technology, to a situation where technology has attained a certain degree of 
functional autonomy. This was discussed in Chapter 1, as well, where it was questioned 
whether this indicates that technology comes with, or has developed, an essence of its 
                                              
1 Are we now entering a Bio Age? Biotechnology marks a technological development where body extensions can be 
non-organic. Artificially produced may still be organic, however, as seen in the cultivation of replacement ears. 
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own that is at odds with the human way of life. What I am interested in looking at now, 
on the other hand, is what this degree of autonomy means for the thesis of body 
extension. 
For Gehlen at least (Mitcham does not touch on this), modern technologies still comply 
with the body extension thesis. In tools, we objectify bodily characteristics and actions. 
Man, he says, “‘objectifies’ his own labor. Hence the tool. The stone is a representation of 
the fist.” (1980:18) Objectification requires a third aspect (besides strengthening and 
substitution) in Gehlen’s version of the body extension thesis, called facilitation techniques, 
which are actions dealing with a technology so that it relieves the burden upon our body. 
(Gehlen 1980:3) Because of the shift from organic to non-organic sources of energy, 
there is a gradual development where (some of) the objects of our objectifications 
become automated. This happens when “the system does not vary in its operation 
according to commands imparted from outside, but rather under the influence of the 
results of those operations themselves”. (Gehlen 1980:21) The main drive behind 
objectification is that “‘objectification of human labor into the tool makes it evident that a 
lesser effort can achieve greater results”. (Gehlen 1980:18) 
The crucial question for Gehlen concerning the relation between the body and 
technology is, then: Is technology there to facilitate bodily human existence? If it is, then 
technology is still a form of body extension, an objectification of a bodily action. 
Although quite different in build and in its function as energy supplier compared to pre-
modern technological artefacts (cf. Chapter 1),1 modern artefacts are nonetheless related 
to our requirements. Gehlen finds the transition into a new kind of thinking more definitive 
for the step into modern technology than the material artefacts themselves. More 
precisely, he sees this transition in connection with the growth of modern experimental 
science and “the contemporary emergence of the capitalist mode of production”. (Gehlen 
1980:9) Contrary to Jacques Ellul, Gehlen sees the modern technological system as being 
caused by politico-economic factors, and not the other way around, as Ellul wants it (cf. 
Chapter 1). Dealing with modern technology, therefore, means dealing with how we 
associate with and interact, scientifically and politico-economically, with technology. 
Although they do not correspond as well with the body extension thesis as hand tools and 
modern mind extending information technologies, it is possible to regard machines as 
                                              
1 And in the phenomenology of use, both concerning their feel and in our control over them. (Mitcham 1994:178f) 
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extensions in the sense that they are substitutions for work that could have been 
performed by individuals or groups of persons. However, there are technologies that in 
my opinion do not sit with the thesis at all. For instance, is there a sense in which duvets 
and blankets extend our body? These are technologies that have been developed from 
sheep furs etc that humans have used to stay warm, and which can be seen as 
strengthening and supporting our own bodily shortcoming in keeping warm. What about 
the pillow - is it an extension of our arm? Maybe. But what about the alarm clock, or 
clocks in general, or even the hourglass – do such contraptions extend or strengthen any 
shortcomings with the human body? A lamp helps us read, but would it not be better to 
regard it as an extension of the sun than of our eyes; is there any bodily aspect that can be 
said to be extended (or substituted) through artificial sources of light? And what about 
the football, the basketball or ice hockey puck? 
Langdon Winner (Chapter 1) pointed out that around technologies socio-political systems 
emerge to keep the technological artefacts going, and as such, these systems should be 
regarded as belonging to the technologies. For instance, an important part of the 
improvement of the Norwegian road system in recent years has been the construction of 
tunnels. In what sense is a tunnel an extension of our body? Even if we see the car itself 
as an extension of our legs (which is possible only in an abstracted manner), what about 
the car factory, of what is that an extension? Or should we, as opposed to Winner, regard 
the factory as a mere assembly of machines (each of which, as Kapp would say, is 
analogous to the workings of the whole body)? Furthermore, what about web-based 
communication technologies like Instant Messaging? Even if the Internet itself can be 
characterized as an extension of our mind, appearing as a collective mind, in McLuhan’s 
words, what about computer programs? Is Instant Messaging an extension of our mouth, 
or of our arms? Some of these technologies are based on technologies that more easily fit 
the description of being extensions of the body. For instance, MSN can be seen as both 
the continuance of the telephone (extension of the ear), and of the pen (extension of the 
hand).  
Experientially speaking, a transparent technology is more easily considered an extension 
of the body than an opaque technology. As we saw above, transparent technologies allow 
us to focus through it and directly on the task. The use of the piece of technology is as 
effortless as using the body itself, and in such cases, there is virtually no 
phenomenological difference between the body and the technology. However, Gehlen 
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and others also include other manners of relating to the ways of the body in their 
conceptualization of the extension thesis. An opaque technology is a technology that 
cannot be effortlessly employed, regardless how well we learn to handle it. Heavy-duty 
equipment, old computers running on MS-DOS and shoes that are too tight will never 
attain the degree of transparency that inspired the body extension thesis. But, as we saw, 
opaque technologies can still be regarded as retaining an augmenting or substituting 
relation to the body and its workings. However, we must ask, how far removed from the 
workings and functions of the actual body should we allow a technology to be and still be 
described as an extension? ‘Smart’ bombs have evolved from axes and spears (or even 
from teeth and fists, if we follow Hall), but should they for that reason still be 
conceptualized as extending our bodily capacities? 
The main problem with the body extension thesis 
Possibly, one can develop arguments both for and against the application of the body 
extension thesis for any given technological item. In the end, though, this kind of 
argumentation is irrelevant when discussing how fundamentally the thesis grasps the 
human-technology relation;1 the most serious problem with the thesis is that the concept 
of body extension is compatible with both instrumentalism and essentialism (cf. Chapter 1). It is 
compatible with instrumentalism because it is presumed that we ‘see’ through the 
technology: We are focused on a task and therefore pick up any instrument that suits our 
needs in the task. As transparent prolongations of the body, we attach ourselves to 
instruments that make no fundamental difference to how we are in-the-world; the relation 
is one of strengthening and/or substitution. If this is the primordial manner in which we 
relate to technological items, in what sense can a technological item be said to co-
constitute the technological action?  
What I have been arguing, and will substantiate below, is that using technologies means 
that we are in (being-in) our surroundings differently. Using technologies for sight means 
that we see our surroundings differently. Using a hearing aid means that we hear things 
differently. The hammer and the axe, and the bulldozer for that matter, mean that we act 
in our environment differently. Our total organizational activity is different because our 
world is different, not because we act differently in an already perceived world, but because we perceive 
the world itself differently. Founding the meaning of technology on its contribution as an 
                                              
1 Put differently, how true it is. 
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extension, on the other hand, implies that we use technologies to reach already defined 
goals. However, it is through technologies that make us perceive our surroundings in new 
ways that we even can catch a glimpse of these goals. Therefore, we cannot employ a 
technology as an extension of our body to obtain a foreseen goal unless this goal already 
was unconcealed by the technology. The conclusion must be that extension is not a 
constitutive aspect. 
However, the body extension thesis is also compatible with the essentialism of Heidegger, 
who himself points out that the instrumental definition is correct, but not true about 
technology; it is correct because we do use technology as we want to, but it is not true 
because in doing so we are really under its spell. Similarly, it is compatible with the 
determinism of Ellul (who points out that our techniques, our way of handling 
technology, are in fact due to the technology itself). If we couple the extension thesis to 
Heideggerian essentialism and technological determinism, we gain the aspect we found 
missing in the transparency reading of the body extension thesis, but the shaping through 
technology is overwhelming. It then comes to mean that we not only perceive our world 
differently; extending our abilities through technologies means that we are handed over to 
the world as it is defined by, mind you, not the technology itself, but the Gestell 
(Heidegger) or the ideals (Ellul) of technology. Technology as it is described in the body extension 
thesis does not prevent this implication, just as it does not prevent the instrumentalist implication. We 
can conclude, extension is not co-constitutive. 
For reasons that we have seen in the preceding chapters, the meaning of technology, as 
something that extends our practical space, must be conceptualized in a way that is both foreign 
to us, yet still not as a mere object, that is, as standing opposite to us. The item is 
approached as being able to do something, not something that we ourselves would have 
been able to do had we had harder hands, stronger vision etc., but something that enables 
us to go into spheres not hitherto seen. The tool, as opposed to a mere object, is not 
taken as a prolongation of our body, but as something that aids our intentionality, our 
manner of being in the world; as a part of ourselves, but not as a body part. When we see 
through the technology, we discover the world in a way that we would not have 
discovered without the technology. Because of the technology, we are able to relate 
intentionally to further aspects of the world. The tool, or the entity taken as a tool, is 
taken as a tool not just because it affords us to do something we ourselves are not able to 
do, but because it affords us to perceive the world in a different manner. 
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The magnification-reduction structure 
The body extension thesis seems convincing because of the transparency of certain kinds 
of tools, which often are tools that are regarded as being historically primary, as for 
instance, hand-tools used for the manipulation of our immediate surroundings. However, 
transparency even for such technologies is hard to sustain; focusing through what specific 
technologies afford, does not mean that we ourselves, bodily or mentally, are prolonged. 
Even instruments that are closest to the body extension thesis are not truly extensions in 
the sense that they retain the full experiential depth of our being-in. As Don Ihde points 
out, any piece of technology that augments and strengthens our capabilities will 
simultaneously reduce or weaken other aspect of our experiential presence. (1979:9) In 
the terms from the previous chapter, being intentionally directed at aspects of the world 
through a technology transforms the intentional experiences in accordance with the 
technology itself. Had the directedness been performed unmediated, or mediated with a 
different kind of technology, the experience would have been different. Scratching the 
surface of a blackboard with a dentist’s probe produces a tactile experience of the 
blackboard, but is quite different from the one we would have if we had touched it with 
our finger directly. Through the probe, we can feel scratches and marks in the surface that 
we cannot feel with the bare finger. The finger, on the other hand, would have given us 
experiences of a certain temperature and of the old chalk dust that usually covers the 
surface of blackboards, while the small irregularities would be overlooked. “A 
microscopic presence is amplified through the probe thus extending my experience of the 
board to a level of discernment previously unnoted.” (Ihde 1979:9) Our experience of the 
blackboard using the probe, therefore, is augmented in some aspects, but weakened in 
others. 
This is the sense in which transparent technologies must be regarded as foreign to our 
body and us, even if they extend and augment certain bodily capacities. Ihde calls this a 
‘magnification-reduction structure”. (Ihde 1990:761) Through a technology the world appears 
differently, as clearer, more detailed, frailer (with a sledgehammer in hand, a small rock 
has the hardness of a pile of dirt), etc. At the same time, it appears to be less detailed in 
other aspects, or out of sight (things that are close and to the side disappears when we 
look at a distant phenomenon through binoculars), and so on. Most people gesticulate 
when they speak on the phone – why? Clearly, the phone enables us to speak to persons 
                                              
1 Ihde 1979 employs the less agreeable phrase sensory-extension-reduction, cf. Ihde 1983. 
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not present, but it is unable to communicate the bodily gestures we often depend on in 
face-to-face conversation. 
The telephone does retain intonation, though. This, however, is lost in other forms of 
communication technologies, such as the written letter and in e-mails, which affords 
communicating in a different way from the phone or face-to-face, but have their own 
reductions. Combining several technologies, as in the videophone, involves smaller ‘loss’, 
allowing several sense modalities to be enhanced. Is it at all possible to develop 
augmenting technologies that retains a ‘full’ experience, while enhancing some aspects of 
the world? In a future version of Virtual Reality technology, we might.1 However, for the 
time being, I think most people are content with losing side vision for a moment while 
one glances through a pair of binocular, or that we cannot feel the temperature of the 
blackboard when we use a chalk to draw on it, etc. 
The magnification-reduction structure is a revealing/concealing structure, retaining the 
ontological point from the previous chapter, where technological actions were seen as 
revealing a world. From what we have discussed so far, it follows that any technological 
revealing implies a concealing of a (possible) world, as well; revealing some aspects of the 
world in accordance with a technology implies concealing others. However, in Chapter 1 
we saw that ‘the later’ Heidegger drew a rather dystopian conclusion from this, claiming 
that the Gestell that reveals itself through modern technology not only co-constitute the 
world, but dictates how the world appears to us. The task for the following, then, is to 
avoid such dystopia from the fact that technologies influence our intentional relatedness to 
the world. Therefore, we need to catalogue our relation to technology in a manner that 
embraces precisely the co-constitutive magnification-reduction structure. 
Don Ihde’s typology of human-technology relations 
– Embodiment relation – 
For Ihde, the quasi-transparent relation to technology is characteristic of an embodiment 
relation to technology. In such a relation, we deal with technology, but the ‘terminus’ of 
our intentional directedness is beyond the mediating technology. The prime example of 
                                              
1 VR technology, still to a large degree dependent on head-mounted displays and therefore strongly biased towards 
the visual, is not so much used for augmenting and strengthening in the hammer/axe kind of extension, but 
supplements the body extension group of relations with simulation, enabling us to try out, learn, and perhaps 
automate actions prior to real world commitments. 
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this kind of relation is the one between a pair of glasses and their possessor. If the 
prescription is right, and the glasses are clean and not broken; the glasses will not make 
themselves present in the relation between the carrier and what is perceived. Many of the 
examples we saw in connection with the body extension thesis are of this kind, only with 
the important twist that Ihde does not accept that perceiving or acting through the 
technology implies ‘true’ transparency (although, this particular example probably gets us 
as close as we can come). In the embodiment relation, the technologies become “‘means’ 
of experience”. (Ihde 1979:8, cf. Ihde 1990:73) 
Although there is a sense of extension in the embodiment relation – in the sense that 
what is experienced is at the end of the mediating technology, and not at the end of our 
skin (the blackboard is felt through the probe, the nail through the hammer), the quasi-
transparent directedness brings out the specific properties of the technologies. A 
telephone, for instance, is not an extension of our hearing in the same manner as the 
hearing aid. A hearing aid amplifies all nearby sounds (within certain frequencies). The 
telephone, on the other hand, connects us to a person located distantly (next-door, in 
another town, or in Australia), but does not, of course, pass on all the sounds that exist 
between us, as if we had giant ears that enable us to hear our conversation partner. For 
this reason, the telephone does not extend our ears, or hearing; it brings the other person 
nearer to us. Experientially, embodied technologies do not so much transform our 
capabilities as they transform the appearance of the world.1 This transformation is the reduction 
of the world; it accentuates aspects of the world that are relevant given the kind of 
technology we interact with, how it is interacted with, and in what connection. 
If we simplify the relation between the world, the technology and us into three 
components: human – technology – world, Ihde symbolizes the embodiment relation in 
the following way: 
    (Human-technology) → world 
The coupling between humans and technology creates an entity (much like Latour’s man-
gun) which operates and experiences in-the-world. This simple figure does not do full 
justice to the implications of Ihde’s own magnification-reduction structure, though. The 
‘world’ as perceived and acted in in the embodiment relation is a specific world belonging 
                                              
1 More precisely, for this example, it brings the other person’s mouth nearer to us, given that we do not see his facial 
gestures, his gesticulations, etc. 
1 2 8  T E C H N O L O G Y  
to this relation; since it is perceived in compliance with the aspects that the technology 
accentuates. Consequently, the ‘world’ in different relations appears differently, or in 
accordance with the terminology from Chapter 2, is articulated differently. 
Note that, given what was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the coupling human-technology 
within the parenthesis is no mere ‘human + technology’; both factors accentuate each 
other. Two persons might see separate pairs of glasses, one of the people recognizes them 
as something that can augment his vision because they have the correct prescription, and 
consequently puts them on for the sake of reading. The other person, on the other hand, 
recognizes the glasses as something that can collect the rays of the sun, and can be 
utilized to set fire to a piece of paper. The two couplings accentuate different aspect of 
the world, a book, for instance, in the first coupling, and some flammable material in the 
latter (or even, respectively, a book as ‘reading material’, and a book as ‘flammable’). How 
the human appears, how the technology appears, and how the world appears are, in the 
terms introduced in Chapter 2, articulations, whose specifics are co-dependent on 
technology, technology-user(s), and the world. In the embodiment relation, the prime 
coupling is (human-technology) since the technology is not thematized. It is quasi-
transparent, but even so, still effective in the articulating process. 
The way Ihde sees it, the embodiment relation is merely one of several relations we have 
to technology. Like Heidegger, Ihde acknowledges that something happens to our 
comprehension of a piece of technology once it does not function as intended. For 
Heidegger, this means a change in the being of the item, from readiness-to-hand to 
presence-at-hand (Chapter 3), for Ihde it involves a change in our relation to it. The 
technology itself becomes focus, and we experience it directly. The technology itself is 
then the object of our intentional directedness, and no longer a means for the intentional 
directedness.1 This kind of relation, however, is not only for cases where the readiness-to-
hand (or the embodiment relation) breaks down; many interactions with technology have 
this intentional structure, and Ihde distinguishes two kinds of such relations, hermeneutic 
and alterity relations. 
– Hermeneutic relation – 
Moving from an embodiment relation to a hermeneutic relation, means that we are 
moving from “experiencing through machines to experiences of machines”. (Ihde 1979:11, 
                                              
1 Although, as we shall see, it can still be means for something beyond itself. 
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my emphasis) For instance, to crank up the thermostat to heat a room, the terminus of 
my interaction is the technology, the thermostat, itself. The scientific knowledge of sub-
atomic particles generated at CERN, is a result of the reading and interpretation of events 
that are traced, plotted and charted by computers, and the artificial (but still real) 
circumstances that are necessary to measure particle collisions are generated by 
technological equipment. We have no perceptual access to the level of these happenings, 
but we can control and perceive it by technological mediation. In a hermeneutic relation, 
the technology is still a means for a real world change (warming a room, crashing 
protons), but the use of it is not transparent in the same sense of embodied technologies, 
we are very much aware of the thermostat or the particle accelerator in using it. We 
manipulate the world through manipulating the technology; I feel something is lacking, a 
room is too cold, and address myself to a technology to rectify this. Intentionally, then, 
the world and the technology is apprehended as a unity. There is an element of 
interpretation, hermeneutics, in this – interpreting the relation between technology and the 
world; to understand how we can manipulate the world, we must understand how to 
manipulate the technology. Ihde expresses the hermeneutic relation in the following way: 
    Human → (technology-world) 
Technology and world here functions as the experiential unity. As described above, world 
is marked to denote that what acts as ‘world’ in the particular technological action is the 
world as pointed out by the specific technology – acting with a thermostat means that the 
‘world’ is the room which temperature is controlled by the thermostat. Consequently, 
because we act towards the elements in the parenthesis as a unity, we can speak of a 
transparency between technology and world comparable to the perceptual quasi-
transparency between human and technology in the embodiment relation (where the 
human and the technology was the experimental unity). 
There are several kinds of transparency in the hermeneutic relation. If the technology we 
interact with represents (aspects of) the world, there is a representational transparency. 
(Ihde 1990:81) For instance, a temperature gauge can be said to represent the temperature 
in a room; if the temperature goes up, the mercury in the gauge rises, and if the 
temperature drops, the mercury does too. A map, likewise, is a representational 
technology, in this case representing a specific area. Using a map means moving around in 
an area engaged in two perspectives simultaneously, one from our own bodily presence 
and one from a bird’s eye view. Or, of course, a map can be examined before entering an 
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area, in the planning of one’s movement in the area. Maps are often a much-reduced form 
of representation, focusing on shapes and phenomena in the area that are deemed 
relevant for what kind of map it is. In a street map, for instance, most houses are depicted 
identically (some important buildings can be represented from the street perspective); 
they are merely there to indicate that the space between the streets are buildings rather 
than parks, or lakes. 
In a representational transparency there is a form of isomorphism between the (aspects of 
the) world and the technology. Often, however, this is not the case, and then there is 
instead a referential transparency. (Ihde 1990:82) In such cases, we still assume that the 
technology is connected in the proper manner to the world, but we do not lean on any 
perceptual similarities between technology and world in our manipulation of (technology-
world). Using a thermostat properly requires that we are aware of the connection between 
the numbers on the thermostat and the temperature in the room, that we know that the 
numbers refer to possible temperatures, and that the indicator on the thermostat refers to 
the actual or the preferred temperature. Another example, discussed at length by Ihde 
himself, is the relation between spoken and written language. The letters of the alphabet 
refer to the phonetic sounds we utter, but they do not resemble the sounds. Ihde says, 
“[w]riting is a technologically embedded form of language” (1990:81), but the 
technological relation between the uttered sounds and the written letters is not 
isomorphic; there is no isomorphism between the letter ‘A’ and the sound I utter when 
reading it. Letters still indicate the sounds, so there is a form of transparency, but that of a 
referential one, not representational.  
In representational transparency, the technology refers to a world beyond itself. Equally, 
the consulting or the manipulation of a referential technology has real world 
consequences, and as such, the technology represents the world. The difference between a 
representational and a referential transparency is therefore that “the representational 
isomorphism disappears”. (Ihde 1990:82) As such, there is a sliding transition from 
representational to referential transparency. X-rays and ultrasound images are here in a 
dual position. On the one hand, they are generated by using non-visual techniques, but 
the product is an image. These images are generated because there has been a process of 
translation between the signals the technologies are built to acquire, referring to shapes 
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within our bodies, into images that represent these shapes in an isomorphic manner.1 The 
same applies to scientific knowledge that utilizes re-constructive techniques; deep space 
photography, the depiction of dinosaurs having certain colours, or as having feathers, 
based on the combination of fossils and knowledge of presently existing species, etc. 
Ihde talks of varying degrees of opacity between technology and the world. (1979:12) 
Sometimes, as when we adjust the thermostat in a room we ourselves are in, or when we 
are manoeuvring ourselves through a city by using a street map, we are in an experiential 
loop with the technology and the world, and are able to deem directly the degree of 
transparency between the technology and the world. At other times, as in cases of images 
of long-extinct dinosaurs or sub-atomic particle collisions, there is no manner in which 
we can experience the transparency; we have to trust the anticipated fact that the 
technology works the way it should. In such cases, the technology is not only the 
terminus of our intentional directedness; it is also the terminus of our technological 
action.2 
Both hermeneutic and embodiment relations bear strong similarities to pre- or non-
technological behaviour. Embodiment relations are found in how we can utilize natural 
occurring things as tools, as when a rock or a stick is picked up (and not manipulated) for 
a specific purpose. In the hermeneutic relation to technology we can recognize how we 
interpret causal connections between natural events, as in the cases when we say that the 
gathering of dark clouds in the sky indicates that rain will fall, or in the idiom ‘no smoke 
without fire’.  
– Alterity relation – 
In a hermeneutic relation, we treat the technology as referring/representing a world 
beyond itself. In the case of alterity relations, the technology is also the terminus of both 
the intentional directedness and of the technological action, but we do not treat the 
technology as pointing beyond itself.3 While the hermeneutic relation is an interaction 
with a technology with the intention of making a real world change (an aspect it has in 
common with the embodiment relation), interaction with a technology in the alterity 
                                              
1 Visualization in the hermeneutical relation between science and its instruments is explored in Ihde 1998. 
2 Ihde 1990 also discusses a linguistic transparency, which I will not address here, partly because it is presented in a 
vague manner, and partly because, in my mind, it is closer to an alterity relation. See below. 
3 Ihde in 1979 regarded alterity relations as a kind of hermeneutic relation. However, I follow Ihde 1990 where these 
are distinguished as two different kinds of relations. 
1 3 2  T E C H N O L O G Y  
relation lacks this dimension. However, that is not to say that there are no real world 
consequences of such an interaction. For instance, buying a soda from a vending machine 
is an interaction with a machine that does not represent or refer to anything beyond itself. 
Neither is the interaction perceptually transparent as in the embodiment relation 
(although steps of it might be, for instance dropping coins while locating the code for the 
soda of choice). Nevertheless, the transaction has an evident real world consequence. If 
all goes well, you will have an ice-cold soda in your hand within seconds. 
Other alterity relations do not necessarily have real world consequences. Online banking, 
for instance, has enabled us to move money between our accounts ourselves. If my cash 
card account is empty, I can transfer money from my savings account, and withdraw 
money. In this sense, there are real world consequences. However, I am able to move 
money around without this aspect, perhaps I on an earlier stage moved money the other 
way, in which case the money transaction was mere virtual. Reading books will often 
invoke imagery, ideas and virtual worlds in the reader; we construct imagined persons, 
settings and happenings based on what we read. In the case of fiction, these worlds will 
be entirely imaginary (although evidently connected to the written words), and our 
interaction with the technological item, the book, has no real world consequence as such. 
In the case of biographies and other kinds of non-fictional literature, the situation is 
slightly different. Reading about an historical character still invokes a virtual world, but 
this world will be informed by previous factual knowledge of the character and/or the 
historical period in which this character lived. Furthermore, at the other end of the 
reading experience, what we read will most likely enter our historical consciousness, and 
become part of what we know about the world, the history of our, or a, culture in 
general.1 
The case of ‘the virtual’ is in my mind the paradigm example of an alterity relation. 
Cyberspace ‘worlds” like the ones we can find in Second Life or in World of Warcraft are 
virtual worlds in which we can act. These worlds exist technologically, and our interaction 
with them is entirely in their own right. In an alterity relation, we interact with the 
technology as if it is not a technology. The vending machine is like the owner of a kiosk 
that gives us soda when we ask for one, and acting in World of Warcraft is like acting in 
                                              
1 Ihde regards our relation to non-fiction as hermeneutic. (1990:84) I am not convinced; although there is a sense of 
interpretation (hermeneutics), I think that there is also too little transparency also in reading non-fiction. All kinds of 
literature have interesting implications for the concept of the virtual, as I will discuss below. However, this might be 
one of many examples where the relation we have to the technology is not a clear-cut either/or situation. See below. 
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our real world surroundings (well, if we had the ability to transform ourselves into our 
avatars). The people/creatures we, that is, our characters, interact with in the game are 
controlled by, but are not the people controlling them.1 An alterity relation is defined by 
us relating to the technology as if it was an other, what Ihde call a quasi-other 
(embodiment relations indicates that the technology is a quasi-me). (Ihde 1990:98) 
Ihde chooses to formalize the alterity relation in the following way: 
    Human → technology-(-world) 
In a sense, it is the ‘bracketing’ of the world (not to be confused with Husserl’s 
methodological bracketing, cf. Chapter 3), that enables activities such as sport, art and 
play (Ihde 1990:107), but to me, this formalization seems to be a bit deceptive. It indicates 
a sort of non-realism, when in fact the alterity relation is a prime example of technological 
realism (Chapter 2), where the technology enables the world to be articulated in a certain 
way: We can have vending machines instead of kiosks, online banking instead of queuing 
up in an actual bank. That is, the alterity relation implies that the world is organized 
meaningfully through technologies. This does not indicate a less-real world, only a 
different real world, and in some cases not an alternative world, but a form of real world 
that if it were not for the technology would have been impossible to articulate. In so 
doing, the alterity relation accentuates what is in fact an aspect of both the embodiment 
and the hermeneutic relations to technology, but remains hidden because of the real 
world link. 
Note that technological actions do not imply either this or that kind of relation, or that an 
assembly of technologies acts as a unified totality in the relation. Both hermeneutic and 
alterity relations can be combined with embodiment relations. For instance, when I 
perform an online bank transaction, the computer-screen is perceptually transparent, to a 
certain degree also my use of the computer mouse. Driving in a traffic queue, while 
listening to the radio involves some technologies of an embodied kind (we have a certain 
feeling for where the car body ends and trust this embodiment when we steer the car as 
close as possible to other cars, the car radio is not attended to but what is said on it is), of 
a hermeneutic relation (driving in a queue involves a different attention to clutching, 
                                              
1 It is a simplification to say that cyberspace dealings have no real-world consequences. For players, there can be 
significant social consequences of both the positive and negative kind. Positively, players can form communities, 
meet for conventions, etc., while negatively, it is to a certain degree addictive, players might drop our of school to 
play, etc. 
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braking and accelerating than plain driving). Furthermore, the road we are driving upon is 
taken for granted in a different kind of relation, called background relation (see below). In 
fact, most technological actions will involve several technologies, with different degrees 
and kinds of transparencies.  
– Background relations – 
There are numerous technologies that are around us, and affect us in various ways, but 
with which we do not interact. There is no intentional directedness towards the 
technological items themselves, or of the world through the technological items. Ihde 
calls the relation to such technologies background relation, and distinguishes two types. 
What is common between them is that the technologies in question shape the context or 
condition for other experiences, and in some cases, we can even say that they are 
necessary for our survival even though we do not interact directly with them. The first 
type concerns automatic (and semi-automatic) machines and devices. For instance, the 
earlier mentioned thermostat, once calibrated and programmed will proceed to keep the 
temperature in the room constant; it will turn on the heating when the temperature has 
dropped slightly below the preferred temperature, and it will turn the heating off once it 
has reached said temperature. The ‘daily’ workings of the thermostat do not bother us, 
only when we need to set a different temperature does it enter our intentional 
directedness (in what was defined above as a hermeneutic relation). A refrigerator, or a 
deep freezer, maintains the temperature automatically, and in these cases, the owner rarely 
intervenes in the control of the temperature. Semi-automatic appliances, such as washing 
machines (soaking, soaping, rinsing, centrifuging), tumble dryers (drying, checking 
dryness, another drying cycle), coffeemakers (heating water, moving water, mixing water 
and coffee), are similar during most of the processes, only that we interact more directly 
at the start or the end of the processes. What is typical of these kinds of technological 
processes is that they do not display any degree or kind of transparency. Instead, their 
functioning is characterized by an absence. (Ihde 1990:109) 
The other kind of background relation concerns technologies like our clothes, houses and 
other shelter technologies. Such technologies, especially clothes, might first seem to be 
embodiment technologies, extensions of our skin or enhancements of our small amount 
of body hair (Ihde admits that they are borderline cases), but although the using of such 
technologies should, optimally, be as non-intruding as possible, absence is a better 
characterization of their functions than transparency. (Ihde 1990:110) For houses, the 
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same thing holds; bar the odd maintenance, the house does its function, to keep us 
sheltered from bad weather and curious neighbours, without us attending to it. It is there, 
but intentionally it is absent.1 
Expansion, not extension 
The concept of background relations indicates that our lifeworld is permeated by 
technology also in cases we are not aware of it as technologically textured. Think of the 
silence when the refrigerator or the air conditioning turns off; suddenly we become aware 
of a sound that we heard without noticing the moment before. Still, I think there is an 
aspect to technological presence that Ihde fails to discuss adequately. To me it seems that 
technologies whose function and availability we take for granted are in the background as 
a technological framework to our lifeworld/technosphere. As such, we have a 
background relation to such technologies as well, even when they are not in current use. 
Ihde is of course aware of this aspect to our technological lifeworld, calling it, in a nod to 
Husserl, the horizon of technology. “Horizons belong to the boundaries of the 
experienced environmental field. Like the ‘edges’ of the visual field, they situate what is 
explicitly present, while as phenomenon itself, horizons recede.” (Ihde 1990:114, my 
emphasis) In my mind, Ihde does not stress the importance of horizons sufficiently, 
discussing primarily such phenomena as the anxiety children might experience due to the 
possibility of nuclear war. 
The technological horizon, however, is more tangible and more involved in shaping our 
present concerns than that, and as such directly involved in the meanings we find around 
us even if the actual technological items themselves remain in the background. Some such 
technologies, though, are occasionally taken into the foreground and interacted with in a 
direct manner, but what is important here is that their potential actuality is taken for granted 
as background for both technological and general activities; their potentiality also remains 
on the fringes of our current activities when they are not in use. This taken-for-granted 
status is of course made visible once they break down (in a movement similar to the 
                                              
1 Some embodiment technologies approximate an absent relation rather than a (quasi-)transparent one. Examples are 
a crowned tooth, an artificial knee and other kinds of implants, and the birth-control pill. (Ihde 1990:113f) Bio- and 
gene-technologies are intriguing in this respect. These artificialities will have consequences that in many cases are so 
closely associated with one’s biological equipment that they do not readily fit into the transparency–opacity axis. 
However, although potentially interesting for the notion of technology, there is a sense in which we do not interact 
directly (the first three relations), nor indirectly (background relations) with such technologies. Rather than 
challenging the borderline between technology and the self, biotechnologies challenge the borderline between 
artificiality and life. 
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movement from readiness-to-hand to presence-at-hand, or from being an embodiment 
relation to a hermeneutical one). When the thermostat or the refrigerator are broken we 
notice (the lack of) their background activity when it is starting to become colder in the 
living room, or the milk has turned sour. Think of a washing machine whose centrifugal 
function suddenly breaks down: Finding the clothes clean but soaking wet reminds us that 
we take all its sub-processes for granted. In our daily activities we trust that such 
functionalities are working properly; we organize the parts of our lives not in touch 
directly with technologies in accordance with the surrounding technological system. For 
interactive technologies (hermeneutic and alterity relations) the same applies, the ready 
availability of the telephone is a background relation although the actual use is not. 
Knowing that we can call, or be called upon, is also a background relation to the 
technology. (The mobile phone, though, has these days become more of an embodiment 
technology than the old house phone ever was (cf. Clark 2003:27)) The availability (and 
its contextual functions, cf. Chapter 2) is presupposed in the very act of wanting to use 
them. 
However, many technologies remain in the background. They profoundly influence the 
social environment we move around in, but are not thematized as technologies that shape 
the way we live in or perceive our own lifeworld and the possibilities we regard ourselves 
as having. For instance, a car driver takes roads and tunnels for granted and may never 
ever think of them as being part of his technological lifeworld. Behind the taken-for-
granted possibility (in Norway at least) of optaining drinkable water from our kitchen tap, 
there is a huge technological system, from the pipes to the cleaning plant to the 
production of the chemicals used to cleanse the water. The mobile user presupposes a 
sufficiently strong service area, although most mobile users will experience frequent 
dropouts. These days, in what is increasingly the fashion for many of us, the sheer 
possibility of getting online is taken for granted. Perhaps one day, access will be as taken 
for granted as roads are today. Yet another aspect of the technological horizon is the 
socio-political consequences discussed in Chapter 1; we construct political and economic 
frameworks around material technologies to ensure that these technologies run as 
smoothly as possible. Although not technological artefacts themselves, they are part of 
the technological system, and in our technological understanding, can be considered 
horizon phenomena. 
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Often, the literature on technology focuses on actual technological activity and the 
characterization of our relation to technologies in actual use. The contextualization 
implied in the (expanded) concept of background relations illustrates that there is also a 
technological presence (not quite activity) when technological items are not in use. That is, 
technologies are a part of our lifeworld in both technological actions and as a potential for 
such actions. In this sense, the question of the meaning of technology must point beyond 
the actual use, and concern itself with the relation between technology and lifeworld. 
Lifeworld, as mentioned earlier, is the world seen as permeated with meaning; it is the 
world as given to us, with ‘always-already’ structures of meaning, meanings we need to 
consider, partake in and abide in our lives. Technological presence characterizes our 
lifeworld, in actual use, as a background, and as shaping the lifeworld we move around in. 
This far in the chapter, an image of technologies as co-constituting the structure of our 
lifeworld is about to emerge. This is a structure we might not actively use, but that we always 
depend on indirectly, both in the sense of being a context for technological actions and as 
being a potential when we move around in the lifeworld. The technologically structured 
lifeworld forms the framework for our understanding of how to organize our daily lives 
and surroundings. In this sense, technologies are also part of how we understand 
ourselves and our possibilities.1 This, then, rather than any variety of the body extension 
thesis, is the real sense in which technologies expand our practical space. The question I 
now must turn to is: How should technologies be conceptualized so that this sense of 
expansion is maintained? I need to illustrate the potentiality that technologies embody, 
and I need to illustrate this is in a manner that explains how they embody this potential. 
Virtuality 
In discussing the organizational potential of technologies, we need to focus on aspects 
other than transparency and extension seeing as these concepts fail to embrace the 
accurate meaning of the expansion of our practical space due to the technological 
presence. Depending on technology, directly or as a background phenomenon, is no mere 
extension of our practical space, it transforms radically what we ourselves are. Speaking 
about cognitively related information technologies, Andy Clark points out that, 
Such technologies, once up and running in the various appliances and institutions that 
surround us, do far more than merely allow for the external storage and transmission of 
                                              
1 Explored in Part 2. 
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ideas. They constitute, I want to say, a cascade of ‘mindware upgrades”: cognitive 
upheavals in which the effective architecture of the human mind is altered and 
transformed. (Clark 2003:4) 
The same point can be made for the shovel, the car and the remote control as well; there 
is an expansion that should be seen as more of an ‘upgrade’ of our range of actions than a 
mere extension of the ‘existing’ range of action. What is extraordinary about technology is 
not what we want to do with it (from a design or praxis perspective), but what it enables 
us to become. The man and the gun is not a mere man-gun, it is something else. Coupled 
with a piece of the technology, we are constituted as an entirely new entity (cf. Chapter 3). 
However, in regard to the extended concept of background relations, where we in the 
sheer being-in-the-world are technologically aware, this constitution does not merely 
concern the active use of technology, the technological action per se, but even technologies 
that are ‘idle’ and ‘invisible’. How should we conceptualize the potentiality of a 
technologically co-constituted action into the concept of technology? I want to do this in 
two steps. First, I will use French philosopher Pierre Lévy’s concept virtualization to 
denote the potential in technologies, and then I want to expand on the aforementioned 
concept of affordance to explain how, or why, technologies ‘have”, or embody, this 
potential. 
Lévy claims that technologies should be thought of as virtualizations of actions, while 
specific uses of technologies are actualizations of these actions. (Lévy 1998) Above, I asked 
where to draw the line between a genuine body extension and a technology that has a 
similar function, but that does not as easily fits the body extension thesis. Even if we 
accept that a cave or a small cottage is an extension of our body’s shortcomings in staying 
warm and safe, would we be as willing to say that the 90-storey skyscraper is such an 
extension? The bicycle might fit our conception of an extension of our feet, as might the 
car, although to a lesser degree, but what about the plane? Many technologies, some of 
which were discussed above, are quite remote from the workings of individual or 
collective bodies. Rather than regarding, awkwardly, the wheel as an extension of the feet, 
Lévy proposes to regard the bicycle as a virtualization of moving around. (Lévy 1998:95) 
In this sense, the hammer, although giving the illusion of being an extension of my arm, is 
better regarded as a virtualization of the action of hitting. Instead of asking whether MSN 
is an extension of our mouth in talking, or of our arm in writing, we should regard it as a 
virtualization of communicating, as one potential way of actualizing this kind of action. 
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According to Lévy, we approach technologies as enabling us to do certain actions, rather 
than as enabling our body to become stronger, longer, more powerful, etc. 
In ordinary usage, ‘the virtual” tends towards that which does not exist, as something that 
is made up, or created without being materially realized (for example, cyberspace). For 
Lévy, however, the virtual is not the non-existing, it is, in fact, an aspect of everything that 
is existing. Taking his cue from scholastic philosophy, Lévy defines the virtual as that 
which has a potential actuality, “virtuality and actuality are merely two different ways of 
being”. (Lévy 1998:23) The virtual is always present as the potential inherent in any 
actuality. “[T]he virtual is a kind of problematic complex, the knot of tendencies or forces 
that accompanies a situation, event, object, or entity.” (Lévy 1998:24) 
For technologies, it follows that any material object presents us with several routes of 
action; there is one or several inherent virtualities in the object as it presents itself to us. 
The virtual encompasses not only functions defined by an item’s role in a social praxis, 
but also unconventional uses. For instance, while the hammer is a virtualization of 
hammering or pulling nails, it is also a virtualization of being a paperweight, and rather 
more dramatic, a virtualization of killing. Almost any technological item can be employed 
for many kinds of technological actions, some designed and some not, but only a few 
becomes the conventional use. A single piece of technology can virtualize several actions.1 
Conversely, one kind of action can be actualized by several technologies. A city bike 
affords one way of actualizing movement, a mountain bike another, while the car affords 
yet another way of actualizing moving from point A to B.  
[A] bicycle doesn’t exactly replace my legs when I’m walking or the horse in the stable. It 
stands for a general function of transportation, an abstract function, which is detached a 
priori from any specific referent and refers to an indeterminate number of situations or 
concrete devices of movement. (Lévy 1998:107) 
The virtual, then, is that which is present, although not in use. It is present in the sense of 
being formative, both in the sense of being a potential for actions and, as I will return to 
below, in the sense of proposing actions. In Ihde’s (and Husserl’s) words, the virtual is 
part of the horizon of the actual. The actual and the virtual constitute our practical space. 
However, if we are to avoid instrumentalism, actualizations of the virtuality of 
technologies (technological actualizations) must be conceptualized in a manner that 
                                              
1 Usually a technology, in its conventional use, is employed for only one task. Some technologies, however, are 
designed to do many things, today’s mobile phones and computers, for example. The ‘double-headed’ hammer is 
also multifunctional, as it has both hammering and pulling nails as conventional uses. 
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substantiates what was said above, namely that technological presence is an ‘upgrade’ of 
this practical space, not a mere extension of it. 
Technological actualization  
Nothing in the concept of the virtual necessitates that it be thought of as immaterial, or 
somewhat unreal, as in the virtual world that is evoked when we are reading a book of 
fiction, or the cyberspace world of Second Life. As we saw, in any actuality there is an 
element of the virtual, and vice versa: the virtual and the actual go together. This implies 
that the virtual is the potentiality of the actual, and if it were not for its potential actuality, 
it would not be a virtuality. This excludes our regarding the virtual as ‘just anything’, and 
implies that in a piece of technology, there is the potential for several technological 
actions (for the hammer; hammering, paperweight), but not just any kind of action. For 
instance, to use a hammer for fine-grained brain surgery is not part of its virtuality, a fork 
is not a virtual cutting device, MSN does not have speaking as its virtuality, and you 
cannot hit someone at the other end of a phone conversation using the mobile phone, 
and so on. 
The concept of the virtual should therefore not be seen as an expression of arbitrariness. 
Quite the opposite, virtuality in technology is not primarily a question of a user’s 
interpretative imagination – how a person interprets ingenious uses of an object in front 
of him. The virtual, in technology, is about the constraints the technological item itself 
puts on technological actions (and by implication, how it constrains ingeniously 
interpreted forms of use). While the virtual in a cyberworld such as World of Warcraft is 
constrained by the computer programme, the virtuality of technological devices is 
constrained by their materiality. However, how are we to understand the transition from 
the virtual to the actual, how should we conceptualize technological actualization? 
There are two obvious candidates for this; a) the technology is designed for the particular 
actualization, and b) the technology belongs to a social praxis that defines its actualization. 
However, none of these (instrumentalist) candidates will do, and for an apparent reason: 
In light of the social praxes that any technology belongs to, we might say that there are 
right ways of actualizing virtuality, and that there are wrong ways of actualizing it. Claiming 
that a particular actualization is wrong can clearly not be due to the material item itself. A hammer 
used for the killing of a person is, unfortunately, a virtuality of said item. Claiming that 
this kind of use is wrong is to hold it up against its conventional uses, what it was 
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designed for and/or its function in a social praxis. Technological actualization must be 
conceptualized in a way that involves so-called wrong uses, and for this reason the design 
and praxis perspectives fail as explanations; one simply cannot say that a technological 
item is designed for the wrong purpose, or that there is a social praxis for the wrong kind 
of use.1 
Why is the wrong way of actualizing a technological virtuality important? In Chapter 1, we 
looked at what Langdon Winner called the inherent politics of technology. The actual 
impact a piece (or complex) of technology has on the society might transcend what the 
technology specifically is designed for (the overpasses on the Long Island parkways), or 
the actualization that is taken up as the function in a social praxis might be different from 
the actualization the technology was designed for. Using a mobile phone for sending text 
messages was a part of the virtuality of the phone, but from the design perspective, the 
intention behind this virtuality was to enable the mobile user to receive short messages 
from the mobile company, for instance about incoming voice mails.2 In some cases, the 
virtuality will be the dominant is designed (the fork, for instance is designed as a specific 
kind of cutlery and is for most part only used as such), at other times a virtuality that was 
not initially seen as the main way of using a piece of technology becomes dominant 
(sending text messages to other mobile user). 
What is required for the conceptualization of technological actualization is to shed light 
on why the use of technologies sometimes does not comply with their designed use, and 
as such shed a light on evolving social praxes that deviate from the designed function, and 
yet, at the same time, tell us something important about uses which from the design 
perspective count as correct ones. In other words, what I turn to now is to explain how a 
piece of technology can embody a virtual action. Again, this shed light on the relation we 
have to technology, in that it displays how technology itself brings something into the 
relationship. In this sense, the following section is also about the direct meaning of technology. 
That is, not its meaning understood as an interpretation, but how it in itself enables us to 
go together with a piece of technology to perform an action containing contributions 
                                              
1 Of course, if we think of ‘wrong’ as an ethical value, many technologies are designed for the wrong purposes from 
certain perspectives, weapons, pollutive industrial technologies, genetic manipulation technologies, etc. In addition, 
what function a technological item attains within a social praxis can be wrong from the design perspective. More on 
that below. 
2 Earlier mobile phones, hardly mobile at all, were not virtual text senders or receivers, and of course, today mobile 
phones come equipped with many virtualities. 
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from ‘both parties’. If technology is to be seen as co-constituting a technological action, 
we need to see how it contributes to the constitutional process. Affordance, the concept I 
shall use for this, is therefore the link between the virtuality and actuality of an action. 
Affordances 
In Chapter 2, I mentioned that the hammer affords rock-hard hits and pulling, and that this 
connects it to things like nails and spikes, things that afford being hit or pulled. A thing’s 
affordance is how the thing presents itself as usable to a user. In being material, any 
technology affords certain uses, and for this reason, technological actualizations are 
constrained by the affordances of a technology. If a technology does not afford a specific 
use in an action, this piece of technology is not a virtualization of this action, regardless of 
how imaginative the technology-user is. Conceptually, affordance is an aspect of 
materiality that connects a thing’s actuality (‘as it is, right here, right now’) with, on the 
one hand, its virtualities, and on the other, the user. Affording, or the concept of 
affordance, is in this respect a key notion in the relation between virtualizations and 
actualizations in that it induces both ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ uses, but precludes interpretative 
arbitrariness. Actualizations of a technological virtuality, conventional or not, are always 
in accordance with the material affordances.1 
The concept of affordance is primarily associated with psychologist James J. Gibson, who 
coined the term to denote the value or meaning a phenomenon in our surroundings has 
to us. Not speaking specifically about tools and technologies, Gibson claims that we 
primarily know objects, events, places, other animals and artefacts from what they afford 
us. (Gibson 1982:404) Rather than giving a clear-cut definition of affordances, Gibson 
presents numerous examples of the affordances of various phenomena in the 
environment. A handle, for instance, affords grasping, a sufficiently small stone affords 
throwing, and a sharp object affords piercing, Viscous substances afford being smeared 
while liquids afford pouring, and in certain cases drinking. Nutritional and poisonous 
substances afford eating, and so on. (Gibson 1982:405) A social phenomenon like a 
mailbox affords letter-mailing, a social meaning, but materialized in the very design of the 
mailboxes. (Gibson 1986:139) The value and meaning that an object, event and so on 
                                              
1 Gibson, for most part, discusses what ‘affordance’ means for a visual psychology. My use is in a more action-based 
sense, and includes how an item affords to be handled. This is in line with the more general sense of what it means 
to afford. A similar expanded utilization of the expression can be found in Norman 1999, Hutchby 2001, Brey 2006 
and Graves 2007. 
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have are not something we infer cognitively on the basis of the perceived objective 
properties of the objects we encounter, they are how the objects present themselves to us: 
“The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, 
either for good or ill.” (Gibson 1986:127) 
For this reason, affordances should not be taken for merely being the social praxis the 
objects functions in. A physical mailbox might be discarded and thrown in the backyard, 
but it still affords putting mail into (although, if one wants the letter to arrive to the 
addressee, one is best advised not to do it). Affordances are not bestowed upon the 
physical item, not by a social praxis, nor by a personal interpretation. Affordances are a 
real characteristic of the phenomenon. 
The observer may or may not perceive or attend to the affordance, according to his needs, 
but the affordance, being invariant, is always there to be perceived… The object offers 
what it does because it is what it is. To be sure, we define what it is in terms of ecological 
physics instead of physical physics, and it therefore possesses meaning and value to begin 
with. (Gibson 1986:139) 
Affordances, then, are how we meet our environment.1 The affordances of things in our 
environment shape how we handle them. More precisely, they shape technological and 
non-technological strategies (techniques) to meet them. However, it is also necessary for 
us to have the capabilities to perceive or use the affordances. A watery surface for some 
insects affords locomotion, but for humans it does not. Affordances, for this reason, 
“have to be measured relative to the animal”. (Gibson 1986:127) Because of this, we cannot 
regard affordances as the objective phenomenon itself. That would be too strong a claim, 
and would imply that the relation of humans and technology is not interdependent, but 
dependent upon the technology itself, a determinist claim. 
The concept of affordance emphasizes the intertwinement (and interdependence) of 
humans and technology in social and technological development. The role of society, or 
intersubjective meaning, should neither be overlooked. The ‘postability’ of mailboxes, for 
                                              
1 Gibson presents his ecological theory as a radical alternative to ‘the orthodox view’ in perceptual psychology that 
holds that what we perceive when we move around in the world, “is not the world itself, but the pattern of light on 
the retina, and that pattern does not supply enough information to determine how things are in the environment. For 
example, from the retinal image of a table alone, it may not be possible to tell whether it is large and far away, or 
small and nearby.” (Noë & Thompson 2002:2) The result of the orthodox view is that the world as we know it (both 
in terms of value and meaning and in terms of three-dimensional extension and physical properties) is a mental 
construction. Gibson tries to avoid this implication by showing that the world presents itself to us directly, and the 
concept of affordance has a key role in this. Gibson’s theory remains controversial in psychology, with an article by 
Fodor and Pylyshyn as the best-known counter-attack from the orthodox camp, arguing that Gibson’s view to a 
large degree is in agreement with it. (1981:141) In more recent years, theories of vision, perception and action that 
are similar to Gibson in their critique of the orthodox view have become common. See Varela, Thompson & Rosch 
1991, Hutchins 1995, Port and van Gelder 1995, Clark 1997, Noë 2004, and Wheeler 2005. 
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instance, are primarily detected because the box is a part of a social postal-praxis. Without 
knowing this, it would probably never occur to us to put a letter to a dear one into those 
red boxes. (Rappert 2003:576) In another example, forks and knives might at first glance 
seem superior to the chopsticks as eating equipment for the Westerner. But although that 
might be true for the eating of potatoes and steak, anyone who has eaten sushi or maki 
rolls can testify that chopsticks are far better eating equipment for the latter dishes. Using 
a fork will make the Sushi pieces fall apart and render the eating of them nearly 
impossible. However, chopsticks were not developed to handle pieces of sushi, the design 
of Sushi pieces was adapted to the affordances of the chopsticks, as these were around 
long before the Sushi dish.1 Furthermore, various rituals have been developed around the 
eating of Sushi concerning the way the fish is cut, how the pieces of fish and the rice are 
aligned, how it is served, and what to drink alongside it. There are even traditions for how 
to earn your standing as a Sushi chef.2 The development of dishes, and this applies to 
potatoes and steak as well, is partly shaped by the available eating technologies (the 
original function of combining fish and seasoned rice was to preserve and ferment the 
fish, and once the fish was ready for consumption, the rice was thrown away).3 
To the best of my knowledge, there is nothing in Gibson’s writings that indicates a 
familiarity with Heidegger’s concept of readiness-to-hand. Nevertheless, there is an 
obvious similarity between the two in their claims that we approach items in our 
environment in a primordial way, through the kind of value or meaning the items has for 
us. We do not determine an item in its objective specifications (presence-at-hand), and 
then decide to what extent this item can be put to use. Any objective specification grows 
out of the acquaintance we have with the thing through its value to us (cf. Chapter 3). 
However, one major difference is that the concept of affordance applies to the relation all 
animals have to their environment. For Heidegger, on the other hand, readiness-to-hand 
is the being of the items that we are in-the-world alongside, and as such, it is an aspect of 
items that only concerns Dasein ‘the only being for whom being is an issue’). 
                                              
1 Chopsticks date back more than 3000 years (http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9082341 [02.01.2009]), while sushi 
developed fairly recently (http://en.wa-shoi.com/?page=100299 [02.01.2009]), and although its pre-history dates 
back another 1000 years (http://www.sushifaq.com/history-of-sushi.htm [02.01.2009]) it is still considerably younger 
than the eating equipment. 
2 http://www.bigburrito.com/umi/umihist.shtml [02.01.2009] 
3 This example makes explicit the necessary aspect of techniques, the mastery of a piece of technology, in this case 
the chopstick. Edward Tenner claims that evolving techniques rebound onto the technological development. It is 
not the case that an affordance is presented as usable, or usable in the optimal way instantaneously. The best 
technique to handle a technology can take years to evolve. (Tenner 2003) 
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Consequently, for affordances, what an object, event, place etc afford is species-specific. 
As we saw above, one and the same object might afford different actions for different 
species. A tree, for instance, affords being cut down, being building material, or being fire 
wood for a human being, while it affords living in, a means for transport, and a source of 
food for a squirrel. Therefore, the value and meaning of phenomena in the environment 
are determined neither by the phenomena themselves, nor by the interpretational process 
of the animals themselves. Instead, the concept of affordance “implies the 
complementarity of the animal and environment”. (Gibson 1986:127) Even though a 
human and a squirrel perceive the same physical object, it is simply impossible for a 
squirrel to perceive and handle an object the way a human being perceives and handles it, 
and vice versa; the impossibility of transcending the species-specific perspective 
constrains the meaning of a phenomenon.1 
An implication of this difference is that affordances do not directly concern the 
appearance of items in their toolness; that is, as having specific functions in an equipmental 
totality. Although the concept of affordance expresses our being in an environment as 
practical and action-based, phenomena afford more than tool-like aspects of the 
environment. For example, in perceiving various surfaces, we might find that: 
A solid horizontal surface affords support. A water surface does not. A surface of support 
affords resting (coming to rest)… An extended surface of support affords locomotion, for a 
terrestrial animal… A vertical solid surface stops locomotion and affords mechanical contact. It 
is a barrier. A rigid barrier affords injury by abrupt contacts, i.e., collision. It is an obstacle… 
A vertical double surface, that is, a wall or screen, affords hiding behind, that is, being out of 
sight of observers on the other side. This is true if the double surface is opaque. (Gibson 
1982:413) 
For Heidegger, such phenomena are part of an equipmental totality. In this totality, items 
are connected through the functions (readiness-to-hand) that refer each item to each 
other, forming a “functionality whole”. (Heidegger 1988:164) Heidegger points out that 
equipment not only points out a context, it involves a reference to other Daseins as well. 
In the hammer, in the nails, in the work being produced by such tools, there is a reference 
to others. In fact, in any produced item there is such a reference. 
[A]long with the equipment to be found when one is at work [in Arbeit], those Others for 
whom the ‘work’ [‘Werk”] is destined are ‘encountered too’… [W]hen material is put to 
                                              
1 In addition, bodily differences within a species matter, infants and grown-ups have different capabilities in dealing 
with the environment. Past individual experiences will also be relevant: “we must, of course, learn to see what things 
really are – for example, that the innocent-looking leaf is really a nettle or that helpful-sounding politician is really a 
demagogue.” (Gibson 1986:142) Affordances, then, should not be seen as being what an object affords us 
instantaneously and naïvely. As mentioned, techniques evolve in interaction with the technology. 
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use, we encounter its producer or ‘supplier’ as one who ‘serves’ well or badly. When, for 
example, we walk along the edge of a field but ‘outside it’, the field shows itself as 
belonging to such-and-such a person, and decently kept up by him; the book we have used 
was bought at So-and-so’s shop and given by such-and-such a person, and so forth. 
(Heidegger 1962:153-4/117-8) 1 
The relation of equipment and the others is especially palpable when we encounter an 
item that we can tell is a tool, but whose function we do not know. We recognize it, not 
as a mere thing (in its presence-at-hand), but in its readiness-to-hand, as a tool that for 
another Dasein has a specific function. The Other is an inevitable aspect of readiness-to-
hand, the way Heidegger sees it. Readiness-to-hand indicates a social world of functions 
and praxes (cf. Chapter 6). 
As we saw above, with functions the notions of rightness and wrongness of use manifest 
themselves. To say that a function is proper implies that deviating functions are non-
proper, or wrong. Given that the material item affords the non-proper use, wrongness 
must be a consequence of either the item’s design or the adaptation of an item into a 
social praxis. Although some, and perhaps most, non-functional uses are uninteresting, 
subjective and situational, as when a person uses a hammer to keep a window open, some 
lead to new conventional uses and social praxes. The medical use of X-rays, for instance, 
was discovered as Wilhelm Röntgen was testing the ability of the then recently discovered 
X-rays to penetrate various materials, including his wife’s hand. Although X-rays at this 
time had no conventional use, what a phenomenon affords in terms of organizational 
potential will sometimes have to be due to the phenomenon itself. Focusing merely on 
conventional use will not grasp this important aspect. 
In putting the emphasis on materiality, affordances are less specific than readiness-to-
hand for specific functions. Any material object affords certain ways of being handled, 
but this does not mean that this handling has a conventional function. Donald Norman 
points out that “[a]lthough all screens within reaching distance afford touching, only some 
can detect the touch and respond to it. Thus, if the display does not have a touch-
sensitive screen, the screen still affords touching.” (1999:39)2 Although the social aspect 
                                              
1 The other is apprehended as Dasein and not just any object. (Heidegger 1962, §26). I return to this in Chapter 6. 
2 Norman, writing from a designer’s context, points out that the concept of affordance is ill understood within the 
design profession, especially with Internet designers. Sometimes it is used to denote any graphical item on the 
computer screen. For instance, a folder is said to afford being clicked, but this is clearly wrong as “you can click on 
the object, but you can click anywhere.” (Norman 1999:40) The clickable object is a visual convention that guides the 
user in finding out what the computer system affords. Norman would say that pieces of sushi afford eating, while the 
actual design of them is conventional, rather than affording specific ways of being handled. 
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(including design) is essential in the distinction between things and tools, and between 
tools and technology, affordances, in granting ‘wrong’ uses, brings a different perspective 
to the use of technology than either the design or praxis perspectives.1 
The importance of this perspective should now be familiar; around us, we have a world of 
material objects that expand our potential practical space beyond what our bodily 
capacities afford. This expansion would have been of marginal theoretical interest if the 
organizational potential of technologies was just a matter of preserving and materializing 
already existing and designed/envisioned social praxes. Some of the earliest kinds of 
typewriters, for instance, were initially devices to assist those who had trouble writing for 
physical reasons, such as the blind. (Tenner 2003:193) Needless to add, typewriters soon 
took on a rather different role in society. Organizing our lifeworld through material items 
signifies an unpredictable ‘upgrade’ of our potential practical space. Therefore, in this 
sense, affordances are a supplement to investigations of technology through readiness-to-
hand, and to the design and social praxis perspectives of technological development. 
Nevertheless, it is strikingly clear that in discussing technology as a phenomenon, the 
concept of affordance is in itself not sufficient. To investigate designed functions, or 
conventional uses, we need a broader view, and to look at the intertwinement of humans, 
technology and society in the development of technological conventions. Without the 
social aspect, technologies would conceptually be on par with found items. Affordances 
would still be real aspects of technological items, but their utility would be determined on 
a case-by-case basis, and the referential totality would be lost. As Don Ihde puts it: “Just 
as there is no such thing as ‘an’ equipment, neither is there an equipment without its 
belonging to some set of culturally constituted values and processes.” (1990:126) 
Summing up this section, we can see that affordances are a way of conceptualizing the 
actualization of the virtual actions that material phenomena constitute. The concept of 
affordance substantiates the interdependence of technological item and user, namely that 
while the item affords certain ways of being handled that constrains its possible uses, an 
affordance is dependent on the user’s competence, intentions, motives, short- and long-
                                              
1 I am not implying that affordances are non- or pre-social, or that affordances are primordial to intersubjectivity. It 
is very likely that the unearthing of an item’s affordances is connected to a social problem, such as a pertinent 
scientific one like the X-ray example above, or as those concerning the Ordinary bicycle’s reception (cf. Chapter 2). 
As Bijker et al. observe, “a problem is only a problem when there is a social group for which it has the meaning of a 
problem”. (1984:93) Explorations of possible affordances of an object, for whatever reasons, are not something I 
will discuss, but that such affordances transcend conventional uses should be evident. 
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term goals, etc.1 The most important contribution of the concept of affordance is that by 
using it as a fundamental conception for understanding technology, neither 
instrumentalism nor essentialism makes sense. We do not control technology; technology 
does not control us. As Ihde points out, the question of who controls whom, technology 
or us, is a question asked on the wrong basis: “It either assumes that technologies are 
‘merely’ instrumental and thus implicitly neutral, or it assumes that technologies are fully 
determinative and thus uncontrollable.” (1990:140) By understanding technologies as 
affording virtual actions we can clearly see that such assumptions are unsupported. 
Consequently, the two concepts of virtuality and affordance are the foundation we need 
to regard technologies as expanding our practical space rather than extending our bodies. 
Through these concepts, we are able to support Ihde’s typology of human-technology 
relation in a manner that demonstrates the non-transparency in these relations, while, at 
the same time, refuting the submissive view drawn by the later Heidegger. 
The concept of affordance, however, primarily clarifies the interdependent relation 
between a technology user and a piece of technology. To conceptualize how technologies 
gain an impact on society in their stabilized form, I shall now turn to Don Ihde’s concepts 
multistability and trajectory. The way I see it, these two concepts need affordance and 
virtuality as their foundation, as a way of displaying the basic sense of the 
interdependence between user and technology. Multistability and virtuality, however, are 
required for the argument that technologies constitute a social structure that we (‘always 
already’) are within and always depend on (see above, on the various relations we have to 
technology), while at the same time showing why this structure is not existentially 
overwhelming. 
Multistability 
Affordances indicate that what a phenomenon is is related to several factors. The 
materiality of the phenomenon itself is of course important, but so are the abilities, 
competence, techniques and perspective of those perceiving and interacting with the 
phenomenon as well. Extending this into the social sphere, it is clear that the role, 
function and meaning a piece of technology takes on in a society is to a large part 
dependent on the perspective and role it is perceived as having within this society, that is, 
on a social level. That a piece of technology has a specific function within a social praxis, 
                                              
1 And all this is framed by a social setting, as I discuss in Chapter 6. 
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however, does not prevent it from having a slightly or even vastly different function 
within another social praxis (in a different culture, or attaining a revised function as time 
goes). “In both structure and history”, Ihde says, “technologies simply can’t be reduced to 
designed functions”. (2002:106) Instead, technologies are multistable; a technology can take on 
different functions and meanings within different praxes. 
The concept, a nod to Bijker et al. (1984), implies some similarities to affordances; 
technologies have potentials that exceed designed or present conventional functions 
within a social praxis, but retain the interdependence of users and technology in a social context. As 
mentioned, the main difference between multistability and affordance is that the latter is 
primarily about our relation to the technological item itself (although still relative to the 
perspective of those perceiving it), while the former is about the item when it has been 
stabilized with a socially defined function within a social praxis.  
With multistability, Ihde has formulated a concept that avoids the instrumentalist 
conception of the relation of technology and the social that threatens the concept of 
interpretive flexibility (cf. Chapter 2). Multistability captures the social dynamics that 
transform the stabilized meaning of a technology into another, stabilized, form. For 
example, the overpasses on the Long Island Parkways are no longer a means of keeping 
poor and underprivileged people off the beaches of the southern shoreline of the island, 
as the possession of cars is no longer exclusively for the privileged like it was in the 1920s 
when Robert Moses planned the Long Island Parkway system. (Verbeek 2005:117) 
Sometimes the kind of impact a technology has on a society changes completely because 
of a social development. Technological stabilization is not necessarily a one-way street. If 
it had been, we would have been influenced deterministically.1 
Ihde offers a handful of examples of technology transfer, that is, when a technology is 
introduced to a culture that was previously unaware of the technology. This can happen 
by accident, as when Australian gold miners in the 1930s left behind cans of sardines in 
New Guinea. The cans of sardines were promptly adapted into the culture of the natives, 
but as “centrepieces of the elaborate headwear they wore for special occasions”. (Ihde 
                                              
1 Multistability should not be confused with revenge effects, which Edward Tenner notes are a common problem with 
introducing new technologies: “whenever we try to take advantage of some new technology, we may discover that it 
induces behaviour which appears to cancel out the very reason for using it”. (1997:7) Burglar, fire and car alarms are 
frequently ignored because they start too many false alarms. Networking has made installing home offices easier, but 
means that working home is as easily interrupted as working at the office, etc. 
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1990:125) Without transfer of the surrounding socio-technological system, a piece of 
technology is left with its affordances as a thing, even if it is recognized as an artefact 
rather than a naturally occurring item. The affordance that will be stabilized as a function 
is in some cases anyone’s guess. Technology transfers can also be planned, of course, as in 
the activities of the humanitarian organization Fair Allocation of InfoTech Resources, 
which works with the distribution of ICTs in developing countries, often in terms of 
collecting and distributing recycled computers that are deemed unusable in Norway and 
other ICT-rich countries.1 A related example, closer to home, is the use of ICT-related 
pedagogical tools in Norwegian primary and secondary schools. Studies have shown that 
although there is a certain correlation between the presence of computers and the use of 
them, of course (without any tools present, no use is possible), mere presence is not 
enough to ensure an extensive use of ICT in class. Even if both teachers and pupils use 
ICT outside the classroom, this is not reflected in the use of ICT in schools. (Søby et al 
2005:126f, Krumsvik 2007:20) The low level of ICT use can partly be related to a low 
level of competence of (aging) teachers, but a more serious issue is it that ICT is not 
properly integrated into the pedagogical programme for the teacher education. (Krumsvik 
2007:18) Presence or access in itself is not sufficient to ensure use of technologies. As we 
saw in Chapter 1, the use of a technology involves an entire socio-technological system 
comprised of competence, praxes, other technologies, and economic and political factors. 
In itself, a piece of technology affords certain uses, but it does not afford the entire 
surrounding system.2  
Trajectories 
That technologies are multistable, that is, able to perform different afforded functions 
within different social contexts, implies that the socio-technological development will 
differ in various contexts. This suggests that stabilizing/constituting a technology as a 
function triggers (or, more likely, is already a part of) socio-technological development in 
a specific direction. Had the technology been stabilized as a different function, the 
developmental direction might then have been different. Potentially, prior to constitution, 
the socio-technological development can go in several directions. “Within multistability 
there lie trajectories, not just any trajectory, but partially determined trajectories.” (Ihde 
2002:106) Once a technology is constituted (or re-constituted, as it may be), the direction 
                                              
1 http://www.fairinternational.org/ [02.01.2009]  
2 In Chapter 7, I will return to the theme of sheer technological presence. 
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for further development is partially laid down, in the sense that the potential in the 
material properties of the technologies opens us up to specific ways of developing these 
technologies further. Galileo Galilei’s first telescope had a magnification of 3x, while his 
last magnified 32x; having established the utility of the first, further development of the 
subsequent ones was motivated. This is not to be taken as a technological determinism 
where we suddenly find ourselves as obliged in any way to follow this trajectory. Whether, 
and to what extent, a technology is further developed depends on social, economic, 
political and scientific processes. (Bijker et al 1984) Instead, we should regard trajectories 
as inclinations. “Such inclinations are related to the capacities opened up by the 
instruments, capacities of a technological possibility leading to the productive capacities 
of experimental science” (Ihde 1991:137), or the productive capacities in some other area 
of technological mediation, such as the possibilities for mass production allowed by the 
invention of the moving assembly line. 
Once a technology is constituted in a socio-technological system, what is regarded as its 
strengths and weaknesses are tinkered with. 1  How should we make the piece of 
technology better? How should we eliminate those aspects of the item that distract us 
from its primary function? Tinkering can be done ‘positively’, where we try to make the 
technology better, such as faster computers, increasing RAM, digital cameras with higher 
resolution.2 The same trend can be found early and throughout in humankind’s tool-use: 
better stone-hammers, better spears and cutters. Galilei’s use of the telescope created a 
need for better and stronger telescopes, eventually ending in modern radio and gamma 
ray telescopes. The early optical microscopes dating back to the 1600s have evolved into 
electron and helium atom microscopes3, enabling us to ‘see’ non-visual data. Being able to 
see things we cannot see with the bare eyes sent science on a trajectory towards enabling 
us to see phenomena that is not visually available at all. (Ihde 1991:137f) Although the 
radio telescope in itself is not in the trajectory of the optical telescope, as it involves a very 
different kind of visualization, this calls attention to visualization as a ‘value’ trajectory of 
                                              
1 Or ‘thinkered’; the Institute of Design at the Illinois Institute of Technology calls the exploration and innovation of 
technologies meant to help and augment thinking skills ‘thinkering’. http://www.id.iit.edu/ThinkeringSpaces/ 
[02.01.2009] 
2  Trajectories can be broken. The better/stronger trajectory of audio-visual equipment has the recent years 
experienced a set back by the introduction of digital AV equipment. We now seem to be happy with lousier picture 
quality on our LCD and plasma TV’s, with poorer sound on MP3 files, with digital cameras not yet able to match the 
quality of old cameras. The ‘digital revolution’ has, of course, a similar trajectory to older AV equipment 
(better/stronger), but given the quality and the price of the new technologies, it is somewhat surprising that so many 
are willing to go digital before the quality is comparable to the old technologies. 
3 Koch et al 2007. 
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its own within modern science. The preoccupation with the visual and the subsequent 
translation of the non-visual into images by means of instruments shows that vision is the 
paradigm perceptual sense within modern science. (Ihde 1998:151-169) The discussion of 
intentionality in the previous chapter showed that, according to Heidegger, Husserl had 
not been able to shake this preoccupation with visual perception either. Because of this, 
his analysis of intentionality became misguided (cf. Chapter 2).1 
Another type of trajectory is set off when we react to the unhappy consequences of a 
technological development. This is different from the trajectory of an artefact, and is 
more related to the development of the socio-technological systems that are constructed 
around technologies that Winner was concerned with (cf. Chapter 1). Palpable today are 
pollution effects of industrial and travelling technologies. Addressing these problems will 
involve many socio-political and juridical actions, and of course, new kinds of 
technologies, developed precisely to meet these unhappy consequences: decontamination 
units, biofuels, catalytic incinerations, and so on. Trajectories are an integral aspect of any 
constitution of a technology; once we are capable of saying what something is for and 
what it is able to do (positively and negatively), we are also able to analyse the parameters 
that should make it better and more powerful (or less harmful). Regardless of whether it 
is an enhancement or a reaction, socio-technological development has taken a certain path 
relative to how the technology was constituted.2 
An important aspect of trajectories is that their potential path can be very hard to predict. 
For instance, these days we know that nanotechnology and nanoengineering will 
potentially bring sweeping changes to a variety of aspects of our society (medicine, foods, 
environmental issues, etc.), but this field of research is still embryonic so we do not know 
the full potential – positively or negatively – of the ‘nanotrajectory’, not technologically, 
nor in terms of the social consequences. Of course, such insecurity makes it imperative to 
chart possible motives behind and goals for the present research, and ask with Langdon 
Winner whether it is “wise to experiment with technological applications likely to produce 
irreversible effects?” (Winner 2003)  
                                              
1 Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Husserl mistook, if indeed that was what he did, how we perceived 
visually. “Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do… What we perceive is 
determined by what we do (or what we know how to do); it is determined by what we are ready to do.” Noë 2004:1) 
2 As noted by Tenner, the introduction of technologies requires and set off developments and refinements in 
techniques as well, and these techniques will play a part in what direction the further development of the piece of 
technology takes. (2003:13f) I will regard techniques in Tenner’s sense as part of the social process that constitutes 
the function a technology attains. 
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In closing 
In this (long and complex) Chapter, I have discussed the long and complex pathway that 
lies behind the constitution of a thing as a technology embedded within a social praxis. 
The intuitive notion of technology as some sort of body extension was dismissed in 
preference to Ihde’s more exhaustive typology because the body extension thesis does not 
illuminate the magnification-reduction structure implied in technologies. However, to 
warrant this structure and to display the interdependence of technology and us (which is 
argued for in the preceding chapters), I presented the concepts of virtuality, affordance, 
multistability and trajectory. The dual concepts of affordance and virtuality form the basic 
meaning of technology, telling us how technological items both depend on us, but still 
transcend our motives and intentions, or in other words, how technology itself, through 
the potential and actual actions it affords us, reveals our practical space, the horizon of 
possible actions. Technologies not only augment our actions in the world, they co-
constitute the very world those actions are performed in. The dual concepts of 
multistability and trajectory build upon this perspective, showing us how interdependence 
work in the context of socially governed functions, that is, when the technology is 
stabilized (cf. Chapter 2). 
To stabilize a technology implies a revealing-concealing structure. Revealing, because a 
technology discloses a world (cf. Chapters 3 and 4): It makes us see and approach the 
world in a certain way in accordance with its magnification-reduction structure. This 
technological revealing, then, has an inherent tendency that is augmented by the 
subsequent socio-technological development, trajectory, bringing us further into the hows 
of the technological world-revealing. Concealing, because any elevation of an affordance 
into a stabilized social praxis conceals other potential stabilizations that would have made 
us see and approach the world differently. Concealing can be read in two ways. First, a 
trajectory might create social and technological conditions that make it hard to catch a 
glimpse of alternative ways of life. Concealing in this sense reads like a paradigm. The 
other way of concealing is the kind that Winner is afraid might be unleashed by the 
nanotrajectory if we do not excise sufficient political and social control and assessment of 
its development. (Winner 2003) Once a trajectory of this kind is initiated, it can be quite 
hard to reverse it, sometimes even impossible.  
Although all constitutions of technologies involve the revealing-concealing structure, they 
differ vastly in their degree of concealment. Some trajectories are ‘soft’, only suggestive in 
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a relatively small role within a socio-technological network. Such trajectories only partly 
conceal other possible trajectories, leaving the developmental directions mostly in the 
hands of users and society. How the bike has developed from the Ordinary bike was to a 
large degree dependent on the specific needs and preferences of various social groups. 
(Bijker et al. 1984) The bike, of course, still afforded several developmental trajectories, but 
the trajectories themselves did very little in terms of concealing alternative trajectories 
(mainly because each trajectory had its own problems in relation to specific groups, which 
were not solved until the air tyre was invented). Small electronic gadgets aimed at leisure 
activities rarely have much impact beyond their brief period of hype. The Tamagotchi is 
still around1 but has never been close to concealing alternative ways of spending one’s 
leisure time (although for individual users, for a period, it probably was). 
Other trajectories are stronger, overshadowing other possible trajectories. The 
microprocessor, for instance, is now in use in a wide variety of appliances, from 
spacecraft to personal computers to refrigerators to shoes.2 Can we even imagine how our 
society would look without it? To a certain degree, we can say how life was prior to its 
introduction, due to historical records and comparatives studies of other cultures, but it is 
hard to imagine how recent socio-technological development would have turned out 
without it. Probably the singular most powerful technological trajectory in this sense has 
been the one leading up to the development of the atom bomb. Its mere presence has 
made existence without it a sheer impossibility. And yet, the same trajectory has led to 
developments that some deem useful; nuclear power plants are now thought to be 
environmentally sound sources of energy, despite their risks, and thus as something worth 
considering as an alternative source of energy also in Norway. 
Heidegger regarded modern technology as a whole to constitute a very powerful 
trajectory. By implementing the Gestell, the modern technological system became the only 
way of being, and thus, concealed other possible ways of being in the world (Chapter 1). 
This dystopian conclusion neither is a necessary consequence of his own earlier thinking 
about the revealing of a world due to our technological actions, nor is it a plausible one, 
bearing in mind the interrelatedness of user, society and technology that we have been 
discussing. For many of the same reasons, instrumentalism seems doubtful. Technologies 
come with their own impact, to varying degrees, but the constitution of this impact is 
                                              
1 http://www.tamagotchi.com/ [02.01.2009] 
2 http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn4969-smart-sports-shoe-adapts-for-optimal-cushioning.html [02.01.2009] 
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interdependent on other factors as well. The revealing-concealing structure is a 
consequence of the interdependence, the dynamics in the socio-technological 
development. 
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As mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation is a formulation of a theory about 
human-technology relations. This has been undertaken in two main steps: the first, which 
I have completed in this part, is an investigation into the relation of technology and us, 
followed by an investigation into the relation of self and society, which I shall turn to 
shortly. In Chapter 1, we saw that two candidates for the description of the relation 
between technology and us, instrumentalism and the determinism of Heideggerian 
essentialism, failed at illuminating this relation because we have good reason to believe 
that technologies really do have an impact on society, and possibly also on us. Although 
easily seen as opposites, both –ism’s, in fact, share the same basic view of technological 
items: They do not matter; they are transparent. Transparency, in turn, was refuted by 
technological determinism, but here the relation is that of a submissive one; we are 
controlled by technology and technological ideals. This is equally untenable in the 
transparency view, although Ellul is right in pointing out that technology has an impact 
on society. 
The three chapters constituting Part 1 has been devoted to a) a substantiation of the fact 
that we do actually have an influence over technology, that is, a more solid (albeit implicit) 
dismissal of technological determinism than I could offer in Chapter 1, and b) an 
elaboration of how technologies influence society and us. Both arguments, the first rather 
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implicitly through the argumentation for the latter, were dealt with through the 
constitutional-articulative perspective introduced in Chapter 2. I argued that we should 
not view technological actions as a mere modification of an already existing 
world/society, but as being essential in articulating this world/society, essential in 
creating, articulating, reality. To avoid both technological determinism and Heideggerian 
essentialism, I argued that the action leading the articulation of reality must be regarded as 
constituted by technology, user(s) and the task at hand. The constituents’ relation in a 
technological action is interdependent rather than interactive; how each contributor appears 
(which properties and competencies are accentuated) in the technological action is a result 
of the specific situation and how other constituents appear in it. Neither constituent 
enters a technological action predefined. This way no single contributor has primacy in 
the causal chain leading to the articulation that results from the technological action. 
Consequently, it is the technological action as a whole that has causality; not the technology 
employed in it, and not the user(s) (nor the social interpretation of the articulation).  
What does that imply? How can, for instance, a technology influence (‘co-determine’) the 
task it is to be utilized in? This was explored in the last two chapters of Part 1, and the 
argument, again, was put forward in two steps. First, as discussed in Chapter 3, we 
discover the world through our concerned action in it; our dealings, more often than not, 
are technologically augmented and the world as unconcealed gives evidence of this. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that the lifeworld – the world as it appears to us, with 
social and material structures of meaning, various relations, and with problems and solutions 
concerning these, is co-constituted by us and our available technology. A technology co-
constitute its own task because we discover a problem in light of the available problem-
solving strategies we have (also when we do not have any readily available strategies for 
dealing with a specific problem), without having any problem-solving strategies we would have no 
problems. 
The first step, then, was about constitution. However, to gain an insight into just how ‘the 
available’ technology does partake in the revealing, a second step had to be performed. In 
Chapter 4, I fleshed out in more detail exactly how the process of revealing (and the 
necessary concealing that goes along with it) is performed, in terms of technologically related 
input. In other words, Chapter 4 was mostly concerned with how we should conceptualize 
the contribution from technology in the revealing of the world. Because such a revealing 
is no mere uncovering of something that is already there, pre-defined, I called what is 
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unconcealed an articulation, thereby displaying the productive effort by the constituted 
technological action. Consequently, how we perceive and know the world is an 
articulation, related to the possibilities we have of acting in it, that is, our actual and 
potential practical space. 
Concluding Part 1, the main feat of technology as a phenomenon is the upgrading of our 
practical space that it represents. This, I claim, is an aspect that belongs to all 
technologies, ‘big’ and ‘small’, ‘near-transparent’ and ‘near-opaque’, ‘habitually used’ or 
‘hardly used’. It is, in other words, the meaning of technology. Just how each piece, or type, 
of technologies actually does this, of course, is due to the specifics of each piece or type. 
The goal of my investigation into the meaning of technology has been precisely this, to 
display the manner in which technology as such influences the world we live in and at the 
same time provides an opening in the formulated meaning that does not cancel out 
specific effects and influences. In this sense, the general meaning of technology 
contextualizes the specific social praxes that surround any technology. By using the general 
meaning as the backdrop for empirical studies of technologies’ effects we are better 
equipped to understand the changes that come in the wake of a single type, or a cluster of 
technologies. Specific trajectories themselves, for instance how mobile phones incite a 
developmental trajectory, are a task for historians and sociologists et al, but that mobile 
phones afford a trajectory is the philosophical contribution to technology studies that 
Part 1 has clarified. 
However, as we have seen, a technological action is co-constituted by the technology 
involved, the user(s) and social aspects, such as praxes, conventions, etc., in which the 
action is performed. The personal and social dimensions also contribute to those aspects 
that we have discussed so far, but these dimensions have not yet been discussed. To 
understand the meaning of technology involves understanding those aspects that work in 
tandem with technology as well. Moreover, what concepts of self and intersubjectivity are 
required for the theory of technology developed in Part 1? The meaning of technology as 
it was developed in Part 1 has profound effects on the notion of the self: If technologies 
were mere instruments, technologies would contribute nothing interesting to the 
constitution of the self. However, if technological actions are genuine upgrades of our 
practical space rather than extensions of our bodies, the self is transformed radically in 
technological presence; technologies co-constitute our future selves. 
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The relation between the self and its practical space is investigated through two lines of 
inquiry. First, we need to see the self as something that indeed has an opening towards 
intersubjective influences such as those coming from others and from technology. If we 
see the self as shaped by its surroundings, what notion of the self underlies such a view? 
And does that imply that the self is a mere result of its influences? Second, and most 
important, if we are to avoid the social determinism that threatens the first line of inquiry 
we need to develop a concept of the self that sees it as something that projects itself 
forward into its own possibilities. Self-theories, as we will see in Chapter 5, often concern 
the re-construction of the self from past experiences. However, my claim is that the self 
should (also) be understood in terms of the future.  
The first leg of the investigation might be seen as a requirement for the second leg to be performed 
at all. Only in attaching us to others and to things in our surroundings can we project 
ourselves forward in terms of having possibilities in our own lives. The main claim of Part 2 is 
that without a material and social embedment, we would not have the means through which we can project 
ourselves. This, then, is the most fundamental notion in which technologies co-constitute 
the self: through creating the actual and potential practical space in which the self finds its 
own possibilities. By this, technologies scaffold our self-understanding. 
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The self 
When Hume turned his gaze inwards he made a non-discovery philosophically almost as 
significant as Descartes’ discovery of the cogito. John Searle, upon discussing the self, even 
says that “[m]any contemporary philosophers… think that Hume had more or less the 
last word on this issue [the self]”. (2004:279) Famously, all Hume could find were 
occurrences of perceptions “which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and 
are in a perpetual flux and movement”. (1978:252) Hume’s refutation of the possibility to 
perceive the cogito was a consistent application of Descartes’ own naturalistically inclined 
investigation of nature and humans. Descartes, somewhat of a fierce naturalist himself 
through the absolute mechanization of res extensa, had left the cogito outside of his 
naturalization. Hume, on the other hand, included it, found it to be lacking the proper 
foundation (in impressions), and then eliminated it. 
More precisely, Hume compares the perception of the self to the perception of external 
objects, which, he claims, are of bundles of properties rather than things in themselves. If 
so, the self can be conceived as a bundle of perceptions. This implies that the self in some 
sense does exist, but can be compared to “a republic or commonwealth, in which the 
several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and 
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give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its 
parts” (Hume 1978:261) rather than to a body, a substance, or any persistent self-
sustaining thing. One way to think about the self after Hume is in terms of personality, or 
character, as something that has developed through one’s experiences, social class, 
friends, work, interests, and so on. Nobody has a self, in Descartes’ sense, but we are 
selves, nonetheless. 
Because of the varied influences on our personality, this kind of self can be approached 
and enlightened in a number of ways, and as such, it is investigated in many empirical 
disciplines, from religious studies via anthropology and psychology to neuroscience. My 
focus, however, will be on philosophical topics, but even here, the possible approaches 
are many and diverged in scope. Bermúdez et al. categorized the philosophical writings on 
the self into four: ontological (the nature of the self), phenomenological (the nature of our 
experiences of ourselves), epistemological (how to gain self-knowledge), and semantical (the 
reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’). (Eilan, Marcel, Bermúdez 1995:1) In addition, 
there is the question of personal identity: What are the criteria for saying that this person, 
observed at time A, is the same person observed at time B? Or even, what criteria do we 
ourselves employ when we perceive ourselves as being the same person at the two 
different times? The Cartesian cogito aside, the two main candidates for an answer to this 
question is psychological continuity and bodily continuity. John Locke’s theory 
emphasizes memory’s crucial role in creating the phenomenological feeling of personal 
identity, but psychological aspects also include our personality: values, interests, 
preferences, beliefs, etc. In line with a materialistic ontology, psychological continuity has 
recently been argued to be reducible to bodily, especially brain, continuity. (Shoemaker 
1963, Williams 1973) Since we normally do change gradually psychologically and 
physiologically, changes where the causal properties are well known do not pose any 
problems to the continuity-theory. But what would happen in case of sudden and drastic 
changes? 
Think of the French artist Orlan, who numerous times have undergone plastic surgery to 
alter radically her appearance for the sake of performance art. Orlan herself says she does 
this to “decry the social pressure placed on the human body, especially women’s bodies”.1 
Through all these operations, we would still say that she is the same person; it still is 
                                              
1 http://www.orlan.net/ [02.01.2009] 
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Orlan even if her physical appearance at certain times can be quite far from how she 
normally looks (and now her normal looks are quite different from how she looked 
before starting these performances as well). But what if something went awfully wrong 
during one of her plastic surgeries, and after recovery, she decides that her body 
alterations has only been foolishness, and that she wants to stop doing performances, 
enter a convent, and dedicate herself to religious matters? Would she then be the same 
person, or would we say that Orlan has changed so much that we do not recognize her 
anymore? She is not Orlan as we know Orlan. If this is so, why? Similar and more science 
fiction-like examples emphasize the importance of psychological continuity when we 
ascribe identity to a person. 1  We perceive not just a body, but also a body with a 
personality, and if this personality changes abruptly, it does not matter if the body is the 
same, we would not be willing to say that it is the same person. However, is it that simple? 
Would we not say that she is not the same? ‘She’ here evidently refers to the same person 
before and after the change. Rather than saying that Orlan-the-nun is a different person 
than Orlan-the-performance-artist, we would say that it is as if she is a different person. 
Disruptions and abrupt changes in a person’s psychology do not automatically make a 
person into a new person.  
In this chapter, I am going to discuss the self in a manner that will not respect the 
boundaries between, say, the epistemological and the ontological approaches. Further, I 
am going to discuss personal identity without an a priori definition of a proposed 
distinction between the self and the person. It is my contention that investigating the self 
within one of these distinctions, although enlightening in certain aspects, will ultimately 
obscure other, just as important aspects of the self. The self, in my mind, is not reducible 
to one specific phenomenon, disclosed either through bodily or psychological continuity, 
but is a many-faceted expression of various aspects, some that are expressed at some 
times, and others at other times. The self is an active and engaged participant in the 
world, that is, as a user of, a communicator in, and a constituter of the lifeworld, and 
more interestingly, is itself constituted through this activity. The approaches mentioned 
above are normally centred on intrinsic aspects; how is the self’s own perception of its 
continuity established. My approach is to think in extrinsic aspects; “what determines 
whether a person at one time and at another is the same person is not just how the two 
                                              
1 Thought experiments that envision body transfer, body dis-/reintegration, and all kinds of abnormal situations are 
commonly employed to single out the criterion for personal identity. As I am mainly interested in the normal sense of 
self and personal identity, I will not discuss many of those. 
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are physically and/or psychologically related to each other [the intrinsic view], but how 
they are related to everything else – especially everybody else”. (Martin & Barresi 2003:1) 
Extrinsic aspects are given a co-constituting role. However, to shun social and cultural 
determinist views of the self, intrinsic aspects are not eliminated. What interests me is the 
interdependent relation of the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects. In this sense, the intrinsic 
aspects are complemented with extrinsic ones, not replaced. So, what are the intrinsic 
aspects? In this chapter, I shall search for the defining characteristic of the self. What is 
the self, how can we know ourselves as selves, and, at a more fundamental level, do we 
know? In Chapter 6, I will proceed and explore more directly the interdependence of the 
intrinsic and extrinsic aspects. In the end, the self appears in its two-sidedness, the 
mineness of the conscious being, and the embedded self that is engaged in the world. 
The empirical self 
Hume’s empiricist predecessor, John Locke, came to a slightly different conclusion from 
Hume. While Descartes’ cogito was an immanent self, a remnant of the immaterial and 
immortal religious self of earlier times, Locke’s analysis, the “first ever, fully-fledged 
empirical account of self-constitution” (Martin & Barresi 2000:8), led him to postulate an 
empirical self. Locke identifies the self or person, as he prefers to speak of, 1  with 
consciousness, or more precisely reflexive consciousness. To be a person, then, is to be a: 
[T]hinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, 
the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that 
consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it 
being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. When 
we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is 
always as to our present sensations and perceptions: and by this every one is to himself that 
which he calls self. (Locke 1975:335) 
It is clear from what Locke says here that consciousness in itself is not sufficient for 
personal identity, that is, for an enduring self that transcends a mere conscious moment. 
Personal identity requires ‘sameness’ of consciousness over time. Therefore, in addition to 
self-reflexive consciousness, memory plays a pivotal role in the establishing of the identity 
of the person: “as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action 
or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person”. (Locke 1975:335) 
                                              
1 Locke does not always equate these two expressions. According to Martin and Barresi “Locke’s definition of 
person highlights that persons are thinkers and, as such, have reason, reflection, intelligence, and whatever else may 
be required for trans-temporal self-reference. His definition of self, on the other hand, highlights that selves are 
sensors and as such feel pleasure and pain, and are capable of happiness, misery and self-concern.” (Martin & Barresi 
2000:20) 
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Locke’s memory-founded view of personal identity has been met with a lot of criticism,1 
primarily because the theory is circular. It is hard to see what memory is if there is no 
personal identity there already: How else would we be able to tell that what is 
remembered ‘belongs’ to the same person that is having the present experience? Martin 
and Barresi argues that this is not a problem for Locke per se as it is not clear that he sets 
out to formulate a non-circular theory of personal identity anyway. Instead, they argue, 
the circularity of memory is implicated in the double reflexivity of consciousness. 
[W]hen you remember having had an experience or having performed an action, a 
reflexivity is involved which is similar to that which is involved when you are merely aware 
that, in the present, you are having an experience or performing an action. (Martin & 
Barresi 2000:17) 
If we are having, right now, an experience, we, through self-reflexivity, appropriate the 
experience, that is, we claim ownership of it; we are aware not only of an occurring 
experience, but also that it is we who are having the experience. By extension, when we 
remember an experience, we also remember our appropriation of that experience, not just 
that an experience has occurred. Hume, however, being just as consistent an empiricist as 
he was a naturalist, argued that the empiricist approach to consciousness (that Locke 
himself employed), rather discloses the self as a fiction, neither immaterial nor empirical; 
Hume simply could not find any entity called the self in his own fleeting perceptions. 
Therefore, such an appropriation is nothing but a fictional event. Locke, although 
naturalizing Descartes’ self, did not go far enough for Hume.2 
Hume is unimpressed by Locke’s application of the self-reflexivity of consciousness and 
memory to explain personal identity. Remembering an experience is, for Hume, not much 
different from having an experience. To compare two experiences, now-experiences or 
remembered ones, and claim an identity relation between them is mistaken because 
“identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them 
together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their 
ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them”. (Hume 1878:260) 
                                              
1 See Perry 1975:135ff for a review of weaknesses and strengths of memory-founded self-theories. This is not, for 
me, the most interesting aspect of Locke’s theory, so I will not concern myself further with it. 
2 Martin & Barresi mentions that Locke, as he was a deeply religious man, had practical concerns in his theory of 
personal identity; he needed a self that was responsible for its actions, and therefore “accountable for their thoughts 
and deeds, and, hence, appropriate subjects for the distribution of rewards and punishments”. (2000:18f) Gilbert 
Ryle, in discussing the early modern concept of the self, in effect says the same thing, describing both the Cartesian 
and the Lockean selves as “transformed application[s] of the Protestant notion of conscience”. (1949:159) Indeed, it 
can be argued that practical concerns permeate Locke’s entire epistemology considering how engaged he was in 
political and educational matters. 
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For Hume, memory of past experiences and the uniting of these into an identity-relation, 
can no more disclose a self than what was present in the original experiences. The 
subsequent appropriation of an experience that was so important for Locke would be 
problematic for similar reasons. Appropriation presupposes an objectification of the 
original experience. Considering the problem of circularity; “awareness that the presented 
object was φ would not tell one that one was oneself φ, unless one had [already] identified 
the object as oneself” (Shoemaker 1984:105), this will merely shift the level of the 
investigation; we will have to ‘look for’ the self at a higher level. Hume’s reply would 
probably be something along these lines: “I never can catch myself at any time without a 
perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.” (Hume 1978:252) To 
introduce a level of self-reflexivity would only be begging the question. I shall return later 
to the problems of the objectification of experiences as an explanation of the self. 
Me, myself and I 
Despite what Searle indicates in the quote above, Hume’s denial of Descartes’ and 
Locke’s selves has not been the end of the discourse of the self, and any theory 
proclaiming the disappearance of the self has several concerns to address. For one thing, 
the concept is still importantly present. Even if we do not acknowledge the self as 
something other and above the body, we still cannot talk about an experience without 
positing a subject of that experience, a ‘you’ or a ‘she’, or an ‘I’, because it is, as Gilbert 
Ryle puts it, “improper to speak of my eyes seeing this, or my nose smelling that; we 
would say, rather, that I see this, or I smell that”. (1949:168) However, this particular use 
of language should not lead us to think that the subject of the sentence denotes a self, a 
‘ghost in the machine’ as Ryle dubs the Cartesian cogito. (1949:15f) To understand words 
about the states of mind of a person – beliefs, motives, intentions and so on – to mean 
that these words signify an independent mental realm where the states are located is a 
category mistake, Ryle says, a misunderstanding of the logics involved. Ryle’s famous 
example in this respect is a first-time visiting professor to Oxford or Cambridge who is 
given the tour, sees the colleges, the libraries, museums and the administration, etc., and 
then asks, ‘But, where is the University?’ The mistake is to think that ‘the University’ is a 
concept that belongs to the same logical category as the other words (College, libraries, 
etc.) when it in fact is an abstraction, used to describe the workings of the other units. 
Logically, ‘the University’ is of a higher order than the other words. If one, however, 
thinks that the University is of the same logical category, but is not to be found, one 
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might, as John Heil puts it, “come to imagine that the entity in question is ‘non-material’’. 
(1998:60) 
Hume had already suggested that “the nice and subtile questions concerning personal 
identity…are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties”. 
(Hume 1978:262)1 Ryle continues, and reformulates the problem of the self into a fully-
fledged problem about language. He claims there are several peculiarities in language that 
creates the category mistake. All people, philosophers and nonprofessionals alike, 
according to Ryle, think of ‘I’ as a proper name, and hence ask what or whom it is a name 
of. In reality it is an index word, contextually bound, pointing to the bodily being that 
utters it (and likewise with ‘you’ and ‘he’). This is somewhat common sense, of course, 
and frankly presupposes what Ryle sets out to do, namely, the disappearance of the ghost 
in the machine. If ‘I’ is an index that points to what is only a bodily being it must be 
because this bodily being is conceived as not ‘containing’ a ghost in the machine. 
Nevertheless, Ryle’s aim is to show that this way of talking confuses us: ‘I’ is mysterious 
because of the way we talk. The mystification of ‘I’, and why we tend to think of ‘I’ as 
being more than a mere index, is due to a dissymmetry between different occurrences of 
‘I’ and related words:  
In the sentence ‘I am warming myself before the fire’, the word ‘myself’ could be replaced 
by ‘my body’ without spoiling the sense; but the pronoun ‘I’ could not be replaced by ‘my 
body’ without making nonsense… It makes perfect sense to say that I caught myself just 
beginning to dream, but not that I caught my body beginning to dream, or that my body 
caught me doing so. (Ryle 1949:189f) 
Therefore, we tend to think of ‘I’ as being something else, and somehow something extra 
to our body, as denoting something we ourselves do not easily grab. Even small children 
notice this linguistic peculiarity, which generates a feeling of the ‘I’ as something elusive, 
something mystifying. As such, we can 
catch only its coat-tails. Like the shadow of one’s head, it will not wait to be jumped on. 
And yet it is never far ahead; indeed, sometimes it seems not to be ahead of the pursuer at 
all. It evades capture by lodging itself inside the very muscles of the pursuer. It is too near 
even to be within arm’s reach. (Ryle 1949:186) 
‘I’ displays in this sense the same kind of elusiveness that contextually bound indexical 
expressions like ‘here’ and ‘now’ does. The moment you say ‘now,’ it is, in a sense, already 
                                              
1 Barry Stroud claims that Hume later was dissatisfied with his own account of the self. (1977:127f) Exactly why, 
according to Stroud, is hard to say, but he seemed to hold his principles (of resemblance and causation) as not being 
sufficient. The quote concerning the role of grammar indicates that Hume perhaps wanted to look at extrinsic 
mechanisms for the full story of personal identity. 
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‘later’ (remember Heraclitus). We cannot grab the now-state as an experienced now-state, 
but only through making it a topic for attention, and thereby objectifying it. This is how 
the ‘I’ functions as well. Instead of it naming a cogito, Ryle explains the elusiveness of ‘I’ 
with a difference in logical force of the occurrences of the index. Sometimes ‘I’ is used 
simply to refer, as in, ‘I am sitting in my office writing on my computer’. Other times the 
index is a comment on the simple reference, as in ‘I suddenly found myself sitting in my 
office just staring at the wall’. Logically the last occurrence is equal to remembering that ‘I 
was in my office yesterday’, or critically assessing what I did there, ‘today I couldn’t get 
any work done in my office’, or any other reflecting commentary on my own activity. In 
other words, ‘I’ is often used in a higher order sense, as a meta-occurrence: “To try, for 
example, to describe what one has just done, or is now doing, is to comment upon a step 
which is not itself… one of commenting.” (Ryle 1949:195) It is necessary to see that 
certain occurrences of ‘I’ are due to a higher-level activity. To attain this level, we need to 
step out of the lower, immediate, level, objectify it, and thereby making it a topic for this 
higher order act of description, the comment, in Ryle’s words. This, then, is the 
grammatical reason for the confusion. 
Had Ryle acknowledged consciousness, he might have had a Lockean theory of the self, 
using consciousness’ inherent reflective character as the explanation. Ryle’s account for 
the reflexivity, however, goes in a different direction, employing familiar behaviouristic 
themes of observing and learning (and language). The development of the self, then, 
requires the ability to objectify not just others but also oneself (in an analogue fashion to 
how Locke’s reflexive self-consciousness objectifies the primary experience by 
appropriating it). Further, and a much stronger criterion, objectifying oneself is dependent 
on objectifying others. According to Ryle, in adolescence we prime our higher order acts 
by learning the connection between, on the one hand, the behaviour of others and 
oneself, and on the other hand, observing how this behaviour generates various sorts of 
response. The development of the higher order standpoints against others are, however, a 
complex process, as can be gathered from some of the examples Ryle gives: 
Higher order actions… can be done efficiently or inefficiently, appropriately or 
inappropriately, intelligently or stupidly. Children have to learn how to perform them. They 
have to learn how to resist, parry and retaliate, how to forestall, give way and co-operate, 
how to exchange and haggle, reward and punish. They have to learn to make jokes against 
others and to see some jokes against themselves, to obey orders and give them, make 
requests and grant them, receive marks and award them. They have to learn to compose 
and follow reports, descriptions and commentaries; to understand and to give criticism, to 
accept, reject, correct and compose verdicts, catechise and be catechised. Not least (and 
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also not soonest) they have to learn to keep to themselves things which they are inclined to 
divulge. Reticence is of a higher order than unreticence. (1949:193) 
Learning how to direct higher order acts towards others turns at a certain stage into the 
trick of directing the higher order acts onto oneself. We apply the language we have 
acquired for commenting others onto ourselves; we discover, as Ryle puts it, “how to play 
both roles at once”. (Ryle 1949:193) We become, at the same time, both the doer and the 
critic. Furthermore, says Ryle, there are no higher-order acts that cannot themselves be 
attended to by other higher-order acts, the critic can himself be criticised. 
Retrospection 
The self as a critic, and the role of critic made possible through being a language-user, is 
that Ryle’s theory made short?1 A critic, however, can be wrong in his assessments, and he 
can judge another person out of the wrong reasons all together. Surely, this cannot be the 
case for the ‘criticism’ of ‘I’. Nevertheless, it does seem to be the implication of the 
theory. Ryle confirms this, “[m]y reports on myself are subject to the same kinds of 
defects as are my reports on you, and the admonitions, corrections and injunctions which 
I impose on myself may show me to be as ineffectual or ill-advised as does my 
disciplining of others.” (1949:194) For Ryle, it is a mistake to think of self-consciousness 
(or simply, consciousness) as being wholly transparent, something we know either 
subjectively and privileged through introspection, or immediately through the ‘inner light’ 
of consciousness.2 This kind of theory, which Ryle calls the ‘theory of Privileged Access’, 
implies a dichotomy between the first- and the third-person perspective that creates a 
dissymmetry between our knowledge of others and that of ourselves; about our thoughts 
and our experiences we cannot be mistaken, while about others… well, it is fairly obvious 
that we can be wrong about the mental life of other people. 
However, can we be wrong about our own mental life, our own thoughts and 
experiences? Ryle thinks so: 
[T]here is no contradiction in asserting that someone might fail to recognise his frame of 
mind for what it is; indeed, it is notorious that people constantly do so. They mistakenly 
suppose themselves to know things which are actually false; they deceive themselves about 
                                              
1 Although, the way Ryle presents this, it seems to me that language is not necessary. Non-linguistic meta-behaviour 
towards one’s peers is frequent in other species. What is the addendum that makes it possible to turn this into a 
meta-behaviour towards oneself? Is this aspect inherent in language itself? I can find no clear account of this in Ryle. 
2 These two different methods of knowing the content of one’s consciousness are given a parallel treatment in The 
Concept of Mind, see subdivisions (2) and (3) in Chapter 6. Here I will focus on Ryle’s arguments against introspection, 
but later I will argue for a sort of immediacy, and then touch upon arguments similar to Ryle’s. 
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their own motives; they are surprised to notice the clock stopping ticking, without their 
having, as they think, been aware that it had been ticking; they do not know that they are 
dreaming, when they are dreaming, and sometimes they are not sure that they are 
dreaming, when they are awake; and they deny, in good faith, that they are irritated or 
excited, when they are flustered in one or other of those ways. (1949:162) 
Furthermore, we think we know ourselves pretty well, but often fail to predict our own 
reactions to something even when we know that something will happen and are prepared 
for it. If Ryle is right about this, we can be introspectively wrong. Examples of this is not 
hard to come by, for instance, we might be unable to predict our actual reactions to the 
death of a loved one after a period of sickbed. Or, less dramatic, when we are watching a 
horror movie we can predict correctly what will happen if a person goes into an 
abandoned house, but are frightened anyway. Neither do we have full introspective access 
to our mental life; if we go into a state of panic, or raging fury (or a temporary state of 
insanity), we do not have introspective access to the mental state we are in unless we 
interrupt the state itself. The objectification of a state of this kind involved in 
introspection runs counter to being in it. 
However, we can examine these kinds of states after the fact. In fact, Ryle claims that 
introspection in general is more like retrospection. Not only for special cases like those 
mentioned, but in general. On the privileged access based definition of introspection (as 
some sort of synchronic or simultaneous inner perception1) we would have to attend to 
two states at the same time; the state I introspectively attend to, and that which this state 
intentionally is directed at. For instance, if I think that I really like this particular sound of 
the guitar, I must attend, at the same time, to the sound, and to my liking of it. Now, this 
is not a problem in itself, as Ryle mentions, many people can drive a car and keep a 
conversation going at the same time. However, I should also be able to find out, 
introspectively, that I introspect my liking of the guitar-sound, i.e. a triple holding. In fact, 
this is necessary in order to find out whether I like the sound in the first place; the first 
state representing the sound, the second state represents my liking it, and the third 
making me introspectively aware of my liking of it, and so on. However, to avoid an 
infinite regress – and also pragmatically if we are going to act on the introspective 
knowledge – there must be a limited number of simultaneously attended states. If this is 
so, there must be some mental states that are not open to introspection, namely the last 
introspective state that introspects all the other states. Now, if it is possible that this last 
                                              
1 D.M. Armstrong (1993) holds a theory of self-knowledge that requires perception-like introspection. 
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introspective state occurs without ‘anyone’ introspectively attending it, “it would follow 
that a person’s knowledge of his own mental processes could not always be based on 
introspection”, which suggests, “if this knowledge does not always rest on introspection, 
it is open to question whether it ever does”. (Ryle 1949:165) A further complication is 
that the original ‘fact’ attended to, namely the guitar sound, would have to be featured in 
all these introspective states, which means that it is first doubled, then tripled, and so on. 
The same goes for all the content in all the states, it would have to be represented in every 
state introspecting another . 
According to Ryle, to think of self-knowledge as an act of retrospection will have several 
advantages over introspection. For one, it seems to fit well with certain expressions; ‘I 
caught myself thinking about…’ is now conceived as an act on par with suddenly realising 
that I’ve been picking my nose in public, and the expression will have the same truth 
criteria as ‘I caught myself picking my nose while standing in the grocery line’. Moreover, 
phenomenologically, this seems to be in accordance with some mental events, we often 
fail to notice states and events of which we nevertheless can say or know about ourselves 
in hindsight. I can for instance suddenly realize that I am feeling very hot, and have been 
for quite a while, when somebody opens up the door making a draft in the room. If self-
consciousness were based upon monitoring mental events through introspection, 
unattended mental events would be lost.1 
Further, the retrospective approach brings what we refer to as the mind out of its private 
subjective realm. I know my mind through the same kind of clues that I know somebody 
else’s. This does not entail that everything is out in the open: that we cannot but disclose 
everything that goes on in our mind, or that a feigned mental state has to be granted 
genuineness. It is no more mysterious that a person cannot overhear another person’s 
thought (Ryle conceives thought primarily as silent monologue) than his difficulty in 
reading his locked diary (or if it is written in cipher). The quietness of thinking must not 
lead us to believe that it is exercised in an inaccessible subjective realm. Instead, “keeping 
our thoughts to ourselves is a sophisticated accomplishment”. (Ryle 1949:27) A case in 
point for Ryle, reading without reading aloud was not practised until the Middle Ages.2  
                                              
1 But it does not rule out that I, at some level, was aware of feeling hot, even though I was not self-conscious about it 
the way introspection requires. Now, just what this level is, I do not think Ryle can, or want to, answer. However, 
mineness is a suggestion, as we shall see below. 
2 Ryle cites no reference for this assertion, but he might have had St. Augustine in mind, who, in his Confessions, tells 
of his wonderment upon seeing Bishop Ambrose refreshing his mind by reading, “[b]ut when he was reading, his eye 
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We can, on Ryle’s theory, still hide our thoughts, and still exaggerate, or fake, our pain, to 
gain sympathy from on-lookers, or some desired extra comfort from a loved one. The 
methods and, foremost, the perspective from which we observe our own mind, is, 
however, basically the same whether it is ourselves, or somebody else’s mind we are 
concerned about. The differences between knowledge of my mind and that of any other 
are “differences of degree, not of kind”. (Ryle 1949:179) The reason we are less surprised 
by the workings of our own mind than we do by another person’s is not due to our 
subjectivistic knowledge of ourselves, but to the degree of intimacy that we know 
ourselves. The better we know a person, the less surprised we become by this person’s 
actions and thoughts and opinions, and we do get to know ourselves pretty well after 
some time (but, as mentioned, not perfectly). Our friends and lovers surprise us less by 
time than at the beginning of our relationships. The cleverness of the famous joke about 
the two behaviourists just having engaged in sexual intercourse, whereupon one of them 
says, ‘that was good for you – how was it for me’, somehow falls short of Ryle’s case.1 
Substituting introspection with retrospection is a neat move, but what exactly is gained by 
it? Both the introspective and the retrospective approach, and Locke’s reflexive theory of 
the self, are higher-order approaches to the self; they presuppose an objectification of the 
primary conscious state to be able to say anything at all about it. It is higher-order in the 
sense that they require a higher, or more advanced, cognitive ability than being conscious 
requires. On a higher-order approach, we must take ourselves as objects, either 
synchronically (through introspection) or diachronically (through retrospection), if we are 
to know anything about ourselves. However, by taking ourselves as objects, we create a 
subject-object relation to the state under investigation, which means that we will not be 
aware of ourselves as an ‘I’, but as a ‘him’ or ‘it’. How are we ever to become acquainted 
with the ‘I’ through a higher-order kind of relation? 
                                                                                                                                             
glided over the pages, and his heart searched out the sense, but his voice and tongue were at rest”. (Augustine 
1999:98) St. Augustine was not sure why the Bishop read silently, but pondered whether it was to avoid interruption 
from listeners who wanted him to elaborate on something he read and thereby losing valuable refreshing time, or if it 
was of the more practical matter of sparing his voice. 
1 Without holding the logical behaviourism of Ryle, it can still be argued for the usefulness of making thoughts 
public in order to improve our own cognizing. For example, and almost trivial, how we explicate and externalize the 
mathematical problem of, say 243x341, to gain both accuracy and speed to the calculation; even if it could have been 
done ‘in the head’. Other times we can ourselves become aware of both strengths and weaknesses of an argument by 
articulating our thoughts, written or orally, on a matter. Both these examples are of an externalization of an internal 
process, but it is quite possible that we, at an earlier stage depended on an internalization of an external process to be able to 
do these in the head at all.  
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Furthermore, in the process, we also lose sight of the subject, or to use a slightly more 
impartial word, the agent doing the objectification. The agent’s focus will be directed 
towards the objectified state, and if we are to be aware of ourselves as this agent, the 
objectifier must itself become the object in a new act of objectification. In the case of 
introspection, and this applies to self-reflexivity as well, we saw that this leads either into 
an infinite regress or to the non-introspectivity/non-self-reflexivity of the final state. In 
the case of retrospection, we are faced with a similar problem. If we only are 
retrospectively aware of ourselves, how do we know this? The answer is, of course, 
through retrospection. We can only become aware of our retrospective awareness of 
ourselves through a further act of retrospection. To avoid this kind of infinite regress, the 
objectification has to stop somewhere, and then we would be left with an objectification 
that itself is not objectified, in this case a retrospection that itself is not retrospected but 
still is conscious, which makes me want to ask Ryle if it is not then ‘open to question 
whether it ever does’. 
The subject-use of ‘I’ 
Ryle’s remarks about the self’s non-solipsistic nature are interesting, and as I will explore 
in the following chapter, this is a central aspect in embedded theories of the self. What we 
think of as the self is not an elusive, hidden, innate entity, but is dependent on its 
surroundings. This includes our fellow humans, but also humankind’s evolutionary 
history, our culture and social life, our theories and sciences of ourselves, and of course, 
as has already been suggested in Part 1, technology. Whatever the self is, or who it is, it is 
an embedded self. However, the main problem with Ryle’s theory, what leads him into 
the higher-order ‘trap’, is his unwillingness to analyse the ‘I’ in terms of the first person 
perspective. Instead, he opts for an elimination of this perspective, saying that we know 
ourselves through the same perceptual means as he takes our knowledge of other subjects 
to be, that is, through a third-person perspective. Ryle’s approach will then inevitably 
overlook the subjectivity of any conscious experience. This makes his approach, in my 
mind, run contrary to the phenomenology of being a subject, an agent, an ‘I’. 
Primarily, this is due to his conception of how the ‘I’ refers; ‘I’ refers to a retrospectively 
objectified mental state. As we saw, the referring, that is the talk about oneself, can be 
erroneous. But Ryle overlooks, or cannot accept given his largely behaviouristic approach, 
that there are two different uses of ‘I’. Ludwig Wittgenstein claims that ‘I’ can be both as 
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an object, and as a subject.1 (1960:66f) Examples of the first case are ‘I am riding a 
wheelchair’, ‘I clearly remember my reaction when Vegard Heggem scored Rosenborg’s 
winning goal against Milan in 1996’, ‘I am the King of the Universe’, or Wittgenstein’s 
own example: ‘My arm is broken’. In all these examples, it is obvious that I can be wrong. 
I might hallucinate that I am in a wheelchair, when in fact I am lying in bed with a grave 
attack of the flu. I might remember mistakenly about the game, perhaps I did not even 
see it, but having been told so many stories about this goal and having it described vividly 
how it felt for others I have started to believe that I saw it myself.2 Further, I might have 
gone into one of those rare psychological disorders described by Oliver Sachs (1997), and 
live under the illusion that I am King of the Universe, when in fact I am not. 
Wittgenstein’s example is the man who has been in an accident, feels a pain in his arm, 
sees a broken arm at his side, and mistakes it for his own, when in fact it is his 
neighbour’s arm – his own being only slightly injured. In this case, my observations about 
myself are structurally similar to those observations and judgements others make of me, 
and will likewise be based on limited and therefore fallible evidence. Wittgenstein says 
that in such cases, it is a question of making a statement, passing a judgement, about a 
particular person; it could be he, or she, but as it is, this time it is about me. There is no 
guarantee of truth in this kind of judgment. Sydney Shoemaker refers to this as ‘reference 
with identification,’ which is fallible because it involves assigning a property to someone 
or something. (Shoemaker 1994:82) Assigning, in this sense, is a process that is based on 
observations and assumptions, and consequently on imperfect evidence. Therefore, it will 
only be reasonable to ask me, if I said any of the things above, whether I am really sure 
about them; ‘are you sure you are the King of the Universe, or could this be 
misunderstanding?’, ‘are you sure about the game…, weren’t you on holiday in the Alps 
then’, and so on. 
In cases of subject-use of ‘I’, such follow-up questions would only sound strange. The 
subject-use are displayed in sentences like ‘I am in pain’, ‘I see red’, ‘I feel happy’, and so 
on. In such cases, the way Wittgenstein sees it; there are no possibilities of an 
identification error, because the use of ‘I’ is not the outcome of a process of 
identification, but is equal to spontaneous outbursts: 
To ask ‘are you sure it’s you who have pains?’ would be non-sensical… it is as impossible 
that in making the statement ‘I have a toothache’ I should have mistaken another person 
                                              
1 It might be more correct to say that Ryle eliminates the subject-use, by claiming that it is in fact an object-use. 
2 However, I did see the game, and I do remember my reaction! 
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for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else with me. 
To say, ‘I have pain’ is no more a statement about a particular person than moaning is. 
(Wittgenstein 1960:67) 
Wittgenstein agrees with Ryle that the thought of a cogito arises due to linguistic 
peculiarities, and consequently is a fallacy. However, due to the distinction between these 
two uses of ‘I’, he does not share Ryle’s exclusive referential theory. Like Ryle, he points 
out that ‘I’ (in subject-uses) cannot be replaced with body, and therefore seems to refer to 
“something bodiless, which, however, has its seat in our body”. (Wittgenstein 1960:69) 
Rather than blaming this on a category mistake made in the act of referring, subject-use 
does not refer at all, but, as already mentioned, is akin to a non-referring, non-fallible 
outburst.1 
Shoemaker stresses that one should not understand Wittgenstein’s distinction to imply 
that subject-uses of ‘I’ are incorrigible in content. Rather, “they are immune to a certain sort 
of error: they are immune to error due to a misrecognition of a person”. (Shoemaker 
1994:81) It is, however, not clear why this immunity should be restricted to subject-use. 
Even on the object-use of ‘I’, as in the instance I mistake my neighbour’s broken arm for 
mine, I do not mistake myself for someone else, but I mistake an object, an arm, for being 
my arm, my ‘object’ (Glock and Hacker 1996:100, cf. Bakhurst 2001:232). Nevertheless, 
this suggests the presence of an unmistakeable ‘me’ even in object-uses of ‘I’. This ‘me’, as 
will be clear as this chapter proceeds, can be said to be an unmediated, implicit, self-
awareness that follows every use of ‘I’.  
The main problem with basing self-awareness on object-uses of ‘I’, which then, as we will 
see below, extends to all higher-order theories of the self, is its reliance on a kind of 
perception. As mentioned, the self, or awareness of oneself as a self, will then be 
dependent on an identification process, which we saw earlier leads to the possibility of an 
infinite regress. Even if one accepted this regress in principle, or develops a 
counterargument, one critical question will remain; how is identification in this case at all 
possible? As Shoemaker points out, if we are to recognize something as something, we 
must know this something to include properties that are true of it, but not of anything 
                                              
1 In the The Blue Book, Wittgenstein seems to accept that object-use refers, but in Philosophical Investigations, due to his 
praxis-based theory of meaning, no use of ‘I’ is said to refer. I will not go into that here, but it could be argued that 
the dilemma between ‘referring-therefore-fallible’ and ‘not fallible-therefore-not referring’ is a consequence of 
accepting a Fregean theory of meaning, where the reference of a statement is its truth-value. Critics of Wittgenstein 
have argued for the fallibility of ‘I’-utterances, and thereby claimed that ‘I’ after all do refer. (Glock and Hacker 
1996:95) If one does not accept the Fregean theory, however, as the case with the later Wittgenstein is, one is not 
committed to the dilemma.  
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else. Normally an identification process based on this criterion should not pose a 
problem. If for instance I should search for my coffee cup in my office, I search for 
something that has the properties that I know is true of my coffee cup; something I know 
about it that makes it conspicuous in my otherwise untidy office. When it comes to 
identifying me-as-objectified, however, the process is not as straightforward. “Identifying 
something as oneself would have to involve… finding something to be true of it that one 
independently knows to be true of oneself, i.e. something that identifies it as oneself”. 
(Shoemaker 1994:86) That is, if I am to know that the objectified ‘I’ is me, I must know 
something about myself before I can confirm positively that the observed ‘I’ is indeed me! 
For instance, if my realization that I am in pain is dependent on me observing myself 
being in pain, I must know beforehand that I am in pain. How can I know that without 
somehow already being acquainted with myself? Objectification of the self, it seems, does 
not suffice to explain self-awareness. Note that this does not imply that knowledge of 
oneself as an object is not possible, or is weak or false knowledge of any kind, but rather 
that “perceptual [objectifying] self-knowledge presupposes non-perceptual self-
knowledge, so not all self-knowledge can be perceptual”. (Shoemaker 1984:105) In other 
words, I can recognize my body as my body, only because I already possess self-
awareness: 
[I]f asked what it means to call a body ‘my body’, I could say something like this: ‘My body 
is the body from whose eyes I see, the body whose mouth emits sounds when I speak, the 
body whose arm goes up when I raise my arm, the body that has something pressing 
against it when I feel pressure, and so on.’ All the uses of ’I’ that occur in this explanation 
of the meaning of the phrase ‘my body’, which in turn can be used to explicate the use ‘as 
object’ of the first-person pronouns…, are themselves uses ’as subject’. (Shoemaker 
1994:92) 
The essence of this argument is that basing self-awareness on an objectifying process 
leads to the same problem of circularity that I mentioned in connection with Locke’s 
theory of the appropriation of the conscious experience. For something to be mine, I have 
to possess an awareness of a me, and as should now be clear, an earlier instance of a 
higher order observation, that is, an objectifying process, cannot act as the source of this 
awareness. This is quite straightforward. If one explains self-awareness not by ‘looking 
for’ it at the level of conscious experience (whatever such a level is, see below), but by 
introducing another level saying that in order to become self-conscious the conscious 
experience must be taken as an object, what exactly is the self-awareness on the second 
level, from ‘where’ does it come? Introducing a second level would only shift the level of 
explanation. Further, what exactly is an experience if it is not a conscious experience? 
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Moreover, can we be conscious without being aware that we are conscious, that is, can we 
be conscious without some sort of self-consciousness? To avoid the question begging 
circularity, Wittgenstein/Shoemaker introduces something we, in accordance with Zahavi 
(2006:8), could call a notion of a minimal self. Whatever the minimal self is,1 it is regarded 
as a necessary foundation for higher-order functions of the mind, such as introspection. 
Higher-order theories of (self-) consciousness 
We have seen several reasons for being sceptical to theories about the self that requires a 
kind of reflection or monitoring of one’s conscious state. Ryle rejected introspection, 
while we saw reasons for claiming that his own solution, retrospection, in a similar 
manner objectifies consciousness. Both theories regard self-consciousness in terms of 
reflection, and to be self-aware is to be aware of what we are aware, either immediately 
(Locke) or in retrospect (Ryle). Consequently, in order to become self-conscious, we must 
enter into a relation to our own conscious states. Self-consciousness is, in this sense, 
extrinsic to consciousness. As we saw, this leads to number of objections relating to the 
risk of infinite regress, the difference between objective and subjective kinds of self-
acquaintance, and the criteria for saying that anything monitored or reflected on is indeed 
me. 
We can find a variant of the extrinsic approach in the recent higher order theories of 
consciousness (HOTC).2 For short, these claim, “what makes a mental state M conscious 
is not some difference in M’s intrinsic properties but the relational fact that M is 
accompanied by a higher-order state whose intentional content is that one is in M”. (Van 
Gulick 2006:12) In other words, to become conscious, we not only have to be in a state 
(for instance, having ‘thirst’), we need to have an awareness of being in that state (‘I am 
thirsty’). This awareness is a higher-order mental state directed at the lower level state 
(sometimes called first-order state). This might sound an awful lot like Locke and Ryle’s 
theories, but instead of claiming that consciousness is because the higher-order state is 
conscious, it is held that it is the mental state M itself that becomes conscious when it is 
taken as an object by the higher-order state; the awareness relation makes the first-order 
                                              
1 Shoemaker and Zahavi disagree on this. While Shoemaker holds a functionalist theory (see 1984), Zahavi holds a 
phenomenological approach. (1999, 2005) 
2 As will become clear soon, extrinsic in this kind of approach does not mean extrinsic to the organism but extrinsic 
to the mental state that is held to be conscious. 
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state conscious.1 Thus, one avoids the danger of infinite regress that threatens both Locke 
and Ryle; since the higher-order state itself is not conscious there is no need to postulate 
yet another state being conscious of that one, and so on. The first-order state becomes 
intransitively conscious by being taken as an object for the higher-order awareness. The 
higher-order state is transitive and we are therefore not usually conscious of this state. 
However, the higher-order state itself becomes conscious when it is taken as object by a 
‘third-order’ state directing its awareness to it. This happens when we, for instance, reflect 
on our own consciousness (‘I am unusually thirsty today’). Because one is conscious only 
if one is aware of being in a certain state, consciousness and self-consciousness go 
together in the higher-order theories. (Rosenthal 1997:744f, 2005a:34) Consciousness and 
self-consciousness is due to the relation between the two mental states. 
The strength of HOTC is that it supports the widely held notion that while our mind 
consists of many mental states, only a few of them are conscious. (Rosenthal 2005a:21) 
Furthermore, a mental state need not be conscious all the time, in the sense of being 
attended to. For instance, a friend of mine, A, ask me if I remember the phone number to 
our mutual friend B. I reply that I do, and give B’s phone number to A. A couple of 
minutes later, A again approaches me, excuses himself for having forgotten the phone 
number before he came around to dial it, and asks me for it once again. I recollect it, and 
give it to A. Now, it seems likely that even though I was not conscious of the number in 
the meantime, it was still represented as a mental state, albeit as an unconscious one.2 If 
consciousness had been intrinsic to the mental state representing the phone number, I 
could not have helped being conscious of it in the meantime. In fact, if consciousness was 
intrinsic to the mental states that have the potential for being conscious, I should be, at all 
times, conscious of those mental states that have this intrinsic consciousness-ingredient. 
With HOTC, there is no necessary link between a mental state and us being conscious of 
it. In explaining consciousness in terms of (the relation of) non-conscious mental states, 
HOTC has the same attraction as functionalistic theories of the mind, which explain 
intelligent behaviour in terms of (the relation of) non-intelligent processes.3 
                                              
1 Roughly, there are two different views about the nature of the awareness relation, either the higher-order state 
monitors the lower level one, perceptual-like, or it is a thought about it, conceptual-like. (Van Gulick 2006:12) In either 
case, the higher-order state represents the lower level state. 
2 For several examples of non-conscious mental states, see Rosenthal 1997:731f) 
3 HOTC implies that a state’s being conscious, rather than unconscious, makes no causal difference on behaviour 
and cognition. According to Hardcastle, however, this runs counter to what is empirically known about these two 
kinds of mental states. (2004:283f) 
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In HOTC, self-consciousness is not a matter of finding the proper relation between 
consciousness and self-consciousness, but it is still a matter of a relation, namely between 
two mental states. The higher-order theory, then, still postulates the reason for the first-
order state to become conscious as being extrinsic to the state itself. This means that a 
higher-order theory, although it can shrug off objections of infinite regress, still struggles 
with some other problems. For instance, there are many unconscious phenomena that we 
are aware of, for instance, such objects as rocks, chairs, books, paper clips, and so on, but 
these objects do not become conscious only because we are conscious of them, so “why 
should having such a thought or perception of a mental object transform it into a 
conscious one?” (Van Gulick 2004:72) This is a very basic question, of course, as it 
touches upon the issue of the conscious versus the non-conscious, and how physical 
objects or systems at all can be conscious. 
An obvious reply would be to hold that there is a difference between the physical ‘outer’ 
object that I perceive, and the mental state that becomes conscious when being taken as 
an object of higher-order awareness. However, the proponents of HOTC are excluded 
from saying that there is something special about the first-order mental state that makes 
it, but not the chair, conscious. To say something along these lines would be to re-enter 
intrinsic properties into the mental state in question, and the main achievement of HOTC 
is precisely that it renders intrinsic properties superfluous, as Rosenthal has argued 
extensively. (1997, 2005a, 2005b) Nevertheless, it seems that this is exactly what 
Rosenthal does when he claims that the objection results from a presumption that 
consciousness is intrinsic to mental states: 
Being transitively conscious of a mental state does in a sense make it intransitively 
conscious. But that is not because being conscious of a mental state causes that state to 
have the property of being intransitively conscious; rather, it is because a mental state’s 
being intransitively conscious simply consists in one’s being transitively conscious of it. The 
mistake here is to suppose that a state’s being intransitively conscious is an intrinsic 
property of that state. If it were, then being intransitively conscious could not consist in 
one’s being transitively conscious of being in that state unless being thus conscious induced 
a change in that state’s intrinsic properties. (Rosenthal 1997:738-9) 
In other words, Rosenthal maintains that the objection is raised because one is committed 
to the view that mental states have an intrinsic conscious-making property, which the 
rock and the chair and so on lack. Alex Byrne, on the other hand, claims that Rosenthal 
grabs hold of the wrong end of the stick, and fails to see that the objection is a consequence 
of denying the relational view. 
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The objection is that if what makes a state conscious is the fact that it is the object of 
another mental state, then there is no explanation of why only mental states are conscious. 
For other non-mental states can be object of mental states and they are not conscious. 
(Byrne 1997:110) 
Therefore, the objection is merely trying to deduct an absurdity from the presupposition 
of the relational view. The objection is, more precisely, that HOTC lacks a proper 
explanation of why higher-order states infer intransitive consciousness on only some 
mental states, when there are, presumably, many other mental states that are not made 
conscious.1 What Rosenthal is forced to hold, then, is that there is something special 
about the mental states that becomes intransitively conscious compared to other mental 
states that are not.2 (See also Gennaro 2004:6f, Hardcastle 2004:285f) 
Being conscious involves subjectivity, so another, related, question is why a mental state 
should become a state that exhibits subjectivity by being taken as an object by another 
state? Rosenthal discusses this much in the same way as he discusses consciousness in 
general. Mental states can have intentional properties, representing what they are about, 
or they can have phenomenal properties that represent qualitative sensory input, or both. 
(Rosenthal 2005a:23) Rosenthal follows up on this by associating the ‘what it is like’ 
aspect to a higher-order awareness of a mental state having a phenomenal property of 
some sort. We have a phenomenal conscious experience, then, only to the extent that we 
are aware of a mental state exhibiting the sensory quality of pain, redness, and so on. 
(Rosenthal 1997:433, 2005a:38, 2005b:144) From a certain point of view, this seems to be 
a fairly accurate description. If I knock my calf into a low table, I feel an instant pain, but 
might forget about the pain if the doorbell rings. The pain, though, will most likely come 
back after a short while, but for a few moments there, I was distracted and not aware of 
it. It is still good sense to say that it is the same pain that came back and not that I got a 
new one. (Rosenthal 2005a:39) Accurate maybe, but does it grasp what it is that 
characterizes the phenomenality of a conscious experience. 
                                              
1 A related, but inversed argument is put forward by Fred Dretske who argues that it is possible that the first-order 
state in which one is conscious has properties that one is not conscious of having. “If this is true, then it cannot be a 
person’s awareness of a mental state that makes that state conscious.” (Dretske 1993:278) 
2 In addition, there is a host of other problems with HOTC that need not concern our occupation with the self and 
self-consciousness, see for example Byrne 1997, Gennaro 2004, Hardcastle 2004, and Van Gulick 2004 and 2006. 
The just mentioned problem, among others, has led to an alternative kind of representational theory about 
consciousness, the self-representational account. According to this kind of theory, an intentional mental state “is 
conscious if and only if it represents itself in the right way”. (Kriegel and Williford 2006:1) Self-awareness in this case 
requires a relation between the mental state and its own representation, and therefore indicates, like HOTC, that self-
awareness consists in a subject-object structure. (Zahavi 2005:79-81, Drummond 2006:208-210) 
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Some authors have argued that there is a ‘what it is like’ aspect to the awareness of having 
a sensory state, for instance painful when you aware of being in pain. There is no necessity 
that an awareness should be felt qualitatively when a mere awareness could have triggered 
all the necessary avoidance-strategies. Consequently can this aspect not be reduced to 
awareness. (Nagel 1981, Chalmer 1996) Rosenthal more waive than counter-argue this 
objection by insisting that there is nothing else about a pain experience besides being 
conscious of having a mental state that has the content of being in pain. (Rosenthal 
2005a:41) If phenomenality is due to intrinsic properties of the first-order state, a 
satisfactory explanation of the coming and going pain experience would be more intricate 
and (at least to Rosenthal himself) less appealing. This is much for the same reasons we 
saw above concerning unconscious mental states; the pain experience should be constant 
until the qualitative sensory input diminishes. (Rosenthal 2005b:146) The attraction of 
there being an irreducible phenomenal consciousness, in Rosenthal’s eyes, is that it seems 
to us that nothing is more basic to being human than having a consciousness; a feeling 
that entails that consciousness cannot be explained by some further facts.  
But consciousness could be essential to our nature only if all mental states are conscious 
states. If a fair number of our mental states are not conscious, we cannot define our mental 
natures in terms of consciousness, and there will be nonconscious mental phenomena in 
terms of which we can explain consciousness itself. (Rosenthal 2005a:42) 
 
HOTC, as should be clear now, attempts to substantiate the claim of the existence of 
non-conscious mental states. Rosenthal does not provide any further arguments for 
reducing phenomenal consciousness to awareness of phenomenal properties besides 
claiming that this question cannot be answered within the HOTC itself. (Gennaro 2004:7) 
The reason for this is presumably that such a theory would be about the nature of mental 
states and not about consciousness of mental states, which is what HOTC provides. 
Consequently, this question requires a further theory. (Rosenthal 2005b:135) This 
argument, though, seem to me to presuppose what HOTC is meant to uncover; that there 
is a distinction between the first-order state and the higher-order state that makes it 
conscious. Without there being such a distinction, the claim of a further theory makes no 
sense. Whether one is satisfied with the HOTC explanation of phenomenal consciousness 
depends on, it seems, already being comfortable with the extrinsic view. 
An implication of HOTC’s way of ‘tackling’ phenomenal consciousness is that we can 
have phenomenal experiences without corresponding first-order states, something 
Rosenthal readily admits. (Rosenthal 2005a:29, 1997:744) With this in mind, there is no 
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fundamental difference between unconscious intentional properties and unconscious 
phenomenal properties; both properties are picked out and defined on the background of 
us being conscious of them. “The reason we cannot know what it is like to have, for 
example, a nonconscious pain is simply that unless the pain is conscious there is no such 
thing as what it is like to have it.” (Rosenthal 2005b:137, cf. 1997:733) There is, then, no 
more mystery to having an unconscious pain than there is to have an unconscious 
intentional mental state.1 Although Rosenthal maintains that HOTC is capable of, and to 
a better extent than the intrinsic view, explaining this aspect of being conscious, not 
everybody is convinced that HOTC does the job.2 (Chalmers 1996:361 n16, Byrne 1997) 
Co-givenness 
Even if we grant HOTC as having a satisfying account of the phenomenal aspect of being 
conscious, there is still another aspect that is just as, if not more, fundamental to 
subjectivity. In this section, I shall ask to what extent HOTC manages to handle this 
other aspect in an adequate manner. We need to ask this, because the ‘what it is like’ 
aspect, although it is there in all our conscious experiences, lacks the homogeneity that is, 
or at least presumably is, an essential part of being a subject, being a self. 
What it is like to be me is not some one something; it varies from day to day, even moment 
to moment. We wake up in a mood: on the wrong side of the bed, unaccountably happy or 
sad, ready to take on the world or to shrink from it. Before we have even begun to focus 
on our surroundings or the tasks of the day, we are in a mood. (Wider 2006:67, cf. 
Heidegger 1962:173/134) 
 
By being in a certain mood, or meeting the world in a specific way – that is, being 
conscious with whatever specific phenomenal feel it has (which may very well differ from 
moment to moment depending on our general mood), discloses subjectivity in a different 
way from the phenomenal feel of specific experiences. Whatever we experience, it is 
experienced as belonging to someone, as belonging to myself. The lack of homogeneity of 
specific conscious experiences is balanced through displaying mineness. Any conscious 
experience is experienced as being ours; conscious experiences are experienced as 
                                              
1 Is not this a somewhat non-falsifiable claim? It is, if one holds that unconscious phenomenal properties, in contrast 
to unconscious intentional properties, have no causal effects. 
2 Byrne argues that the possibility of unconscious phenomenality renders HOTC useless as a credible alternative to 
an intrinsic kind of account of phenomenal consciousness. “[I]f this move is allowable at the level of higher-order 
thoughts, it ought to be allowable at the level of the sensory states themselves”. (Byrne 1997:123) The self-
representational theory of consciousness can be seen as a direct reply to this problem. (Kriegel and Williford 2006:2f) 
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belonging to us.1 In other words, what it is like to be someone requires that one is a 
someone. But what exactly is this someone? 
First, it is important to note that ‘this someone’ should not be understood as being on par 
with the kind of acquaintance we experience when standing face to face with another 
human being. That would be an acquaintance of a subject from a third-person 
perspective. As we discussed above, we can even experience ourselves in this manner, 
which is indirect and observational. Encountering ourselves as ourselves in a conscious 
experience, however, involves an entirely different access to ourselves. 
When I am aware of an occurrent pain, perception, or thought from the first-person 
perspective, the experience in question is given immediately, non-inferentially and non-
criterially as mine. That is, the experience is given (at least tacitly) as an experience I am 
undergoing or living through. First-personal experience presents me with an immediate and 
non-observational access to myself. (Zahavi 2005:78) 
In conscious experiences, then, the world is presented to us, but we are also presented 
with ourselves. We could say that the moment of conscious experience points both 
‘outwards’, the intentionality of consciousness, and ‘inwards’, the specific kind of self-
awareness, the direct and immediate self-experience of a conscious moment.2 
In Chapter 3, we saw how intentional experiences require a transcendent object 
(regardless of whether this object exists in the world or is fictional). However, it is also 
the case that there is no intentional experience without there being a subject of the 
experience. This can be illustrated by reflecting on the difference between two different 
modes of being in the world. For a consciousness, the world, objects, events, other 
subjects and so on (in short intentional objects), appear, but if “I lose consciousness, I (or 
more precisely a body) will remain causally connected to a number of different objects, 
but none of these objects will appear”. (Zahavi 1999:23-4) The discussion on 
intentionality in Chapter 3 substantiates this; in a similar manner to the impossibility of 
perceiving an object without seeing it from a perspective, an intentional object appears in 
a certain mode: it is plainly perceived, it can be desired or disliked, judged about or 
thought of in curiosity, etc. For a consciousness, the object does not appear at all unless it 
appears in such a way. As Zahavi warns against, analysing intentionality in this manner 
does not imply that we have an indirect access to the object. It is, actually, the other way 
                                              
1 The concept of ‘mineness’ is Heidegger’s (1962:68/42, 78/53) and concerns the relation between inauthenticity and 
authenticity. I shall explain it without going into his definition. For the most part, although used in a different setting, 
the notion as it appears in this chapter is in agreement with Heidegger’s use. See next chapter. 
2 ‘Inner’ and ‘outer’ are dangerous words, as they seem to imply a Cartesian duality. 
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around; it constitutes the access to the object. (1999:23, cf. the concept of articulation in 
Chapters 2 and 4) Thus, appearance presupposes that it is for someone, which is the 
reason we can say that the subject is co-given with the intentional object in conscious 
experience. Self-awareness is implicit in being conscious; self-awareness and intentionality 
“refers to the other as that which it is not, but upon which it depends”. (Zahavi 1999:130) 
The self, then, is present in experience, but not in the sense of requiring reflection on the 
experience, it presents itself in the experience itself.  
However, what is the self that is co-given in experience? How should we understand the 
kind of self-awareness that appears in this manner? Above, we saw that HOTC regards 
consciousness and self-consciousness as co-given. We are conscious because we have a 
higher-order state directed at a first-order state that represents a fact in the world (or a 
state of the body). The content of this first-order state is made conscious, and we become 
self-conscious at the same moment because the first-order state is taken to belong to the 
same subject as the higher-order state. As Rosenthal puts it, higher-order states “make us 
conscious not only of their target states, but also of the self to which they assign those 
targets”. (Rosenthal 2005c:343) That is, we become conscious and self-conscious because 
a representing first-order mental state becomes the object by a higher-order state. Self-
consciousness, like consciousness, is therefore explained as being dependent on the 
intentional directedness of the higher-order state. 
This intentional relation between the first-order and the higher-order state, in accordance 
with what we saw characterizes the implicit awareness of ourselves in intentional 
experiences, is direct and unmediated. But that should not mislead us to think that self-
consciousness is intrinsic to the conscious state. Without the higher-order awareness, we 
would not be conscious of anything, and neither of ourselves. If we think about it, our 
awareness of the intentional object is comprehended in the same manner, as immediate 
and direct. For instance, if we suddenly become aware of the hum of the refrigerator that 
we know has been there all the time, but had not noticed until just now, this transition of 
the sound from unconscious to conscious does not feel like being a mental state being 
taken as an object by a higher-order mental state. Therefore, the felt immediacy is no 
argument for self-awareness to be intrinsic: “Access to things often seems spontaneous 
and unmediated without actually being so; perceiving typically seems spontaneous and 
unmediated, though we know that it isn’t.” (Rosenthal 2005c:355)  
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However, there is a fundamental characteristic of intentional relations that is left 
untouched even by accounting for the immediacy of self-consciousness, namely “the 
distinction between intentionality, which is characterized by an epistemic difference between 
the subject and the object of experience, and self-consciousness, which implies some form of 
identity”. (Zahavi 2005:28) Being conscious of something is experienced as belonging to 
me, there is an identity between the conscious experience and me, while there is a 
difference between what is experienced, say a chair beside a table, and me. I can be wrong 
about the latter, maybe it is a hallucination, but I cannot be wrong in that it is me who is 
having the perception/hallucination. In other words, a theory about self-consciousness 
must capture the identity that is implied in the subject-use of ‘I’ (see above). 
How does an extrinsic theory of self-consciousness, such as HOTC, account for this 
aspect? To put it differently, from ‘where” is the mineness of the conscious experience, 
disclosed by the co-givenness of intentional object and self, supposed to come from. Bear 
in mind, for HOTC it is the first-order state that is the conscious state, but self-
consciousness cannot be intrinsic to this state. As long as self-consciousness is meant to 
arise from the relation between the first-order and the higher-order state, the mineness of 
being conscious must be due to the higher-order state’s taking of the first-order state as 
an object. In a recent article, Rosenthal confirms that this is what he has in mind, and 
counter-argues against the subject-use of ‘I’ in a by now familiar fashion: 
The mental analogue of the pronoun ‘I’ refers to whatever individual thinks a thought in 
which that mental analogue occurs. So each HOT [higher-order state] in effect represents 
its target state as belonging to the individual that thinks that very HOT. When a pain is 
conscious, the individual the relevant HOT represents that pain as belonging to is the same 
as the individual that thinks that HOT. So one cannot be wrong about whether the 
individual that seems to be in pain is the very same as the individual for whom it is 
conscious. (Rosenthal 2005c:357) 
As we can see, Rosenthal holds that there is no mystery to the immunity in the subject-
use of ‘I’. The higher-order state, in taking the first-order state as its object, not only 
represents the content of the first-order state, it represents it as its own; mineness is due to 
the higher-order state recognizing the first-order state as ‘mine”. 
This, of course, is no more than a re-hashing of what has already been said about HOTC, 
and it is unlikely that it amounts to a satisfactory explanation of the full content of the 
subject-use of ‘I’. As was discussed above, there is another, more fundamental, argument 
concerning theories that postulate self-consciousness in terms of a relation: If self-
consciousness is taken to be extrinsic rather than intrinsic, an identification process is 
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required, but recognizing something as me requires a previous knowledge of me. To be 
sure, Shoemaker advanced this argument towards conscious mental states, but even if 
Rosenthal can account for both consciousness and phenomenal consciousness in terms of 
the relation of unconscious mental states,1 it is hard to see how this move can do the job 
concerning self-consciousness. The structure of Shoemaker’s argument still applies: How 
can the unconscious higher-order state, in a manner of speaking, recognize the first-order 
state as being one’s own? 
 Just as I cannot recognize something as mine unless I am already aware of myself, a 
nonconscious second-order mental state (that per definition lacks consciousness of itself) 
cannot recognize or identify a first-order mental state as belonging to the same mind as 
itself. (Zahavi 2005:29) 
Rosenthal’s model of self-consciousness attempts to ensure that the identification process 
is infallible (it is spontaneous and unmediated), but in the Shoemaker/Zahavi model, 
there is no identification process at all, the awareness is already there, implicitly. We do 
not need to identify ourselves in the most proper and correct way in order to know that 
we are in pain, that we have a perception of a chair, or that we desire an ice-cream on a 
hot summer day. The only solution HOTC seems to be able to resort to if they want to 
account satisfactory for mineness, the taking of the first-order state as its own, is to 
postulate yet another higher-order state that can monitor and ‘guarantee” that the two 
mental states are in fact mental states of the same self. However, this state, of course, will 
be in an equal need for yet another, so there is an infinite regress threatening HOTC after 
all. (Zahavi 1999:29) 
The kind of self-awareness that is given to us in a conscious experience cannot be 
captured by an objective ‘look” or thought about oneself, but is implied in any such looks 
and thoughts about oneself. ‘This someone” that I spoke of above, is, most 
fundamentally, what or whom we are self-aware of in a conscious moment. But it is 
equally clear that this someone is not apprehended in an act of reflection; it is present prior 
to reflection. It is therefore better to speak of it as a pre-reflective kind of self-
consciousness, or better yet, self-awareness; pre-reflective implies pre-conscious, at least 
in a thematic sense. Instead of regarding self-consciousness as being a question of 
awareness of a self, it can “rather be understood as the awareness that a specific experience 
has of itself”. (Zahavi 2005:2) 
                                              
1 I am not saying that I endorse the HOTC- account of consciousness and phenomenality, only that it is possible. 
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Zahavi warns against understanding the critique against reflective notions of the self as 
claiming that reflection on oneself is impossible. (1999:33) That, of course, would be an 
absurd claim. This analysis merely points out that reflective consciousness presupposes a 
different notion of the self, a notion that does not have the dualistic tendencies of the 
Cartesian self (although, as we have seen, the object- and self-awareness in a conscious 
experience implies a duality of moments, but without this duality there could be neither 
object- nor self-awareness). As Jean-Paul Sartre, who discusses pre-reflective 
consciousness extensively in Being and Nothingness, argues:  
[T]he reflecting consciousness posits the consciousness reflected-on, as its object. In the 
act of reflecting I pass judgment on the consciousness reflected-on; I am ashamed of it, I 
am proud of it, I will it, I deny it, etc. The immediate consciousness which I have of 
perceiving does not permit me either to judge or to will or to be ashamed. It does not know 
my perception, does not posit it; all there is of intention in my present consciousness is 
directed toward the outside, toward the world. In turn, this spontaneous consciousness of 
my perception is constitutive of my perceptive consciousness. In other words, every 
positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of 
itself. (Sartre 2003:9) 
The implication of the pre-reflective self-awareness is that the Cartesian kind of self that 
HOTC implies, which takes itself as an object and reflect on itself, cannot evolve without 
being intractably linked to the world. We discover ourselves in the intentionality of 
consciousness, or, in other words, we discover ourselves in being concerned with the 
world with its objects and other subjects. How the world appears, then, is part of 
ourselves prior to becoming (reflective) selves. We could also say, selves are constituted 
in-the-world. Herein lies the critique of the Cartesian/HOTC self. Without there being a 
world active in the constitution of the (reflective) self, there could not be a self 
sufficiently self-reflecting to ask the question whether there actually is a world ‘out there” 
(cf. Chapter 3).1 
Agency and ownership 
John Searle admits having thought that Hume had had the last word on the issue of the 
self, but that now he has come to think otherwise. This, he says, has “to do with the 
notions of rationality, free choice, decision making, and reasons for action”. (Searle 
2004:293) We have, or at least we presuppose that we have, free will when we choose and 
                                              
1 There are hosts of issues left untouched here: the unity of consciousness, the precise nature of pre-reflective self-
awareness, the relation between pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness, intersubjectivity, and so on. Some of 
these will be touched upon later, but I hope that the present discussion has been sufficient to illustrate the 
elusiveness of the self-concept. 
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when we act, and this aspect falls outside the Humean theory of action, which is 
dependent upon a certain sequence of impressions and ideas. These, even supplemented 
with the behaviouristic notion of disposition, are not sufficient to explain rational agency. 
The crux of his argument is that we can cite all the possible reasons for us to perform an 
action, and yet not fix the realization of the action. I can choose at any time not to act, 
even if I would be better off doing it, or I can choose to do something else. Because of 
the possibility of doing nothing, or doing the alternative, the action itself is not 
determined by its reasons. Therefore, citing reasons (including so-called ‘psychological 
causes’) is not sufficient to secure the onset of an action. Rational agency is described in 
opposition to mere agency, as cases where one has the feeling of no alternatives, or no 
retreat. Mere agency can also be performed by a stimulus-response system, such as a 
robot. The addition that makes a difference is what he wants to call the self: “Agency plus 
the apparatus of rationality equals selfhood.” (Searle 2001:92) 
There is a further argument for the notion of the self. The self denotes “an entity capable 
of assuming, exercising, and accepting responsibility”. (Searle 2001:90) We are in no way 
responsible for our perceptions, as we are for our actions. So if (bundles of) perceptions 
(and dispositions, etc.) are the sole reasons behind action, what then is responsibility? If 
we postulate a self, this question disappears. On Searle’s theory, there is “a formal 
requirement on rational action that there must be a self who acts, in a way that it is not a 
formal requirement on perception that there be an agent or a self who perceives”. (Searle 
2001:93) 
An obvious impediment to this is that free will cannot be the explanation of the self for the 
reason that it already presupposes a self. Because what, unless a self, has free will? 
However, we do not know much about the formal requirements that amounts to the self 
at the present (Searle calls his theory “not more than a beginning” (2004:299)) Therefore, 
there is a deliberate gap of ontological significance in his theory of rational action. 
Deliberate, because Searle identifies the gap as the reason why we should not be content 
with Hume’s analysis. A gap, because we know a lot about what precedes it (reasons for 
action), and equally a lot about what follows it (actions, alternatives to action, no action, 
etc.), but not much about the nature of the formal requirements. Not much, that is, 
except the necessity of a self to instantiate them “because the intention-in-action is not 
just an event that occurs by itself. It can occur only if an agent is actually doing 
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something, or at least trying to do something”. (Searle 2001:83) Selfhood, then, is bridging 
the gap. We exist, as he says, in that gap. (Searle 2001:94) 
There is a curious tension in Searle’s notion of the gap that makes the ontological status 
of the self somewhat ambiguous. Is it a mere theoretical construct, designed to give the 
theory of rationality coherence? Or, is it a transcendental notion, that, à la Kant, is 
required to give consciousness itself coherence?1 Actually, it seems to be a little bit of 
both. Because, on the one hand, “it is the complex of the notions of free action, 
explanation, responsibility, and reason that give us the motivation for postulating 
something in addition to the sequence of experiences and the body in which they occur”. 
(Searle 2004:285) This indicates that the self is employed instrumentally, that is, primarily 
as a formal merging of several cognitive functions.2 On the other hand, it is also, he says, 
a fact that “an important feature of our experiences is what one might call a ‘sense of 
self’…something that it feels like to be me”. (2004:298f) And elsewhere he says that “‘self’ 
is simply the name for that entity which experiences its own activities as more than an 
inert bundle”. (Searle 2001:93) In this sense, there is an experiential dimension to being a 
self. However, this dimension, he claims, is not sufficient to “flesh out the purely formal 
requirement that… [is] necessary to supplement Hume’s account in order to account for 
the possibility of free rational action”. (2004:299) In other words, Searle does not, or 
cannot see any reason to, align the consciousness of the agent with the agency of the 
agent in a constitutional manner. Therefore, besides the fact that it is through being 
conscious that we detect our own rationality and free will, there seems to be no reason, 
according to Searle, to delve into analysis of the experiential dimension.  
                                              
1 “[T]he empirical consciousness, which accompanies different representations [Vorstellungen], is in itself diverse and 
without relation to the identity of the subject. That relation comes about, not simply through my accompanying each 
representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious 
of the synthesis of them. Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one 
consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in [i.e. throughout] these 
representations.” (Kant 1929:B133) Kant’s notion of self-consciousness is strictly formal: “we cannot even say that this 
[I] is a concept, but only that it is a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts”. (Kant 1929:A346, B404) 
2  Thomas Metzinger proposes something similar to this. The self, Metzinger argues, is a confusion, a 
misinterpretation of a self-model that the brain generates for “an organism to conceive of itself as a whole, and thereby 
to causally interact with its inner and outer environment in an entirely new, integrated, and intelligent manner”. 
(Metzinger 2003:1) Not unlike something Hume would say, Metzinger claims, “[n]obody ever was or had a self”. 
(Metzinger 2003:1) All that exists is the self-model. Seen this way, we are akin to the robot HAL in 2001: A Space 
Odyssey that starts to think of itself as a himself, as a sentient being with emotions and self-consciousness. Metzinger 
argues that the self-model is transparent, and that this is the reason we are fooled into thinking we exists as selves; 
we are unable to see the self-model itself, because we see through it. (Metzinger 2003:330ff) This, of course, makes 
Metzinger’s self-model entirely un-falsifiable (in much the same way as HOTC’s claims about phenomenal 
consciousness). Although being positive to Metzinger’s analysis of phenomenal experience, Zahavi questions the 
conclusion Metzinger draws from his own arguments and claims that Metzinger’s dismissal of the self is due to a 
self-concept that is too Cartesian, too dependent on advanced cognitive functions. (Zahavi 2005) 
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The reason for this view, I suspect, is due to a rigid definition of what an experience of a 
self consists in. To experience a self, means, for Searle, to fall into the Cartesian trap. One 
therefore has a choice between two options, either one, like Hume, denies the possibility 
to experience a self, or one experiences a self in the Cartesian way. To avoid any hints of 
Cartesianism, it is of utmost importance for Searle to stress that his conception of the self 
is a formal conception. “The point… is that though the self is not the name of an 
experience nor is it the name of an object of an experience, nonetheless there is a 
sequence of formal features of our experiences that are constitutive of ourselves as 
selves”, and therefore, “the postulation of a self does not require that we have any 
experiences of the self”. (Searle 2001:93-4) 
It seems to me that Searle does not distinguish between awareness of a self, and 
awareness of itself. As we saw above, this distinction concerns the nature of the self-
experience. If one experiences a self, then the self is taken as an object, which 
presupposes the ability to reflect upon oneself. To experience itself, on the other hand, is 
a basic, non-reflective, non-thematic awareness that an experience has of itself. It is a way 
of owning an experience without inferring (or perceiving) one’s ownership. This makes it 
possible to speak of self-awareness without experiencing a self. Searle understands self-
experience to be only of a self, which he cannot accept. The tension in his theory, then, is 
that without grounding rational agency, that is, selfhood in non-reflective self-awareness, 
self-experience very easily resembles the experience of a self in the Cartesian respect. 
Searle’s reluctance to analyze the experiential dimension therefore prevents him from 
going beyond the mere statement of ‘formal features’, and he thereby leaves selfhood in 
an ontological limbo. Releasing this tension could set Searle on his way to a different 
understanding of selfhood. 
Searle’s conception of selfhood as closely associated, or even coinciding with rational 
agency, corresponds to what Shaun Gallagher calls a sense of agency. Gallagher contrasts this 
with the sense of ownership. Both senses are “first-order, phenomenal aspects of experience, 
pre-reflectively implicit in action”. (Gallagher 2005:174n) Normally, these two senses 
coincide, but this is not necessarily always the case. For example, I am at a party, holding 
a glass, when someone is passing me and accidentally bumps into my arm making my 
hand hit the glass of another person out of his hands. Now, was the breaking of the glass 
my doing? I would say no to that, I am not the one who made him lose his glass. But was 
it my hand hitting the glass making it fall to the floor? Yes, that much I have to admit. In 
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this case, I have no sense of agency of the movement of my arm, but I have a sense of 
ownership of the arm.1 Gallagher mentions examples of the same dissymmetry from 
various psychiatric disorders, such as thought insertion and schizophrenia. (2005:174f) 
However, it would be harder to find an example of the other way around. If I have a 
sense of agency I necessarily also must have a sense of ownership. This means that the 
sense of ownership is more basic than, and more interestingly also a prerequisite for, the 
pre-reflective sense of agency, and therefore for rational agency. 
For Gallagher the sense of ownership is intimately tied to proprioceptive awareness. 
Proprioception is the name for the unconscious processes that monitors and regulates 
body movement, body posture, etc. We are proprioceptively aware only insofar as we are 
not consciously aware of these processes (which would be a different kind of monitoring 
and regulating). But even when we are not conscious of them, we retain a sense of 
ownership about them. Because, if we did not  
It would be possible for me to be proprioceptively aware of my body, but not as my own 
body. This would involve a structure similar to a situation in which I am aware that 
someone, X, is acting in a certain way, but I do not know that X is myself. This can happen 
in certain cases when I perceive X in an objective way, ‘from the outside’, but not when the 
awareness is based on proprioception, which is an awareness ‘from the inside’. (Gallagher 
2005:105) 
Proprioceptive awareness is akin to the subject-use of I, which we saw Wittgenstein and 
Shoemaker defined as immune to misidentification, and to pre-reflective mineness. In this 
way, proprioceptive awareness, and its accompanying sense of ownership, becomes a very 
early consciousness, or at least the seed of such, in the sense of a mechanism that 
distinguishes between self, and non-self. (Gallagher 2005:106) Of course, this would not 
mean that the non-self is identified as an other or anything even distinct; what is operative 
is the indication of self versus the non-self. Again, we can see an implication towards the 
impossibility of a self without a non-self, there is no self without a world. 
The synaptic self 
While Gallagher looks at the role of the whole body in the development of (a reflective) 
consciousness, HOTC explains (self-) consciousness in strictly mentalist terms. The 
                                              
1 An example, paraphrased from Armstrong (1993), that cuts across this division, is the driver that drives a familiar 
route, for instance from the grocery store to his home. The driver thinks of many things (plans for the evening, what 
he could have bought instead of that keg of beer, etc.) without attending to the driving, which is performed in a state 
of automatism (Armstrong 1993:94), when suddenly the car swerves and ends up in the ditch. Although the driver 
was not consciously aware of his driving, he will likely see himself as responsible for, as the agent of, the incident, and 
he certainly would be responsible as an agent in the legal sense, something that can be disputed in the glass-incident. 
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presupposition in HOTC is that the brain activity has been organized into a functional 
structure, and consequently, terms for consciousness and self-consciousness are reduced 
to abstract functional states. This is to a certain degree speculative, and another 
reductionist approach to the study of (self-) consciousness is to investigate the relation 
between the self and neurophysiological brain states, that is, to connect our terms directly 
to the brain activity. Before ending the discussion in this chapter, I shall see if this 
approach might make the self a little less elusive. 
Joseph LeDoux sums up his theory in a straightforward way: “you are your synapses”.1 
(2003:ix, cf. 324) According to LeDoux, to discuss the self in terms of consciousness, 
self-awareness and self-knowledge, is a too narrow focus. The self should instead be 
discussed at the level of personality, that is, as something that evolves ontogenetically, in 
interaction with other people. Our personality is linked to genetic and learned traits, our 
behaviour, other people’s behaviour towards us, and our social situatedness and so forth: 
“the self is the totality of what an organism is physically, biologically, psychologically, 
socially and culturally”. (LeDoux 2003:31) However, on the level of personality, there is 
no such thing as a self. As sociologist Erving Goffman has studied, we exhibit disparate 
personas and personality traits in different situations; when at work and at home, from 
one social situation to another, from one point in time to another, and so on. Sometimes 
this is because we want to accentuate certain of our traits and downplay others, but most 
often, we perform a role that it appropriate for the social setting we are in; it is a way of 
connecting to other people on the presumption that we have a shared knowledge of the 
social situation. (Goffman 1959, Chapter 1) 
Although not designating a unitary set of behaviours and ways of being, the self is 
nonetheless a unit, according to LeDoux. This is because our behaviour is controlled by 
the workings of our brain, that is, the whole brain, or if one is speaking philosophically or 
psychologically, the whole mind, not just by the conscious aspects. Focusing on self-
consciousness will therefore only disclose some aspects of our self, namely the explicit 
ones: “These are what we refer to by the term self-aware and constitute what we call our 
self-concept.” (LeDoux 2003:27) The explicit self corresponds to what we are directed at 
in reflection, that is, when we are conscious of a self. However, due to the involvement of 
the whole brain in shaping behaviour and personality, there are also implicit aspects, 
                                              
1 The synapses are the area for ‘communication’ between brain cells. 
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which “are all other aspects of who we are that are not immediately available to 
consciousness”. (LeDoux 2003:27-8) Implicit aspects include both what is not accessed as 
the moment and workings of the brain that are never accessed. Unconscious cognitive 
functions are as important in determining what the self (in LaDoux’s sense) is like, 
according to LeDoux, and therefore, seeking out the self in our conscious knowledge, or 
conscious feel of being a self, will fall short of grasping what it is that makes up the self. 
The concept of the self has to be thought broader, and because of this, the empirical 
focus can be narrower, namely on the brain.1 
The brain consists in various functional subsystems, where only a few are conscious, 
taking care of attention, perception, memory, emotion, learning, retrieving, motivation, 
thinking and so on. All these functions play a part in how we become who we are. 
LeDoux’s therefore believes that the self arises from the way these systems interact, and 
work together in creating a coherent perception of the world and consistent behavioural 
response to inputs from the world. The argument for this is simple:  
Without these interactions, and the mental integration they engender, each of us would 
simply be a collection of isolated mental functions rather than a coherent person… [O]ur 
brains make us who we are [because of] synaptic processes that allow cooperative 
interactions to take place between the various brain systems that are involved in particular 
states and experiences, and for these interactions to be linked over time. (LeDoux 2003:32)  
In other words, behind what we call a self, there is a synchronous process, the mental 
integration, and a diachronic process, the memory that links interactions over time, that 
determines who we are. The presupposition, and he cites strong empirical evidence for 
this, is that the various subsystems are plastic, that is, susceptible to neurological change 
due to learning. Consequently, even though the brain systems are the same in each of us, 
and the number of neurons roughly is the same from individual to individual, “the 
particular way those neurons are connected is distinct, and that uniqueness, in short, is 
what makes us who we are”. (LeDoux 2003:303)2 
Now, for this to become a theory about the self, and not merely a theory of how the brain 
integrates information, we need to see how those two processes give rise to an explicit 
self, that is, we need an account of self-awareness. In LaDoux’s case, this amounts to the 
relation between the implicit and the explicit aspects of the self. Actually, and somewhat 
                                              
1 This concept of the self, because of the focus on the whole brain, leads to the view that animals have selves also. In 
fact, all creatures with a brain have a self, in the sense of an implicit self. (LeDoux 2003:27) 
2 Most of LeDoux 2003 is dedicated to showing empirically how brains develop into individual minds. 
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surprisingly, this is not easy to find, as LeDoux primarily presents an account of the 
processes amounting to the implicit self, the coherent whole. However, without an 
explicit self arising from the brain activity, the coherent whole would hardly be called an 
implicit self. Concerning the synchronous process, one alternative is to opt for a higher 
order theory: the explicit self as a monitoring of the implicit self. If so, the explicit self 
would amount to a higher order representation of certain aspects of the implicit self, 
which would mean that his theory is open to the same objections that we encountered 
above, such as the threat of infinite regress. For the diachronic process, LeDoux’s theory 
is quite close to Locke’s memory-based theory, so an alternative concerning this process 
is that the explicit self is an appropriation of the implicit processes as one’s own, and the 
memory of this appropriation in earlier encounters of the self. This, apart from the 
inherent circularity of any memory-based theory about the self, would actualize the 
problem of how to recognize something as one’s own without already knowing what it is 
that characterizes that which is one’s own.  
None of these alternatives appear to be the case. In contrast to Locke’s top-down 
approach to personal identity through appropriation of a subpersonal process, LeDoux’s 
emphasis on the unconscious makes his understanding of identity dissimilar; he proposes 
a bottom-up approach. The thought is that the various brain subsystems, doing their 
varied kind of work, gives rise to a coherent personality, “a fragile patch job”, as he calls 
it. (LeDoux 2003:304) And this is the argument for his main claim; since it is the synapses 
that are responsible for the communication between the various subsystems, the 
integration is down to the synapses, and consequently, it is the synapses that constitutes 
the self. That is, this is the case for the implicit self. For the explicit self, when we turn 
our focus on and thematize ourselves, self-consciousness, the case is rather different, and 
it might seem that LeDoux is claiming that the explicit self is an epiphenomenon; merely 
arising from the workings of the implicit self. As such, it will be an after-the-fact 
phenomenon, entirely dependent on what goes on at the unconscious and non-conscious 
level. LeDoux certainly suggests something to this effect: 
Many of our thoughts, feelings, and actions take place automatically, with consciousness 
only coming to know them as they happen, if at all. Figuring out the mechanism of 
consciousness would surely be a major scientific coup, but it wouldn’t explain how the 
brain works, or how our brains make us the individuals we are. (2003:10-11) 
However, the bottom up process, although important in integrating the implicit self, is 
not the end of the story. The prefrontal cortex (larger in humans than in other species) 
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assembles spatial (‘where’) and object (‘what’) information about the world from 
specialized brain systems reciprocates its activity back to the specialized brain systems. 
(LeDoux 2003:182) Of especial importance in this regard is the working memory, which 
is linked to the activity in the prefrontal cortex. There are good reasons to believe that the 
reciprocate activity is not an epiphenomenal process, but selects and shapes the neural 
activity in the underlying specialized areas. In other words, the higher order level of 
perception and behaviour control feeds back information that has non-trivial impact on 
the lower level neural activity. (LeDoux 2003:185) This top-down process “can direct 
traffic in the areas with which it is connected, enhancing the processing of stimuli that are 
relevant to the task on which it is engaged and suppressing the processing of other 
stimuli”. (LeDoux 2003:319) LeDoux’s idea is that consciousness and the explicit self is 
connected to the activity of the working memory.1 Consequently, the working memory is 
extremely important in order to understand the function of consciousness: “we can begin 
to see how the way we think about ourselves can have powerful influences on the way we 
are, and who we become. One’s self-image is self-perpetuating.” (LeDoux 2003:320)2 
Even though this implies that the explicit self is no mere epiphenomenon, a functional 
consciousness does not itself explain the relation between the implicit and the explicit 
self; that we are able to think about ourselves as ourselves. There are good reasons to 
believe that other animals, especially primates, are conscious in this functional way, but 
without being self-consciousness (in the narrow definition). LeDoux recognizes this, and 
believes that self-consciousness can only be due to the specifically human language-
processing module. “Language radically alters the brain’s ability to compare, contrast, 
discriminate, and associate on-line, in real time, and to use such information to guide 
thinking and problem-solving.” (LeDoux 2003:197) Language makes the human brain 
special among animals, and although animals may have the ability to be conscious, “they 
are unlikely to be able to represent complex, abstract concepts (like ‘me’ or ‘mine’ or 
                                              
1 This does not rule out that “there may exist primitive levels of consciousness, especially involving the passive 
awareness of events as opposed to the active use of online information to guide decision-making and behavior, that 
do not depend on the prefrontal cortex”. (LeDoux 2003:192) 
2  LeDoux’s understanding of the function of being conscious seems uncontroversial among those who work 
empirically on the brain and consciousness. For instance, it has a certain likeness to the global workspace theory of 
Bernard Baars, who sums up the theory in the following way: “[c]onsciousness creates access to unconscious 
resources”. (1997:159) For Baars, as it is for LeDoux, consciousness is a practical way of making unconscious 
information globally known, that is, available for all other brain subsystems. Consciousness therefore becomes 
functionally involved in alteration of priorities, decision-making, the recruiting and controlling of actions and many 
more cognitive and behavioural aspects. See also Chalmers 1996:225. For a textbook on various functional aspects of 
consciousness, see Baars et al. 2003.  
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‘ours’), to relate external events to these abstractions, and to use these representations to 
guide decision-making and control behavior”. LeDoux 2003:197) In other words, the 
explicit self has something to do with how language re-creates consciousness. More specific 
than this, though, LeDoux does not become. 
From what we have discussed in this chapter, the problems with such a theory should be 
obvious: Why is the explicit self accompanied by a subjective sense, when the implicit self 
is not? And how does the explicit self ‘recognize’ the implicit self as its own? In a sense, 
the implicit self is integrated into an unconscious self (whatever that means), but LeDoux 
offers no hints whether this should be understood in the direction of a pre-reflective 
consciousness, or if it plays a role in proprioception (LeDoux is strictly focused on the 
brain, not the whole body). That leaves us in an explanatory vacuum. Despite depending 
on language to constitute the explicit self, LeDoux’s vocabulary does not seem to include 
the subject-use of ‘I.’ As such, the theory of the synaptic self lacks an ingredient that we 
have seen many hold to be important for the understanding of consciousness and the self. 
For LeDoux, the question of the self is not about subjectivity, the phenomenal feel of 
being someone, or the mineness of being conscious, it is about how the brain controls 
behaviour and makes it coherent.  
In closing 
I have in this chapter distinguished between various conceptions of the self. Few of them 
have been dismissed altogether, but most of them seem to lack something. This 
something can be summed up as a foundation. Repeatedly I have returned to this 
foundation, having called it ‘subject-use’, pre-reflective consciousness, or a sense of 
ownership. I have investigated into more advanced, more complex, notions of the self, 
only to be left with a self-notion that is not really a self, but more of a feeling of, a sense 
of, mineness. The claim of the chapter has been that the self is an elusive notion, and as 
such, hard to pin down (unlike, say, the Cartesian self). This is the case, not only because 
the concept is used in several different manners, but also because many approaches have 
to overcome serious problems if their conceptualization of the self is to become coherent. 
However, in its elusiveness, the self has appeared in a minimal sense: There seems to be a 
mineness to any experience, prior to one consciously deciding that it is me that is having a 
conscious experience. 
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The implication of this was that conscious experience is described as having a duality of 
moments, one ‘pointing inwards’ and the other ‘pointing outwards’; without world-
presence, there would be no self-presence. As I have mentioned earlier, the world-
presence manifests itself also in the constitution of the self in the more reflective sense as 
well. In being surrounded by things and others, the self gains opportunities that an 
investigation into the minimal self cannot tell us anything about. I needed the notion of 
the minimal self, because without the minimal self, we could not experiences ourselves as 
selves, and therefore not as actors either. The minimal self is therefore crucial in being a 
reflected self, and consequently in seeing oneself as having possibilities, but it tells us very 
little about these possibilities and how one is attached to them. For this, it is required that 
the self is conceptualized as an autonomic entity, but in a sense that does not presuppose 
a Cartesian self. This self is the embedded self, and it is to this self that I now turn. In the 
following chapter, we shall see the role of both the others and of technology in the 
embedded constitution of the self. 
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Extrinsic notions of the self 
A number of self-concepts were introduced during the previous chapter: self-
consciousness, self-awareness, and personal identity, to mention only a few. We saw that 
these concepts both overlap and could encompass anything between rudimentary and 
momentary subjectivity via pre-reflective self-awareness, to a fully-fledged, mature and 
lasting personality. The wealth of concepts reflects the wealth of understandings one can 
have, and make use of, concerning the self, both academically and in a commonsensical 
manner. I find it doubtful that most people think of themselves as Cartesian cogitos when 
they think of what it is of themselves that persists through their lifetime. The concept of 
‘soul’, though, might be that for many, and ‘soul’ does contain some cogito-like aspects. 
Neither does pure bodily continuity strike me as a widespread criterion, although it 
certainly is important (especially in ascribing continuity to others). I also think that 
Locke’s emphasis on psychological continuity (memory) denotes something important for 
what connects one’s present self-awareness with one’s earlier experiences. In addition, it is 
plausible that we do get to know ourselves better through an objectifying retrospection of 
our own reactions, ways of thinking, and judgements in situations that have occurred, and 
that this self-knowledge is then included in our concept of ourselves. 
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Distancing his late philosophy from Ryle, Wittgenstein blames behaviourists for making 
the same reductionist mistake as Cartesians, in trying to find one, unequivocal, objective 
criterion for the self. (Wittgenstein 1953, §304-7) Instead, the word ‘person’, in its 
ordinary use, must be considered a composite. (Wittgenstein 1960:62) Perhaps we employ 
a bundle of criteria, where no one is primary, but some are emphasized in certain contexts 
and others are more important at other times? Neither Ryle nor Wittgenstein seems to 
accept that ‘I’ contains the unified and unifying core that the linguistic function implies.1 
In that case, not just behaviourism is under attack, but all approaches that search for the 
single, unproblematic criterion that manages to fend off all criticism. 
Moreover, to handle personal identity, if we are going to understand it as the 
phenomenon that holds together moments of conscious experiences, there is the question 
of how our self-image (to introduce yet another concept…) is constituted. The discussion 
in the previous chapter focused on how we come to perceive ourselves as a lasting entity 
with an identity over time, but this lasting self-image might not be constituted entirely 
through our own (mental) activity. Sometimes schizophrenia and split-brain thought 
experiments are used to demonstrate the possibility of two personalities inhabiting the 
same body. What happens in actual cases of this kind? If a person shows signs of having a 
split personality, others would say that this person (nobody would say ‘these persons’) has a 
disorder. In reality, society does not accept two selves in one body. Intersubjective and social 
strategies will be undertaken to treat the disorder in order to eliminate what is regarded as 
illegitimate personalities. The same goes, I suspect, for the philosophers’ more fanciful 
thought experiments, say Locke’s cobbler whose soul is inhabited by the soul of a prince2, 
or Shoemaker’s Brownson3. Whatever intrinsic criterion is singled out, and these examples 
                                              
1 But Ryle nevertheless sought the one explanation for the use of ‘I’, and found it in retrospection. Wittgenstein, 
however, claims that both Descartes and behaviourism have misunderstood the self’s role in language (we saw that 
Ryle thought that Descartes had, but presumably did not think he made the same mistake himself). 
2 “For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince’s past life, enter and inform the 
body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be the same person with the prince, 
accountable only for the prince’s actions.” (Locke 1975:340) Locke commented himself that other people would say 
that the prince was not the same man, but as long as the prince’s memories were intact, Locke maintained that he was 
the same person. 
3 Brown’s brain is transplanted into Robinson’s body, creating a new person, Brownson. Brownson exhibits all of 
Brown’s behavioural characteristics, except for the recognizable bodily ones (at least, ‘outer’ ones, since he still has 
Brown’s physical brain). Shoemaker claims that “[t]here is little question that many of us would be inclined, and 
rather strongly inclined, to say that while Brownson has Robinson’s body he is actually Brown”. (Shoemaker 
1963:23) Fission is a more advanced variation of these thought examples: A person A’s two brain hemispheres (both 
halves are presumed to keep the full psychology of A) are transplanted into two bodies, B and C. For complication 
(!), the bodies are supposed to be clones of A’s body. B and C will then be numerically different, but qualitatively the 
same as each other and to A. As no one, not even they, would be able to tell the difference, I will not discuss fission 
here, but see Parfit 1984, Garrett 1998, Martin and Barresi 2000. 
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do emphasize intrinsic ones, it is still a matter of dispute how the world around the 
person reacts to instantiations of ‘same person-different bodies’. 
What creates a lasting self, a person, is not only due to the subject’s own awareness of his 
own person’s identity, but must be seen as the result of many contributing factors, both 
subjective and intersubjective, both intrinsic and extrinsic. Evan Thompson expresses this 
in the following way: 
One of the most important reasons that human mentality cannot be reduced simply to 
what goes on inside the brain of an individual is that human mental activity is 
fundamentally social and cultural. Culture is no mere external addition or support to 
cognition; it is woven into the very fabric of each human mind from the beginning. 
(2007:403) 
If Thompson is correct, it is wrong to go for one specific, intrinsic, criterion as the sole 
reason for why and how we think of ourselves as persons. We need to think in extrinsic 
aspects as well, and this is the task for this chapter. Regarded generally, the chapter is a 
dismissal of the clear-cut distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic factors in both 
biological/environmental and psychological/social aspects. Of course, this was inherent 
in Part 1, as well, where we saw numerous reasons why we should think of the external 
world (of technology) as not being neutral and mere instruments, but as being an upgrading 
of our possible practical space. We are in-the-world through the possibilities our technologies 
afford us. This chapter will explore the same core idea, but in terms of what this implies 
for the constitution of the self and the self’s self-image. 
Extrinsic co-constitution of the self is also illustrated by the fact that observing oneself 
does not necessarily mean the intrinsic, mental acts of intro- or retrospection. We are 
social beings, and we participate in social action, and we observe our own actions in the 
world. In an intersubjective world our actions trigger repercussions that have short- and 
long-term bearings on our own self-image. A strong part of the self-image is what we are in 
the world; how others see us, and how we see ourselves, as being. Cognitive psychologist 
Ulric Neisser operates with two basic forms of self-knowledge, one based on reflexivity 
(intrinsic) and the other based on perception (extrinsic). Through the latter, we are 
acquainted with the way we operate in an immediate and social environment. In contrast 
to the reflexive self, the interacting self “need[s] not be recalled, imagined, constructed, or 
conceptualized” (1993:3), but is perceived directly through engagement in the physical and 
interpersonal surroundings. This is important for how we conceptualize the self(s) and 
personal identity because developmentally the perceiving of our interactions with our 
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surroundings predates higher order functions; we act in our surroundings, and observe 
the repercussions of our acts, before we are able to take ourselves as objects in an 
intrinsic act of reflection. Young infants, Neisser says, 
see what is within their reach, maintain a specific awareness of things that have gone out of 
sight, and distinguish their own actions from those of other individuals. They engage in 
lively social interactions with other people and are aware of the extent to which they 
control those interactions themselves. The fact that these achievements appear in the first 
weeks and months of life makes self-perception especially important: It is the first and 
most fundamental form of self-knowledge. (1993:4) 
Extrinsic factors then, whether they are our fellow humans or our own actions, are in this 
respect an essential part of the constitution of the self. Therefore, for the concept of the 
self, it is necessary to reflect on how the self is co-constituted by its surroundings. The 
possibly rather intriguing lesson of this is that personal identity is maintained, not just as 
an intrinsic, psychological act in the person himself, but in the social world. 
In addition, there is a further element of the concept of self and personal identity that 
needs to be recognized. The self is not something that just exists now, or in the past. We 
also live in a way that has the future built into our lives. We are, as selves, directed 
towards the future, and any kind of planning, whether it is an arrangement for our days of 
retirement, the summer holiday next year, or going to the store for some milk, can be 
performed because we presuppose that we exist as individuals in the time after now. An 
integral part of how our present lives are conducted is due to how we think about, hope 
for, and anticipate the future.1 This kind of self-awareness is different from introspective 
or retrospective acts, as these are directed at the now and the past respectively. Although 
our existence ‘in the future’ might be modelled as an inference from our experience of 
already existing over time (although, as we will see, I believe such a model to be flawed), 
the interesting aspect is how the many different respects in which we can be self-aware 
constitute the self as stretched out from its here and now. Our extended awareness 
constitutes the self across the ‘I’. The self extends from the past, through the now, and into 
the future, and it extends from the inside to the outside (and vice versa). 
Personal identity, then, is modelled in this chapter as stretching out in time and in space. I 
shall model the self as a criss-cross, as an ‘x’, with one line representing the extension in 
time and the other the spatial extension. Any ‘x’, though, has an intersection, a nexus that 
                                              
1 This directedness on the conscious level might reflect the transcendental structure of our consciousness. Husserl 
claims that every conscious moment is in fact a time-extended now, made up of the fundamental triadic structure of 
retention (the just-now)- present (the now) – protention (the anticipated-now). (Husserl 1991) 
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holds the criss-cross together. What is the nexus in the varying aspects, the varying 
concepts, of the self? Having rejected any objectifying approaches, we saw in the previous 
chapter that the mineness in pre-reflective consciousness stood out as a possible candidate. 
In keeping with the criss-cross metaphor, objectifying approaches can only be taken from 
somewhere out on time- and/or spacelines, which would make the intersection 
correspond to what was identified as the minimal self (or more precise, the minimal 
notion of the self). The minimal self is extended and persists through higher order 
functions, such as language, reflection, and narrativity. ‘The extended self’ is a commonly 
employed notion, for instance; both Antonio Damasio and Ulric Neisser use it to express 
how a person’s autobiographical history is actualized in his present persona (Neisser 1988, 
Damasio 1999), thereby focusing on the timeline. 1  The criss-cross model, however, 
merges this aspect with what Neisser calls an interpersonal self, “the person who is 
engaged, here, in this particular human interchange” (Neisser 1988:36) and, lastly, the 
more fundamental co-constitution of the self of extrinsic aspects, such as interpersonal 
relations, social aspects and the use of technology.  
In what remains, I shall look more closely at the lines going out from the intersection, 
that is, to leave the criss-cross metaphor behind, embedded notions of the self. In this chapter, I 
shall explain the concept of embeddedness through three different types of embeddedness. 
The first concerns the relation between ‘nature’ and ‘environment’, because, in my mind, 
‘interdependence’ finds its clearest expression in the writings of Susan Oyama. The 
second type concerns intersubjectivity, the relation between us and others. Finally, I shall 
look into the most important aspect of embeddedness, how the self is not just something 
that has been until now, but is constituted in terms of its own possibilities, in terms of 
what it might become. What we do now is not a mere result of what we have been so far in 
life, we conduct ourselves now in anticipation of what we see ourselves as being able to 
do, to achieve, both in terms of actions that we are able to undertake and in terms of 
what we might achieve in life. Why is this embeddedness? Because the possibilities we see 
ourselves as having are to a large degree related to the possibilities we see in the entities 
that we encounter in our surroundings, in things and in other people. It is in the act of 
creating our own future self that we can find the most proper alternative of reflective and 
memory-based concepts of the self. In other words, our possibilities cannot be reduced to 
being intrinsic features of our mind. 
                                              
1 Neisser later re-christens the extended self the remembered self. (Neisser 1993) 
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What arises from the discussion is a view of self as extended in time and space, which, for 
that reason, is more appropriately named the embedded self. The concept of, but not the 
expression, embeddedness was introduced in Chapter 3, through the discussion of 
Heidegger’s concept of Dasein. In that sense, this chapter proceeds from where that 
chapter ended, by looking at the ‘human existence’ (Dasein) in its dependence on its 
surroundings, in the understanding of the environment itself, the understanding of other 
subjects, and in the understanding of itself as something that has been, is, and will 
become. In this sense, this chapter is about meaning, not as a cognitive, representing, 
internal structure, but as embedded in-the-world, as becoming. 
Embeddedness 1: interdependence 
In the thinking around the relation between ‘the biological world’ and ‘the social world’ 
there is something like, for lack of a better expression, a received view. This expression 
signifies that it is a widespread view, and that it is a view that often is adopted without 
sufficient critical scepticism. The expression also indicates that it signifies a cluster of 
thoughts, which are aligned as a family of attitudes rather than making up a clear-cut 
theory. The received view is the idea that nature and the social are two completely 
different realms, two ontologically differentiated categories, one penetrated by meaningful 
relations, and the other devoid of meaning, merely driven by causal relations. 1  This 
implies that either a) meaning is an epiphenomenon, completely reducible to the causality 
of the meaningless nature, or b) meaning develops as a social phenomenon without being 
anchored in nature, which makes meaning just as mysterious as Descartes’ cogito, and 
causally speaking, equally problematic.  
As we saw in Chapter 3, in order to live successfully in our surroundings, we have to enter 
and master the complexity of meanings in our surroundings. This is, I guess, a somewhat 
trivial observation, and could even be labelled a ‘cultural fact’. However, the same goes 
for a biological existence. All species occupy an ecological niche. An ecological niche is 
the what of the world, and how this what presents itself to an organism belonging to a 
certain species. The ecological niche is not just the world; it is the world in its species-
specific appearance. Ontogenetic development is the development of an organism into an 
ecological niche. In this sense, organisms develop into a world that has a certain meaning 
for its species. I say that the ecological niche involves meaning because the way the 
                                              
1 Without arguing further, my claim is that the ontological dualism is held by both biological and social determinists. 
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environment appears is matched to the physiological, behavioural and cognitive 
characteristics of the species. (Gibson 1986:128f, Uexküll 1982) Items in the niche do not 
appear in any objective sense; they present themselves as having specific values and 
functions for the individual of a certain species. These values and functions are not 
something the individual can choose, or the result of an interpretation; the individual 
must learn to master these to live successfully in its niche. For many animal species, but 
most notably for humans, the ecological niche includes social phenomena. To grasp the 
transition that our species made from a (hypothetical) biological existence to a social one, 
it is required that the meaning gap between nature and culture, between our status as 
evolved, natural creatures and our status as social beings, is bridged, or better, filled. Once 
this is done, we can see that the two categories, ‘biological’ and ‘social’, are idealizations 
that do not reflect the actual lived existence. Therefore, the problem of meaning’s 
seemingly cultural belonging is fallacious. In this section, the alleged gap is questioned 
through the description of the relation between genes and the environment. 
The received view might seem to denote something long since obsolete, and perhaps the 
contrast was accentuated above, but there are research areas where the distinction is 
maintained, at least implicitly. Much attention, from funding-resources to popular media, 
is on genetics and related matters these days, as is seen in the charting of the human 
genome, in research on stem cells, in the (in the public) ill-understood question of 
cloning, and of course in the thriving pharmaceutical business and related research. 
Through the works of Edward O. Wilson (1975) and Richard Dawkins (1976, 1999), 
genetics was combined with ethology, the study of animal behaviour, and the theory of 
evolution to create sociobiology. Sociobiology and its more recent offshoot, evolutionary 
psychology, 1  attempt to understand social actions (goal-directed movements, 
communication, morals, etc.), through what is portrayed as the underlying level, the 
genes. In this sense, sociobiology and evolutionary psychology retain the dichotomy 
between the realms of meaning and the realm that ‘just is’; our social actions are regarded 
as meaningful, while our biological traits are regarded as meaningless (in themselves). 
Dawkins has a number of times stressed that genes just are; they are not good, they are not 
bad (or selfish in any moral understanding of the word), they just do what they do. (See 
for instance Dawkins 1999:9-14) The question is, of course, what exactly do they do? Or 
rather, what are they envisioned as doing? 
                                              
1 See for instance Barkow et al 1995. For a critical view on evolutionary psychology, see Buller 2005. 
2 0 8   S E L F  A N D  S O C I E T Y  
While the received view leaves a problem for our self-understanding, in the sense that it 
creates a not easily mended gap between understanding humans as evolved, natural beings 
and humans as social and cultural beings, sociobiology proposes a well-known mending 
strategy, namely reductionism. Social phenomena must be understood as the expression 
of the activity of genes, that is, as an expression of nature. Social actions like alcoholism 
(Mulligan et al 2006), infidelity (Cherkas et al 2004) and anorexia,1 are reduced to the 
activity of specific, although generally numerous, genes. However, since there was no 
alcohol around when the proposed gene for alcoholism entered the human gene pool or 
any marriages when the infidelity-gene entered, this type of explanation is reductionist not 
only with regards to the actions themselves, but more importantly with regards to the 
meaning of the behaviour of the alcoholic, the infidel husband and the anorexic teenager. 
The kinds of behaviour these genes are presumed to support or influence have changed; 
today they have taken on a new meaning. Consequently, it is much more than a mere set 
of behaviours that are explained or reduced by the genetic link, it is a whole range of 
socially meaningful behaviours. Although the reduction of each specific behaviour might 
seem sound enough, this methodology potentially has a strong implication: the total realm 
of the social is reduced to an expression of genetics. 
Not surprisingly, because of this possible implication sociobiology was fiercely attacked 
from the word go, often for political reasons. (Lewontin et al. 1984, Rose 1997) However, 
a brief glimpse at the tabloids suggests that supporters of sociobiology shrugged off this 
criticism quite successfully; every week now it seems that a new gene for… something has 
been located.2 As we will see, doubts about sociobiology and its foundation are to a 
certain degree warranted, but it should have been the simplified tabloid version that was 
the main target for the attacks. In general, it is the case that actual scientific work is more 
detailed and complex in its explanations and models than a popularized version ever has 
capacity to be, which is also the case for sociobiology. Both Wilson and Dawkins are 
better described as interactionists than greedy reductionists. In fact, there are very few 
examples of a one-to-one correlation between genes and phenotype.3 Such a correlation 
does exist, though: Huntington’s disease is a brain-damaging illness that develops with 
certainty if one has a particular gene (and lives long enough). If a person does not have 
                                              
1 http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/anorexia-nervosa/features/anorexia-bulimia-genetic-code [02.01.2009] 
2 A recent addition, the genetic link for lung cancer: 
http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080402/full/news.2008.733.html [02.01.2009] 
3 Phenotype is the ‘visible’ expression of the genotype, which can encompass possibilities for several phenotypes, as 
the case is with eye colour, where we might have genes coding for both brown and blue eyes. 
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the gene, the illness will not develop, but if it is there, the disease is unavoidable. In most 
cases of ontogenetic development, though, there will be necessary contributions from the 
environment to ‘build’ a phenotype. This is also acknowledged in sociobiology, even if the 
tabloids do not have enough column space to present the full complexity of the relation. 
Now, interaction seems the better option given the alternatives of biological or social 
determinism. But it is not clear how we can go beyond the mere statement of interaction 
to an actual model that explicates the interaction. For instance, how are we to isolate a 
contribution stemming from biology, or from culture, for that matter? This, Susan Oyama 
points out, has proven quite difficult.1 (Oyama 2000:52f) As already mentioned, there is 
no shortage of attempts to propose a genetic base for socially meaningful behaviours. The 
problem is that often an attempt to identify a certain feature as ‘biological’ presupposes a 
prior, and usually implicit or tacit, conception of the biological-social gap. So, these kinds 
of explanations that seemingly attempt to justify a genetic bias are in fact the result of 
having a genetic bias to begin with. (Oyama 2000:3) 
The main problem, the way Oyama sees it, is the uncritical holding of two mistaken ideas 
about interaction in ontogenetic development, the first being that traits are transmitted 
through DNA. (Oyama 2000:21, cf. 27ff) This is not the case, Oyama argues; 
developmental interactants are informational, not by carrying context-independent 
information about phenotypes, but because of their context-bound impact, that is, by 
making a difference through being present in the developmental process. What difference 
this will make, will depend on specific environmental features, not on any inherent 
characteristics in themselves. Consequently, the interactants cannot be said to carry 
specific information. 
However, this idea must be said to already be implied in most evolutionary thinking as 
biologists are more concerned with the variations that can be found due to genetic 
variation than with the similarities that can be found due to genetic similarities. The real 
lesson from this, though, might be a little muddled because of the implicitly held gap of 
the biological versus the environmental. This leads us to the second mistaken idea, namely 
the holding of a developmental duality, that there are two distinct kinds of developmental 
processes, one controlled from the inside and the other from the outside. If the 
understanding of interaction rests on this idea, the world will remain carved up into 
                                              
1 Huntington’s disease is a notable exception, but she does not discuss it, and it does instantiate a rare occurrence. 
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‘innate’ and ‘acquired’ characteristics. (Oyama 2000:21) This, of course, will reinforce the 
nature/social gap ontologically as two foundational and mutually exclusive categories.  
Oyama’s main target is the sociobiological understanding of interaction, but she 
emphasizes that any social reductionism, or socially biased interactionism, is not an option 
either. Actually, at one point she argues that the two seemingly opposite concepts share 
some similar assumptions in a very unlucky manner. 
Much of social constructionism, in fact, not only fails to question these divisions [‘biology’ 
vs. ‘social’] but is actually grounded in them… Indeed, a poignant aspect of some of this 
work is that it often begins with a desire to defend the reality and significance of the social 
against what seems a hypertrophied biology (or individual psychology), but then ends by 
ratifying some of the very beliefs that feed that biology’s unbalanced growth. (2000:16-17) 
In fact, if we are to avoid the ontologization of two fundamentally different categories, 
development must be conceptualized without a cultural or biological bias. 
What we need, according to Oyama, is a radical transformation of some of the key 
concepts involved. First, we need a new conceptualization of causality; DNA is not a 
coded representation of traits and a recipe for building an organism. The causality 
involved in ontogenetic development is non-linear; it is non-reductionist. This means that 
there is no central control of causality, not from the ‘inside’, or from the ‘outside’. 
Instead, development is systemic: its control is multiple, mobile, and distributed. The 
language used in molecular biology is misleading, and indicates that genes are controllers 
of causal relations, with talk about genes that ‘self-replicate’, that engage in ‘gene action’, 
that ‘make’ proteins, that are ‘turned on’ or ‘turned off’ by ‘regulatory’ DNA. Such 
language leads to a picture of development as being controlled in an outward flow of 
information. (Oyama 2000:47) However, as DNA does not ‘do much’ on its own, such 
metaphors conceal the degree to which genes depend on the environment, not only for 
their actual expression, but also as to how they are expressed as a phenotype.  
What is required, according to Oyama, is a different look at the developmental process, 
and not one that merely replaces the causal view with a simple interactionist one. 
“Movement among scales, both of magnitude and time is important: from interaction of 
molecules inside cells to those between persons, from the brief periods involved in the 
action of a hormone in the nervous system to changing relations among conspecifics over 
the life span.” (Oyama 2000:4) No process or relation should be privileged in modelling 
development. Of course, she does not by this discourage delimiting the context by 
focusing on merely one level; restricting oneself to the details on a particular level is 
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necessarily part of what doing actual science is about. But that should not mislead us to 
make ontological claims using the specifics of a limited sub-process as prototypical. 
Further, we also need a different understanding of heredity; heredity involves more than 
passing on DNA to the next generation. According to the so-called central dogma, what 
is inherited is the genotype. The genotype ‘builds an organism’, and the genotype that has 
built itself the best fitted organism wins, and passes on its genotype to the next 
generation. Traits therefore are said to be in the genotype, and are transmitted. But 
claiming this is primarily a consequence of having the wrong assumptions about the 
concept of causality (and transmission). In fact, the totality of what is inherited is both 
innate and external. The external factors can be narrowly or broadly defined, depending 
on the scope of the analysis. 
This should be recognized even in the central dogma: If the genotype is envisioned as 
contributing to an environment, this environment will be around for the next generation. 
This is of course what culture is, the preservation of knowledge, successful techniques, 
language and so on, through other means than the passing on of DNA. Actually, the two-
sidedness of heredity makes it impossible to see biological and cultural evolution as 
separate processes, and it is not sufficient to supply this notion with an ill-defined notion 
of interaction either. “Nature and nurture are… not alternative sources of form and 
causal power. Rather, nature is the product of the processes that are the developmental 
interactions we call nurture.” (Oyama 2000:48) There is no genotype versus phenotype – 
there is only phenotype; what we call nature is already phenotypic and depends on a 
developmental process that includes both genomic and extra-genomic contributions. 
The inherited-acquired distinction, with its different kinds of developmental processes, 
and different sources of form, must therefore be discarded. What passes from one 
generation to the next is an entire system that guards and contributes to development. At 
one point Oyama lists nine such contributors, ranging from the genome, via intra- and 
extracellular chemicals, to the immediate physical environment, climate and food 
resources – indirect (parents) and direct contributions. (Oyama 2000:73f) 
The complex developmental process should therefore be conceptualized differently; 
genetic and environmental factors do not merely interact, they are interdependent. Rather 
than understanding genetic and environmental contributions as a mere statistical 
interactions, where predefined contributors can create predictable results, the 
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contributions are mutually dependent. Interdependence, as we saw it defined in Chapter 
2, implies in this context that genes and environment are more than mere mutual 
constraints for each other’s possible expression; they must be seen as actively defining 
each other. When this is the case, whatever is genetic, or ‘nature’, makes no sense without 
a notion of environmental, and vice versa; none of the categories can be taken as 
fundamental. In fact, rather than denoting something genuinely fundamental and causally 
independent, whatever is labelled ‘genetic’ or ‘environmental’ is, in this view, an 
idealization, certain attributes of a totality taken out of their actual situation. What is 
perceived as a gene, then, is in reality an idealization, embodying much of what actually is 
not genetic, but ‘environmental’ (itself an idealization), as, for instance, in the 
aforementioned genes ‘for’ alcoholism or infidelity. If we can talk at all about information 
in the genes, it is information that only comes into play in an environment. None of the 
categories even exist until they ‘meet’ as a relation of meaning. 
The interdependence of ‘genes’ and ‘environment’ demonstrates a very basic sense of 
embeddedness. Genes, to be genes for something, that is, as having meaning, as being 
distinct, must necessarily be embedded. Articulating something as something means 
holding it up in its embeddedness, but embeddedness does not only concern how we 
conceptualize something’s existence; as we saw, it concerns its very existence. Although 
genes are not important for developing the notion of the embedded self, the structure of 
Oyama’s criticism of traditional biologistic thinking shall follow us throughout this 
chapter. 
Embeddedness 2: intersubjectivity 
Who do I meet when I move around in interpersonal space? How do I meet this who? 
Do I meet ‘the other’ – an impersonal and neutral self, or do I meet ‘doll face’, ‘fat guy’, 
‘the hooligan’, ‘the overly self-conscious dude’, etc – that is, people? Do I have to recognize 
the other as a self before I attribute this self with my prejudices? Or, do I meet the other 
through the prejudices, in the sense that they are a pathway into the other? Are the 
prejudices inferences that presuppose the self, or are they a means for acknowledging the 
others’ self? And what about me, my self, am I prior (for myself) to the other; do I have an 
awareness of myself prior to an awareness of the other as a self? 
In this section I shall look at the relation between the self and other selves. Although the 
question of the self is a question of the ‘I’ – who or what am I, it is also a question about 
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the other – in what respect am I different from the not-I. As we saw in Chapter 5, in 
intentional experiences there is co-givenness of the self and the world. What implications 
does this have on the I-other relation, and what implication does the I-other relation have 
on the concept of the self? In Chapter 3, we saw that our primordial acquaintance with 
the world is of a world where every item is immersed in meaningful connections, praxes, 
and so on. To be able to know every item as an item in itself, an abstraction from the 
actual lived situation is necessary. Does this also have implications for the I-other 
relation?  
The Cartesian understanding of self-knowledge as the basis for all other kinds of 
knowledge implies that knowledge and acquaintance of ‘the other’ are secondary; to 
establish the existence of others, it is necessary first to establish the existence of oneself.1 
However, the mere establishing of oneself as a self does not in itself explain knowledge of 
the other as a self, so how do we, so to speak, go from me to you? Gilbert Ryle contends 
that this problem, often dubbed the problem of other minds, occurs because it is held that the 
only kind of access anyone can have to his own mind is through a privileged, inner 
perception-like access to a private mental realm. (Ryle 1949:13ff) I can only know what 
goes on in my own mind, not in the mind of the other; the only one who has access to 
that mind is the other one, that is, if he has a mind. Can I, then, really know that the other 
is a subject, a self, on par with me? Ryle himself, as we saw in the previous chapter, denies 
that the kind of access we have to our own mind is of the privileged sort. Instead, the 
kind of information that we use to determine the contents of our own mind is accessed 
by observations of our own, publicly available, behaviour. According to Ryle, statements 
about the mind are in reality statements of behaviour and dispositions to behaviour, not 
about some private closed realm. Saying that I believe that it is unwise to drink coffee 
after 7 pm is to say that if I am offered a coffee at 8 pm, I would turn the offer down.2 
Structurally, then, the access to our own mind is the same as the access we have 
concerning the status of an other and his mind. (Ryle 1949:90, 179ff) There should be no 
                                              
1 Descartes himself does not discuss how we can know that others are cogitos as well. Some sporadic remarks indicate 
that he is content with the definition of human beings as the only animal that has a mind. Recognizing others as 
human beings (mainly on the basis of the use of language), then, is evidence enough for Descartes. (Avrimides 1996) 
2 Besides being phenomenologically unconvincing, the common argument against how philosophical behaviourism 
explains mentality is that such an explanation would require other mental terms. For example, in saying that coffee 
should not be drunk after 7 pm, it must be because I believe that late coffee consumption would keep me up at night, 
and further, that I do not want to be kept up at night, and further still, that this is because I think I need a good night’s 
sleep, which is because I want to perform well in the morning, etc. Logical behaviourism, attempting an elimination 
of mental states, does not seem to escape from this regress. (Searle 2004:53) 
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more mystery about other minds than of our own minds, according to Ryle, and claiming 
otherwise would be to be tangled up in the Cartesian Myth, which Ryle calls the 
conviction that our mind is private.  
Ryle’s and other kinds of eliminative strategies about the mind aside, for those accepting 
that there is more to the mind than statements about behaviour and dispositions to such, 
the certified existence of other minds does pose a challenge. However, in terms of recent 
cognitive psychology this is not questioned the way a philosopher might question the 
existence of other minds, but is a question of how we get to know the other ‘body’s’ mind. 
It is the case that we very often successfully understand and predict another person’s 
behaviour, the question is: how is this done? A widespread idea is that we all employ a 
‘theory of mind’ (ToM) that enables us to explain and predict the behaviour of others. 
ToM is not a scientific or philosophical theory, but a kind of common-sense psychology 
often called ‘folk psychology’, and seen as “an implicit naïve theory”. (Gopnik and 
Wellman 1994:257) The crux of ToM, which is quite the opposite of behaviourism, is that 
explanations and predictions of behaviours are undertaken by appealing to knowledge or 
acquaintance of our own mental states. It is this knowledge that amounts to the theory of 
mind that we subsequently can apply to others. 
There are two prevailing approaches to the hows and the whys of ToM, the theory-theory 
of mind and the simulation theory of mind.1 What these approaches have in common is 
that our access to the other’s mind is indirect. The approaches differ in what it is that we 
consult in gaining knowledge about the other’s mind. The theory-theory (TT) holds that 
we understand “other minds by implicitly employing a theoretical stance… [that] involves 
postulating the existence of mental states in others”. (Gallagher 2001:83, my emphasis) 
That is, in explaining and predicting behaviour we appeal to beliefs, desires, motives, 
intentions and other mental states in the other. Such mental states are represented as 
concepts in our ToM. According to TT, the concepts we have are generated against the 
background of what we experience in the world, including both what we can observe 
around us and what we experiences ‘inside’ us. In other words, ToM might be socially 
influenced, although this influence is constrained by innate structures of our cognitive 
system. (Moses 2005:12) Nevertheless, the employment of ToM is internal to our own 
                                              
1 There are some others, as well. (Moses 2006:12) These can be seen as variations and mixtures of TT and ST in the 
sense that they share assumptions about the relation between mind and world that I shall discuss shortly. 
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mind; in applying this ToM to another person’s behaviour we infer from the observed 
behaviour to the concepts in our ToM. 
In its dependence on concepts and in assuming a theoretical stance, TT postulates our 
understanding of others’ minds as a rather advanced cognitive task.1 In fact, it is thought 
that a child does not have a proper ToM until approximately at the age of four, when it is 
able to understand the difference between its own and another’s state of belief about a 
particular feature of the world. (Gopnik and Wellman 1994:264, Gallagher 2001:83f) 
Before this, a child has conceptions of perceptions and desires, but these are totally 
reorganized when the concept of belief is fully developed. As Gopnik and Wellman 
express it, explanations and predictions might be successful prior to the age of four, also, 
but they will be incorrect from an adult’s point of view because they are not founded in 
belief attributions. (1994:264) That is to say, TT postulates the theoretical stance as a 
conceptual holism that is consulted when we attribute mental causes in understanding 
others behaviour, and changes in or the introduction of a new aspect, that is, concept, 
into this whole brings along changes in other concepts. (Hutto 2005:59) 
The simulation-theory (ST) postulates a less theoretically inclined mentality in the 
explaining and predicting of others’ behaviours. As the name implies, the accomplishment 
of understanding a foreign mentality is due to a (mental) simulation of what oneself 
would experience or think in a situation that is similar to the one we are observing. I 
pretend (usually implicitly) that I am the other person in that specific situation, assess 
(usually implicitly) how my reactions would be and apply (explicitly) this to the other 
person. The reason that I am able to explain and predict another person’s behaviour is 
that I use my own mentality as a model for the other person’s mentality. (Gallagher 
2001:84) Instead of appealing to and applying a theoretical construct about minds in 
general (the theoretical ToM that TT postulates). I simulate an experience in imagining 
being in a similar specific situation. However, ST still requires conceptualizations in the 
sense that to understand the other as having specific mental states we must be able to 
differentiate between our own (simulated) mental states. In this sense, ST is not an 
alternative to the cognitivist leanings of TT; as mentioned above, an important common 
trait of TT and ST is that we explain and predict the other person’s behaviour in an 
indirect manner. The main difference is that TT sees the mental construct that we consult 
                                              
1 The knowledge of our own in similarly mediated by theory, but I shall not go into that here. See previous chapter. 
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as a theory in its own right, while ST sees the mental construct as being situation- and 
person-specific.1 
In that respect, TT and ST have certain similarities with an older argument for the 
relation between the self and the other, namely the argument from analogy. Consequently, 
they also share some of the problems with this argument. The argument was raised as a 
direct response to the Cartesian understanding of self-knowledge.2 The argument goes 
something like this, using a by now familiar dichotomy between me and the other: While 
having direct access to my own mental life, all I can see of another’s inner mental 
capacities is his outer bodily and linguistic behaviour. The reason I think that there is a 
mentality, conscious experiences, behind that behaviour is that I connect my own body 
and my own behaviour to my own conscious experiences. I know I have a mentality, so I 
assume that the same goes for the other body as well. If I feel hot, and want to cool down, 
and believe that having an ice cream will do the trick, I buy an ice cream. If I observe 
another person buying an ice cream, I suppose that that person does this because he wants 
one and perhaps for many of the same reasons as I. If not those reasons specifically then 
at least for reasons that are similar in form: I bought the ice cream because I was hot, he 
might just have a craving for something sweet, but what triggers his ice cream buying 
behaviour is a belief that an ice cream will answer this craving. I am able, then, to explain 
(and predict) another person’s behaviour in terms of beliefs, motivations and desires. The 
analogy argument is similar to TT in that we infer from publicly observed behaviour 
about the closed up and hidden (presumed) mind of the other. The similarity to ST 
consists in using knowledge of our own mentality as the model for what we explain and 
predict about the other’s mind. (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008:181) 
The main problem with the analogy argument is that if I accept the Cartesian pre-
supposition, there is no way I can ever know that the other person has conscious 
experiences, or is a self; this will always remain a conjecture. Searle points out an obvious 
shortcoming of the analogy argument:  
If I ask everybody in the room to put their thumbs on a desk and I go around pounding 
each thumb with a hammer to see which ones, if any, hurt; it turns out that as far as I can 
                                              
1 For more on important differences between TT and ST from a TT point of view, see Gopnik and Wellman 
1994:275-280, and from an ST point of view, see Hutto 2005. 
2 Although Descartes perhaps implicitly held a version of the analogy argument, through language use (see note 1, 
page 213), John Stuart Mill is often thought to be the originator of the actual argument, although his argument might 
better be labelled inductive rather than analogical. (Thomas 2001:508) 
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observe there is only one thumb that hurts, the one I call mine. But when I hit the other 
thumbs, there is no feeling at all. (2004:20) 
This holds for any kind of observable behaviour. I can observe all kinds of behaviours 
around me, but the only behaviour that elicits any conscious experiences is performed by 
my own body (cf. Ryle 1949:14f). So, instead of assuring us of the mentality and the 
selfhood of others, the argument seems to do the opposite; to confirm the solipsism that 
threatens the Cartesian self-knowledge. 
The reason for this is that the argument from analogy involves circularity: Only if we see a 
type of behaviour as expressing a specific kind of mentality can we interpret this type of 
behaviour as ‘evidence’ for the presence of that kind of mentality in another body. Max 
Scheler points out that the only valid conclusion I can draw from perceiving a behaviour 
that is similar to my expressive behaviour is that I myself am present. (1954:240f) If I 
instead conclude that the behaviour of the other body indicates the presence of an other 
mind, it can only be because I already assume that the other body has a mind that the 
behaviour is expressing. In this sense, the argument from analogy presupposes what it 
sets out to explain, and, as such, “can never establish the existence of other conscious 
individuals”.1 (Scheler 1954:241) 
The circularity of the argument from analogy makes it evident that it can only be 
proposed by someone taking for granted the thesis about the mind as something that is 
hidden inside each (human) body. Consequently, to base our belief in the existence of 
other minds on inference from behaviour, that is, as regarding bodily and linguistic 
behaviour as being separated in nature from mentality, will never enable us to know for 
certain that another body harbours a mind like ours. The entry to the other’s mind 
therefore becomes a question of knowledge, and of how to go about attaining this knowledge 
properly. This is evident in the cases of those who deal with the solution to the problem 
of other minds in terms of a ToM.2 (Cf. Gallagher 2001:91) Both TT and ST assume that 
knowledge of the other’s mind is in fact knowledge of our theory-theory or our simulation; 
                                              
1 Another weakness of the analogical inference is that the behaviours that enable us to infer another’s mentality rarely 
or never are identical to our own, but are variations. (Scheler 195:240) The conscious experiences, however, are said 
to be the same: pain, joy, desire. Scheler also points out that perceiving behaviours can generate only specific 
assumptions about the mentality of an other, such as ‘he can remember A’, ‘he perceives B’, ‘he desires C’, etc. In 
other words we cannot, without doing a further, inductive, inference, conclude that the other is, indeed, a self, that is, 
that he is equipped with mentality in a general sense. In fact, the way Scheler sees it, it is the presence of a general 
mentality that is presupposed when we attributing specific conscious episodes in another person based on analogical 
reasoning. 
2 See Meltzoff and Brooks 2001:174 for a blatant analogy argument for knowledge of the other’s mind. 
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we do not encounter the other’s mentality directly, we are confined to conjectures about 
it. However, is our assurance in other minds a mode of knowledge; is the existence of the 
other self really an epistemological question? I return to this question in the next section.  
As we saw, Scheler’s critique of the classical argument from analogy is that the position 
from which we carry out the analogical inference presupposes that we are in the presence 
of another mind. For TT and ST, the same applies, and Shaun Gallagher points to several 
abilities that must be in place for a subject to begin its theorizing about or simulation of 
the mind of another: 
[A]n understanding of what it means be an experiencing subject; … an understanding of 
what it means that certain kinds of entities (but not others) in the environment are indeed 
such subjects; and… an understanding that in some way these entities are similar to and in 
other ways different to oneself. Furthermore, to form a theory about or to simulate what 
another person believes or desires, we already need to have specific pre-theoretical 
knowledge about how people behave in particular contexts. (2001:90) 
These aspects concern the ontogenetic angle of the problem of other minds; how we 
acquire the ability to simulate or form a theory-theory. This is in contrast to the question 
we looked at above, which concerns the nature of online reasoning. Due to the cognitivist 
nature of the online reasoning system presupposed by TT and ST, the ontogenetic 
question is investigated in terms of the development of concepts and of the ability to 
differentiate between mental acts, often amounting to a discussion of innate versus 
learned (proto-) concepts and abilities of our mentality. (Gopnik and Wellman 1994:264-
267, Meltzoff and Brooks 2001, Malle 2005, Hutto 2005) That is to say, the investigations 
into primary forms of intersubjectivity take as their perspective the same cognitivism that 
is reflected in the explanations of the adult level. Consequently, the investigations into the 
pre-conceptual stage are mentally biased, and the direction in the developmental stories is 
towards a fully-fledged adult mentality. 
An example that displays this clearly is found in Bertram Malle’s (2005) description of the 
development of the intentionality concept from a TT perspective.1 Malle first points out 
that infants at the age of 9 to 18 months learn to distinguish between intentional and 
unintentional behaviour. Since the infant has no mental intentionality concept yet, it finds 
the meaning of this distinction in the context of the behaviour: 
[T]he degree of movement ‘smoothness’ as a symptom of the agent’s control (compare 
walking down the stairs versus falling down the stairs); characteristic accompanying 
                                              
1 As we will see, this is an entirely different concept of intentionality from the one discussed in Chapter 3; instead of 
the directedness of consciousness, it is the goal-directedness of behaviour that is under discussion. 
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behaviors (e.g., head turning, eye gaze); the connection and manipulation of objects in the 
world; equifinality (the principle that intentional agents pursue their goals along multitude 
paths, trying a different path when the first one failed); and characteristic agent responses 
at the end of the behavior (e.g., ‘there!’ or a happy face with an intentional action; ‘oops’ or 
an unhappy face with an unintentional action). (Malle 2005:28-9) 
The infant displays understanding and grasp of intentionality, but “[a]s far as we know, 
intentionality is not ‘mentalized’ at this early age”. (Malle 2005:29) Later, however, 
between the age of 2 and 4 years, this understanding of intentionality takes on another 
form, when it is a) ‘mentalized’, that is, represented as a mental concept, and b) ‘paired’ 
with other mental concepts. This enables an advanced understanding that considers an 
action as intentional “only when the agent has desire for an outcome, beliefs about the 
action that leads to the outcome, an intention to perform the action, and awareness of 
fulfilling this intention while acting”. (Malle 2005:29, my emphases) Mentalization is 
required for evolving a mental framework, that is, a synthesis of the mental concepts 
(which all have been grasped pre-conceptually on an earlier stage) deemed necessary for 
the display of the smooth, advanced interactive behaviour that older children, adolescents 
and adults display. 
This frame allows the powerful inference that whenever an action is intentional 
(presumably judged, like the infant does, on the basis of cues other than mental states), 
there must be the involvement of various mental states, most notably beliefs and desires 
that provide the reasons for acting. (Malle 2005:29) 
This is to say that we, unconsciously, make inferences (or, in the case of ST, mental 
simulations) involving other mental aspects in all cases of assessments of intentional 
behaviour. This is true not only when we ‘stop’ and reflect on a specific situation, as in 
bewilderment about a person’s reasons for doing something, but in all cases of ascribing 
intentions behind behaviours. 
For Gallagher, this approach is entirely wrong because it implies that we do not 
communicate or interact directly with each other but indirectly: “one’s understanding 
involves a retreat into a realm of theoria or simulacra, into a set of internal mental 
operations that come to be expressed (externalized) in speech, gesture or interaction”. 
(Gallagher 2001:93) Although more reflective forms of thinking about the other’s ways of 
thinking and evaluating are not excluded but are seen as frequently used – Gallagher calls 
them “specialized and relatively rare modes of understanding others” (2001:94), typical 
social and communicative interaction, according to Gallagher, is direct and external. In 
this respect, our normal interactions, although much more complex, are not unlike that of 
a child, using contextual information as the cue for determining the intentions, the desires 
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and beliefs of others. If this is the case, we should “think of communicative interaction as 
being accomplished in the very act of speech, gesture and interaction itself”. (Gallagher 
2001:93) 
This statement entails a number of things, but it is important to note that it presupposes 
that mind and body are not separated in the manner of the Cartesian tradition; contrary to 
ToM, Gallagher does not regard communication as something that happens between two 
Cartesian minds. (2001:93) Instead, the mind is associated with the body, as being in the 
body, and vice versa. The mind is not hidden behind the appearance of the body; the 
appearance of the body is the co-appearance of the mind – perceiving a body is to 
perceive a mind.1 Rather than regarding the development of persistently more proficient 
abilities for social interaction as a mentalizing of meaning, it should be regarded a process 
of the embodiment of meaning. 
This means that what Gallagher proposes is not a form of eliminativism, where we stop 
using terms for the mental. Rather, inspired by Jean-Paul Sartre (2003:370), he requests 
that we associate mental terms with bodily behaviours: Sadness is not merely a state of 
mind – it is in the tears, joy is in the rolling laughter, and pain is in the arm movement 
that in a caring way puts a Band-Aid on a scrape. Expressive behaviours like “screaming 
in pain, laughing with joy, or growling with anger”, are also recognized by Malle as being 
“sufficiently transparent so that the perceiver who uncovers their meaning gets by 
without any mental state inferences”. (2005:29) In addition there are “basic human 
movements, such as reaching, grasping, walking, standing up, and lying down” (Malle 
2005:30), which, like expressive behaviours, are “embedded functionally in physical 
contexts”. (Malle 2005:30) That is, their meaning can be contextually grasped. However, 
as we saw above, this way of grasping meaning is seen by Malle as a transitional phase, or 
building blocks for the mental apparatus to fall into place. Once that is accomplished, this 
form of comprehension is transcended and abandoned in favour of a theory of minds in 
general. 
Gallagher objects to this and claims that it is simply not a correct way of describing our 
(adult) social interactions. A non-mentalist biased investigation of social interactions will 
disclose that our ordinary ways of acting are much more in line with the expressive 
behaviours as described by Malle. Rather than being fringe phenomena, such behaviours 
                                              
1 This means that an expression like ‘co-appearance’ is deceiving, implying that mind and body are separated. 
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are the norm, and comprise several more forms that the semi-hysterical ones that Malle 
includes. More subtle aspects, such as intonation, posture, eye movement and gesture and 
so on are also effective in ‘revealing’ our mentality. In interaction with others, we 
normally take our cues from the directly perceptible aspects of the situation that we and 
the others are in. Usually, Gallagher claims, this is sufficient for communication to 
proceed successfully. However, sometimes it breaks down, and we need to take a 
reflective standpoint towards the communication, the situation it is situated in and the 
persons we are interacting with to grasp what is going on.1 That, however, does not imply 
that a reflective standpoint is always used in social interactions. Not only, then, should we 
stop regarding the mind as closed and hidden, we should also give up the converse 
prejudice, namely to regard the body as a purely physical and mechanical system, as an 
object that is in need of a subject to function. It is not the case that the body, an object, 
reveals (or hides) a subject, the mind. The body is both object and subject; the mind is 
both object and subject. The mind is not in the body, it is the body. 
It seems to me that this discussion revolves around whether we should see the data from 
developmental psychology as supporting a theory that claims that an ‘open’ and 
embedded organism turns into a ‘closed’, representing mind at a later stage. Perhaps we 
should better regard the organism, that is, us, as a combination of ‘open’ and ‘closed’, as 
being partly ‘outwardly’ directed and partly ‘inwardly’ directed? Conceptualizing social and 
communicative interactions in the ‘open’ manner leads us from the passive mode of TT 
and ST, which sees us as being unable not to go through the representing motions to 
interact with and understand others. Instead we could regard our role in an interaction in 
an active mode, where we ourselves, based on the situational requirements, control the 
extent of mental reasoning and mental simulation that is necessary to obtain the 
knowledge we need to ‘get abreast’ of the situation. 
Although Gallagher discusses embodied meaning, this consideration also has implications 
for how we model representations, if we still want to grant theory construction and 
simulation a role in social interactions, as when we need to take a more reflective 
perspective. Sometimes it might come in handy to rehearse a way of reasoning without 
                                              
1 It is no accident that this sentence contains a not-so-hidden reference to Heidegger’s description of the breakdown 
of the hammer that takes us from a state of practicality to a state of theoretical interest (cf. Chapter 3). Gallagher is in 
a likewise manner inspired by phenomenological theories, in the text referenced here especially Scheler and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, and, as we shall see in the following section, Heidegger. For much more on the embodied nature of 
aspects that we normally associate with mentality see Gallagher 2005. 
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forming a theory of an agent’s desires; if a student makes a mistake in a logics assignment, 
do we need to make a representation of this student’s desires to figure out how he 
reasoned? Other times, we consider a person’s desire without taking his beliefs into 
consideration. If I perceive a friend of mine grabbing a donut, I figure that this is because 
he desires it, or at least desires something sweet or is merely looking for a snack, I do not 
stop to wonder whether this is tangled up in a belief that eating a donut will ease his 
craving; is it even tangled up in his own evaluations of the situation? If such aspects are 
not necessary for my conscious assessment of the intersubjective situation I am in, for the 
pragmatic grasp of this situation, why should we use mental and physical resources to 
construct implicit representations that are not required? If we grant that reflection 
demands of us the formation of some kinds of representations, it is still not given that 
these representations are of the kind presumed by ToM theorists. While the passive mode 
of the ToM sees us as forming representations (or more precisely, as representations 
being formed) of the entire mental repertoire (beliefs, desire, intentions, awareness etc) in 
all communicative interactions, the active mode sees us as forming contextually dependent 
representations based on the requirements of the specific situation. As Gallagher puts it: 
Even to the extent that evaluation becomes reflective, it is more like an embedded 
reflection on possible actions… than a detached consideration of mental states. Rather 
than drawing up a theory about a particular situation, or taking an objective, observational 
stance toward the other person, we have the capacity for measuring it up in pragmatic 
terms. (2001:95) 
As we saw in Chapter 3, we are in-the-world and display certain interests, certain values 
and concerns. Why should this not also be reflected in the physiological and cognitive 
system in the sense of accommodating the use of the corresponding cognitive resources? 
Our encounters with the world in general, and other subjects included, is not theoretical, 
it is primordially pragmatic.  
Embeddedness 3: the social primordial: das Man 
Gallagher maintains that if we consider our experiences in encountering other people we 
can find no trace of the implicit and subconscious processes hypothesized by ToM. This 
is not a denial that such processes are at work; even in our direct encounters we of course 
depend on cognitive resources. It is rather to say that a) they do not constitute the full 
extent of our actual experiences of the other, which in some cases might be accomplished 
without constructing mental representations (or at least with different kinds of 
representations than presupposed) of the other’s mentality, and b) as we saw in regard to 
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the argument from analogy, they presuppose an already constituted relation with the other 
as an Other. I cannot discuss the first point here,1 but in regard to the last point, I asked 
earlier whether intersubjectivity and the question of other minds really form an 
epistemological question, that is, should we base our trust in the existence of other minds 
in what we are able to know about them? Having the Cartesian ‘I’ in mind (…), this seems 
to be the only option, even the existence of ‘I’ is argued for in terms of being an object of 
infallible knowledge. The method and the ontology are closely connected here. Above all, 
the method Descartes undertakes in finding what he cannot doubt is driven by the 
securing of knowledge. (Descartes 1984:9-15, cf. 127) But the reason we 
(epistemologically) cannot say for sure that other minds exist is due to the ontological 
mind-body dualism; as long as the mind is regarded as being hidden ‘behind’ the 
appearance of the body, we cannot achieve infallible knowledge about minds other than 
our own. However, it is important to note that it is because of the method that Descartes 
reaches the mind-body dualism. Therefore, if we cannot accept the ontological 
consequence of the epistemologically driven method we should not accept the method 
leading up to it either, and this is why it is important to ask whether the question of the 
existence of other minds is a question of knowledge at all.  
A line of critique concerning the knowledge-based approach to other minds has certain 
similarities to Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s perception-based approach to 
intentionality that I discussed in Chapter 3. Heidegger criticized Husserl for not taking the 
question of being into (proper) consideration in his account of (intentional) objects, and, 
as the preceding discussion displays, being is not considered in the ToM accounts of 
(other) subjects either, but is taken for granted. We saw earlier that the prerequisite for 
intentionality is that we (Dasein) and the intentional object both are in-the-world. What 
this means is that Dasein finds itself in a primordial mode of being-alongside entities. 
These entities present themselves as readiness-to-hand, as being related to our concerns, 
which implies that subject and object are linked not as a subject facing an object, but as 
joined in concernful activity. The subject-object relation that characterizes intentionality 
the way Heidegger reads Husserl as describing it, on the other hand, is between the 
subject and an object in its presence-at-hand, that is, in its objectivity, the way the intentional 
object appears in terms of itself. As we saw, presence-at-hand depends on the entity’s 
                                              
1 Alternative ways of modelling representations in (general) behaviour can be found for instance in Clark 1997 
(Chapter 8), Clark and Chalmers 1998. 
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readiness-to-hand, thereby making our relating to objects presuppose the more 
fundamental mode of being-alongside them.  
Being-alongside, however, is not the only fundamental mode of Dasein’s Being as being-
in-the-world. Edgar C. Boedeker Jr. describes being-alongside as one of three existential 
perspectives belonging to Dasein in this thrownness into-the-world. 1  (2001:68f) The 
existential perspective of being-alongside expresses the relation with intraworldly 
equipmental entities. The other two existential perspectives are also relational modes of 
being-in-the-world, directed towards whatever else we in our thrownness find ourselves 
among (not in a spatial manner, of course): a) other Daseins and b) Dasein itself. 
(Heidegger 1962:169/131) Dasein’s existential perspective to other Daseins is being-with, 
and to oneself being-one’s-self. 
By calling it an existential perspective, Boedeker wants to convey that it is “a distinctive 
stance that Dasein can take in its encounters with entities”. (2001:69) Although Dasein in 
its thrownness is directed towards other entities, the perspective should not be 
understood as perceiving or looking at other entities. This is clear from the discussion of 
the relation Dasein has to the entities it finds itself being-alongside, and the same applies 
to those entities that we find ourselves as being-with (and also of the stance we have 
toward ourselves). That is, just as it is not the case that we primordially are in-the-world as 
a subject facing objects (entities in their presence-at-hand), it is not the case that we 
primordially are in-the-world in the sense of a subject facing other subjects. The subject-
subject relation presupposes the more fundamental mode of being-with. As we shall see, 
the interrelation between the three existential perspectives will be important in 
conceptualizing the self, the subject, as embedded.  
However, encountering other Daseins means encountering something that is of a 
fundamentally different kind than things. (Heidegger 1962:154/118) Contrary to ToM, 
Heidegger holds that the distinction between a thing and another person is not something 
we need to infer to establish. Instead, we ‘recognize’ another Dasein as a Dasein 
immediately and non-inferentially. This is important to emphasize, because according to 
                                              
1 Boedeker claims that the English phrase ‘being-alongside’ (Sein-bei) is too spatial and implies a passive mode of 
being among entities. He suggests ‘being-at’, inspired by expressions like ‘at work’, ‘at the wheel’ and ‘at it again’. 
(2001:94 n19) I agree about the passivity of ‘alongside’, but find ‘being-at’ problematic because of the expression is 
too similar to ‘presence-at-hand’. Joan Stambaugh translates Sein-bei with ‘being-together-with’ in her translation of 
Being and Time. (Heidegger 1996:51/54) 
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ToM, prior to the appropriate inference to the mind of the other person, there can be no 
initially perceived or grasped difference between a thing and a person. Differentiating 
between a robot and a human being, for instance, involves first perceiving these two 
entities as objects, evaluating their behaviour, and then concluding that one of them has a 
mind and is a human being, while the other, the robot, does not and consequently is not 
human.1 In other words, ToM presumes the priority of oneself as separated from the 
Other. Instead of attempting to answer the resulting problem of how this separation can 
be bridged, how to align the ‘I’ with the Other, Heidegger rejects this presumption and in 
doing so turns the problem on its head. Rather than starting with an isolated ‘I’ and then 
wondering how we can attain a glimpse into the mind of the Other, he claims that we for 
most part exist ‘integrated’ with this Other, and that the Dasein only emerges as an ‘I’ 
(and simultaneously, the others as Others) out from this ‘unity’, which he calls das Man. 
Therefore, the ‘I’ is not ontologically prior to the Other, but neither is the Other prior to 
the ‘I’. 
Dasein, then, is primordially not separated from other Daseins, but is absorbed in a 
fellowship without questioning, or having the need for questioning whether the other is a 
subject in the same sense as oneself (cf. Gallagher’s comments in the section above). Of 
course, physically we are separate entities, but we act, we speak and we think as if on behalf 
of a community. Das Man has been translated in a variety of ways, pointing in different 
directions, but a helpful way of understanding the concept is to see it in terms of social 
norms and conventions for conduct, speech and so on, or at least, that das Man is expressed 
as such.2 Regarding it this way conveys plainly that we see, think about and act in the world 
in a manner that is deeply influenced by das Man while still being ‘one’s own Dasein’. In a 
sense, then, in our everyday life we are as immersed in das Man when we interact with the 
Other as we are immersed in readiness-to-hand when we interact with equipment. 
                                              
1 If we imagine a sufficiently advanced robot, the observer will not discover that it is without a mind because it can 
display an outer behaviour that is indistinguishable from a human being. This possibility, explored in films like Blade 
Runner and Terminator, has led to the philosophical zombie: the creature that conducts himself behaviourally and 
cognitively on par with human beings, but which lacks any conscious experiences. (Chalmers 1996:94-99) It is also 
safe to say that this possibility displays the weakness of the argument from analogy, as it clearly shows that the 
argument presupposes the very thing it is supposed to provide us with; the belief in the existence of other minds.  
2 Das Man is in both translations of Being and Time translated with ‘the They’, but this obviously imply that the ‘I’ is 
integrated with ‘the Others’, when it is better to regard it as that in which both ‘I’ and the Other primordially reside. 
Outside Being and Time a variety of choices can be seen; in Heidegger 1992, ‘the Anyone’ is used, Dreyfus (1991) 
prefers ‘the one’, while for instance Boedeker keeps the German expression. As the expression is easily translatable 
in Norwegian (‘slik skal man ikke gjøre det’, ‘hadde man bare visst det’, etc are some of the expressions where the 
word ‘man’ is used similarly in German and Norwegian), I have chosen to keep the German expression. 
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This does not mean that we do not see or detect the Others and act as one with them as a 
sort of collective. That is not the case, and in fact, for the most part, the Others are 
differentiated as being indifferent to us; we pass them by, ignore them, reckon that we 
have no need for them, or do not want to have anything to do with them – states of mind 
that Heidegger calls Indifferent modes. (1962:161/124) But, being alone or being apart 
means ‘being-apart-from’, and therefore presupposes being-with in an analogous fashion 
to how present-at-hand (the thing in its own) presupposes readiness-to-hand (the thing in 
a context). As Heidegger puts it, “Not only is Being towards Others an autonomous, 
irreducible relationship of Being; this relationship, as Being-with, is one which, with 
Dasein’s Being, already is.” (Heidegger 1962:162/125) Put differently, it is not the 
attendance to another Dasein that constitutes him as an Other Dasein (or ourselves as a 
Dasein, for that matter), because even in the total absence of Other Daseins is the being-
with presupposed; we are, as Daseins, constituted in the mode of Being-with. 
Dasein’s being-alone is a being-with in the world. Being-alone is only a deficiency of being-
with – the other is absent – which points directly to the positive character of being-with… 
The other can be absent only insofar as my Dasein is itself being-with. The absence of the 
other is a modification of the being of my very Dasein and as such is a positive mode of 
my being; only as being-with can Dasein be alone. (Heidegger 1992:238) 
In other words, it is not because there is an Other Dasein beside me that intersubjectivity 
is constituted, it is because Dasein is constituted in a mode of intersubjectivity, as being-
with, that Others can be beside me or be absent from me.1 
The belonging of Dasein (and Others) to das Man is in our everyday dealings prior to the 
separateness from it. Consequently, the meaning of our actions, spoken words and 
thoughts transcends the physical and psychological entities that we all are, and 
understanding others (and ourselves) can only be achieved by understanding the further 
social context in which we all belong. It is in this sense that Heidegger regards das Man as 
the true subject of our everyday actions. 
In the sphere of its possibilities of being, each is totally the other. It is here that the peculiar 
‘subject’ of everydayness – the Anyone [das Man] – first has its total domination. The public 
being-with-one-another is lived totally from this Anyone. We take pleasure and enjoy 
ourselves as one takes pleasure and we read and judge about literature as one judges, we hear 
music as one hears music, we speak about something as one speaks. This Anyone, who is no 
                                              
1 In this sense, the problem of other minds, as explored in ToM and similar approaches, grows out of the possibility 
of being-alone. More precisely, it appears because we do not realize (or forget) that being-alone depends on being-
with, so this is the sense in which Heidegger turns the problem on its head as mentioned above (cf. Heidegger 
1962:161/124). 
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one in particular and ‘all’ are, though not as a sum, dictates the mode of being of everyday 
Dasein. (Heidegger 1992:245, cf. 1962:164/126f) 
Being absorbed in das Man is the case both in our everyday dealings with other people and 
in the constitution of the self as a person. In other words, the task for a theory about 
intersubjectivity is not to investigate into how Dasein and the Others can be aligned 
(through being assured that the Other is indeed a subject, just like me), but to investigate 
how one Dasein breaks out from the social way of being, das Man, and becomes a subject, 
a self.1 Therefore, we do not need to search for criteria regarding how to recognize what 
was initially perceived as a ‘thing’ is instead a person, but criteria for how we are able to 
perceive ourselves as different from the others. 
Despite the differences between perceiving a thing and another Dasein, I want to 
mention two important parallels in how Heidegger sees Dasein’s being-alongside and 
Dasein’s being-with. First, Being-with and Being-alongside are two different modes of 
Being-in-the-world. As such, as has been discussed in the last couple of pages, we do not 
first find ourselves as a subject or an ‘I’ and thereupon enter into a relationship with 
objects or other ‘I’s’, but find ourselves in our thrownness as already being in a relation 
with things and other ‘I’s’. In fact, we most often encounter the other through our 
practical dealings with things. That is, in equipment there lies a reference not merely to 
other pieces of equipment, but also to Others: 
[W]hen material is put to use, we encounter its producer or ‘supplier’ as one who ‘serves’ 
well or badly. When, for example, we walk along the edge of a field but ‘outside it’, the field 
shows itself as belonging to such-and-such a person, and decently kept up by him; the 
book we have used was bought at So-and-so’s shop and given by such-and-such a person, 
and so forth. The boat anchored at the shore is assigned in its Being-in-itself to an 
acquaintance who undertakes voyages with it; but even if it is a ‘boat which is strange to 
us’, it still is indicative of Others. (Heidegger 1962:153-4/117-8) 
Through equipment, Others (and oneself) are assigned to the context in the sense of 
having roles and tasks, for instance, as producer, as farmer, as boatman. Although we 
encounter the Other through being attentive to concernful activity, we do not meet him 
                                              
1 Dasein absorbed in das Man lives what Heidegger calls an inauthentic life, not necessarily implying the negative 
connotations of this expression. (Heidegger 1962:220/176, cf. 68/42f) It is important to note that Dasein reaching 
the authentic life does not coincide with Dasein discovering itself as someone other than the Other, because “even in 
its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity – when busy, when excited, when interested, 
when ready for enjoyment”. (Heidegger 1962:68/43) While Dasein’s co-being with things is characterized by concern 
(cf. Chapter 3), our being-with with other Daseins is characterized by solicitude, a caring for. Solicitude is expressed as a 
mixture of inauthentic care, called ‘leaping-in’, which is marked by a mistrust of and domination over each other, and 
authentic care, called ‘leaping-ahead’, which is marked by a helpful approach to the liberation of Dasein itself. 
(Heidegger 1962/158f/122) I shall try to convey the embeddedness of the self without dwelling on the 
inauthenticity/authenticity axis, but see footnotes below. 
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thematized as an Other; the roles are anonymous. It is the common activity that is 
primary, thinking of the Other or ourselves as a Dasein only comes later. As being 
engaged in common activity, the Other is encountered as manufacturer of the equipment, 
or he can be in the target group of what we produce, or maybe as a co-worker, with us in 
a joint project. It is through activity, in our practical roles that an awareness of ourselves 
as being apart from the Other emerges. 
[T]here is constant care as to the way one differs from [the Others], whether that difference 
is merely one that is to be evened out, whether one’s own Dasein has lagged behind the 
Others and wants to catch up in relationship to them, or whether one’s Dasein already has 
some priority over them and sets out to keep them suppressed. (Heidegger 1962:163-
4/126, cf. 1992:244f) 
When we discover ourselves as being behind or in front of the others, a distance that is 
constitutive of ‘I’ as not-the-Other emerges. This distance presupposes that ‘I’ and the 
Other is linked to das Man prior to this differentiation; only by comparing our work to a 
norm can I say that I am ahead of or behind the Other. This displays that we are subjugated 
to the norms of das Man; I expose a concern about conforming to them. (Heidegger 
1962:164/126) However, it is also the case that through this everyday distantiality I see 
myself as different from the Other, and for that matter, from das Man, in everyday dealings.1 
From this discussion it is evident that for Heidegger the relation between Dasein and the 
Other is not a question of locating a ‘point in time’ when Dasein realizes that it is 
different from the Other (in an analogous manner to how an opposite theory tries to 
                                              
1 As mentioned in the previous footnote, how Dasein sees itself as itself should not be confused with the authentic 
ways of being-one’s-self. There are various reasons for Dasein’s break from the inauthentic life of das Man to attain an 
authentic existence. The most important aspect in this respect is Death. In the sheer act of existing, we are being-
towards-death, to die is an unavoidable aspect of Dasein’s existence. Inauthentically, das Man has developed certain 
strategies to circumvent the troublesome consequences of acknowledging this fact, as seen in utterances like ‘one day 
everybody dies’, ‘we all have to die, but right now, let’s watch the game’, and so on. These strategies imply an 
impersonal stance towards death. Nevertheless, death is implicitly acknowledged, and the idea that death is 
unavoidable is planted in every Dasein. (Heidegger 1962:199/255) However, to realize that this involves me requires 
stepping out of the inauthentic avoidance strategies of das Man. For the authentic Dasein, the possibility of death 
appears to be personal, as a non-relational event that experientially can happen only to one’s own Dasein, and 
consequently, in being mortal we are not merely a part of das Man but exist as single Daseins. As Heidegger says at 
one point, “death is in each case mine”. (1962:284/240) In general, it is hard to discuss the relation of Dasein, the 
Other and das Man without going into the details of the very intricate exposition that Heidegger offers. For my 
purposes, certain aspects must be left untouched, for instance, how das Man exerts social norms through language, 
especially idle talk, the role of the various moods, especially anxiety, in our being-in, and the briefly mentioned 
transition from inauthentic to authentic existence (in which anxiety plays an important role). I have chosen not to 
bring in the aspects of anxiety and death in relation to the self and subjectivity, preferring the exposition of mineness 
in the previous chapter. Although not discussed as such in the previous chapter, this expression is Heidegger’s, who 
mentions it as “the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible”. (1962:68/43, cf. 78/53) 
Although, or because, mineness belongs to both modalities, there would be no distinction between authenticity and 
inauthenticity without mineness. As such, mineness, and the minimal self, as discussed in the previous chapter, can 
be seen as a precondition for the projection of oneself into the future that I turn to shortly. 
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locate the point in which the Other’s existence as a person is ensured), and then proceeds 
to live as separate entities. For Heidegger, Dasein sometimes conducts itself on its own 
terms; at other times, Dasein conducts himself immersed in a practical activity and/or in a 
social discourse, where the thinking of ‘I’-versus-the-Other is not relevant. Consequently, 
we drift in and out of the (authentic) mode of being-one’s-self. (Heidegger 1962:68/43) 
However, in parallel with the relation between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, 
the absorption, the belonging to das Man is primordial, and cases of standing apart from 
the Other can only be understood on the ground of the belonging to das Man.1 
Embeddedness 4: projection 
The second important parallel in the analysis of being-alongside and being-with is that 
both things and Others relate to an existential horizon, which Boedeker in his comment on 
Heidegger defines as “roughly, a set of possibilities in terms of which entities are 
encountered”.2 (2001:65, my emphasis) This horizon must be understood in a particular 
sense, namely as involving a temporal aspect, and as such it underlines that our directedness 
towards things, the Other and oneself (the existential perspectives) is not static, but 
involves future matters. (Heidegger 1988:302) In this sense, the existential horizon is 
elusive; we can never reach it (there is always a future also in the future), and never 
transcend it (we cannot go ahead of the future). However, it will always be conspicuously 
present as an ultimate contextual limit for the understanding of that which lies before us, 
                                              
1 That intersubjectivity is primordial to subjectivity is widely held in the phenomenological tradition, but views on 
how subjectivation comes about differ considerably. (Zahavi 2006, Chapter 6) For instance, Sartre likens the relation 
of subjects in Heidegger’s being-with to that of a crew, a friendly co-existence of subjects that are alike myself in being 
anonymous. (Sartre 2003:270) Sartre claims that it is hard to see how we can go from this state to the authentic state 
of being-in-itself, as this demands that I see myself as different from the Other, in the sense that his subjectivity 
transcends mine. For Sartre, subjectivation takes place when I realize that I am an object for the Other, for instance 
when I feel ashamed or proud, feelings that cannot exist without me being looked at by what must be another 
subject. (Sartre 2003:284) In realizing that I am an object for the Other, our difference is constituted, and so also our 
status as subjects, since his objectivation of me makes me aware of myself as an ‘I,’ as well. In other words, it is in 
recognizing the Other as being different from me that he is constituted as a subject, not as being like me. Of course, as 
we have seen, ‘difference’ is recognized by Heidegger, but Sartre’s claim is that alikeness (being-with) does not 
permit differentiation in itself; the ‘we’ demands that we are surrounded by Others. (Sartre 2003:449) Meeting an 
Other involves a struggle between him seeing me as an object and me seeing him as an object, so subjectivation is 
more like a conflict rather than that of a friendly co-existence. (Sartre 2003:435) 
Another aspect prominent in the phenomenological thinking about intersubjectivity is the role of the body. 
Heidegger was criticized by Sartre for not paying attention to the body, since the “body is the psychic object par 
excellence – the only psychic object”, so that the “Other’s body… is given to us immediately as what the Other is”. 
Consequently, “being-there is precisely the body” (Sartre 2003:370, 371, 375) For more on Heidegger, other 
phenomenologists and the body, see Askay 1999. 
2 In using ‘horizon’, Boedeker connects Heidegger’s concept of the world (Heidegger 1962:92f/64f) to Husserl’s 
concept of horizon (Husserl 1982:51f/48ff), but differentiates them by emphasizing that an existential horizon should 
not be regarded as totality of things, but as a totality of meanings. (Boedeker 2001:72, cf. note 2, page 103) 
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between me and the horizon, in a manner of speaking. In our thrownness in-the-world, 
we are confronted with several horizons; if we are being-alongside things, the ‘world’ is 
the horizon (cf. Chapter 3), if we are being-with Others, das Man is the horizon.1 
Equiprimordial to our thrownness in-the-world, Heidegger claims that we project ourselves 
as our own possibilities in-the-world towards the future-as-horizon. This projection is not a 
plan we form about how to conduct ourselves; instead it is a fundamental directedness 
towards the future, that is, towards the existential horizon. The basic idea is that what we 
are now is constituted not merely by what has been and what now is the case, but also by 
what we might become: “to [Dasein’s] facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs 
essentially. Yet as Being-possible, moreover, Dasein is never anything less; that is to say, it 
is existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-Being, it is not yet.” (Heidegger 1962:185-
6/145) In other words, the self is not only what it sees itself as being ‘right here, right 
now’, but it also sees itself in terms of its own possibilities. Our possibilities, in turn, are 
related to the thrownness, in the sense that we can only ‘become’ in relation to that which 
we are-alongside and that which we are-with. 2  Consequently, our possibilities are in 
accordance with the existential horizons of things (the ‘world’) and the Others (das Man); 
we project ourselves towards the horizons through co-thrown entities. 
This implies no determinism. As Heidegger says himself: “Dasein can understand itself in 
terms of the ‘world’ and Others or in terms of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.” 
(1962:264/221) Although we can be totally absorbed in das Man’s ways of interpreting 
events and phenomena in our surroundings, we are not condemned to it. For the most 
part and in our everyday dealings we depend on the conventions and norms with which 
we have been socialized, but we have also the possibility to form ourselves. Likewise, I 
can use a hammer to hold a window open, although the conventional use is for 
hammering or pulling. However, this might imply, conversely to the determinism, that we 
have an instrumental relation to technologies, but this is not the case either, as we saw in 
Chapter 4. Although my use of the hammer formally is my interpretation, it is nonetheless 
related to the affordances of the hammer itself; the holding-the-window-open is a virtual 
action afforded by the material hammer. We have a freedom towards the thing-world and 
das Man, but even so, this freedom is still within the existential horizon, it is 
interdependent on me, my things, and my social belonging. 
                                              
1 In addition, Dasein’s being-one’s-self has a horizon that I will not go into: this is Death. (Boedeker 2001:74f) 
2 Or, cf. note 1, page 228, in relation to being-one’s-self, which is the emergence of the authentic self. 
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As seen in Chapter 3, for Heidegger the ‘world’ is not to be associated with the physical 
world of Descartes’ Res Extensa. Instead, what constitutes the ‘world’ is the totality of 
equipmental contexts to which things in their readiness-to-hand refer. 
In anything ready-to-hand the world is already ‘there’. Whenever we encounter anything, 
the world has already been previously discovered, though not thematically. But it can also 
be lit up in certain ways of dealing with our environment. The world is that in terms of 
which the ready-to-hand is ready-to-hand. (Heidegger 1962:114/83) 
The ‘world’, if we relate this back to the discussion in Chapter 4, is the totality of 
possibilities that things afford in terms of practical actions, what was defined as things’ 
virtualities, and it is in terms of these that the ‘world’ forms the limits of our possible 
understanding of the thing-world. As we recall, through readiness-to-hand the things that 
make up the ‘world’ and the ‘world’ that the things are within are assigned to each other 
through their possible practical relations. As such, the ‘world’ constitutes the existential 
horizon of our possible actions, and consequently it also constitutes how we see our own 
(practical) possibilities in the world. (Heidegger 1962:120/87, cf. 185/134) 
For this reason, the analysis of Dasein’s thrownness, projection and horizon-related possibilities 
serves as the ontological underpinning of the interdependence of technology, self, and the 
social in technological articulations discussed in Part 1. With the future directedness of 
the existential horizon combined with the virtualities of technologies, ‘world’ is not 
understandable merely in terms of the things and conventional uses that are, but also those 
things and uses that may become actualized. The realization of these requires that we are not just 
dependent upon what is, but that we can project ourselves through virtualities as well. 
I am now in the position to define the concept of practical space: it involves a throwing oneself into the 
future through the actual and virtual actions afforded by technologies. 
In the mode of being-in-the-world that Heidegger calls being-with, it is das Man that 
forms the existential horizon. (Boedeker 2001:72ff) Although dealings with things have 
repercussions for the Dasein itself (especially in being intentional, in revealing a world), 
the possibilities we can project ourselves into towards the intersubjective horizon are 
more directly connected to the realization of Dasein’s everyday conception of itself; how 
we have grown into roles, into a personality or personalities, and as maintaining social 
functions, in short, how we understand ourselves in relation to Others. Around us, in our 
existential perspective towards the existential horizon of das Man, we can find a wealth of 
such relations. In a manner similar to how the hammer is nothing in itself – it is a 
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hammer only to the extent that in figures in an equipmental context – any job, any social 
activity is nothing in itself, it gain its meaning from how it is related to other social roles.  
We saw above that das Man was oppressive and that we in our everyday dealings willingly 
conformed to the rules and conventions found in the social. But it is also the case that it 
is through das Man that social behaviours gain their meaning, and this does not necessarily 
mean in an oppressive form; it does not necessarily imply social determinism. Instead it can 
be seen as a more general argument. The teenager rebelling against his parents, the 
outsider preferring to live as a homeless person instead of receiving welfare, the solitary 
monk – all these roles that are attempts to find one’s own identity are meaningful only to 
the extent that they are related to the opposing (and more conforming) social roles. As 
was mentioned above, being-alone is dependent on being-with. 
This entails, then, that in saying that our social possibilities are constituted by the 
directedness towards the horizon of das Man, we are not condemned to conformity, we 
do not have to become something that already is. It only means that whatever we 
become, it will be, or must be, related to what already is. We cannot go outside of and be 
totally independent of Others. Whatever social role we enter, it will be meaningful only to the 
extent that it is possible to define it in relation to Others. As Boedeker expresses it, the existential 
horizon of das Man, “is the network of possible ways for Daseins to be, it is constituted 
by possibilities to which Dasein can take others as referring”. (2001:74) With the concept 
of das Man, Heidegger first and foremost pays attention to the historical and cultural 
belonging each and every Dasein is thrown into. (Heidegger 1962:439ff/387ff) 
Nonetheless, it is the case that Heidegger sees our everyday dealings with Others as being a 
case of a determined way of life. “The public deprives Dasein of its choice, its formation 
of judgments, and its estimation of values; it relieves Dasein of the task, insofar as it lives 
in the Anyone [das Man], to be itself by way of itself.” (Heidegger 1992:247, cf. 
1962:165/127) This, then, implies that in our everyday roles we conform to the 
preferences and conventions of das Man, which in turn has implications for how we deal 
with our surroundings, including how to deal with things and equipment. Escaping this 
state, which Heidegger refers to as levelling, involves stepping out of everydayness. 
Heidegger thus makes our assuming a non-determined state a considerable effort. 
However, the way I see it, this should not be necessary, given the understanding of the 
relation between technologies and ourselves that we now have developed, which again 
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involves the virtual actions inherent in technology. Through these, technologies have a 
meaning that transcends social conventions for use. It is not the case that all of our 
relating to technologies is mediated through social praxes. Using a regular living room 
chair as a ladder when I hang a picture on my living room wall, is neither a use that is 
governed by the chair’s social role, nor is it an inventive use that was entirely discovered 
by me. Instead, it is a potential use that is revealed in my interaction with the chair’s materiality; 
being a ladder is a virtual readiness-to-hand of the chair. As a result from this brief example, 
we can see how the aspect of virtuality prevents us from ending up in the social 
determinism that threatens Heidegger’s conception of das Man. 1  For this reason, the 
existential analysis of Heidegger concerning both things and Others (who we primarily 
meet through things, or through discourse about things) is supported by the 
constitutional-articulative perspective on technology, while it serves as an ontological 
underpinning to this perspective in showing us the embeddedness of the self. 
In this way, we can say that it is not the self, nor the social, nor technology that is 
primordial in the shaping of each other. We find ourselves as thrown into a social and 
technological world that is structured by (always) already existing structures of meaning, 
but in our thrownness we can project ourselves into the future-as-horizon with a choice 
to conform to the already existing structures of meaning (I can refuse to use the hammer 
for anything other than hammering and instead look for something else to keep the 
window open), or I can find possibilities that transcend those that exist. Virtualities (not 
just technological ones) present us with solution strategies to actualized problems, 
actualizing these are our own possibilities (cf. Chapter 4) 
We have now seen various concepts of how to place the Self in relation to the Other. We 
have seen how embeddedness permeates the human organism from its conception to its 
formation as a person in an intersubjective and future-directed realm. The embeddedness 
of the self is not just a matter of the self in its surroundings right now (how the 
surroundings continually influence the self) and what-has-been (how the self has 
maintained an identity through time), but more importantly that the self, through its 
existential horizons, is constituted by its possibilities to become. Although this includes 
                                              
1  For Heidegger, the escape from social determinism involves the step from the inauthentic to the authentic 
existence. As mentioned, this is possible only to the extent that we leave the everyday relation to Others. Another 
reason why I have chosen not to focus on this aspect of escaping the clutches of das Man, as I have stated before, is 
that my overall concern is technology, so I have chosen not to focus on the authentic becoming. 
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many factors, religious, social, existential etc, this chapter has most importantly enabled us 
to bring the investigations of technology in Part 1 together with the concept of the self. 
Technology and the self 
If the self is constituted by its possibilities, then the possibilities afforded by technologies 
must necessarily be an important part. Especially interesting in this respect are the 
virtualities of technologies. Since the meaning of technology was established as 
transcending the intentions individuals conceive and the conventions communities 
govern, virtualities upgrade our practical space. Or, in the terms of this chapter, the 
virtualities of technology form a fundamental aspect of the possibilities that we project 
ourselves through towards the existential horizon(s). 
While the discussion of the relation of Dasein to the world in Chapter 3 primarily was 
oriented towards clarifying the concept of technology, but nevertheless gave us a partial 
view of embeddedness, the discussion on the future-directedness, the existential 
perspectives, of Dasein towards its existential horizons clarified a more fundamental 
sense of embeddedness, temporality. This is because encountering equipment, items with 
functions, presupposes not just an equipmental context; it presupposes a community of 
Other Daseins. This substantiates the interdependence between the self, the social world, 
and technology. However, before the investigation into the embeddedness of the self, this 
interdependence was not ontologically founded. Said differently, the constitutional-
articulative perspective on technology required an ‘openness’ of the self for the dynamics 
of the interdependent relation to be effective, which is what the last two chapters have 
provided. 
The notion of the minimal self is both open and ‘closed’. It evades the problems of the 
objectifying approaches to self-consciousness, but retains a sense of unifying experiences. 
Through the sense of unifying, the embedded notion of self does not lose subjectivity 
even without taking the reflective self as a foundation. This is seen in the way mineness is 
a requirement not just for constructing and projecting aspects of the embedded self. 
Projecting ourselves into our possibilities requires that I am, indeed, a me. 
[I]n each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some 
sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine… [Dasein] comports itself 
towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it 
‘has’ this possibility but not just as a property, as something present-at-hand would. And 
because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 
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‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do 
so. (Heidegger 1962:68/42)  
In other words, the duality of the minimal and the embedded self constitute our 
possibilities. And the embedded self, of course, is never a bare self à la Descartes’ cogito. 
In closing 
This chapter has revealed the need for a theory about the self and the social that does not 
keep technology at a distance. That is to say, this chapter has completed the investigation 
of the interdependence of self, the social and technology from ‘the other side’, from the 
side of the self and the social, whereas Part 1 showed us this interdependence from the 
side of technology. 
Having considered the plausibility of regarding the self as embedded, the implication of 
bringing the two lines of our investigation together is that the self in an important sense is 
technologically embedded. Not in the fairly trivial sense of finding itself among a great deal 
of technologies, in an increasingly technological lifeworld that the self has to master to be 
able to lead what would count as a normal life, but because what becomes a self surfaces 
in and is defined out from this technological lifeworld. This has been illuminated through 
two lines of reasoning. First, technologies are not merely there for our tasks, they co-
constitute our tasks, the goals, and the means we use to reach those goals. Second, 
understanding our surroundings, including the technologically permeated lifeworld, means 
understanding ourselves, understanding our own possibilities, understanding what we 
might become. Change the social and technological surroundings and you change the 
self’s self-perceived possibilities. Understanding ourselves means grasping our possible 
practical space, proximally (what am I able to do right here, right now) and ultimately 
(where can I go ‘in life’). 
In short, Part 1 was about the shaping of the world in which any self necessarily finds 
itself. In contrast, we thus far in Part 2, have seen some arguments for treating the self as 
an ‘open’ entity, as something that is fundamentally embedded, something that depends 
on its surroundings, with both the thing-world (Chapter 3) and the intersubjective world 
(this chapter), as its common way of being. The self as something that is withdrawn from 
the world is in this view an achievement that can only be made against the background of, 
and out of, embeddedness. 
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Communication technology and social change 
In the previous chapter, a sense of the self was understood in relation to the concept of 
technology as it was developed in Part 1. As far as the self sees itself, not only in terms of 
its history and present state, but also in terms of its potential, it is a self in the midst of 
technological actions. Consequently, the potentials of the self are intrinsically tangled up 
in the technological potentials. It is clear that this holds in a double sense: for the 
individual holding the hammer (or the gun, or the computer keyboard) and, perhaps more 
fundamentally, for the individual as a part of a social group, as constituted 
intersubjectively. This chapter is about those possibilities that open up for the individual 
in so far as it lives in a society. More precisely, whereas the previous chapter was about 
the relation of the self to society (or, more general, intersubjectivity), this chapter is about 
the relation of technology to society. 
Society’s potentials, as for the individual, are tangled up in the technological potentials of 
that society, but not, as I argue in this chapter, determined by them. Coming with 
constraints on its meaning and affording various virtualities prevents us from regarding 
the meaning of technology as a mere effect of its designed or conventional use. As we 
recall from Part 1, being autonomous in this careful sense, technologies are intentional in 
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that they open up, reveal, the world for us; having a lifeworld entrenched with technologies 
means perceiving and comprehending it through these technologies. As we have seen, 
technologies, in not being transparent, influence ‘both ends’ of technological actions: 
both the user(s) and the product, the articulation, of the action.  
Thematically, this chapter picks up where the previous one left off, in discussing the 
relation between technology, society and us. As such, this chapter extends the topic of 
intersubjectivity into a discussion of society. Methodologically, however, it is a turn into a 
less abstract level of analysis. More precisely, I shall look at the presumed shaping of 
society from communication technologies. In medium theory, known from for instance 
Marshall McLuhan, Harold Innis and Joshua Meyrowitz, it is held that communication 
technologies excise a very strong influence on how we relate to each other, on how we 
make up a society. Consequently, we can learn much about the development and the 
present and future states of society by studying the evolution of communication 
technologies. As such, we can find some obvious inclinations towards some of the 
stronger ontological claims that have been discussed earlier. Inherently, medium theory 
refutes the instrumental notion of technology. It would simply be a contradiction in term 
to develop an entire discipline that studies a phenomenon, in this case a mediating 
technology, which is held to be transparent, a mere instrument; without a presumed 
impact, there would be no reason to study media in the first place. However, the strong 
claim in medium theory, that society as a whole is organized through the communication 
technologies that belong to that society, obviously implies technological determinism. 
In this chapter, I look at how medium theory argues for the technologically induced 
societal change, discuss the potential determinist implications, and finally, using the 
terminology developed in the previous chapters, present a way of conceptualizing 
communication technologies as influencing our society without doing so deterministically. 
My main assertion is that the determinist implication of medium theory is due to a vague 
analysis of the relations between technology and the social. 1  Describing wide-ranging 
social change as merely following technological innovation, without a clear 
conceptualization of how the presumed impact is carried out, ends up implying 
technological determinism regardless of this being intended or not. This chapter, then, is 
                                              
1  ‘Medium theory’ is a rather loose notion, and includes thinkers from history, communication studies and 
information science. What aligns them is not a common methodological platform, but an interest in the impact of 
communication technologies on society. 
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primarily about what problems a study of technological innovation and development 
might lead into, if the study is performed without an adequate contextualization of the 
concept of technology.  
By now, my proposal for a more distinct analysis should come as no surprise: selves, 
society and technology are interdependent. For this reason, it is just as true to say that 
society is structured in a certain way because of the history of our communication 
technologies (implied in medium theory), as it is to say that we (re-) structure our society 
through communication technologies (implied in social constructivism); through 
technologies, we meet the world as an (always already) structure of meaning, but 
technologies also afford us to create new structures of meaning, new societies. This is true 
for communication technologies, but it is also true for other kinds of technologies: 
infrastructure, military, surveillance, etc. All kinds of technology organize our lifeworld in 
different ways, according to their specifics and their role in various praxes. That any one 
kind, such as communication technologies, should determine, exclusively, how we meet 
and act in our surroundings seems incorrect even if one accepts technological 
determinism as a general platform. 
Communication eras   
According to Joshua Meyrowitz, the relation between media and society can be 
approached through two different kinds of studies, one investigating the content of media’s 
messages and the other investigating “the particular characteristics of each individual 
medium or of each particular media”. (Meyrowitz 1994:50) The latter approach is called, 
in Meyrowitz’ own coinage, medium theory, while the former, which by far is the most 
common in media studies, is called media theory. Media theory typically studies how 
various forms for mass media influence and is itself influenced by social, economic and 
political factors. Examples of this kind of media studies are the shaping of propaganda, 
how people react to what they are exposed to, for instance, in video games and reality-
TV, how news broadcasts are formed; what is reported and what is not and how 
something is reported, how gender roles are formed, consolidated or undermined through 
mass media, and so on. Clearly, media influence society through presenting audiences 
with specific attitudes and values, and offering content of pure entertainment or more 
thought-provoking programs, traditional or experimental, fiction or news, and so on. 
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However, Meyrowitz believes that media theory, valuable as it is in studying aspects as 
those mentioned and more1, only grasps a part of the impact on society that media have. 
To grasp this further impact, we need to move beyond the forming and the reception of 
media’s content, and consider the technological aspects of mediated communication. 
What one then is concerned about is how different kinds of media offer different kinds of 
impact on society. The thought is that one and the same message can have one kind of 
impact if it is presented in one media, but another kind of impact if it is presented in 
another. As such, the medium theorist is occupied with the extent the mediating 
technology itself contributes to the reception of a message; whether mediated 
communication is different from non-mediated communication and how various media 
differ from each other in relation to its social, political and psychological impact.  
Medium theory examines such variables as the senses that are required to attend to the 
medium, whether the communication is bi-directional or uni-directional, how quickly 
messages can be disseminated, whether learning how to encode and decode in the medium 
is difficult or simple, how many people can attend to the same message at the same 
moment, and so forth. (Meyrowitz 1994:50) 
 
The influence of the mediating technologies can be studied on two levels (which by no 
means are independent). For instance, in what way does my choice of e-mail instead of a 
letter, or a phone call, have an effect on the interaction with the addressee. Or, if I send 
an SMS to my neighbour downstairs instead of walking down the stairs to complain on 
the noise he is making, what does such a choice reveal about how my neighbour and I 
relate to each other? Questions like these concern the individual, micro-level, and, 
Meyrowitz implies, have been under-represented in medium theory. Instead, medium 
theory has for the most part been concerned with the macro-level, “the ways in which the 
addition of a new medium to an existing matrix of media may alter social interactions and 
social structure in general”. (Meyrowitz 1994:51) 
As we can see, both the micro- and the macro-level investigations presuppose that 
communication technologies are not merely transparent instruments, but contribute to 
and at least partly shape the actual communication and/or the society in which the 
technology is distributed. Interestingly, in an almost exact parallel to Hans Achterhuis’ 
division of the two generations of technology-philosophers (cf. Chapter 1); Meyrowitz 
distinguishes two generations in medium theory corresponding to the two levels. While 
                                              
1 See Meyrowitz 1985:13-15 for an overview of various models in and methodological approaches to the study of 
media content. 
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the first generation, represented by thinkers like Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan, was 
occupied with the macro-level and put forward claims about a far-reaching societal and 
ontological impact of communication technologies, the second generation is more 
concerned with the micro-level and makes claims of a more empirical nature about users’ 
actual interaction with such technologies.  
Especially investigations into the macro-level tend to result in some rather strong explicit 
claims about the impact of communication technologies on the societies in which these 
belong. That is to say, the dominating type of communication technology that belongs to a 
certain period is taken to shape not just the individual forms of communication of that 
period, but also social, political and economic aspects of the society on a whole. 
Furthermore, and stronger still, it is held that fundamental changes in such non-
technological aspects come about because of the introduction of a new type of 
communication technology, eventually leading to the rise of a new era. (McLuhan 1962, 
Innis 1972) 
Reviewing the literature in medium theory, not just the sweeping scope of McLuhan and 
Innis but also research with narrower scope presenting more modest claims about the 
societal impact of communication technologies, Meyrowitz finds that “a surprisingly 
consistent and clear image of the interaction of media and culture emerges”. (1994:53) 
The history of communication is thought to be separable into three periods, with each 
period dominated by a specific communication form: oral, writing/printing and 
electronic. While the first period is seen as largely technology-free, at least in terms of 
communication technologies, the latter two periods are entirely dominated by their 
respective paradigm communication technologies. The step from the original ‘oral’ culture 
was triggered by the introduction of the alphabet and orality as the dominating form of 
communication faded away as writing was institutionalized.1 Although writing dates back 
approximately 5000 years (Schmandt-Besserat 1996:1), the real significant social changes 
because of writing did not occur until after the printing press enabled written manuscripts 
to be widely distributed, and cheaply so, from the mid 15th century. For this reason, the 
pre-print written culture might better be regarded as a transitional phase. (Meyrowitz 
1994:54) From the introduction of the electric telegraph and the telephone, via radio and 
                                              
1 One might not agree that the alphabet is a technology in itself, although I think it should be considered as such, 
nevertheless, writing is dependent on technologies developed specifically for writing, pen, paper, ink, etc. (Ong 
1982:81f) 
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television, and now extended into internet based communication forms, written culture is 
challenged, and medium theorists now agree that we have entered a new post-writing era, 
dominated by electronic communication. What, however, this culture will do to our ways 
of relating to each other we can only catch a glimpse of now, at most, as the evolution of 
these communication forms is still underway. In fact, one might argue that we are still in 
another transitional period, parallel to pre-print era in written culture, where electronic 
media not yet have reached their full impact. What is needed for electronic culture in 
order to break through is a technology on par with the printing press in written culture. 
Maybe the Internet is this kind of technology; it is impossible to say yet. 
It is important to note that none of these cultures removes the older forms of 
communication; we still talk to each other, we still write to each other, we still print books 
and papers, and on the internet, we frequently write (e-mail, chat) as well as talk to each 
other (Skype), which can be supplemented by vision (webcams). It is safe to say that the 
preceding communication form figures as a precondition for the new one. For instance, 
the written (or printed) word obviously depends on language as oral, and electronic 
communication, as mentioned, makes use of both written and spoken words. Walter Ong, 
who has investigated into the transition from oral culture (orality) to written culture 
(literacy), says, “we can style writing a ‘secondary modeling system’, dependent on a prior 
primary system, spoken language. Oral expression can exist and mostly has existed 
without any writing at all, writing never without orality.” (1982:8) Leaving one period for 
another means entering a period where a new kind of communication technology shapes 
the dominating communication forms in society, but we do not for that reason dispose of 
the older communication forms. 
Nevertheless, one should not regard the ‘new period’ as merely adding to our existing 
repertoire of communication, leaving the older form(s) intact; a new dominating form of 
communication technology re-shapes the functions, the significance and the effects of the 
older forms of communication. (Meyrowitz 1985:19) For instance, as Ong has explored, 
writing changed fundamentally the role of oral language. This includes relatively innocent 
features, such as that the phrase ‘to look up’ something would not mean anything to a 
person coming from a strictly oral culture. The resources for fact checking would be 
some person’s memory, not books or notes (or Wikipedia!). Consequently, the 
corresponding phrase could only be something like ‘to recall’ something. (Ong 1982:31) 
This innocent example, though, points us to a markedly social difference between orality 
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and literacy, namely, how stories, events, biographies and more are remembered. Without 
having the resources to write such things down (and later to look them up), they have to 
be remembered. Knowledge, history, yes, much of the culture of a group of people, 
besides rituals and artefacts, are restricted to what individuals can remember. Transferring 
this history and knowledge to a new generation is done by mouth, by telling stories about 
the shared past, including the group’s religious and mythological narratives. Obviously, a 
very fragile method, as persons tend to jumble memories and to forget. As a result, 
developing various mnemonic strategies is important.  
In a primary oral culture, to solve effectively the problem of retaining and retrieving 
carefully articulated thought, you have to do your thinking in mnemonic patterns, shaped 
for ready oral recurrence. Your thought must come into being in heavily rhythmic, 
balanced patterns, in repetitions or antitheses, in alliterations and assonances, in epithetic 
and other formulary expressions, in standard thematic settings (the assembly, the meal, the 
duel, the hero’s ‘helper’, and so on), in proverbs which are constantly heard by everyone so 
that they come to mind readily and which themselves are patterned for retention and ready 
recall, or in other mnemonic form. (Ong 1982:34) 
 
Traces of orality are today found in terms of proverbs, idioms and phrases (Ong 1982:26), 
and in such rituals as the (fading art of) mandatory memorizing of bible verses in school. 
We find it in rhymes and rhythms in poetry and in lyrics. Books like the Odyssey and the 
Iliad, and the Bible, are all books that first existed as oral narratives. (Ong 1982:17ff) The 
same is true about the Norse sagas, such as Edda and Håvamål. Having developed modern 
science, modern history, archaeology, etc., the tales and sagas contained in these books 
still live on, but while they had a historical and veridical function in orality, they are relics 
of a way of living long since gone, curiosa and on par with fiction in literacy (although still 
important as historical documents).1  
Meyrowitz (1994:54) points to two limitations (when seen from our culture’s perspective) 
in orality. First, individuals in oral cultures cannot communicate with people that are not 
physically present. This applies to both space and time continuums, and has various social 
consequences. Ong notes that while “oral societies live very much in a present which 
keeps itself in equilibrium or homeostasis by sloughing off memories which no longer 
                                              
1  Another interesting aspect of the transition from orality to literacy that displays that the older dominating 
communication form is transformed is that writing gives rise to grapholects, that is, official languages, such as Standard 
English or in Norwegian, bokmål and nynorsk. Grapholects, although usually being modelled on one or a few dialects, 
encompass resources (vocabulary, etymology, etc) that surpass greatly that of a single spoken dialect. (Ong 1982:8, cf. 
106f) Belonging to a grapholect enriches the spoken resources at one’s disposal. For a discussion of many more 
examples of how written language has transformed orality, see Ong 1980, Chapter 3. 
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have present relevance” (Ong 1982:46), writing materializes memory into words on a 
paper (or equivalent writing material). As Ong adds, such preservation of thoughts and 
thinking patterns was important for science to evolve (from history to physics). The 
second limitation, not entirely unrelated, is that individuality has little room for being 
unfolded. “Individual expressions, novel ideas, and complex arguments can find little 
place in such cultures because they are hard to remember (even by the persons who come 
up with them).” (Meyrowitz 1994:54) Furthermore, they can only be passed along to 
those who are present in time and space. Therefore, changes are slow to come about in 
oral cultures. However, on a more positive note, orality invites close interaction, openness 
within the group and a fairly homogenous perspective on the world. 
One important aspect of the introduction of writing into a group is that people can share 
physical environment and yet know and experience it differently; two neighbours can 
entertain different worldviews. (Meyrowitz 1994:54) One is no longer confined to the 
presentation of the world of one’s peers, but can encounter alternative outlooks through 
texts that were written in different contexts. Although this aspect is undoubtedly 
important, I believe we should be careful to accentuate the difference between orality and 
literacy here. Without question, there were discussions and disagreements on how to 
interpret the world, how to worship one’s gods, how to respect the elders and so on in 
orality as well. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that “writing permits people who 
read the same material to feel connected to each other regardless of the physical distance 
between them” (Meyrowitz 1994:54-55), and by that literacy undermines that closeness 
could only be felt to those who are physically present. 
The parting of the speaker and the spoken, however, has both strengths and weaknesses. 
Naturally, in the transitional phase it will be the weaknesses that are focused on. For 
written culture this is clearly stated in Plato’s Phaedrus, where Socrates, who likens writing 
to painting, that is, as quite low on the ontological scale, lists a number of negative effects 
on thinking that the reliance on writing will have. For instance, writing is unnatural and 
consequently inhuman, it destroys memory, and furthermore, the written text is 
unresponsive and cannot defend itself the way a speaker does. (Plato 1999)1 One of the 
strengths of writing, as mentioned, is that it renders possible communication and 
connectedness over distance, but this particular benefit also comes with a weakness, a 
                                              
1 Ong finds it amusing that most of these objections are also directed against electronic communication technologies. 
(1982:79) 
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distortion, which is in the nature of this new connectedness. As Paul Levinson puts it, in a 
clear reference to Plato, “the written word sacrificed the interactivity of in-person speech 
– you cannot receive a reply from a written page”. (Levinson 1995:152) Not if the person 
who did the writing is distant in time and space, anyway. 
This, according to Levinson, is typical of the evolution of communication technologies; 
introducing a new communication technology will have its (technology-specific) benefits, 
but at the cost of leaving certain cherished aspects behind; in enabling communication 
over distance, interactivity was lost. Another benefit of writing is the enabling of keeping 
statements, knowledge, and history, etc. ‘alive’ independent of the individual memory; 
there is no longer any need to memorize everything that one needs to recollect at a later 
stage, remember, it can be ‘looked up’ later. This benefit also comes with a potential 
negative side, as stated early in written culture by Plato’s Socrates, who claimed that 
writing “will create forgetfulness in the learners’ souls, because they will not use their 
memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of 
themselves”. (Plato 1999:66-67) The destruction of this inherent human quality is a worry, 
Ong observes, that lived on well into the Renaissance and was charged against the 
printing press as well. (Ong 1982:80) 
Literacy can be seen as taking communication away from being a natural, real-time, social 
activity. (Meyrowitz 1994:55) Besides those aspects already mentioned, a high degree of 
effort goes into learning to read and write, and it depends on artificial means, alphabet, 
writing material and a medium to write or print on. Levinson concurs, and points out that 
“the written word has neither the intrinsic emotional shading of speech nor the form, 
color, etc of images”. (Levinson 1995:153) In this sense, worries about the naturalness 
(whatever that is) of communication in the evolution of communication technologies, and 
therefore also worries about their potential alienating effects, might seem appropriate. 
However, the way Levinson sees it, electronic culture reinstates interactivity in the 
dominating type of communication technology. Technologies like telephone, e-mail, 
chatting, video conferences and e-learning once again enable real-time social interactivity 
also for long distant communication. In other words, with electronic communication 
devices, being absent in space is no longer necessarily an obstacle for interactivity, 
although absence in time presumably is still an impossibility for interactivity also in 
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electronic communication.1 The latter electronic era, then, is a return of sorts to some of 
the characteristics of orality, that is, it incorporates synchronicity, closeness etc., that were 
absent in the technologies of literacy, but still it retains the advantages of literacy.  
The impact of printing 
As mentioned, literacy did not attain its real breakthrough until Gutenberg’s printing 
press enabled availability of (much more) written material at a lower cost.2 It is easy to see 
why: The social changes due to writing technologies required wide distribution of 
identical written material so that people from all over (that is, those that knew how to 
read) could read it, take a stand on what they were reading, and discuss it with others in 
assurance that they were discussing what indeed was the same text. The changes due to 
the printing press and printing culture has been widely discussed in medium theory and is 
acknowledged as the prime example of a penetrating societal impact of a communication 
technology. (McLuhan 1962, Innis 1972, Eisenstein 1980, Meyrowitz 1985, Levinson 
1997, Misa 1994) Elisabeth Eisenstein, for instance, who provides a very thorough 
empirical study of the aftermath of Gutenberg’s invention of the movable type, claims 
that the wide availability of scripts due to the printing press had a direct causal effect on 
the Renaissance, the Reformation and on the Scientific Revolution. She, clearly inspired 
by McLuhan, also displays the influence of the printing press on the Age of Discovery, 
the colonization of America, the rise of national states, and capitalism (cf. Levinson 
1997:9,24f, Ong 1982:117f). Thomas J. Misa, a writer careful to attribute too much 
inherent power to change society to technologies, writes of the Reformation, “in this 
instance, the medium formed the message”. (2004:23) The printing press is indeed seen as 
an example of a powerful communication technology that induced wide-ranging changes 
to our culture, and enabled the final breakthrough of literacy as the dominating form of 
communication. 
The Catholic Church firstly welcomed printing. In it, they saw an opportunity for a 
uniform education of clergymen and practising of the religion, in addition to being helpful 
in implementing “long delayed internal reforms”. (Eisenstein 1980:314) However, 
                                              
1 Electronic communication technologies also include films, TV and radio, traditionally one-way communication 
forms although making them more interactive has been attempting (calling-in programs, votes on potential endings, 
etc). Also, oral culture includes communication forms that do not invite interactivity, giving a speech, for instance. 
2 In Paris in 1470, the price of a handwritten Bible was about 5 times that of a printed one. (Innis 1972:141) This was 
only 15 years after the first printing of the Bible. For the characteristics of Gutenberg’s printing plant, based on 
movable type, as opposed to preceding and competing types, see Eisenstein 1980. 
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printing soon turned against Catholicism. It has been common, Eisenstein notes, to map 
social and religious reasons for the Protestant Reformation, and then to consider the 
printing press only as an instrument for the cause. Through it, it has been thought, 
dissenting theologian Martin Luther could distribute his ‘heretic’ thoughts and attacks on 
the Roman Church. However, as she documents, there are good reasons to believe that 
the printing press, or rather what the printing press enabled, was more than a mere handy 
instrument. For instance, church traditions had been challenged also before Luther, but 
such challenges were always local and transitory. With the printing press, the ‘heresy’ 
could be spread, and in being printed, it was of a more permanent nature: even if one 
exemplar is destroyed by censorship, there is always another copy.1 (Eisenstein 1980:311) 
The printing press had contributed to a change of the social milieu within which the heretic 
thoughts occurred. This social effect was partly due to the wide distribution of Bibles 
enabled by the printing press, something that had already taken place well before Luther. 
Although the first Bibles printed were in Latin, vernacular Bibles soon followed. The first 
German edition came in 1466, and by the time Luther quickly rose to fame in 1517-18, 
Bibles were available in German, Italian, Spanish, French, and other languages. 
(Eisenstein 1980:346) “The position of the Church and the quality of Christian faith was 
already in the process of being transformed by the shift from script to print before the 
Protestant revolt had begun.” (Eisenstein 1980:368) With Bibles in wide distribution, and 
in vernaculars, people could follow Luther’s arguments for themselves, and were not 
merely surrendered to the authority of the Church.  
As Misa notes, printers were also businessmen, and in late October in 1517 they saw the 
business potential in a note that was hung up on the church door in Wittenberg. (2004:22) 
The note contained 95 theses criticizing the Church’s arrangement of the letters of 
indulgence. The Church had no right, it was claimed, to grant indulgences because the 
judging of good and evil was a job for God, not for the Pope, and forgiveness should not 
be granted for money anyway. The theses were, according to their author, Martin Luther, 
intended for academic discussions (the note itself was an invitation to a meeting were 
these were to be discussed), and for that reason, they were written in the learned language 
of Latin. Had the note stayed on the church door, and in Latin, nothing much probably 
would have come out of it. However, the theses were soon ‘bootlegged’; re-printed, 
                                              
1 That is of course not to imply that only original manuscripts existed before Gutenberg. The scribal culture, that is, 
the business of copying by hand, could be quite efficient (Eisenstein 1980:10ff), but it could of course never reach 
the numbers of the printing press. (Eisenstein 1980:46) 
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translated to a number of vernaculars, and printed in those. Within a month, they had 
spread across Europe, and in so doing, they incited the Protestant Reformation. (Misa 
2004:22, Eisenstein 1980:307) 
Luther pleaded ignorant of the spreading of his theses, but Eisenstein wonders if that 
could be right. There are reasons to believe that although he himself did not contribute to 
the actual re-printing and distribution, he was aware of it and welcomed it. (Eisenstein 
1980:306ff) Nonetheless, the Protestant voices soon saw the revolutionary potential in the 
printing press, and made well use of it in the years to follow. Between the printing of the 
95 theses in 1517 and 1520, Luther issued 30 publications, selling 300.000 copies. 
(Eisenstein 1980:303) By 1523, 493 German titles were in print, 180 of them were written 
by Luther. (Levinson 1997:23) Protestantism was “the first movement of any kind, 
religious or secular, to use the new presses for overt propaganda and agitation against an 
established institution”. (Eisenstein 1980:304) The Catholic Church soon experienced the 
dilemma of censorship: In trying to prevent further distribution of the heretic words of 
Luther and other dissenting voices, it offered a tactic that boosted the distribution of the 
very same voices. It issued its first list of prohibited books in 1559, the so-called Index, 
but “for printers in Protestant countries it amounted to a conveniently compiled list of 
potentially best-selling titles”. (Misa 2004:23) 
In a similar manner, the printing press helped pave the way for other developments in the 
same period. As mentioned, most major breakthroughs in the years following the 
introduction of printing is by medium theorists held to be rendered possible, or at least 
highly influenced, by the societal changes due to the printing press. These claims are 
supported by pointing to the same kinds of examples as in the Protestant revolution: 
Printing spread the news, and spread it fast enough for feedback to be noticeable when 
the news is still fresh, thereby setting off social reactions. By this, the printing press 
contributes to a change in the social climate in which news travel; it changes the world in 
which these events occur, thereby allowing the events to bear the consequences that they 
do. For events to gain the ‘causal power’ to elicit change they need to be known outside 
the local situation in which they happen; heretic thoughts before Luther evaporated 
before taking effect, the discovery of America by Vikings was not known in other parts of 
Europe, etc. (Levinson 1997:25f) With the printing press in place, Europe got ‘smaller’, 
distant parts of the continent got close enough to interact rather than just receive news of 
events having taken place weeks, or months, earlier at faraway places. In this sense, 
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Europe was transformed through the new technology. As I will return to later, this aspect, 
the eradication of distance is an important trajectory of communication technologies that is 
carried on through the electronic era.  
In transforming Europe, the printing press continued the development away from the 
homogenous, egalitarian, local culture that started with the transition from orality to 
literacy. Meyrowitz points to a number of characteristics of literacy that accelerated or was 
accentuated with the invention of the printing press. First, the divide between those who 
could read and write and those who could not expanded. This directed people into two 
separate communication systems; one wholly oral and another that was infused with 
written communication. Taking part in the written communication discourse enabled one 
to withdraw from community life and take part of a different stream of events and 
discourse. Thus, we see the formation of political, spiritual and intellectual units that 
exceeded local communities. This had the effect of creating new conceptions of ‘them 
versus us’ that rose above the limits set by the local village. “Feudal societies based on 
face-to-face loyalties and oral oaths begin to give way to nation-states and to nationalism 
based on a shared printed language.” (Meyrowitz 1994:55) The rise of nationalism was 
also spurred on by the new dignity that vernaculars acquired once Bibles and other 
material began to be printed in non-Latin languages. (Eisenstein 1980:358f) 
Most importantly, perhaps, was the change in thinking patterns that emerged. This, 
according to Meyrowitz, should also be credited the printing press. 
The break from intense, ongoing aural involvement distances people from sound, touch, 
and direct response and allows people to become more introspective and more 
individualistic. ‘Rationality’, which comes to be highly valued, resembles the form of 
printed type: step-by-step abstract reasoning along a continuous line of uninterrupted 
thought. From the simultaneous world of sound, literate cultures move toward a one-thing-
at-a-time and a one-thing-after-another world. The isolation of stimuli fosters cause-and-
effect thinking. Literate thinking diminished the view of life as a repeating sequence of 
natural cycles and promotes the view of constant linear change and improvement. 
(Meyrowitz 1994:56) 
Medium theorists regard this as the onset of modern science. 1  The effect of the 
transformation of thinking could soon be seen in architecture and urban development, 
and in classroom design where the “new physical settings generally discourage informal 
                                              
1 Note the similarity to Heidegger’s thoughts that technological thinking (in general, though, not limited to printing) 
fostered modern science (cf. Chapter 1). The impact of technology on the ways of thinking is indeed important, as 
also Ong (1982) argues repeatedly. I agree on this, but, as I will argue below, do not see this shift as determined by the 
technology, but as rendered possible by the technology given various other aspects. 
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oral conversation”. (Meyrowitz 1994:56) Finally, the printing press also elicited changes in 
such literary aspects as writing and intellectual style. In short, Europe before and after the 
invention of the printing press was two radically different worlds, and, if we are to believe 
the medium theorists, it was all down to Gutenberg’s invention of the movable type 
printing press.  
Electronic culture 
Even though the invention of the electrical telegraph was close to 200 years ago, medium 
theorists regard Internet based communication forms as continuing a style of 
communication that started with the telegraph and proceeded through other electronic 
and digital technologies such as the telephone, the radio and TV, and now, the Internet. 
Seen this way, the step from the second to the third communication era, from literacy to 
electronic culture, is very much still in progress. For this reason, it is too early to conclude 
about how electronic culture will influence society. However, some tendencies are 
proposed. As already mentioned, it is held, in a pseudo-Hegelian fashion, that through 
ICTs we are able to revive some of the aspects that characterized orality, but still maintain 
the advantages of literacy. While the first era was characterized by real-time interactivity, 
this aspect was lost in the dominating communication technologies of the second era. 
Instead, we gained the opportunity to communicate over distance. With ICTs, we 
communicate over distance, but talking on the telephone, taking part of the conversation 
in chat rooms, etc. makes it possible to do this in real-time. Or, in the case of e-mail, 
discussion groups and blogging, something approximating real-time (with an added 
ingredient compared to the telephone: a choice whether to attend and respond to 
incoming messages right away or to wait, which is a characteristic inherited from literacy).  
Certain features known from the face-to-face encounters we know from oral societies can 
therefore be said to once again characterize the leading communication form. Ong even 
calls electronic culture an era of “secondary orality’ (1982:136f). Meyrowitz concurs, but 
points out a further aspect: 
Electronic media bring back a key aspect of oral societies: simultaneity of action, 
perception, and reaction… Yet the orality of electronic media is far different from the 
orality of the past. Unlike spoken communication, electronic communication is not subject 
to the physical limitations of time or space. Electronic messages can be preserved, and they 
can be experienced simultaneously by large numbers of people regardless of their physical 
locations. (1994:57) 
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Because of this technological difference, there is a huge dissimilarity between the kind of 
society evolving from oral culture and the one evolving from electronic culture; the 
technological presence enables societies to be constituted differently. Meyrowitz claims 
that physical location is given too much weight in distinguishing what it is that constitutes 
a society. (1985:7, 35)1 Such a notion suits oral culture quite well, of course; a village is 
semi-isolated and self-sustained, and without today’s possibilities for travelling long 
distances, interactions are limited to those living close by. As such, society is defined in 
terms of (geographic) place; one is in society with those that are proximate. However, if 
we consider later communication eras, we will find this insufficient at defining society. 
Through new communication technologies new patterns of interaction emerged, patterns 
that transcended geographical limitations. Through written words, people are able to 
interact with and relate to others that are not proximate, not in space and perhaps not 
even in time. The limit of one’s possible interactions in written culture is defined by the 
understanding of language, not the edges of one’s village. Re-definitions of ‘society’ 
continue with electronic communication technologies. 
The title of Meyrowitz’ 1985-book, No Sense of Place, indicates something about the kind 
of society that arises from the proliferation of electronic communication technologies. If 
we disregard the spreading of vernaculars due to colonization, literacy was still rather 
limited, geographically speaking, and certainly limited in terms of the speed of interaction. 
Not so for electronic culture. Now we can communicate, in real-time, just as effortlessly 
with someone in Australia as with our next-door neighbour, and news (on radio, in TV, 
on the Internet) of an earthquake in China comes to us as fast as the news of a rockslide 
in a nearby region. “[E]lectronic media affect social behavior – not through the power of 
their messages but by reorganizing the social setting in which people interact and by 
weakening the once strong relationship between physical place and social ‘place’.” 
(Meyrowitz 1985:ix) Consequently, we are in need of a definition of society that does not 
refer to geographical place. 
Society is still defined in terms of intersubjectivity and is anchored in the interactions 
going on inside of it, but it “is not the physical setting itself that determines the nature of 
interaction, but the patterns of information flow”. (Meyrowitz 1985:36, my emphasis) What is 
important for interaction is access to the behaviour of other persons; what do we do and 
                                              
1 Meyrowitz discusses situations rather than society, but indirectly it is the definition of society that is scrutinized. 
(Meyrowitz 1985:viii-ix) 
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what can we do together with other persons. I cannot do anything with anybody without 
having access to their behaviour, at least that part of their behaviour that is relevant for 
the situation we share. Consequently, what defines the nature of interaction, and 
ultimately also for constituting a society, is “the types of behaviors that are available for 
other people’s scrutiny”. (Meyrowitz 1985:36) This definition is more basic than physical 
setting, and applies to all three eras of communication, encompassing the social behaviour 
of the illiterate farmer of orality, the intellectual academic bookworm, and the intense 
online gamer in present electronic society. Physical presence should therefore be 
considered an accidental definition of society, tied to a specific form of availability 
belonging to a specific kind of society.  
For the medium theorist, what social behaviours that can be accessed differ considerably 
in the three communication eras because of their respective available communication 
technologies. In the propagation of electronic culture, when personal computers and the 
Internet (initially two different trajectories, although with much common background) 
were combined, a powerful contributor to the occurring social change emerged. As we 
have seen over the past 15 years, this combination has enabled people to connect and 
interact in new unprecedented ways. Internet enthusiasts, such as Nicolas Negroponte, 
were soon to point out, or better phrased, soon to envision, the consequences of this 
change. 
As we interconnect ourselves, many of the values of a nation-state will give way to those of 
both larger and smaller electronic communities. We will socialize in digital neighborhoods 
in which physical space will be irrelevant and time will play a different role. Twenty years 
from now, when you look out a window, what you will see may be five thousand miles and 
six time zones away. When you watch an hour of television, it may have been delivered to 
your home in less than a second. Reading about Patagonia can include the sensory 
experience of going there. A book by William Buckley can be a conversation with him. 
(Negroponte 1995:7) 
The underlying thought is that we feel connectedness towards those with which we are 
able to communicate. This held for orality, it held for literacy, and it will hold for 
electronic culture, both Meyrowitz (writing about television) and Negroponte (writing 
about the Internet) claim. The printing press played a part in the rise of national states, 
but electronic culture takes us even further, above national state borders and connects us 
with people from the other side of the world sharing our interests (or offering us 
something we want, but probably did not know that we wanted…). Michael Dertouzos, 
another net-enthusiast, calls this new connectedness electronic proximity. 
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During the Industrial Age, people’s physical mobility expanded tremendously, widening a 
person’s universe of potential relationships from a few hundred village neighbors to 
hundreds of thousands of people within driving range. As a result, our proximity to people 
whom we could reach grew a thousandfold. Incredibly, the Information Marketplace1 will 
increase this range by yet another thousandfold, to hundreds of millions of people who will 
be within electronic reach. (1997:277) 
 
What might be seen as the main development on the World Wide Web the later few 
years, the move into easy-to-establish-and-maintain blogs, wikis and twitters, and the 
emergence of socially oriented networks like Facebook, MySpace, YouTube and Flickr, 
seems to confirm such visions. This move has led some to talk of a Web 2.0, meaning 
that the Internet presently is about connecting people to people, implying that the 
Internet earlier, ‘Web 1.0’, was more about connecting computers to other computers, 
that is, the setting up of networks. Tim Berners-Lee, widely regarded as the creator of the 
World Wide Web, however, claims that the so-called Web 1.0 always was about 
connecting people to people, and that it is meaningless to talk of a new kind of web as 
long as the social networks mainly follows the same standards and uses the same 
programs that were produced for Web 1.0.2 
Nevertheless, through electronic communication technologies, new forms of ‘them versus 
us’ (the basic structure of society) arise. Internet culture, whether or not we should speak 
of a Web 2.0, is of course a prime example of this, more so than earlier electronic media 
such as TV or radio. Although they bring us recent news from all over the world with a 
strong impact due to images and sounds, TV and radio are hampered by the lack of, or 
the slowness of interactivity. For Paul Levinson, the tendencies of latter stage electronic 
culture means that the third communication era to a higher degree than the preceding 
one, is anthropotropic, that is, it supports the natural human way of being and the natural 
human way of communicating. (1995:153) Electronic culture, in Levinson’s opinion, is 
therefore more humane than written culture. Compared to literacy’s technologies, 
electronic technologies rather paradoxically take us closer to a pre- or non-technological 
kind of existence. For that reason, populating our lifeworld with modern (electronic 
communication) technologies does not make it more artificial, more hostile, for humans 
to live in, the way we saw Heidegger and Ellul characterized modern technological 
existence (cf. Chapter 1). Instead, at least for communication technologies, we are now 
                                              
1 Dertouzos’ preferred coinage for ‘the Information Superhighway’ and similar notions trying to capture the essence 
of the Internet. Apparently, he started using this phrase already in 1981. (Dertouzos 1997:10f) 
2 In a 2006 interview: http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/podcast/dwi/cm-int082206txt.html [02.01.2009] 
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capable of overcoming some of the alienating effects of modern technology. (Levinson 
1995:161n8) Medium theorists might see the inherent power of communication 
technologies to be the prime mover in changing society, but for most part, in a far more 
optimistically manner than Heidegger and Ellul. 
This development has its potential dark sides, as well, some of which are known from the 
orality, and some that are specific for electronic culture. Bernulf Kanitscheider figures 
that if the netbased communication forms become all pervasive, we will be caught in the 
demand for always being available: “Probably it will be rather impossible to disconnect 
oneself from the network to return to the individuality of the hoary days of yore.” 
(1999:7) Once such a system is implemented into a society, we are caught up in it and 
must live by the rules and logic of the system, including social rules. If we withdraw from 
the online co-existence, even for just awhile, we must answer for our action, much like a 
person in a small village that does not partake in the communal village life. Of course, 
(always) being hooked up to an electronic communication network has the further 
disadvantage of being exposed to means for control and surveillance in unprecedented 
manners. The means for social control seems at least just as strong, but perhaps more 
fundamental in this form for community than what was found in orality’s kind of social 
control, since all our electronic actions can be traced, stored and exploited in technology-
specific ways, which were, or is, not available in orality.1 (Kanitscheider 1997:7) 
Technological determinism? 
As we can see, medium theorists forward some rather strong claims about the relation 
between society and specific technologies (alphabet, printing press, Internet, etc). These 
claims, especially those put forward by the more empirically inclined second generation 
medium theorists, are usually well supported by historical data concerning the chief role 
played by the printing press in making crucial events known to a wider audience. 
However, is that role sufficient support for asserting causal power to the printing press? 
Although the processes leading up to the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, etc. 
undoubtedly was augmented by possibilities that came with the printing press, it is unclear 
                                              
1  ID-theft, hacking, digital traces and surveillance are only some of the concerns stemming from electronic 
communication technologies. Relevant in Norway right now is the discussion about the new directive for the 
retention of information concerning private person’s use of data and telephone. The new directive, a result of the 
later year’s international measures to prevent forms of terror, is a noticeable expansion of the legislation that already 
exists, and has met fierce criticism. http://www.datatilsynet.no/templates/article____2155.aspx [02.01.2009] 
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just what kind of empirical data it is that can support claims about a causal relation in this 
context. According to Leo Marx and Merritt Roe Smith, claims about technology being 
the chief cause for social changes is generally diffuse, and might partly be due to the 
tangibility of material artefacts compared to other possible causes, socio-economic, 
political, cultural, and ideological, which are more abstract, but, in their view, just as 
important contributors to the changes. (1994:x) The methodological problem is that in 
comparing the situation before and after the introduction of a piece of technology, one is 
focused on the consequences rather than the genesis of the introduction. This focus will 
seek, almost by default, a causal reason, and since materiality is more tangible than a social 
factor, technological artefacts will assume the dominant causal role in the narratives. This, 
then, is followed up by exploring how the piece of technology takes on a life of its own; 
how new developments follow suit and conform to what is perceived as an internal logic 
of the technology. Again, little regard is paid to the socially driven aspects of post-
developments as well. (Marx and Roe Smith 1994:xi) 
Although having a strong point concerning the literature on the history of technology, 
this criticism is nevertheless slightly off-target, in my mind. Eisenstein and Meyrowitz, for 
instance, state quite explicitly that they do not seek a deterministic tale of their 
technology-focus; after all, nobody wants to be a simplistic technological determinist.1 
The subject matter for these theorists is a certain piece of technology, so it is only natural 
that the investigations primarily are concerned with technology-related causes and effects. 
That said, it is the heavy focus on technologically related causes that invites suggestions of 
determinism. However, this is not necessarily a consequence of writing the history of 
technology: Historians such as Thomas Hughes and Thomas Misa (both 2004) show that 
it is possible to write on the history of technology and still have an eye for socially related 
aspects of technologies’ invention and development. 
In place of technology as being the driving force through the later 5-600 years, historians 
have pointed to: 
[t]he particular efficacy of certain material, geographic, demographic, and socio-economic 
preconditions: access to raw materials or markets; the existence of mercantile capitalist 
economy; the operation of the profit motive; the accumulation of capital; the availability of 
a needy, teachable, exploitable labor force. Others attribute causal primacy to intellectual, 
cultural, or ideological factors: the extent of secular learning; the existence of a reservoir or 
                                              
1 For the most part, Marx and Row Smith talk about technological determinism from a ‘public opinion’ point of 
view, so it is unclear whether they include any of the theorists I have presented. 
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entrepreneurial or financial skills; the presence of scientific rationalism, Christianity, the 
Protestant work ethic, or an artisan ethos. (Marx and Roe Smith 1994:xiii)1 
For instance, what was the social context for the invention of the printing press in the 
first place – should the invention of it be seen as technological in itself? What were the 
social processes leading up to the introduction of this technology? The printing press was 
no invention from out of the blue by Gutenberg. Its inception was in China in the third 
century A.D., and its development in the west was tangled up in an interplay with (the 
state of) other technologies, paper, ink, presses, lead and other metal, etc. “Gutenberg’s 
principal inventions were the adjustable mold for casting type and a suitable metal alloy 
for the type.” (Misa 2004:22) That Gutenberg ‘saw’ the possibility for the moveable type 
printing press was therefore not an invention from scratch, driven by technological 
aspects, but primarily a clever merging of the possibilities that existed in various existing 
technologies.2 
Furthermore, Protestantism called for everyone to read the Bible for themselves and not 
just rely on the official Catholic interpretation. I take it to be an uncontroversial fact that 
the widespread distribution of Bibles was a direct result of the possibility to print many, 
and cheaply. However, had the Bibles only been available in Latin – would the call for 
widespread reading have had the same effect? Would Protestantism have come about 
with only Latin Bibles (widely) available? That might be (this is not the place to speculate 
about counter-history!), but surely, the decision to print Bibles in vernaculars was not a 
technological decision, but was related to other social concerns, from the pious desire to 
make the holy text widely known to more secular concerns such as earning money. As 
mentioned above, the bootlegging of Luther’s 95 theses was very likely done by printers 
seeing a business opportunity. Eisenstein also mentions that part of the reason why 
Luther’s material gained the sales that it did, might be down to the sale techniques that 
were implemented: certain book peddlers were asked by Luther’s sympathizers to sell 
nothing but Luther’s works. (Eisenstein 1980:309) 
                                              
1 However, it has happened that these factors figure in a soft version of the technological determinism thesis, where 
technologies have been invested “with enough power to drive history”. Marx and Roe Smith 1994:xiv) This view of 
technology differs from the one that I am trying to develop, and I do not regard this as determinism at all, but as 
presupposing that technologies are mere instruments for the intentions behind their development and use (cf. 
Chapter 1). 
2 Movable type printing existed before Gutenberg, e.g. in China, but these types were made of wood, and without the 
versatile western alphabet, the types numbered thousands, making printing a complicated effort. (Misa 2004:19f) 
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Likewise, even if news of the Viking discovery of Vinland had been spread to the rest of 
Europe around 1.000 A.D., it is very unlikely that an Age of Discovery would have 
ensued at that time even if the printing press had already been in place. For this 
exploratory activity to happen, Europe had to be in a very different state also when it 
came to scientific and mechanical knowledge, to distribution of economic power, and to 
the overall technological system. Even if Levinson recognizes this, he still finds it hard to 
shake his determinist leanings, and holds that “[u]nlike the winds that moved the Norse 
vessels, the oral sagas had no power to move anyone other than those who had personal 
reason to trust the speakers”. (1997:26) 
Evidently, according to Levinson, printed texts come with an authority that news 
distributed orally does not have. Eventually, they did (as we all know today), but in the 
late Middle Ages, just prior to the Age of Discovery, a written statement was not 
considered more trustworthy than an oral statement. Ong points out: “A present-day 
literate usually assumes that written records have more force than spoken words as 
evidence of a long-past state of affairs, especially in court. Earlier cultures that knew 
literacy but had not so fully interiorized it, have often assumed the opposite.” (1982:96) 
One of the reasons for this, which is still shown in the practices of courts today, is that 
those carrying an oral statement can be questioned and challenged on what they report. 
Since he does not discuss this, it is unclear whether Levinson holds that the quality of 
written news changed due to the printing press; making it more trustworthy, or if it is the 
sheer distribution of printed material that counts for the differing consequences of 
Columbus’ discovery and the Norsemen’s discovery of the same continent. Either way, 
merely pointing to the presence of the printing press as the prime catalyst for the great 
discoveries leaves one with more questions than answers. 
The interdependent view 
The reasons for anything to be an effect of a technology are always so complex that any 
talk of determinism seems curious. Also, the reasons why a specific technology gains the 
impact it does are just as complex, and tangled up in the social milieu within which it is 
embedded. However, is it so complex that we should not speak of a technological 
contribution at all? As discussed in Chapter 2, more nuanced stories of technological 
invention and development are in danger of ignoring the actual power inherent in material 
constraints, and thereby losing valuable insights into our relation to technology (and, 
2 5 8   S E L F  A N D  S O C I E T Y  
consequently, into how we ourselves are constituted). The way I see it, and this is the 
main argument of this chapter, causal claims (by ‘determinists’ and their critics alike) are 
discussed without an adequate conception of what ‘technological impact’ actually means. My claim is 
that we do not need narratives about who controls who, who is the strongest party, etc.: 
technology or society. The implication of what I have been trying to say over the last 
chapters is that the ongoing shaping of society is no power struggle by two clearly 
demarcated ‘entities’. What is needed is to conceptualize this relation in co-constitutional terms; 
neither component would be what it is, without the other being part of its very definition. 
The situation here, I think, is quite comparable to the relation between genes and 
environment, as it was discussed by Susan Oyama (cf. Chapter 6). As we saw, it is 
conceptually impossible to distinguish what is contributed from ‘gene’ and what is 
contributed from ‘environment’ in ontogenetic development because the very thing that 
‘a gene’ and ‘the environment’ is, is only understandable in light of each other; they are 
interdependent. Thinking of the social and technology as interdependent enables us to 
view either as having an impact on each other without any of them necessarily being the 
stronger party in all concerns, for all aspects of socio-technological development. 
Probably, in some cases ‘the social’ will dominate, in others, ‘the technological’, just as 
‘genes’ in some cases will be more dominant, and ‘environment’ in other. Never is a 
developmental trait present without some influence of both contributors and never is it 
possible to point to what is ‘genetic’ and what is ‘environmental’ without the other factor 
having been put into words. In our technologically permeated lifeworld, the same applies. 
What is ‘technological’, and what technologies do, is definable only within a social 
setting/praxis. What the social is, as ‘environment’ to the technology, is only 
understandable in accordance with the technological presence; technology shapes its 
social environment; the social environment shapes the technology (cf. Chapter 2). In the 
example of the printing press, the technological presence had a tremendous effect, 
perhaps even ‘dominating’ as some authors claim, but it was not the sole cause of the 
subsequent changes, neither was its appearance, the way it came to be and subsequently 
came into a position to have this effect, unaffected by social factors. And if it is not, why 
speak of technological determinism? 
If we analyze the relation between the printing press and its alleged determined effects in 
the terminology developed in the previous chapters, we can say that for a technology to 
determine its social impact, say ‘the Reformation’, or ‘the Age of Discovery’, the actions 
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constituting this impact are virtualities of the technology in question (cf. Chapters 5 and 
7). That is, that those actions are potentials ‘in’ the technology; the mass production of 
Bibles, and in vernaculars, the spreading of other ‘heretic’ material, etc. are virtual actions 
of the printing press. However, such virtuality is not available, or visible, in just any 
circumstances. As discussed in Chapter 4, virtualities are only available from a certain 
situatedness. The argument for this is that any virtuality is revealed, or opened up, by the 
technology’s actuality; a technology’s present role and functions. Said differently, it is only 
as far as having an actual meaning that a technology can have virtual (potential) meanings. The 
reason for this is quite simple; it must be a ‘problem’ in its actuality (defined in terms of 
social, technological, economic, political considerations) that directs our gaze to one of its 
virtualities. Using the printing press for the wide distribution of vernacular Bibles, for 
instance, is to employ the present ‘meaning’ of the printing press (mass production, cheap 
reproduction) for a social and religious ‘problem’ (how to spread the holy text, people 
should interpret the Bible themselves rather than leaning on the clergymen’s 
interpretation, and so on). The Reformation, if we should see it as following this ‘meeting’ 
of actuality and religious problems, is then co-constituted by the printing press and the 
religious problem; none should be seen as the sole driving force. Because of the printing 
press, the Reformation became possible, but only in that particular setting.1 This is the 
sense in which the Reformation was a potentiality of the printing press. 
If, say, the printing press had been regarded as suitable only for the printing of restaurant 
menus and operating manuals, and unsuited for the printing of the holy text, mass 
production of Bibles would not be a potentiality of the printing press, even though it still 
would be technically possible. 2  The Reformation would not be possible through the 
means of the printing press, because the printing press’ actual meaning did not include the 
printing of the holy text. As we can see from this rather general example, ‘a problem in its 
actuality’ involves embeddedness – a problem is only a problem in a certain context. A 
virtuality of a technology is co-constituted from its embedded actuality. In other words, it 
is the problem, and the recognition of this problem, that carries the potentiality from its 
virtuality to its actuality.  
                                              
1 I am not implying that ‘the Reformation’, with all everything that that expression involves, was planned. 
2 An affordance, as it was defined in Chapter 4. To sum up the complex relation between these terms: An affordance is 
how a material item proposes itself to be used. As such, the material item points towards, reveals, a potential action 
that, in its non-actualized state, is called a virtual action. What the present paragraph is about is the actualization of this 
virtuality, a process that rarely, if ever, involves a one-to-one relation between the virtual action and the actual action. 
This because of the circumstances in which the actualization is brought about. 
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Regarding the relation between a piece of technology (or a technological system), its social 
embeddedness and its co-constituted ‘products’, or effects, in this way renders any talk of 
determinism (also of the social kind) redundant seeing that any technologically related 
effect is ‘unleashed’ because of its embeddedness (social, ethical, political, economic etc). 
Furthermore, this way of conceptualizing the relation also underlines that the effects are 
revealed as potentialities only as far as the embeddedness has a certain technological 
presence; this being in line with the revealing function of technology discussed in Chapter 
3. We cannot discover the full potential of a technology without it being actualized. Some 
yes, but rarely, if ever, all. As mentioned more than once, through technological presence, 
a world, actual and potential, is unconcealed. 
Paradoxically, perhaps, the relation between a technology and the revealing of a 
potentiality is more clearly seen in the case of unintended effects of technological presence. 
Evidently, such an effect is brought about by the introduction (or re-definition) of a 
technology – we might say that it existed as a non-recognized virtuality of the technology. As 
such, the effect’s actuality is clearly indebted to the technology that brought it forth, but is 
it for that reason determined by the technology? No, it is not, and in at least two ways. 
First, as we can see in the case of the Reformation, the actions that bring about an 
unintended effect must involve the merging of several factors, some technological and 
some social, economic, political etc. These factors constitute the action that produces this 
unintended effect. No action is purely technological, or purely social. This follows from 
what was discussed in Chapters 3 and 5 concerning the co-constitution of a technological 
action. In other words, in distinguishing clearly between the action itself and its effect, the 
product of the action, the unintended effect is never to be said to be determined by the 
technology (nor of any of the other co-constituents). 
The other reason why technological determinism is unsustainable even in talks of 
unintended effects is that the mere bringing about of an unintended effect is no guarantee 
that it will ‘take hold’ and gain any further social breakthrough. Like a piece of 
technology, a technological effect (material or social, economic, etc) is also an actuality. 
As such, it comes with its own virtualities, that is, further potentials in its embedded 
actuality. Such potential is necessarily invisible before the unintended effect itself is 
actualized. Once it is actualized, however, the further potential becomes revealed; like any 
case of virtuality, it is not a potential without an actualized presence. However, there is no 
guarantee that its mere presence will lead into a trajectory. In line with the argument from 
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Chapter 4, whether the further potential of the unintended effect is actualized will itself 
be co-dependent on the embeddedness of the unintended effect itself, that is, the 
situational factors it finds itself among. To exemplify this in somewhat simpler, binary 
terms, let us say that an unintended effect of a technological action has only two possible 
outcomes; it prospers, or it disappears. None of these alternatives existed as potentials 
until the unintended effect was itself actualized; they were revealed as potentials in the 
actualization of the unintended effect. In other words, we need to disengage the 
technological action from its, intended or unintended, effect, and regard it as an actualization 
on its own terms. Consequently, which potential (to prosper/to disappear) is realized will 
depend on the embeddedness of the actuality of the unintended effect; that is, how the 
unintended effect is received.1 Of course, most developments involve far more complex 
potentials than this binary example exhibits, but it nonetheless demonstrates the non-
determinist dynamics between a technological action, its effect, and the effect’s 
virtualities. 
Lee Sproull and Sara Kiesler capture this complex developmental trajectory nicely. They 
claim that communication technology has two kinds of effect; one related to its planned 
effects, which they call ‘first-level effects’, such as efficiency or productivity gains, and a 
‘second-level effect’, which “come about primarily because new communication 
technology leads people to pay attention to different things, have contact with different 
people, and depend on one another differently”. (Sproull & Kielser 1993:4) The result of 
the second-level effect is an entire change in the social system (as we have seen in 
connection with the introduction of the alphabet and the invention of the movable type 
printing press). As Sproull and Kielser recognize, the second-level effect is hard to 
foresee. Because such effects are hard or nearly impossible to foresee, “inventors and 
early adopters are likely to emphasize the planned uses and [to] underestimate the second-
level effects”. (Sproull & Kielser 1993:7-8) This means that the second-level 
consequences are slow to emerge, and only as “people renegotiate changed patterns of 
behaviour and thinking”. (Sproull & Kielser 1993:8) 
It is therefore not a matter of regarding the impact that second-level effects have on the 
society as being caused by the technologies, but rather as, in my terms, being afforded by the 
                                              
1 Such processes are thoroughly investigated for instance by the social constructivists mentioned in Chapter 2. How 
anything develops, brought about unintended or not, is subject to all kinds of influence, especially obvious currently 
are commercial considerations and market forces, see for instance Postrel (1990) on the dead-end quadraphonic 
sound technology of the seventies. 
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technologies; the realization of such effects requires an active renegotiating society. 
Without this process, second-level effects would go unnoticed (and therefore not be 
effects at all…). Sproull and Kielser find an example of this in the introduction of the 
typewriter, whose first-level effects was to produce letters that had the same virtues as 
printed letters (readability, likeness from token to token, etc). For this reason, the target 
group was clergymen and writers. An unanticipated second-level effect, however, was 
soon seen in the world of business. 
Before typewriters, male assistants who were learning the trade performed clerical duties. 
With the new technology, clerical opportunities increased, and typewriters became a safe 
and respectable occupation for young women. The typewriter greatly expanded paperwork, 
specialization of office work, and sharp demarcations of status between typists and their 
male bosses. (Sproull & Kielser 1991:6) 
 
Many of the effects of the internet can be regarded as second-level effects, the falling 
circulation of newspapers, for instance, or the widespread dependence of the Internet as a 
trustworthy source for medical information.1 Through being online, we act and lead our 
lives differently, and it is the effects of our actions (for instance, changed habits in seeking 
out news) that lead to the second-level effects. Our actions, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, is a result of not just the technology, but also of the embedded, socially and 
physically, self. Sproull and Kiesler’s understanding of how second-level effects take hold 
is therefore comparable to, and clarifies brilliantly, what I said above concerning the 
necessity of a) embedded actualization, and b) the co-constitution of a possible further 
trajectory. 
However, sometimes an effect of a technology (or more precisely a technological action) 
can seem very strong, almost inevitable. The invention of the atom bomb, for instance, 
played a principal role in starting the cold war, and surely, the cold war can be seen as an 
unintended consequence of the atomic technology. Moreover, the atomic technology 
appears as decisive in the unfolding of the cold war. However, it cannot be regarded as a 
necessary consequence of the atom bomb itself, but because the bomb showed up at the 
                                              
1 According to a report prepared by Pew Internet and American Life Project, “[r]eliance on the Internet is so 
prevalent… that ‘Google is the de facto second opinion’ for patients seeking further information after a diagnosis”. 
Patients collect information about alternative treatments, about possible side effects of various drugs related to the 
disease, etc. Internet is for not only information purposes, but also enables patients to encounter other patients with 
similar illnesses; experiences are exchanged, updates on the reactions to the treatment, and replies on these, are 
posted. Apparently, the information found online (by the experienced ‘googler’) is increasingly trustworthy. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/health/30online.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&ref=technology&adx
nnlx=1222777195-IFeMS3IBsekaEX0WfuxMhA [02.01.2009] 
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time that it did (a techno-scientific development with its own social situatedness), it did 
have this effect. What role would the atom bomb have played in the post-war period if 
the communist revolution of 1917 in Russia never had happened (all other factors being 
equal)? The actuality of the atom bomb had the cold war as a very strong virtuality, but it 
had this virtuality only because of how its actuality was embedded. 
In this case, we can also see why a so-called technologically determined trajectory might 
stop, change or become altered in any way: its embeddedness changes. Even though the 
atom bomb and adjacent technologies had not disappeared by the late eighties (quite the 
opposite!), the socio-political climate in which this technology was embedded made it 
possible for the USA and the Soviet union to find ways of co-existing with the other 
superpower having the atom bomb without being engaged in a cold war. According to 
Langdon Winner, the atom bomb is ‘a special case’ in the extent that it intrinsically 
requires a large authoritarian political system of intense rigidity to be constructed around 
it. (1986:34) If the atom bomb, then, cannot be said to determine the course of its own 
trajectory, what foundation is there for conceiving other kinds of technologies (or, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, technology itself), as involving determinism?  
For more personal-level technologically related unintended consequences such as 
surprising side effects of medication the case is comparable. Such side effects might not 
be stopped by an embedded social or personal choice, but are not for that reason 
technologically determined; how they are treated, remedied, enhanced and neutralized, is 
never a purely medico-technological decision, but are embedded in a network of ethical, 
economic, family related and personal considerations. As in the case of the atom bomb, 
the technological influence is undoubtedly strong, but the overall reaction of the course 
of things’ development, as in the case of the cold war, should always be seen as 
embedded. Strong or weak technological influence, it is never a case of all-or-nothing. 
And this makes it pertinent that we really understand what ‘technological influence’ 
actually means. 
Anything that we label a technological effect is, as I discussed in Chapter 4, a trajectory. 
As such, it is under influence all along its developmental course; any effect is itself an 
actuality with its own potentiality, revealed and constrained by both social and 
technological factors. The course from the invention of the movable type printing press 
to the Reformation will involve a huge number of such actuality/virtuality points in time. 
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Seen this way, Protestantism was no more an effect of the printing press than the first 
Bibles that Gutenberg printed were effects of the printing press. Although the material 
items, the actual Bibles, had widely ranging short- and long-term effects they also had a 
content without which there would be no material Bibles, and without which the potential 
of printed Bibles to elicit change would not exist. The printing press enabled mass 
production, yes, but without a ‘social desire’ to mass-produce, to sell and an audience to 
read them, Bibles would not have been distributed in the way they were. Therefore, we 
need to regard the social function and role that the content of the Bibles had into the 
complex development towards the Reformation. The content and its social significance 
(including the Church’s political and economic standing) must also be taken into account 
as a player, or, in this dissertation’s terminology, as a co-constituent of the process leading 
up to the Reformation. 
However, we should not forget that it is just as evident that how the very same content 
was received and perceived differed before and after the printing and subsequent 
distribution, and this, I contend, is understandable only in the light of the (new) 
technological aspect that had entered the praxis of reproducing the biblical text. Levinson 
calls his form for determinism soft (in a slightly different sense from what Marx and Roe 
Smith do, see above), claiming that this, at least for electronic communication 
technologies, “entails an interplay between the information technology making something 
possible, and human beings turning that possibility into a reality”. (Levinson 1997:4) 
There is clearly an affinity between this statement and my thoughts about the 
interdependent relation between technologies and us, only I do not see this as a case of 
determinism, hard or soft, only as co-constitutional. Levinson does right, though, I think, 
in calling his own theory determinist, because he lacks the investigation into the relation 
between actuality and virtuality that can shed a light on the dynamics between the 
technological potential and the human or social interpretational activity that turns a virtual 
impact into an actual impact. Without such considerations, Levinson’s theory continues to 
be determinist because the actualizations of virtualities remain shrouded. Consequently, 
the softness of the determinism is only stated, and not explicated. A case in point is his 
already mentioned list of events he claimed to be caused by the printing press. 
Another example of the non-determinist relation between an omnipresent technology and 
society is worth mentioning. This one is not about the mediation of a content, but about 
the developmental trajectory of a specific technology. Although its roots can be traced 
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back to military research, an institution not primarily known for its openness, the Internet 
has developed mainly out of the development of open source software. The originator of 
open source software usually encourages others to continue to work on the product so 
that it constantly is refined and re-defined by others than its originator(s). Networks based 
on open source software and protocols can link to each other, both technically (because 
the codes are open) and because the networks are not owned by anyone. Networks based 
on open source software resulted in continuously growing and connecting networks in 
the 1970’s and 1980’s.1 This ‘open’ development was possible, Manuel Castells contends, 
because “all key technological developments that led to the Internet were built around 
government institutions, major universities, and research centers”. (Castells 2001:22) 
Network technology was mostly of interest to researchers and computer enthusiasts, and 
had little or no commercial potential at that point in time; even the most visionary could 
not find any commercial potential in networks that not yet were privatized. 2 
Consequently, the networks that formed the early Internet grew largely unhindered by 
questions of patents, ownership and rights that private and commercial interests 
necessarily would have resulted in, and which probably would have ‘closed off’ or altered 
fundamentally the developmental trajectory leading to the Internet as we know it today 
(FULL of commercial interests, granted, but also much more). The development of the 
Internet can therefore be said to be based on a culture that promoted openness: “the 
Internet developed in a secure environment, provided by public resources and mission-
oriented research, but an environment that did not stifle freedom of thinking and 
innovation”. (Castells 2001:23) Whatever the Internet as a technology affords, in terms of 
political, economic, religious, scientific actions and communications, the openness itself, 
Castells claims, is a socially governed phenomenon. (2001:38) Without network 
technology having shown up in a milieu characterized by openness, the Internet, as we 
know it, might not have happened. This little example, which is far more complex than I 
have reviewed it here, shows how important it is to look at both the affordance and the 
social reception of a technology when charting its development and its social significance. 
I think we now can conclude that the impact on society from communication 
technologies is conspicuous, but nonetheless, there are few reasons to accept this as 
                                              
1 In October 1994, relatively early in the ‘Internet age’, the Internet already consisted of more than 45.000 smaller 
networks. (Negroponte 1995:181) 
2 Privatization of the Internet did not happen until the 1990’s (Shah & Kesan 2007), and early efforts in trying to 
earn money “did not pan out” because companies did not know how to approach the networked communities of the 
1970’s in a profitable way. (Dertouzos 1997:32f) 
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indicating technological determinism. As medium, communication technologies influence 
what is mediated in a number of ways, how it is made known, how it is received, how its 
content has its own effects and how its content is interpreted, but without anything being 
mediated, communication technologies would not do us much good. What is being put 
through the medium might be shaped by the medium, perhaps even profoundly, but the 
medium is not the message – not even the message is the (whole) message. Taking the 
relation between the actuality and the virtuality of a communication technology seriously 
means that the message is co-constituted by itself and its medium; there are not two 
independent levels here, medium and content, the levels are interdependent.  
Overstating technological presence  
As we can see, the determinism in medium theory follows because certain characteristics 
of communication technologies are ‘retrieved’ in the structure of the societies, without 
much more argumentation than merely pointing to the presence of said technologies. 
This is for instance implied in Meyrowitz’ criticism of McLuhan: Even if no causal impact 
is proposed per se, not showing how communication technologies influence society, the 
relation between technology and society remains unclear. (Meyrowitz 1985:3) Regardless 
of how the relation in fact is perceived, as long as the relation remains vague, ambiguous 
and under-developed, critics will object on grounds of determinism. However, as it turns 
out, Meyrowitz’ own, rather more complex, analysis of how communication technologies 
influence society does not escape determinist implications either. Not by ignoring the 
specifics, but by overstating the impact of the sheer presence of technology on society. 
This, I claim, is due to a less than satisfying account of how a society puts a certain 
technology into practice. 
What Meyrowitz finds missing in McLuhan is a clear explanation of why people behave 
differently when surrounded by different kinds of technology. Although, in Meyrowitz’ 
view, McLuhan correctly points to the need to study the communication technologies, his 
analyses “do not form a clear set of propositions to explain the means through which 
media reshape specific behaviours”. (Meyrowitz 1985:22) But this is precisely what is 
required if medium theory is to show how communication technologies in fact do 
influence society. According to Meyrowitz, what communication technologies do is to 
create new situations for behaviour, especially concerning the relation between what he 
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calls ‘backstage’ behaviour and ‘onstage’ behaviour. (Meyrowitz 1985:291) The theatre-
metaphor is deliberate; in behaving publicly, we perform certain roles that are in 
accordance with public expectations. This means that we do not only play a role when we 
pretend to be something we are not; also a real doctor plays the role of ‘a doctor’, nor that 
our public life is a charade. Performing a role is a necessary part of any social behaviour, 
and each one of us puts on a number of onstage behaviour during the day: the concerned 
parent, the ill-tempered boss, the well-behaved driver, the curious shopper, the romantic 
boyfriend, etc. etc. 
Seeing our public behaviour in terms of onstage behaviour emphasizes that, “role 
performances are necessary for the ordinary and smooth flow of social life. In any given 
interaction, we need to know what to expect of each other”. (Meyrowitz 1985:28) This is 
at least handy because it “may take years to know a person fully, to understand the true 
complexities of a particular social situation, or to learn how a given group of people 
function in a specific social institution or establishment. And yet most social interactions 
require instant judgments, alignments, and action.” (Meyrowitz 1985:29) Consequently, 
we use roles (and corresponding behaviour, clothes, gestures, and tool use) to ensure that 
our daily onstage social behaviour runs smoothly. There is an interesting parallel to 
Heidegger’s analysis of readiness-to-hand here. Heidegger underlined how the flow of the 
practical activity stops when the tool breaks down (cf. Chapter 3). Meyrowitz seems to say 
that the flow of social behaviour also would break down if the roles were not performed 
in line with public expectations; instead of being tools for social interaction, social 
behaviour that does not conform to expectations elicit wholly different social discourses 
than usual encounters.2 In addition, if we recall the discussion of Das Man from the 
previous chapter, it is likely that if we did not perform our behaviour along such lines, we 
would not know how to behave at all.3 
What takes us from backstage to onstage behaviour (or from one onstage behaviour to 
another) is down to what arena we operate in. For instance, in entering the staff room, a 
teacher goes from an onstage behaviour to a backstage behaviour, where instead of being 
surrounded by pupils he is among fellow teachers. The teachers are ‘hidden’ from the 
                                              
1 Meyrowitz borrows both the expressions and the concepts from Goffman (1959), but elaborates on these in ways 
that I will go into. (1985:46ff) 
2 Please bear in mind that this is not meant to be read like a plea for conformity; challenging social roles of course 
can have a value in of its own.  
3 Such kind of analysis is not to be found in Meyrowitz, although he hints at something close to it, see 1985:31. 
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pupils, and can behave differently, less ‘teacher-like’, and also talk about the pupils in 
different terms than if any pupils were present. The same goes for all professions where 
one meets clients/customers/relations but have an arena to retreat to, with or without 
colleagues. Such examples show that there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
onstage/backstage and public/private. The teacher in the staff room still performs an 
onstage behaviour compared to, say, being in the presence of his closest family, but in the 
situation of being at school, the line between onstage and backstage goes at the entrance 
to the staff room. This goes to show that what constitutes the arenas in which we 
perform backstage or onstage behaviour is who it is that has access to our behaviour. 
(Meyrowitz 1985:33) For this reason, Meyrowitz regards the means for access to be central 
for whom we are in society with, and how we are in society with them. Society is constituted 
by the kinds of interactions going on inside of it, and those who have access to our 
behaviours constitute those interactions, of either a backstage or an onstage kind.  
The role of communication technologies here is of enabling new or redefining old arenas, 
for backstage and onstage behaviour, and/or introducing different borders between 
backstage and onstage behaviour. In the teacher example above, the teachers were 
physically hidden from the pupils, and this physical obstacle constituted the 
onstage/backstage border. However, a piece of communication technology, for instance a 
24/7 webcam, breaks down such a border, giving pupils online access to what goes on in 
the staff room should they be interested.1 This is why, as we saw above, Meyrowitz 
prefers ‘patterns of information’ as a more basic constitution of society than physical 
presence; yes, we have access to those physically present, but also those at the other end 
of a telephone line, or in front of a computer. As implied earlier, ‘information’ is here 
viewed broadly, as social information, which includes “all that people are capable of 
knowing about the behaviour and actions of themselves and others”. (Meyrowitz 1985:37) 
This concept of information, of course, is tailored to access as a basic constituent of 
society, as information, through mediating technologies, can be gathered without being in 
the physical presence of others, or of clues of others. 
As ‘information-systems’ rather than physical settings, a society’s set of social situations can 
be modified without building of removing walls and corridors… The introduction and 
                                              
1 I cannot discuss Meyrowitz’ argumentation in full, but he does paint a much more complex picture of how onstage 
behaviours develop, the interplay between onstage and backstage behaviour, the relation between personality and 
various types of onstage and backstage behaviour, and so on, than I have explained here. In general, he holds that all 
onstage behaviour depends on a multiplicity of both onstage and backstage behaviours. (Meyrowitz 1985:50) 
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widespread use of a new medium may restructure a broad range of situations and require 
new sets of social performances. (Meyrowitz 1985:41) 
 
As already mentioned, Meyrowitz argues from a viewpoint where TV, radio and 
stationary telephones were the foremost electronic communication devices. Nevertheless, 
the later year’s ICTs have demonstrated the validity of his claims, or so Richard Cutler 
argues in discussing cyberspace technologies; an argument much in line with Meyrowitz’: 
First, adopting the new communication technologies results in changed social situations. 
Second, with the changed social context comes a widening range of possible relationships. 
Third, changed relationships results in new social roles. New links among society’s 
members are unconstrained by the usual boundaries of space, place, or even time. 
(1996:318) 
 
To sum up Meyrowitz’ argument, new technologies create and redefine arenas for 
interaction. Such arenas require new patterns of social behaviour, which subsequently 
changes what society is and how it is constituted. Consequently, medium theory’s task, to 
display how communication technologies influence and change society, is done by 
showing how communication technologies influence types of behaviour. Shared 
experiences, belonging to groups of varying size, once meant being in the same place, but 
this notion is long since obsolete; having access to experiences through mediating 
technologies means that others, in other places, also have access to the same mediated 
experiences. It is just as natural to be ‘with’ people that we might never even have seen, as 
with someone who just happens to be nearby. (Meyrowitz 1985:56f) Although this was 
true for manuscripts and other written and printed materials, cyberspace technologies 
have turned out to be extremely efficient in connecting people that have had, or want to 
have similar experiences. (Cutler 1996:321f) Communities abound, for good and for 
worse.1 
Obviously, a very strong link between the sheer presence of the technology in question 
and the changing behaviour that ensue is proposed in medium theory. Meyrowitz warns, 
though, that the “shared meanings of situations develop over time and through social 
traditions” (1985:39), citing religion, social conventions and legal concerns as important in 
                                              
1 A study of how having an extensive ‘net-life’ influence one’s self-confidence, feeling of loneliness and social anxiety 
compared to face-to-face encounters, concludes, rather meta-theoretically, that we now should put conclusions of 
‘main effects’ behind us, and realize that effects of internet interactions are as diverse as the ‘internet user’, a non-
homogenous group indeed. (McKenna & Seidman 2006:279) The reason for this is obvious, we are not passive users 
of the net, but “actively shape its use and influence.” (McKenna & Seidmann 2006:291) 
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that respect. However, such aspects can only be important for an already outlined 
situation, that is, an already defined pattern of information flow: 
[W]hile the social ‘scripts’ develop through many sources, appropriate ‘stages’ are necessary 
for the social dramas to be performed. If the settings for situations merge, divide, or 
disappear, then it will be impossible to maintain the old definitions of the situations. 
(Meyrowitz 1985:39) 
In other words, constituting the situation, the points of access, comes prior to, or at least, 
has priority to, the actual behaviour being performed in them. This makes, the way I see 
it, Meyrowitz as much of a determinist as McLuhan. Even though his analysis is more 
comprehensive on how communication technologies influence society through behaviour, 
Meyrowitz still considers the sheer presence of technologies to be the eliciting point of 
departure in social change.  
Although reluctant to draw the same optimistic conclusion from the new access afforded 
by electronic communication technologies, Danish social scientist Lars Qvortrup basically 
accepts the same definition of society as Meyrowitz, that society is founded on 
communicative interactions so that we are, in a sense, in society with those we are able to 
communicate with. (Qvortrup 2003:12, 126) Logistical and other practical problems 
aside1 , ‘access equals communication’ is in Qvortrup’s mind a naïve notion of what 
communication involves. Contrary to what Meyrowitz (and Cutler) seems to believe, 
communication is not achieved through access (or, in Qvortrup’s term, ‘observation’) in 
itself; availability does not necessarily mean interaction, and even less, successful or 
friendly interaction. 2  Availability might be a necessary part of communication (and 
therefore, also for ‘society’), but is far from sufficient.  
Qvortrup finds in such theories 3  a view of communication that is similar to the 
mathematical theory of communication of Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver. As a 
                                              
1 The huge growth in access due to, for instance, the Internet, leads to the very practical problem of how to deal with 
all the potential information (what is spam, what is important and what is merely noise). Dertouzos, for instance, 
likens to e-mail to opening the front door to one’s house and inviting everybody in whenever they wish with a 
promise to see and hear them out. (Dertouzos 1997:91) Qvortrup dubs this the complexity problem, which displays 
the two-sidedness of electronic communication technologies, as they are both the source for the complexity problem 
and the remedy (spam-filters, better search engines etc.). (2003:9) Tenner would call the complexity problem a 
revenge effect of the technology (cf. Chapter 4). Dreyfus presents a pessimistic view on the complexity of the World 
Wide Web. Organizing it through hyperlinks will make it impossible (in Dreyfus mind) to find the most relevant, 
most useful and the best information because this way of organizing information will eventually make us loose the 
abilities that enables us to find it presently, namely the ability to recognize relevance. (2001:8ff) 
2 And I will not even discuss social and political problems of cross-cultural communication, which of course is 
another aspect when all the world, in principle, is available to us through electronic communication technologies. 
3 Qvortrup does not discuss Meyrowitz, but mentions Negroponte and Dertouzos. 
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model of human communication, this theory is disapproved.1 However, as a model for 
what technical challenges one faces in building communication systems, it is well suited, as 
it outlines the basic components of such a system (source, transmitter, channel, receiver, 
destination) and the potential obstacles in getting a signal as unharmed as possible from 
one end to the other. For technical systems, the main challenge is about noise, 
interferences on and distortions of the signal as it travels from the transmitter to the 
receiver. For human communication, the challenges are of a different kind, and are related 
to that of understanding, not of transmission. If we are to interact, mediated or not, it is 
crucial that those who communicate understand each other. I can hear or read what 
another person utters perfectly without this guaranteeing that I understand him; 
understanding is not something that is transferred from one ‘head’ to another, neither is it 
re-constructed in the other’s head if only he can hear or see the words (and gestures) 
right. If communication were guaranteed through access, there would be no 
misunderstandings and no ambiguities in face-to-face encounters, right? Obviously, that is 
not the case; communication, and understanding, is an effort, also for non-mediated 
communication. There is a long tradition in communication studies for criticising the 
transfer model of communication, and I shall not re-hash neither the theory itself nor the 
criticisms,2 but a few remarks seem appropriate as they turn on what I said above relating 
to the interdependent view of communication technologies. 
Qvortrup finds an alternative model of communication in what James W. Carey has 
dubbed the ritual view. Rather than being about transmission, or even about 
understanding per se, communication is considered to be about the establishing and 
stabilizing of a shared context, and ultimately about the maintenance of society. It is 
directed “not [towards] the act of imparting information but the representation of shared 
beliefs”. (Carey 1989:18) Accordingly, the term of communication is less linked to the 
concept of transmission than it is to “terms such as ‘sharing,’ ‘participation,’ ‘association,’ 
‘fellowship,’ and ‘the possession of common faith.’” (Carey 1989:18) Communication, 
therefore, is not so much about conveying new and surprising information, as it is about 
the upholding of community. This is supported by research indicating that communication 
usually does not involve new information, or the enlightenment of listeners/readers, but 
is about the creation and reinforcement of already existing relations. “The media thus 
                                              
1 Famously, this is a theory that grew out of two separate papers, Shannon 1948 and Weaver 1949, and is not a 
jointly proposed theory. As a theory of human communication, Weaver is closer than the more modest Shannon is. 
2 These can be found in most introductory books to communication studies such as Fiske 1990. 
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function as did gossip in the traditional local community: They increase the probability of 
successful communication in society by increasing its redundancy.” (Qvortrup 2003:126) 
In this sense, communication has phatic qualities: it is more about the reaffirming and 
strengthening of communicative ties than enlarging the potential arena for 
communication. (Fiske 1990:14) Of course, this is not to claim that the phatic dimension is 
all that communication is, but this aspect should not be underestimated, as it in turn is 
highly important for the success of other forms of communication through the same 
medium in that it involves generating trust in and closeness to those one interacts with. 
Furthermore, phatic communication increases one’s competence and one’s confidence in 
the medium itself, which has effects for other uses of the medium. Thus, other forms for 
communication (traditionally easier classifiable as just that), from the spreading of news 
big and small, updating about one’s projects or interests, or, to use a recent example from 
Barack Obama’s groundbreaking use of the Web in the US election 2008, to entice people 
to participate in the election,1 are facilitated. Contrary to Dreyfus’ complaints that relating 
to people merely through the Web endanger our sense of commitment towards one 
another (2001:73-89), the ritual view of communication implies that such commitment 
very well can arise from interacting with others through the net, for instance through 
online communities such as Second Life, or online games such as World of Warcraft.2 
Clearly (although Qvortrup does not make a notice of this), the ritual model is not so 
much about the communicative act as such, but concerns a level above actual acts of 
communication; it is about the function of communication. Consequently, the 
transmission model is not refuted by the ritual model (Carey 1989:21f), but designates a 
subset of the actual communicative actions that are performed. However, the ritual model 
does imply a different approach to the communicative acts as well, as it calls attention to 
the fact that the origin of communication is outside the actual act itself, and therefore also 
outside the need to convey something. What does that mean? Walter Ong puts it this way: 
“In real human communication, the sender has to be not only in the sender position but 
also in the receiver position before he or she can send anything… what I say depends on 
what reality or fancy I feel I am talking into, that is, on what possible responses I might 
                                              
1 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/deadlineusa/2008/nov/05/uselections20082 [02.01.2009] 
2 Considering the recentness of such phenomena, it is only to be expected that one is concerned with the potential 
dangers connected with them, for instance the impact of overplaying on school performance. 
(http://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/2008/02/06/526089.html [02.01.2009]) However, research about positive social 
aspects of this kind of ‘online life’ is also emerging. (Ducheneaut & Moore 2004, McKenna & Seidman 2006) See 
also http://www.forskning.no/artikler/2008/mai/182305 [02.01.2009] 
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anticipate.” (1982:176) We take into consideration personal (adult, child, well-read, 
illiterate, shy, outgoing, etc.) and social (what kind of situation) aspects, not to mention all 
those non-verbal aspects accompanying our communiqué. In a sense that is more than 
trivial, we are already in a communicative situation with the other(s) before any words are 
uttered at all: “I can be in touch perhaps through past relationships, by an exchange of 
glances, by an understanding with a third person who has brought me and my 
interlocutor together, or in any of countless other ways.” (Ong 1982:176) In this sense, 
words modify the communication rather than create it. Even an author writing a text 
must fictionalize readers. If not, Ong asks, why write at all? (1982:177)  
With the ritual view in mind, the sheer presence of communication technology only 
marks the beginning of communication. Communication as an action is a virtuality of the 
technology, but its actualization is not by that guaranteed, as we now have seen. 
Consequently, we cannot say that we are in society as a result of communication 
technologies, and for that reason neither say that society changes because of that 
technology. As Qvortup puts it, “the mass media’s common world is not constructed ’by’ 
the media and then imposed on recipients. It is formatted in a network of public actors, 
media technologies, media institutions, and audiences, in which all parties contribute 
actively”. (2003:126) This, however, should not be taken as a clue to just brush the 
technological aspect aside; the presence of communication technologies is highly 
suggestive of the ways communications are performed, and, as we have discussed in this 
chapter, in whom we can communicate with. But being able to communicate with 
different persons than the generation before does not necessarily mean that the processes 
and activities constituting communication are different with respect to how understanding 
is achieved and what the communication does to us, as individuals and as society. 
In closing 
In this chapter, I have tried to convey the sense in which communication technologies 
influence the possibilities, the constraints, and the manners of how we relate to each other. I 
have argued that communication technologies afford a certain society rather than 
determine it. Technology, intersubjectivity and selves are interdependent, they constitute a 
system; change one of the parameters and you will create the potential for a change in the 
overall system. This could have been explored from various perspectives, of course, the 
reason why I have discussed how changes in communication technologies affect such changes 
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to the system can be seen as accidental. Consequently, to emphasize this one last time, 
this is not to say that the technology determines the shape of society, but it is a way of 
mapping the changes in society related to the technological presence. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
C O N C L U D I N G  R E M A R K S  
 
 
 
 
 
The concept of technology developed in this thesis primarily concerns the opening up of 
possibilities through living in a technologically permeated lifeworld. The title of the thesis, 
‘The Primacy of Action’, points to its two main findings: Firstly, that the primordial 
structures in all our relating to the lifeworld must be understood in terms of embedded 
technological actions (cf. Chapters 3 and 4). Secondly, that the possibilities for actions 
granted through technological presence – what amounts to our practical space – co-
constitute what we are, as individuals as well as social groups (cf. Chapter 6). With respect 
to the constitutive role of technology, I have made no distinction between simple tools 
like chairs and advanced technologies like genetic engineering. However, even if general, 
the concept of technology advanced here avoid the claim that there is a uniform essence to 
technology. Contrary to the dilemma emerging from the technological analysis of ‘the 
later’ Heidegger (cf. Chapter 1), my concept does not prevent us from “discriminat[ing] 
between electricity and atom bombs, agricultural techniques and the Holocaust”. 
(Feenberg 1999:187) Indeed, the concept here emphasizes precisely the manner in which 
the specifics of particular technologies make a difference. It is only by virtue of the way that 
particular technologies enter into and co-define concrete use-contexts that technologies 
take on their co-constitutional role. Therefore, the concept of technology proposed here 
2 7 6   T H E  P R I M A C Y  O F  A C T I O N  
is, in a certain sense, ‘empty’ in that it is concerned primarily with the general constraints 
and possibilities that come with technological presence. As such, it sets the conceptual 
and philosophical framework for further empirical investigations into the workings of 
particular technologies. The ‘emptiness’ of this concept should not, however, be taken to 
mean that technologies are in any way transparent. Quite the opposite, one of my main 
points is that technologies have real societal impact, while at the same time underlining that 
they do not determine the trajectory this impact might come to have.  
This is the sense in which the thesis answered the third research question, concerning how 
technology has an impact. Introductorily, this was posed as the specific question (cf. page 7). 
In so doing, I have also answered, implicitly and affirmatively, the second, more general 
question (cf. page 6): technology is indeed taken to have a philosophically interesting 
impact on society and us. Technology affords actions, affords possibilities, affords 
problems and, through that, affords a lifeworld – but never in-itself. Constituted by 
technology, individual motives, beliefs and competencies, and filtered through social 
praxes, ethics, laws and values, technological actions articulate a lifeworld; a world of both 
‘always already’ structures of meaning and potentials or new structures of meaning. We 
cannot but relate to the lifeworld, and through our actions, we cannot but change it. 
Technologies co-constitute possibilities in virtue of co-constituting what ‘always already’ 
is. 
It is my contention, then, that the way we see our future possibilities, both for ourselves 
as individuals and for ourselves as social beings, is profoundly influenced by technological 
presence. Answering the fourth research question, the reflective question (cf. page 7) 
concerning the relation of technology to our self-concept, I claim that we are primarily 
constituted by what we can become. We are not only what we have been and presently 
are; more critically, we are what we envision ourselves to become. In other words, 
technologies co-constitute us by influencing both our actuality and our possibilities. In 
this way, the specific and the reflective questions form a unified approach to the question 
of technology rather than two separate investigations. 
The way technology has been conceptualized in this thesis, then, emphasizes the 
importance of doing empirical investigations into particular technologies. Such an 
empirical study is, however, not what I have provided. This thesis develops, rather, a 
conceptual framework for studies of the empirical kind, and thus serves as a methodology 
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for these kinds of studies. As such, the concept of technology developed in this thesis 
illuminates the research question that served as the thesis’ point of departure (cf. page 6). 
Investigations into the societal impact of particular communication technologies easily 
appear determinist if not anchored in a methodology that explicitly rejects such 
determinism (cf. Chapter 7). But this notwithstanding, such a rejection has to be 
undertaken with the greatest of care, so as not to imply that technologies have no 
philosophically interesting impact at all (but is, at best, a mere indistinguishable part of a 
larger social development). Instead of tracking down the prime causal factor in 
technologically related social changes, an adequate approach to any particular technology 
should frame technology and society as interdependent. The aim of this thesis has been to 
provide such a framework. 
A further perspective 
The discussion of the constitutive and articulative role of technology touches upon a 
more general question of meaning, especially through the two-fold manner in which we 
find ourselves: thrown into an ‘always already’ structured lifeworld and at the same time 
projected towards the horizons of open possibilities. Meaning and potential for meaning 
are key notions in our general being in the world, not just concerning ‘technological 
being’. Focusing on any political, social, economic and religious aspect of our lifeworld 
will therefore involve this two-foldedness. In this sense, language, non-technological 
praxes and social institutions are also organizing aspects of our lifeworld, that is, aspects that 
‘always already’ articulate the lifeworld according to their own specifics, and through that, 
afford re-organizing measures. This thesis, therefore, also contributes to a more general 
investigation into meaning per se. 
More precisely, it does this through its concern with understanding; with the way that we 
create the meanings through which we navigate in our thrownness. Understanding is not 
the result of a sole cognitive or interpretational act; it emerges from our embedded 
actions. In our embeddedness, understanding depends on external structures of meaning, 
structures we use to scaffold the way we perceive and comprehend the world. 
Understanding thus emerges from an interplay of internal cognitive acts and external 
meaningful structures. Only meaning can generate meaning. In this sense, technology 
does not only influence meaning – it is meaning. 
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